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INTRODUCTION
Director onboarding is the process by which an organization facilitates a new director
stepping into the role. It is a means by which an incoming director becomes familiar with their
new surroundings, the organization, their fellow board members, and other organization leaders.
As such, it is an inherently personal experience that has always necessitated face-to-face
interaction, whether it takes place in the boardroom and adjacent offices, company retreats, or
happy hours. Until 2020, tried-and-true onboarding methods functioned effectively, and there
was no reason to reimagine the onboarding process as a potentially virtual procedure.
Unfortunately, the novel coronavirus brought about unprecedented and confusing circumstances,
and organizations worldwide were forced to shift their entire business platforms online with little
or no time to prepare.
In the COVID-19 era, it is increasingly apparent that traditional business models are
simply impossible to maintain, and proven methods of director onboarding are no exception. If
boards wish to integrate new directors and perform as effectively as they had before the
pandemic, they will need to translate their onboarding procedures to an online format. To do so,
organizations must first assess their onboarding procedures to identify their strengths and
weaknesses. To this end, we first must ask: what are the key components of an effective
onboarding program in ideal circumstances?
After the key components of director onboarding before COVID-19 are identified, we
may attempt to translate those components into their online analogs. As we will see, some
components of effective onboarding programs are more easily adaptive to an online format than
others. Moreover, organizations may find that methods used to onboard new directors remotely
are, in fact, less time-consuming and more efficient than traditional, in-person practices. Moving
director onboarding to an online format will include utilizing traditionally pedagogical methods
paired with online data sharing applications, as well as using services such as Zoom to stay
connected through informal, community-building events.
The pandemic has thrown traditional business practice into disarray. Onboarding organizers
should see this as an opportunity to rethink and reshape their onboarding practices. Even after
business returns to a state of normalcy, onboarding organizers can employ online techniques to
be more efficient and better equipped to handle unforeseen circumstances. Shifting the
perspective from a state of chaos to a chance to refine onboarding practices benefits both current
and future directors and results in a more effective board.
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THE ESSENTIALS OF ONBOARDING

Before determining how to best move onboarding to an online format, the orgnization
must identify key components and best practices of its pre-pandemic director onboarding. In this
section, we identify and outline those practices which should be implemented in any onboarding
program.
Director onboarding typically begins with the organization delivering to the new director as
much tangible information as possible, as quickly as possible, including details on finances,
risks, and business strategies. Informal information, such as details on intangible group dynamics
within the organization itself, must also be conveyed.
The delivery of informal information is illustrative of the socialization process, which is
equally important to the efficacy of the board as is familiarizing new directors with business data
and strategy. Socialization can be achieved through a number of onboarding techniques,
including creating a mentor-mentee system in which a fellow director acts as a mentor for the
incoming director in the first weeks of their employment. Ethical and responsible behavior from
the executive team and onboarding planners will also introduce the new director to board culture,
accelerating their understanding of the organization and making their transition into their role as
smooth as possible.
The third key component of director onboarding is motivation of new directors. This is
perhaps more important now than ever as business moves online and directors work from home.
Motivating incoming directors means maintaining a focus on the organization’s mission by
connecting the mission to the day-to-day goals of the director. Ultimately, the onboarding
process should be designed to motivate the new director to “own” their work, internalize the
organization’s mission, and move toward greater autonomy.

A. Information
At the highest level, directors transform information into value. Therefore, someone
transitioning into a director role must learn to access information in order to create value.1 At the
outset, the director onboarding process should provide enough information about the company to
enable a new director to add value as quickly as possible.2 The starting point for all onboarding
programs should be focused on conveying as much company information to the new director as
possible. Information on how the company operates and their role in the organizational structure
equips an incoming director with the tools necessary to become a valuable member of the board
in the shortest amount of time possible. Without the necessary information, a new director may
be disoriented in their first crucial weeks or months with the board, severely diminishing their
efficacy. In this section, we cover the crucial information that must be conveyed at the outset of
the onboarding process, and methods for conveying the information—the “data dump,”
personally tailored information, and informal information.

1

Mary Driscoll & Michael D. Watkins, Onboarding a New Leader—Remotely, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (May
18, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/05/onboarding-a-new-leader-remotely.
2
New director onboarding, KPMG (2016),
https://boardleadership.kpmg.us/content/dam/boardleadership/en/pdf/2016/new-director-onboarding-strategy.pdf.
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Data Dump

A data or document “dump” is an effective way to ensure that a new director possesses
enough information to adequately familiarize themselves with the company’s tangible
characteristics.3 An initial data dump should include, among other items, any organizational
charts, financial reports, company charters and bylaws, codes of ethics and conduct, strategic
plans and project documentation, and other key corporate policies.4 This is usually accomplished
in the form of a comprehensive package of key documents assembled by an organization’s
secretary or a committee of the board for the incoming director’s review. In a recent survey of
over 200 senior interim executives, 95% stated that access to such information made them more
effective in their first few weeks.5 Furthermore, access to information broadens the incoming
director’s view of the organization and their role in the organizational structure.6 Minutes for the
past few board meetings and all committee meetings, regardless of whether the new director is
assigned to a particular committee or committees, will give the director a more comprehensive
view of the company as they enter their new executive position.7
ii.

Personally Tailored Information

“The best [onboarding] programs are formalized and tailored to take into account the unique
backgrounds, experiences, and expected committee responsibilities of each new director.”8
Onboarding organizers must provide new directors with information on their particular role in
the organization, such as how to administer and manage company policies and programs.9 In this
area, the challenge for any board is to tailor the program to the specific needs of the new director,
as new directors have varying familiarity with the role of the director.10
Onboarding organizers should be mindful of the varying experience levels of incoming
directors. For this reason, onboarding programs may be separated into two tracts to compensate
for a new director’s prior experience, or lack thereof. A program incorporating general training
on the role of the board and its directors may be necessary for first-time directors without
previous board experience.11 The same program may not be necessary, however, for a more
familiar new hire. Some experts suggest that onboarding should be tailored for each individual
board member. This may be the best way to ensure that the board members are aware of their
duties, but may not be feasible for small organizations. At a minimum, most organizations can
3

Driscoll & Watkins, .supra note 3.
Jeff Levinson, Scott Hodgdon & N. Peter Rasmussen, All Aboard! Facing the Challenges of Recruiting and
Onboarding Directors, ACC DOCKET (October 2018),
https://www.accdigitaldocket.com/accdocket/october_2018/MobilePagedArticle.action?articleId=1427564#articleId
1427564.
5
Interim Candidate Questionnaire, SAVANNAH GROUP,
https://savannahgroup.typeform.com/report/Q9PFQz/uYUvkmMrREPwyNhe (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
6
Driscoll & Watkins, supra note 3.
7
Supra note 4.
8
New Director Onboarding: 5 Recommendations for Enhancing Your Program, SPENCERSTUART, at 3 (2018),
https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2018/october/new_director_onboarding_final.pdf.
9
Managing the Employee Onboarding and Assimilation Process, SHRM, https://shrm.org/resourcesandtools/toolsand-samples/toolkits/pages/onboardingandassimilationprocess.aspx?_ga=2.221433439.614587024.1602300895356364448.1602300895 (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
10
Levinson et al., supra note 6.
11
Supra note 10, at 3.
4
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provide the bare necessities for both experienced and inexperienced board members. Legal,
fundraising, ethical, and advocacy responsibilities of the board, as well as any specific matters
over which the particular new director is responsible, should be a main focus of onboarding
programs.12 Additionally, any special roles and responsibilities associated with being a
representative of a particular stakeholder or constituency must be communicated to the incoming
director by senior board members, the executive team, or a combination of the two.13
In order to personally tailor the onboarding process to a new hire, onboarding organizers
already must be familiar with the new hire. To obtain the necessary information, onboarding
organizers should assess the new hire’s experience in the director capacity, their familiarity with
the industry, and any past experience with the company.14 This can be done with relative ease,
and will most likely occur naturally through the interview process and following meetings with
the executive team. Once onboarding organizers understand the incoming director’s level of
experience and familiarity, they will be better equipped to deliver any nuanced or personal
information the director may need, such as the sensitive information covered in the following
section.
iii.

Informal Information

Not everything can be conveyed in documents and binders. Some information—especially
information about key people and relationships—needs to be communicated in more
conversational or subtle ways. A priority for onboarding organizers should be to brief new
directors on information regarding potential company influencers, such as employee
organizations, shareholder activists, institutional investors, and issue-driven investors.15
Understanding the interests of potential influencers and the company’s past interactions with
particular organizations will help a new director contextualize the relationship between the
company and outside sources in the present, as well as identify potential issues in the foreseeable
future.
Informal information may be conveyed casually over happy hour drinks, a cup of coffee, or a
regular lunch meeting. The web of relationships and group dynamics inherent in an organization
can be hard to navigate for any newcomer, and understanding this information is arguably as
critical to the smooth functioning and effectiveness of the organization as the documents and
binders provided in the initial data dump. This process of enculturation in the workplace brings
about the second component of director onboarding—socialization.

B. Socialization
Organizational socialization is the process of quickly familiarizing new employees with an
organization’s practices, culture, and values in order to help them become effective members of
12

Board Roles and Responsibilities, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS,
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/board-roles-and-responsibilities (last visited Nov. 16, 2020).
13
See generally Humphry Hung, Directors’ Roles in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Stakeholder Perspective,
103 J. Bus. Ethics 385, (Oct. 2011).
14
Supra note 10, at 3.
15
David A. Katz & Laura McIntosh, Director Onboarding and the Foundations of Respect, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 29, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/29/director-onboarding-and-thefoundations-of-respect/.
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the professional community.16 Socialization is integral to creating and maintaining a productive
company culture. Even in elaborate onboarding programs, organizations need to be cognizant of
the power of informal interactions between new employees and their peers and superior
officers.17 Here, we discuss three key aspects of socialization that any organization should be
attentive of and should implement in their onboarding program—setting the tone, mentor-mentee
systems, and meetings.
i.

Setting the Tone

Setting the tone in the workplace means to establish a particular atmosphere and character for
the organizational culture.18 When starting a new job, newcomers must not only learn the tasks
and expectations of their work, but must also decipher the unwritten rules and norms of the
company’s culture to achieve membership and a sense of belonging among their peers.19
Incoming directors are no exception. Boards must keep in mind that document sharing and
meetings are not only used to provide new directors with information. Every initial step in the
onboarding process sets the tone of the general ethical atmosphere of the board and company
leadership at the outset of the onboarding program. The board should convene to determine
whether the materials they provide a new director are conveying what is important to the
company.20 Effective onboarding—that which sets the right tone in the boardroom—will produce
board members who merit immediate respect and attention of their new colleagues.21
Onboarding an incoming director necessitates that the tone be set “from the top.” Onboarding
organizers, the executive team, and senior board members can all contribute to setting the tone at
the top through several methods, but consistency and integrity should be central to any
onboarding program and organization. Unethical and dishonest behavior among company leaders
is a quick way to undermine credibility, and it is no way to introduce a new director to company
culture.22 Instead, the executive team and board must clearly communicate their principles,
exude the company’s ethics and values, have a written code of conduct, hold frequent staff
meetings, and engage in informal conversations that communicate and promote the company’s

16

Acendre Talent, Organizational Socialization & How it Impacts Employee Onboarding-Part One, ACENDRE (Oct.
15, 2015), https://www.acendre.com/blog/posts/organizational-socialization-how-it-impacts-employee-onboardingpart-one/.
17
Allison M. Ellis, Sushil S. Nifadkar, Talya N. Bauer & Berrin Erdogan, Your New Hires Won’t Succeed Unless
You Onboard Them Properly, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 20, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/your-new-hires-wontsucceed-unless-you-onboard-them-properly.
18
Jemi Sudhakar, LEADERSHIP IT SETTING THE TONE ALWAYS!!!, LINKEDIN (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/leadership-setting-tone-always-ms-jemi-sudhakar.
19
Russell Korte & Shumin Lin, Abstract, Getting on Board: Organizational Socialization and the Contribution of
Social Capital, 66 HUM. RELS. 407 (2012).
20
Brett Safford, Are You Setting the Right Tone at the Beginning?, COMPLI (May 26, 2016),
https://www.compli.com/blog/are-you-setting-the-right-tone-at-the-beginning/.
21
Katz & Mclntosh, Supra note 17.
22
Michael Coates, Five ways to set the tone from the top, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 12, 2014),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/careers/leadership-lab/five-ways-to-set-the-tone-from-thetop/article17438855/.
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ethics and values.23 In addition, an effective mentorship program helps existing directors transfer
institutional norms to new directors.
ii.

Mentor-Mentee System

A mentor-mentee system in the context of director onboarding means pairing the incoming
director with an experienced peer with whom the new director may confer and consult
throughout the onboarding process.24 It is imperative that the mentor be a peer, and not a superior
in the new director’s chain of command. A near peer will have an immediate understanding of
the new director’s role in the company and onboarding needs.25Mentors provide incoming
directors with context in a situation where the whole picture is necessary to fully understand how
to contribute to the board and company’s success.26 Additionally, mentors can shed light on
cultural and unspoken social norms, broadening the new director’s understanding of the
organization.27
When instituting a mentor-mentee program, onboarding organizers should select
knowledgeable board members who embody the mission and direction of the organization.28
These individuals will be most familiar with the roles and responsibilities the incoming director
will be expected to fulfill. Board members who are enthusiastic, empathetic, and respected in the
organization typically make good mentors.29 Likewise, mentors should possess the skills
necessary for constructive dialogue and feedback with mentees. This prevents the repetition of
“mentee missteps,” or common self-destructive mistakes.30 The role of the mentor in the director
onboarding context means making an important commitment to the acclimation of the incoming
director. The mentor must follow up with the mentee after giving constructive feedback to ensure
the new director fully understands what is expected of them.31
iii.

Meetings

One-on-one meetings with the CEO, CFO, the CRO (Chief Risk Officer or the equivalent),
and the various leaders of departments like HR and Operations are crucial in the initial weeks of
director onboarding.32 Such meetings are valuable socialization tools that inform the new
director about the tone and culture of the organization, the strengths and weaknesses of the
board, and candor of communications between management and the board, and among
23

Tone at the Top, CFI, https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/tone-at-the-top/ (last
visited Oct. 30, 2020).
24
Designing a Mentoring Program for Onboarding, INSALA (Aug. 6 ,2019), https://www.insala.com/blog/designinga-mentoring-program-that-improves-onboarding.
25
Driscoll &Watkins, supra note 3
26
Dawn Klinghoffer, Candice Young, & Dave Haspas, Every New Employee Needs an Onboarding "Buddy", HARV.
BUS. REV. (June 6, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/06/every-new-employee-needs-an-onboarding-buddy.
27
Id.
28
Penny Loretto, Top Qualities of a Good Professional Mentor, THE BALANCE CAREERS (May 2, 2017),
https://www.thebalancecareers.com/top-qualities-of-a-good-mentor-1986991.
29
Id.
30
Vineet Chopra & Sanjay Saint, 6 Things Every Mentor Should Do, HARV. BUS. REV. (March 29, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/03/6-things-every-mentor-should-do.
31
Being Intentional with Your Mentoring Time, MENTORLOOP, https://mentorloop.com/blog/intentional-mentoringtime/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
32
Supra note 10.
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directors.33 These one-on-one meetings are necessarily formal, but informal get-togethers with
the full board have their place in introducing the new director to boardroom dynamics, board
culture, and the backgrounds and perspectives of other directors.34
Senior board members and executives should encourage the incoming director to attend all
committee meetings, regardless of the incoming director’s particular area of focus. Some boards
invite new directors to attend all committee meetings during their first year of board service to
help new directors gain a full understanding of the range of issues facing the company.35
Attendance at committee meetings, therefore, familiarizes the new director with their own
committee assignments and provides an introduction to the company and the risks it faces as a
whole.36
Of course, even in the most ideal circumstances, getting individuals to give up time and
energy to attend committee meetings can be a chore. People tend to avoid and disregard
mandatory meetings for a variety of reasons, so having practical means of encouraging meeting
attendance will go a long way in the onboarding process. The easiest, and most obvious method,
is to publish the starting and ending times of the meeting, and make a point of sticking to the
scheduled times.37 Additionally, including a meeting agenda in the same memo or email used to
invite participants to the meeting makes attendees more likely to understand and appreciate their
role at the meeting, and it gives attendees extra time to prepare which makes the actual meeting
progress smoothly and quickly.38 Encouraging active meeting engagement generally comes
down to using different means of motivating new directors, but attendance is the bare minimum.
The real goal is active participation. In the next section, we explore ways in which onboarding
organizers can proactively motivate new directors through the duration of the onboarding
process, producing active participation and the most effective director performance.

C. Motivation
Motivation, in the context of director onboarding, means effectuating within the director a
sense of personal identification with the organization’s purpose.39 No matter how thorough an
onboarding program is, a director must be properly incentivized in order to perform effectively.
In the for-profit context, board directors may be substantially motivated by financial gains. This
is not so in the case of non-profit organizations, where it is important to motivate incoming
directors through other factors. However, motivational techniques traditionally found in nonprofit literature can further incentivize for-profit directors, and should be applied both during and
beyond the onboarding process of any organization. In this section, we discuss two motivational
techniques any organization can implement in their onboarding process in order to encourage
director autonomy.
33

Supra note 4.
Supra note 10.
35
Katz & McIntosh, supra note 17.
36
Id.
37
Mary Gormandy White, Ways to Get People to Attend Business Meetings, LOVETOKNOW
https://business.lovetoknow.com/business-operations-corporate-management/ways-get-people-attend-businessmeetings (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
38
Id.
39
Grant MacDonald, Motivating Board Members: It’s Complicated, GOVERNING GOOD (Jan. 16, 2017),
http://www.governinggood.ca/motivating-board-members-its-complicated.
34
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Stay Mission-Oriented

From the outset of the onboarding process, the executive team, onboarding organizers, and
senior board members must clearly identify the organization’s mission for the incoming director.
The executive team must ensure that the new director is aware of how their work contributes to
the mission’s success.40 Moving forward, the mission should be central to all board meetings,
programs, and policy discussions.41 Involving the new director in as many programs and
activities as possible in the first months of their employment will highlight the mission’s place in
the organization’s day-to-day operations, which will help the director internalize the mission and
apply it to their work moving forward. That said, it is paramount that the mission be articulated
and expressly aligned with the day-to-day work of the board.42
Staying mission-oriented is a concept that is equally applicable to for-profit and nonprofit
organizations alike. Traditionally a facet of nonprofit literature, today many for-profit
organizations categorize themselves as “mission-driven.” Indeed, some experts indicate that any
organization must be mission-driven in order to produce the most proactive and engaged
employees who will view their contributions to the organization more broadly.43 A 2014 Gallup
study found that mission-driven leadership was linked to greater marginal productivity in forprofit organizations.44 Whether a given organization is for-profit or nonprofit, focusing attention
on the organization’s societal impact will help leaders make informed, strategic, and missionoriented decisions.
It is important to note that “mission” refers to the organization’s “why.” It is the impact or
difference the organization as a whole aims to make on society. A corporation’s mission is
closely related to the topic of the next section, “goals,” which succinctly describe the
organization’s mission and values through director expectations.45 Goals should be thought of as
the short-term investments that further the interests of the organization’s mission.
ii.

Goal Setting

Goals are targets set by an organization as specific, quantifiable outcomes that it commits to
attain in order to achieve its mission and objectives.46 Psychologists have recognized that having
a set of goals to work toward helps guide focus and develop strategies to enable performance at
the requisite level, which reaffirms the widely held belief that goal setting has a beneficial impact

40

Kelly Medwick, How to Motivate and Engage Your Board of Directors, FIRESPRING (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://firespring.com/solutions-for-nonprofits/how-to-motivate-and-engage-your-board-of-directors.
41
20 Ways to Involve and Motivate Board Members, RICHARD MALE AND ASSOCIATES, http://richardmale.com/20ways-to-involve-and-motivate-board-members (last visited October 26th).
42
David DuVal, Staying Mission-Focused During Times of Change, MCKINLEYADVISORS (Oct. 31, 2019),
https://www.mckinley-advisors.com/blog/staying-mission-focused-during-times-of-change.
43
Lindsay Mullen, Should For-Profit Companies Have a Mission Statement?, PROSPER STRATEGIES (May 25,
2017), https://prosper-strategies.com/for-profit-mission-statement.
44
Chris Groscurth, Why Your Company Must Be Mission-Driven, GALLUP (March 6, 2014),
https ://www.gallup.com/workplace/236537/why-company-mission-driven.aspx.
45
Tara Duggan, Examples of Corporate Goals, AZ CENTRAL (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://yourbusiness.azcentral.com/examples-corporate-goals-14839.html.
46
How to Write Corporate Goals, WRITING HELP CENTRAL, http://www.writinghelp-central.com/corporategoals.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
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on productivity47 Indeed, setting goals in the workplace is a crucial component of employee
motivation, and the board room is no exception.48 Goal setting produces an atmosphere of
innovative thinking and collaboration that motivates team members to do their jobs as effectively
as possible while they grow to understand that their contributions matter to the goal’s
achievement.49
Any organization onboarding a new director should bear in mind the importance of
communicating goals that are clearly linked to the success of the organization. Of companies
with effective performance management systems, 91% of them say that goals are linked to
business priorities. The reason for the effective performance is that individual employees are
more motivated if they can see how their individual goals fit into the big picture.50 When
onboarding a new director, it is paramount that the director understand, as quickly as possible,
the company’s culture and how they fit in the achievement of the organization’s mission. Clear,
concise, and business-prioritized goal setting can help facilitate each of these critical onboarding
components.
Onboarding organizers must operate with the intention that incoming directors be
comfortable setting goals for themselves as quickly as possible. Director onboarding is, in
essence, a process designed to allow the incoming director to internalize the organization’s
mission and set personal goals in accordance with the organization’s direction. Director
autonomy, or the freedom from external control, enables new directors to take charge of their
transition and best manage their day-to-day operations.51
iii.

Moving to Greater Autonomy

Director autonomy comes directly from the organization’s board culture. It is the freedom of
directors to think for themselves, to make decisions independently, and to “own” their roles.52
The purpose of a thorough onboarding program is to set up a new hire to effectively work on
their own.53 An incoming director’s position is inherently one that they must be trusted to fill, or
else they would not (or should not) have been hired. Moving toward autonomy, and thus the
natural end of the onboarding process, really finds its roots in the beginning: recruiting potential
directors with the right mindset and attitude, who thrive on their own initiative and innovation.54
Self-direction is at the core of humankind’s natural inclination. It makes sense then for
47

Leslie Riopel, The Importance, Benefits, and Value of Goal Setting, POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://positivepsychology.com/benefits-goal-setting/.
48
April Parks, Motivation in the Workplace: The Value of Setting Goals, TEDS (Oct. 30, 2014),
http://blog.teds.com/motivation-in-the-workplace-the-value-of-setting-goals.
49
Id.
50
Sabrin Chowdhury & Elizabeth Hioe, How effective goal-setting motivates employees, MCKINSEY & COMPANY
(Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/the-organizationblog/how-effective-goal-setting-motivates-employees#.
51
Grant Simmons, Want Onboarding That Drives New Hire Productivity? TIER1 PERFORMANCE (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://tier1performance.com/onboarding-and-new-hire-productivity/.
52
David Lee, For More Motivated, Engaged Employees, Give Them More Autonomy, TLNT (Dec. 7, 2015),
https://www.tlnt.com/for-more-motivated-engaged-employees-give-them-more-autonomy/.
53
Ways to Motivate New Employees, SKILLGIGS (Dec. 29, 2016), https://skillgigs.com/ways-to-motivate-newemployees/.
54
Lindsay Harriss, Why job autonomy Is vital for success - and how to encourage it, CIPHR (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://www.ciphr.com/advice/employee-autonomy/.
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executives to motivate incoming directors through “autonomy support”, or giving the director the
appropriate flexibility and choice, when possible to engage in business-prioritized work that
mirrors personal values and interests.55
There are several practical ways to promote autonomy in the boardroom, but the first step is
always to create a culture of trust. Senior board members or executives must consult the new
director on projects and tasks, in order to allow trust to grow and new ideas to emerge.56
Consultations of this sort manifest as inviting directors to share their thoughts and feelings on
various work activities, demonstrating patience and providing time for self-learning, and
providing meaningful information and feedback regarding choices.57 This type of
communication produces a cycle of autonomy and motivation. Trusting a director to make good
decisions and contributions motivates that director to step into that role and add value, which in
turn furthers the organization’s initial vote of confidence, which creates an intrinsic motivation
for them to continue adding value to the company.58
Motivation is no easy task even when onboarding under normal circumstances, and the
barriers created by an online format will only increase that level of difficulty. As all of the facets
of businesses move online as a result of the coronavirus, it is important for business leaders and
onboarding organizers to be mindful of what made things work before the crises and attempt to
implement similar methods online. The next section focuses on how to apply the key
components of corporate onboarding in an online, post-COVID era.

II.

HOW TO MOVE ONBOARDING ONLINE

When the novel coronavirus promoted a worldwide economic shutdown, many
businesses were forced to continue operating online. The experience was trying, and some firms
failed this stress test.59 But this disaster also prompted many to think critically about many
aspects of life to determine which activities are essential. Many reconsidered how to go about
these activities differently. The silver lining is that the pandemic revealed myriad ways to go
about things more efficiently. Necessity is the mother of invention—and that invention can be
useful even after it is no longer necessary.
This section will discuss how to succeed in the essential activity of onboarding new corporate
directors when in-person meetings are impossible. But the advice herein is not limited to these
trying times. Rather, some or all of these techniques can be implemented for in-person
onboarding, too. By drawing comparisons between how things were done before and how things
are done in the “new normal”, this essay highlights how all of these processes can be improved.
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Carly Stone, Examples of Autonomy in the Workplace & How To Get More of It, GQR (Aug. 6, 2019),
https://www.gqrgm.com/examples-of-autonomy-in-the-workplace-how-to-get-more-of-it/.
56
Harriss, supra note 56.
57
Stone, supra note 57.
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Christian Nielson, Autonomy: Empowering the Individual to Do Their Best Work, DECISIONWISE, https://decisionwise.com/autonomy-empowering-the-individual-to-do-their-best-work/ (last visited Oct. 30 2020).
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Indiana Lawyer Staff, One of City’s Largest Law Firms Closes Offices Amid Coronavirus Concerns, Iɴᴅɪᴀɴᴀᴘᴏʟɪs
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A. Provide Information Ahead of Time (The Flipped Boardroom)
Traditional in-person onboarding often occurs at a one half- or full-day retreat. But online
onboarding need not be so sharply time-bound. Instead, online board education can occur over a
longer period of time. Moreover, board members can learn at their own pace. This self-paced
learning is especially useful where board members have different backgrounds, expertise, and
experience levels with corporate governance in general and this corporation in particular. By
giving board members information ahead of time, organization leaders can shorten the live
portion of online onboarding. This makes planning easier for busy executive schedules while
making learning more effective and efficient.
Presenting information ahead of time is part of a tried-and-true pedagogical method called
“flipping the classroom.” In a standard classroom, information is presented during class. In a
flipped classroom, information is presented before class, thus freeing up class time for
discussions, problem solving questions, group work, and other engaging learning activities. This
has been shown to be more effective than lecture as measured by students’ long-term retention
and comprehension of material.60
This essay suggests that “flipping the boardroom” can be equally effective for onboarding
directors. This requires onboarding organizations to be strategic and deliberate about creating
informative learning resources and engaging the board in active learning exercises, but the
investment will pay dividends over time. A flipped onboarding program will generate
efficiencies in board member time and retention of key information—and flipped programs are
more fun and engaging for participants, too.
i.

Create a Virtual Data Room

The online analog to the physical data dump—which often amounts to little more than giving
new directors reams of information in three-ring binders—is a virtual data room (VDR). Put
simply, a VDR is a digital space where files are organized and stored. When properly
implemented, data rooms have many advantages for the conveying of generic information to
several new directors at once. VDR may be more secure, more affordable, and easier to set up
and use than the traditional data dump. Onboarding organizers should consider employing a
VDR even after it becomes an option again to safely hand a new director a towering stack of
paper.
VDR can be made very secure. Professional solutions offer 256-bit Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) encryption and various data center certifications.61 More modest security needs
can be met by common enterprise file-sharing apps like Box.62 On a small scale, or when
information is not competitively sensitive, users can create VDR environments in free apps like
Dropbox.63 VDR administrators can even prevent viewers from downloading, printing, or taking
See Livia Mihai, 8 Flipped Classroom Benefits for Students and Teachers, ᴇLᴇᴀʀɴɪɴɢ Iɴᴅᴜsᴛʀʏ (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://elearningindustry.com/8-flipped-classroom-benefits-students-teachers.
61
Kison Patel, The Ultimate Guide to Virtual Data Rooms (VDRs), DᴇᴀʟRᴏᴏᴍ, https://dealroom.net/faq/what-isvirtual-data-room (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
62
Enhanced Security, BOXSUPPORT (Apr. 2020), https://support.box.com/hc/en-us/articles/360043693854Enhanced-Security.
63
Jane Fazackarley, Virtual Data Rooms VS. Generic File Sharing Solutions,
IDEALS (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.idealsvdr.com/blog/virtual-data-rooms-file-sharing/.
60
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screenshots of highly sensitive information. Access can be controlled remotely and in real time—
which can be useful for offboarding as well.
VDR is affordable. An annual subscription to Box can cost less than professionally printing
and shipping just one dozen onboarding information binders.64 While professionally managed
high-security VDR platforms are available for high-end customers, most organizations can
simply administer their own onboarding VDR using already established corporate cloud
solutions like Box, Google Drive, Microsoft OneDrive and others.
Finally, VDR is easy to set up and use. Data rooms function like hard drives on a computer.
Documents can be organized just as they would be in printed tabbed binders, or new organization
can be applied using app features like hashtags and comments. In addition, VDR hosts large
spreadsheets, high-resolution graphics, video clips and other hard-to-print items. This creates
new opportunities to explain and personalize onboarding information, even before the live
onboarding event begins. The next section will discuss how to create personalized content that
will engage new board members with the significant work of absorbing corporate information.
ii.

Tailor VDR Content

Video and other interactive content is shared with new directors in advance of the onboarding
program through VDR content. This creates new opportunities to begin the onboarding learning
process in advance of a live meeting, enabling a more swift and efficient live session that reduces
“Zoom fatigue” and enhances learning and engagement.
Tailoring VDR content means creating videos that personally introduce the corporation’s
new board members to the institution and then, to the onboarding environment. Corporations
with sufficient resources should record a tightly edited two- to five-minute video that briefly
welcomes the new director to the board, then explains the organization and intentionality behind
the data room. The video should give directors clear direction about which files and folders to
review carefully and which are meant to be skimmed as background or merely maintained for
reference.
VDR personalization is also an opportunity for the corporation to show its new directors that
they are valued. For example, the CEO may record a 30-second personal address to each new
member, followed by a 2-minute description of the VDR from the CFO.
The VDR content itself can also be customized for specific directors or groups of directors.
For example, a folder with information about executive compensation can be shared only with
new directors who are assigned to serve on the compensation committee. In this way, both
enhanced security and a more tailored and streamlined user experience can be achieved online.
iii.

Engage!

Receiving huge reams of information can be boring or overwhelming, whether in binders or
online. To avoid information overload, design learning activities that engage the new directors in
learning about the most important information. This section will introduce how learning
activities are offered ahead of the meeting to complement a data dump and ensure that data is
processed by the new directors’ so they acquire information efficiently. The next part will focus
See Melissa Pardo-Bunte, Box Pricing: Features, Costs and Top DMS Alternatives, BᴇᴛᴛᴇʀBᴜʏs (June 12, 2019),
https://www.betterbuys.com/dms/box-pricing/.
64
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on how to reinforce information acquisition at the live session. Once again, we can draw upon
classic pedagogical tools to engage adult learners: the Testing Principal and Learning by Doing.
The Testing Principle states that people learn better when they take a practice test on the
material rather than restudy it.65 The idea is that the test primes the mind for learning the
material, much like a warmup primes the body for a workout. Depending on corporate culture,
however, it may not be appropriate to give new directors a pop quiz. Instead, onboarding
organizers can achieve the testing effect through more conventional means, as discussed below.
“Learning by Doing means learning from experiences resulting directly from one’s actions,
as contrasted with learning from watching others perform, reading others’ instructions or
descriptions, or listening to others’ instructions or lectures.”66 Although a director may access a
vast amount of information by getting access to a VDR, the director will not automatically
become familiar with how to access specific information or may not even be aware of what
information is in the VDR. To accelerate directors’ familiarity with important information,
onboarding organizers should encourage directors to explore and use the VDR.
Instead of a formal quiz, present the directors with a checklist that sets forth tasks that require
each new director to explore the VDR. For example, if the VDR employs tags, ask each director
to identify which tags correspond to their expertise. This requires the director to learn how to use
tags in a VDR while providing the corporation with actionable information about director
expertise.
Videos may facilitate learning by doing. Consider making a video that shows the directors
how to use VDR features (like tagging files), and then make that video available in the VDR so
directors can reference it when going about their tasks. These videos thus serve the additional
purpose of “flipping the boardroom.” By covering low-level information like this before the
directors’ first meeting, onboarding organizations can make the meeting more efficient and
focused on high-level understanding.
Directors should also complete a brief survey during their pre-meeting learning time. The
survey should ask questions that aim to reveal the directors’ skill set and interests. This
information will help onboarding organizers plan the upcoming meeting. As discussed in the
next section, the online meeting should be tailored to meet the needs and skills of the incoming
directors.
Offer a checklist of key information to be learned in advance of the meeting. This is also the
first opportunity to set the tone67 as goal-oriented.68 A task list or agenda for the upcoming live
onboarding meeting also showsdirectors what they will be required to know. Organizers should
endeavor to connect the introductory checklist, the VDR activities, and the meeting agenda so
that directors intuit the value of preparing for the meeting by exploring the VDR.

Richard E. Mayer, Applying the Science of Learning to Undergraduate Science Education, Nᴀᴛ’l. Aᴄᴀᴅ. Bᴅ. ᴏғ
Sᴄɪ. Eᴅuc. (Jan. 16, 2011),
https://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/dbassesite/documents/webpage/dbasse_072589.pdf.
66
Hayne W. Reese, The Learning-by-Doing Principle,17 BEHAV. DEV. BULL., no. 1, 2011, at 1,
https://psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/2014-55719-001.pdf.
67
See Id. at 89.
68
See Id. at 13–14.
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B. Host a Virtual Meeting
Onboarding generally requires a meeting. There are aspects of the onboarding experience,
such as socialization, that cannot be readily accomplished on one’s own time. The meeting
traditionally occurred in person as a half-day or full-day retreat. However,an in-person retreat
may be impossible or impracticable. For example, governments prohibit large in-person
gatherings due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, even when in-person meetings are
possible, are they the optimal use of corporate resources? In some cases, such as where directors
live far from corporate headquarters or where the corporation lacks the funds to host a day-long
event, a virtual meeting may be a good substitute.
Virtual meetings can be buggy and boring. But careful planning and strategic use of online
meeting technology can result in a great experience for new directors. Once again, onboarding
organizers need to think like online educators. Here are some tips and tricks from the online law
professor’s playbook that are sure to engage board members in active learning and socialization.
i.

Plan a Plenary Session

Plenary sessions—where all board members and executives are to attend—are a great
opportunity to kick off the onboarding experience with motivation and energy.69 They are
especially helpful in online onboarding. The plenary session is the organization’s opportunity to
introduce substantive goals, handle technical concerns, and set the tone for the meeting and the
work going forward.
There are many different formats for plenary sessions, but a good rule of thumb is to keep
them short. To give people time to log on and work out any technical issues, plan to spend the
first ten minutes or so in an unstructured format. Ask the directors to turn on their microphone
and webcam and briefly introduce themselves as they enter the meeting. This will reveal any
audio and video problems. During this introductory time, display a slide that provides the agenda
and other key information while organizers communicate one-on-one with any directors who are
having trouble with connectivity. Wise conference organizers will have alternative contact
information (such as a cell phone number) so they can reach directors and help them get online
before the conference begins.
After any technical bugs are worked out, the plenary session can proceed much as it
would in live. Usually, the CEO or Chair of the Board makes brief welcome remarks to kick off
the event. The master of ceremonies, who may be the CEO or the conference organizers, should
explain how the rest of the event will work. Creative organizers might also use the plenary
sessions to demonstrate how the breakout groups, discussed below, will operate.
The plenary session is a good time to introduce the new directors to each other. An effective
way to do this while highlighting positive attributes of the incoming team members is to discuss
the skills and interests that were highlighted by the survey that was discussed in the prior section.

69

See Rob Hard, Why Conferences Begin With a Plenary Session, THE BALANCE SMALL BUSINESS (Aug. 10, 2019),
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/why-conferences-begin-with-an-opening-general-session-1223626.
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Break Out for Active Learning

Depending on the size of the incoming class of directors, it may be necessary to break up into
smaller groups. Online meeting attendees tend to participate less frequently in large groups than
small ones. Large groups are hard for online presenters to monitor. Larger groups tend to have
more problems with microphones being unmuted and disruptive background noise. When more
people are added to an online conference room, each person’s image gets smaller, and some
software cannot display more than a certain number of attendees at one time. Seeing one another
is an important aspect of socializing new team members, and this is lost when the group is too
large. Limit groups to ten or fewer members.
Each group or cohort can rotate through four or five learning stations. Each station will cover
a different topic and should be facilitated by the key institutional person for that knowledge
domain. For example, the general counsel may lead a discussion on fiduciary duties, while the
Chief Financial Officer reviews accounting basics. By using breakout rooms on virtual meeting
software such as Zoom, these learning stations can occur simultaneously for maximum
efficiency.
Onboarding organizers should make these breakout sessions as interactive as possible. This
can be accomplished in many ways. A popular teaching device for adult learners is called the
Socratic method. In this method, the discussion leader will ask questions to various participants.
The questions are designed to lead the participants to identify, understand, and analyze issues
that may arise during their tenure as board members. If the groups are small enough, the
discussion leader should be able to call on each attendee during the breakout group. This keeps
attendees mentally engaged and attentive.
Keeping the breakout groups short is key to their success. Although the techniques discussed
in this section help to engage adult learners online, attendees will still experience “Zoom
fatigue.”70 Ideally, breakout activities are limited to about 20 minutes, and then five minutes
should be provided for questions and answers and another five for an off-camera comfort break.
In this manner, six training activities can be completed within three hours.
If the corporation needs certain directors to specialize on certain functions, such as
accounting professionals serving on the audit committee, then the breakout rooms can be
designed accordingly. Members of the audit committee should be grouped as a cohort that
attends a session on advanced accounting, while the rest of the class may not need to attend that
session.
As for which topics to address in breakout sessions, these are the same important topics for
new directors to discuss during in-person sessions. Corporate needs will vary, but the following
are generally regarded as important aspects to cover:
● Corporate Governance and Fiduciary Duties
● Accounting and Finance
● Operations
● Products, Services, Customers, and Chief Competitors
● Acquisition Strategy
70
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● Risk Management71
The breakout sessions should deliberately be designed to be relatively fast-paced. Shifting
between concept areas and having new discussion leaders every thirty minutes or so will help
keep directors engaged in learning their new role and stave off Zoom fatigue.
iii.

Come Together for Hot Topics

After the breakout sessions are complete, bring the group back together for a final all-hands
session. Accomplish this technologically by setting all the breakout rooms to expire
simultaneously, returning all members to the main virtual room for concluding remarks. This last
session is the organizer’s best opportunity to begin the socialization process and to motivate the
directors to succeed in their new roles.
One way to achieve this is to hold a discussion on hot topics. The CEO or Chair of the Board
can ask the new board members to discuss an issue that currently and substantially impacts the
corporation. This experience should resemble a mock board meeting, except that the mundane
and droll topics that must be handled in real board meetings should be excluded from the hot
topics session. The CEO or Chair should establish that the goal of the meeting is to come up with
action-oriented resolutions to deal with the issue, and then he or she should facilitate the
conversation.
Facilitating a conversation among a large group of online attendees can be challenging
(hence the suggestion for breakout rooms) but learning to do so effectively is important for
organizational leaders in this online era. Thus, online onboarding is an opportunity for existing
leadership to extend their skill sets.
If the breakout sessions go well, the new directors should be warmed up and ready to engage
in dialogue. If the group contains fewer than 30 members, the online host may ask people to
virtually raise their hands and be called upon to unmute their microphones and speak their points
to the group.
When online groups are larger than 30 members, it becomes harder to manage the raisehands function. Instead, the chat function is the best way to gather input from a large number of
people in an online meeting. Participants can chat to everyone and express their views in writing,
or they can chat to the host and ask to be recognized or to have the comment read aloud.
However the host manages participation in the meeting, they should keep the meeting
focused, short, and goal oriented. The hot topic must be straightforward enough that it can be
communicated and discussed in about a half hour. The host should start to wrap up the
discussion at least ten minutes before the end of the allotted time period so they can express the
emerging consensus of the group and effectuate it by writing a resolution. The meeting should
conclude with a vote on the resolution using the polling feature in the video conferencing
software. In this way, the group will learn how to be effective online board members by
practicing the actual process. By staying goal oriented and accomplishing the stated objective,
this meeting provides a positive model for an effective meeting that the new board members will
carry forward into their future work for the corporation.
After the issue is resolved, the CEO or Chair should take a few minutes to emphasize the
importance of the Board in accomplishing the organization’s goals. This is also an opportunity to
71
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inspire the directors to greater service by discussing how the organization can make a significant
positive impact on society. Remember that the directors have just succeeded in tackling a major
issue of concern, so this is the moment to reinforce the message that the board can and will
accomplish major strategic goals.
In other words, inspire them to create connections before opening up the meeting for
relatively unstructured social time. Make concluding remarks a timely, brief, and positive call to
action and inspiration: We will lead this organization through any adversity! Hopefully, this
inspiration will encourage directors to converse about how to advance corporate goals during the
unstructured socialization period.

C. Socially-Distant Socialization
Most in-person onboarding retreats offer many opportunities for new and old board members
and corporate leadership to get to know each other.72 These social interactions are not as easy to
cultivate online, but there are several strategies to help start the socialization process with new
board members.
i.

Virtual Happy Hour

In-person meetings typically conclude with a happy hour. This social event can be brought
into the online space. Consider physically mailing each of your directors a commemorative glass
that features the corporate logo and arrives before the in-person meeting. Depending on state
liquor laws, the corporation might also include a small bottle of wine. These gifts can be
employed to enhance the social atmosphere and the feeling of community, and directors will be
pleased to receive them.
At the conclusion of the hot topics sessions, the Chair or CEO can kick off the happy hour by
inviting all attendees to grab their glasses and join in a virtual toast with their beverage of choice.
The experience of all drinking from the same glass, so to speak, despite being separated in space
provides a team atmosphere of a common community.
What happens after the toast depends on the size of the group. If the group is relatively small,
the host can stimulate conversation by asking casual questions and continuing to keep the
conversation going until the appointed time for the conclusion of the happy hour. If the group
contains more than a dozen people, however, conversation and socialization may be better served
by the host playing matchmaker.
ii.

Pair and Share: Play Matchmaker

Pair and Share is a pedagogical term for the practice of organizing students into small groups
and giving them discussion questions to resolve. This same concept can be applied strategically
to online onboarding. When members have similar interests, the host can play matchmaker and
group them in a small breakout room to meet and greet during the virtual happy hour. Encourage
three to four members to discuss a topic related to their board function while hoisting a glass
“together.”
72
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The survey described earlier can be a good source of information about directors’ interests
that can be applied here to pair directors who are likely to have commonalities. Posing discussion
questions to each small group can help spark conversation about those interests. One can never
guarantee that two people are going to connect, but a carefully planned group of three or four
directors who are selected for their common interests and given an on-point discussion question
is likely to result in worthwhile conversation and connections.
Consider inviting existing directors and leadership staff to the virtual happy hour. Staff
members can each be responsible for connecting a small group of directors. If the corporation
has a staggered board, or a board made up of different classes of directors that serve different
term lengths and are elected at different times of the year,73 having both new and existing
directors helps integrate new board members. Pairing directors in this way also may lead to
organic mentor-mentee relationships. For suggestions on how to stimulate these relationships,
see the next section.
iii.

Mentor-Mentee Pairs

In the real world, directors with common interests may simply find each other during happy
hour and strike up a conversation organically. Unfortunately, it is not easy for online meeting
attendees to self-select their happy hour group on the spot. But empowering directors to select a
mentor or mentee, and then putting those mentor-mentee pairs into the same happy hour group,
can be an effective way of jump-starting a long-term relationship.
Although the effectiveness of corporate mentoring programs is unclear,74 the research shows
that board members benefit both from mentoring and becoming a mentor.75 There are several
purposes for corporate mentoring programs, including leadership development.76 Setting up
mentor-mentee pairs that match new and existing directors can improve director retention and
deepen both mentor and mentee leadership strength. Mentorship programs may especially help
develop female leaders.77 Improving diversity on corporate boards is just one of many reasons
why an effective mentorship program can improve corporate leadership.
Online mentoring, also called e-mentoring, has grown in popularity over the last 20 years.78
In older e-mentoring programs, the mentoring was delivered asynchronously, via email, message
73
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board, chat, or text functions.79 More recently, massive multiplayer online games, such as
Second Life, have created virtual spaces where mentoring takes place.80 If that sounds too
futuristic and far out for your board members, do not be concerned. E-mentoring can occur in
much more familiar ways, such as on Zoom web conferencing or even via phone calls.
To facilitate the development of mentoring relationships between new and existing board
members, the first step is to think carefully about establishing pairs that are likely to be
compatible. Organizers can accomplish this by asking the directors to take a DISC assessment,
which reveals “how” a person does what they do.81 To keep mentors and mentees engaged, try
pairing them up based on their DISC styles.82 You might also pair based on skill set and common
interests, but this may lead to the pitfall of mistaking superficial similarities, such as a shared
interest in golfing, for a deeper foundation on which to build a long term relationship of trust and
confidence.
However, onboarding organizers establish mentorship pairs, they should remember that
online interactions require much more deliberate forethought. At an in-person happy hour,
directors might circulate among each other until pairs click, forming natural and unofficial
mentoring relationships. This does not happen as easily online (unless the directors are all
hanging out together in Second Life during their free time), so a deliberate effort to pair the right
people at the right time is essential to getting a director mentoring program to work well. If an
organizer follows the suggestion above about having a virtual happy hour, consider using
breakout rooms during the happy hour to introduce the mentor-mentee pairs to each other.

III.

CONCLUSIONS

Moving director onboarding online presents new challenges. But the inability to meet in
person should not prevent corporations from moving forward with vital processes, such as
onboarding. This Article has shown how essential components of the onboarding process are
translated to the online format. Moving onboarding online may also be preferable in some
respects due to greater efficiency and sustainability. Even after the existential threat posed by the
novel coronavirus, replacing three-ring binders with VDRs and holding meetings through Zoom
may become more commonplace. Online alternatives offer greater flexibility in the onboarding
process, making the move toward greater autonomy more organic.
While nothing can replace the comradery of meeting for a casual drink at the local bar,
online team building exercises like virtual happy hours and matchmaking must fill the
socialization role for the time being. At the very least, it will familiarize the new director with
other members of the board in advance of work resuming in person. It will be difficult for new
directors to navigate the ins and outs of the organizational culture through virtual
communications. Onboarding organizers can, however, mitigate that difficulty by being attentive
to the new board member’s engagement during online team building exercises. Virtual
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communication may not be ideal for all things, but an effective onboarding program will make
the best of online technology.
In making the transition to online formats, onboarding organizers in the post-COVID-19
era must be adaptive. They must be prepared to deal with a process of trial and error, as all
organizations are unique and there is no single, uniform onboarding program. By maintaining an
open and adaptive state of mind and implementing the methods and techniques described in this
Article, onboarding organizers can begin to shape a comprehensive online onboarding program
that works for their organization.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 2, 2020 the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission or SEC)
published its much anticipated private-offering framework revisions (Final Rules).1 A June 2019
Concept Release2 and March 2020 proposals3 requested comment and suggested ways the
Commission could ease burdens on companies (issuers) seeking capital and expand privatemarket investor opportunities.4 Commenters offered numerous ways to smooth the discordant,
confusing, and often exclusionary exemption rules.5 To its credit, the Commission recognizes the
current disharmony and its negative impacts on certain entrepreneurs and small businesses,
particularly related to geography and demography. Unfortunately, its fixes fall well short.
Congress tried to address existing inequities nearly a decade ago with the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act).6 The JOBS Act created and expanded registration
exemptions to open private investment to all Americans and give smaller issuers more capital
options. For reasons described below, the JOBS Act failed that goal. Indeed, the Proposed and
Final Rules devote much attention to JOBS Act underuse. Regrettably, the Commission’s
revisions expose its worst instincts and highlight the need for further Congressional action. But a
JOBS Act 2.0 will repeat past failure without a sober view of Commission priorities and culture.
To be sure, the Final Rules enhance the current framework.7 But progress must be
measured against opportunity costs: time to enactment, conditions placed on them, and ignored
alternatives that would have forthrightly bolstered capital formation and protected investors.
Despite measured progress, the Commission hamstrings job creators through archaic rules, some
used nowhere else. Without statutory direction the Commission will keep impeding American
entrepreneurs’ capital needs in an increasingly competitive geo-environment. Commissioninduced hardships will grow starker as tokenized systems evolve that ignore national borders


Principal Attorney, Jossey PLLC and founder of thecrowdfundinglawyers.com. The author thanks George W.
Dent, Jr., Professor Emeritus of Law, Case Western Reserve University for his helpful comments on this article. All
errors are mine.
1
Facilitating Capital Formation and Expanding Investment Opportunities by Improving Access to Capital in Private
Markets, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-10884; 34-90300 (November 2, 2020)
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2020/33-10844.pdf [hereinafter Final Rules].
2
Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, 84 Fed. Reg. 30460 (June 26,
2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-06-26/pdf/2019-13255.pdf [hereinafter Concept Release].
3
Facilitating Capital Formation and Expanding Investment Opportunities by Improving Access to Capital in Private
Markets, Release No. 33-10763 (Mar. 4, 2020) https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2020/33-10763.pdf [hereinafter
Facilitating Capital Formation].
4
This article analyzes “private” issuers, i.e. those that have not registered their securities pursuant to the Securities
Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (2018)), and are not subject to
reporting obligations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78aa (2018)).
5
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits the sale of securities without an effective registration statement
unless the issuer claims a valid exemption. 15 U.S.C. §77e(c) (2018). Exempt offerings are not “public
offerings.” See e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 122 (1953) (interpreting Securities Act Section 4(a)(2)
transactions “not involving a public offering.”). Smaller businesses and startups typically offer securities through
exemptions because they cannot meet the rigors of registration. See Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital
Offense: The SEC's Continuing Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 1, 7–
10 (2007) (discussing the impracticality of registration for smaller
issuers), http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/faculty/pub/248.
6
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
7
The Final Rules become effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register.
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much less state-based sub jurisdictions. Particularly in exempting state-level review, offer
regulation, and secondary trading, the Commission burdens issuers with restrictions and
ambiguities that waste resources and invite crippling investigations.
While public-market advocates insist only more Commission-created barriers would
protect investors and capital by forcing registration and thereby channeling issuers into the
public markets,8 evidence suggests a better way. A lighter regulatory touch which encourages
private ordering while maintaining fairness for entrepreneurs and investors would produce
superior results at less cost. A second JOBS Act could accomplish this.
This article reviews the private-market milieu including what makes it incredibly successful
but also exclusionary for most of the five million U.S. small businesses.9 It examines—including
through market-actor perspectives—how SEC hostility thwarted the JOBS Act via empirically
questionable investor protections. It also proposes statutory solutions to push American capital
raising into the 21st century. These bright-line proposals abjure overreliance on SEC staff or
state-equivalent interpretation and “facts and circumstances” analysis. These solutions may jar
lawmakers accustomed to ceding discretion to agencies with immense power over the nation’s
entrepreneurial spirit. But the world will not wait for the Commission to change cultures and the
Final Rules prove if left alone it will remain inert.

I.

THE CURRENT PRIVATE MARKETS

Former SEC Chair Jay Clayton10 describes the U.S. private capital markets as “unrivaled and
coveted around the globe.”11 They foster U.S. economic might and help our firms become global
powers. They catalyze unrivaled innovation in places like Silicon Valley, Boston, and New
York.12 But this was not happenstance. Late 1970s economic turmoil, lack of entrepreneurial
capital, and confusing Commission rules led Congress to pass the Small Business Investment
Incentive Act of 1980.13 This law and resulting Commission action14 seeded the venture-capital
8

See infra Part IV.D.
According to data from the Small Business Administration, in 2015 there were 5.27 million U.S. firms with less
than 20 employees. These firms employed around 20 million people. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. OF ADVOC.,
2018 SMALL BUSINESS PROFILE (2018), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/2018-Small-BusinessProfiles-US.pdf.
10
Mr. Clayton ended his tenure as SEC Chair on December 23, 2020. See, Letter from Jay Clayton, SEC Chairman,
to President Donald J. Trump (Dec. 23, 2020) (available at https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton2020-12-23).
11
Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the Economic Club of New York, (Sept. 9,
2019) (transcript available in U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speechclayton-2019-09-09).
12
See National Venture Capital Association 2020 Yearbook, Nat’l Venture Cap. Ass’n 2020 Y.B., 5,
https://nvca.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/NVCA-2020-Yearbook.pdf (“Outside of California, Massachusetts,
and New York, median VC fund size reached $43 million in 2019, an increase of 57% compared to 2018, but still
relatively small to the dominant venture hubs—the median for California, Massachusetts, and New York,
collectively, was $100 million.”).
13
Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980).
14
In 1978, the Commission began reexamining the exemptions after complaints about hardships small businesses
faced accessing private capital. This included a new rule, public hearings, a concept release, and a simplified form
for registered small IPOs. Regulation D, the most important Commission action of the era was “a major response to
the new Congressional mandate.” David B. H. Martin, Jr. & L. Keith Parsons, The Preexisting Relationship
Doctrine Under Regulation D: A Rule Without Reason?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1988),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol45/iss3/6.
9
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explosion that propelled so many iconic companies in the 1980s and 1990s and nurtured
American prosperity decades hence. Two private capital-raising hallmarks arose from this era:
the “accredited investor”15 and Regulation D 506 (Reg D, private placements).16
In 1996 Congress enacted the National Securities Market Improvement Act (NSMIA).17
This statute “covered” Reg D securities,18 therefore exempting them from Blue Sky laws19—
state-level registration and merit review, depending on each state. The impact of these changes is
irrefutable. In 2018, the SEC estimates exempt offerings raised $2.9 trillion while registered
offerings raised $1.4 trillion. Reg D 506(b) alone outpaced public offerings with an estimated
$1.5 trillion.20

Reg D dominates the private-capital landscape. Only accredited investors use it, severely
restricting the potential-investor pool.21 But it requires minimal upfront effort and cost before
capital becomes available. Issuers gauge interest (test the waters) with accredited investors in
15

The Commission had defined accredited investors before the passage of the statute. See Exemption of Limited
Offers and Sales by Qualified Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 33-6180, 45 Fed. Reg. 6462 (Jan. 28, 1980). (Rule
501(a) [17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2019)] contains the current definition. For natural persons it includes net worth and
annual income thresholds. In August 2020, the SEC expanded the Accredited Investor definition to add
sophistication criteria enabling natural persons to qualify beyond financial indicia. See, Accredited Investor
Definition, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-10824; 34-89669, 85 Fed. Reg. 64234 (Oct. 9, 2020).
16
Unless otherwise noted “Reg D” refers to the current Regulation D 506(b) [17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2019)].
17
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996).
18
Id. at §102(b)(4)(D) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(F
19
The origin of the term Blue Sky law is subject to different theories. The most known is from Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917) (“The name that is given to the law indicates the evil at which it is aimed; that is . . .
‘speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of ‘blue sky’. . . .”).
20
Concept Release, supra note 2, at 78.
21
As a technical matter Reg D is available to a limited number of unaccredited investors. See Id. at 79.
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their circles before filing paperwork, accredited investors declare their status via “substantive,
preexisting relationships” with issuers or their agents,22 the SEC only requires notice filing, and
states cannot interfere. No monetary limits exist for investors or issuers.23
Investors, however, do not surrender their loot blindly. Reg D private-placement
memorandums disclose issuer information about structures, plans, and risks. The reason is
simple. According to Heritage Foundation Senior Fellow David Burton, “In the absence of
meaningful disclosure about the business and a commitment, contractual or otherwise, to provide
continuing disclosure, few would invest in the business and those that did so would demand
substantial compensation for the risk they were undertaking by investing in a business with
inadequate disclosure.”24 Further, federal law protects these offerees against misleading
statements and fraud.25
Reg D provides the private capital-raising model. Its success arose from balancing regulation
with parties’ freedom to contract. Because investors are accredited the Commission accepts they
can “fend for themselves” without mandatory disclosures.26 Wise policy may require extra
safeguards when gauging exemptions open to all, as with certain JOBS Act titles. But lawmakers
must test this purported need for higher scrutiny against what experience shows works.

II.

DISPARITIES IN THE REG D-CENTRIC PARADIGM

Reg D-centered private-market success has a price; data reveals disturbing inequities. First,
only 13% of U.S. households with sufficient annual income or net-worth use it.27 The dearth of
private-investment opportunities for retail investors has been called “Securities Law’s Dirty
Little Secret.”28 And as one might expect, this cohort is not evenly dispersed either
geographically or demographically.
A. Geographic Disparities
Not only are 87% of households barred from Reg D but the eligible 13% mass in
entrepreneurial hubs. Geographic outsiders often cannot access these funding channels. Indeed,
22

Broker Dealers are not subject to general solicitation prohibitions who solicit existing customers from a predetermined, screened list of potential investors. See, e.g., Arthur M. Borden, SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 1978 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 2001 (Oct. 6, 1978).
23
17 C.F.R. § 230.500 (2019); cf. Joe Wallin et al., Comment Letter on SEC Concept Release (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6182683-192407.pdf (describing the procedure for Reg D 506(b)
raises).
24
David R. Burton, Comment Letter on Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6193328-192495.pdf [hereinafter Burton Letter].
25
Frequently asked questions about exempt offerings, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, (July 12, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/faq; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (“All securities transactions, even
exempt transactions, are subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.”).
26
See Regulation D Revisions; Exemption for Certain Employee Benefit Plans, 52 Fed. Reg. 3015 (Jan. 30, 1987).
27
Concept Release, supra note 2, at 36. See supra note 15 for a recent, but yet-quantified Commission expansion of
natural persons eligible for Accredited Investor classification.
28
Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3390–91 (2013),
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/939 [hereinafter Rodrigues, Dirty Secret] (“The dirty little secret of
U.S. securities law is that the rich not only have more money-they also have access to types of wealth-generating
investments not available, by law, to the average investor.”); Id. at 3422 (“Although not driven by malicious intent,
this regulatory evolution [of the private markets] had the effect of creating a world divided into investing haves and
have-nots.”).
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aggregate Reg D-capital concentrates where accredited investors cluster.29 This has real effects
on American prosperity. One study found lack of access to accredited ‘angel’ networks
experience reduced startup activity and compounded negative economic impacts.30

B. Demographic Disparities
Reg D exacerbates disparities and curbs wealth creation in other ways. If capital raising only
occurs in select areas, exclusionary conventions and cultures will form. In 2019 the SEC Office
of the Advocate for Small Business Capital Formation found 29.5% of angel investors and 11%
of venture capitalist were women and 71% of venture capital firms had no women.31 From 20132017 venture capital backed-businesses were 1% Black, 2% Latino, 2% Middle Eastern, 18%
Asian, and 77% White.32 Moreover, new black-owned businesses start with around three times

29

Jason Rowley, Where Venture Capitalists Invest and Why, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/09/local-loyalty-where-venture-capitalists-invest-and-why/ (describing how
venture-capital funds tend to invest in firms within close geographic proximity); cf. Dana M. Warren, Venture
Capital Investment: Status and Trends, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 12 (2012) (“Venture capital
investment almost always involves significant participation in and oversight of each of the portfolio companies by
the venture capital professionals. As a result, simple logistics makes venture capital investment an inherently local,
or at most regional, activity.”).
30
LAURA ANNE LINDSEY & LUKE C.D. STEIN, ANGELS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS:
EVIDENCE FROM INVESTOR ACCREDITATION RULES (Sixth Annual Conference on Financial Market Regulation
2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939994.
31
SEC, OFF. OF THE ADVOC. FOR SMALL BUS. CAP. FORMATION, ANNUAL RPT. FOR FISCAL YR. 2019, at 28,
https://www.sec.gov/files/2019_OASB_Annual%20Report.pdf.
32
Id. at 32 (internal citation omitted).
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less capital than new white-owned businesses.33 Further, minority entrepreneurs report lack of
capital disproportionately affects their profitability.34

III.

CONGRESS ENACTED THE JOBS ACT TO CREATE OPPORTUNITIES BEYOND REG D

Lawmakers saw how the flawed Reg D model failed small businesses and entrepreneurs
outside select hubs or lacking certain profiles.35 Legislators sought to democratize investing for
both entrepreneur and backer.36 A rare bipartisan moment birthed the JOBS Act. At a Rose
Garden signing ceremony President Obama gushed about the law’s potential for unconventional
capital formation and retail investors to support companies at their earliest and most lucrative
stages. “Right now, you can only turn to a limited group of investors -- including banks and
wealthy individuals -- to get funding. Laws that are nearly eight decades old make it impossible
for others to invest. . . Because of this bill, start-ups and small business will now have access to a
big, new pool of potential investors -- namely, the American people. For the first time, ordinary
Americans will be able to go online and invest in entrepreneurs that they believe in.”37
The JOBS Act contained three titles that expanded issuer access to investor pools.38 Title
II directed the Commission to allow general solicitation for Regulation D. Title IV created a
“new” Regulation A with higher limits and other enhancements open to “Qualified Purchasers.”
Title III created a new “investment” or “equity” crowdfunding exemption.
The JOBS Act also crucially changed another capital-raising factor. Title V amended Section
12(g)(1)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193439 known as the ‘12(g) Rule.’ This rule states
companies with $10 million in total assets and a class of equity securities “held of record” by a
certain number of holders, must register their securities. Title V increased the threshold from 500
persons to 2,000 persons or 500 unaccredited investors. The JOBS Act directed the Commission
to appropriately apply the 12(g) Rule to the law.
33

Id. at 30 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 31 (internal citation omitted); cf. Kendrick Nguyen, Comment Letter on Concept Release on Harmonization
of Securities Offering Exemptions (Sept. 24, 2019), at 2, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6189775192417.pdf (“[F]emale, minority, veteran and immigrant entrepreneurs, as well as entrepreneurs based in Middle
America, often struggle to obtain exposure to and capital from traditional venture investors.”).
35
See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. S8458-02 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley) (“In recent years,
small businesses and startup companies have struggled to raise capital. The traditional methods of raising capital
have become increasingly out of reach for many startups and small businesses. . . . Low-dollar investments from
ordinary Americans may help fill the void, providing a new avenue of funding to the small businesses that are the
engine of job creation.”); cf. Seth C. Oranburg, Bridgefunding: Crowdfunding and the Market for Entrepreneurial
Finance, 25 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 413–14 (2015) (discussing funding gap between $1-5 million where
businesses fail for lack of capital access).
36
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, GOV’T-BUS. F. ON SMALL BUS. CAP. FORMATION, FINAL RPT. (2019) at 20,
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor37.pdf [hereinafter 2018 Forum Report], (discussing the intent of
Regulation Crowdfunding).
37
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Signing (Apr. 5, 2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/remarks-president-jobs-act-bill-signing.
38
This article covers only the private exemptions in the JOBS Act, other titles such as Title I, Reopening American
Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 307 (2012), which eases
private company transition into the public markets are beyond its scope. It also does not cover changes to Rule
144A. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2019); Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(2), 126
Stat. 306, 314 (2012). Compare with note 132.
39
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A)).
34
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A. Regulation D 506(c)
JOBS Act Title II did not expand the investor pool per se. Instead it loosened communication
rules, allowing accredited-investor searches beyond familiar circles. As noted above, Reg D
reigned well before the JOBS Act. Reg D arose from 1970s political and economic turmoil. Oil
crises, weak economic growth, high interest rates, plunging stock prices, and an SEC determined
to force registration40 meant entrepreneurs struggled to raise capital.
After the 1980 statutory push,41 in 1982 the Commission created Reg D as a safe harbor to
ensure compliance with nonpublic offerings defined in Securities Act Section 4(a)(2).” 42 Reg D
sought to simplify and clarify rules and harmonize state and federal exemptions.43 Reg D
allowed unlimited numbers of accredited investors to join these offerings without investment
limits or mandatory disclosures. It also allowed small numbers of unaccredited investors to join
with daunting mandatory disclosure44 and sophistication thresholds.45 The Commission also
created two lesser-used exemptions, Regulation D 50446 and Regulation D 505.47 None of these
exemptions preempted Blue Sky laws.
After Reg D, private placements grew from $18 billion in 1981 to $202 billion in 1988.48 In
1996 Congress further nurtured Reg D with NSMIA.49 This Act amended Securities Act Section

As more issuers offered securities under what is now Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2)
“transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering,” the Commission curtailed the exemption by
“clarifying” limitations on its availability. See U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Non-Public Offering Exemption,
Release No. 33-4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316 (Nov. 6, 1962)..
41
See supra note 14.
42
15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).
43
U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving
Limited Offers and Sales, Release No. 33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11251 (Mar. 16, 1982).
44
Although Reg D 506(b) allows up to 35 unaccredited investors, issuers wishing to accept such investors must
provide disclosures pursuant to Rule 502(b) 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)-(vii)) (2019). Previously the financial
disclosures for non-reporting companies operated on a tri-tiered basis depending on offer amount, 17 C.F.R. §
230.502(b)(2)(i)(B)(1-3) (2019), The Final Rules simplified and slightly relaxed these disclosures to align them with
Reg A+ Tier 1 requirements (offerings up to $20 million) and Reg A+ Tier 2 Requirements (offerings above $20
million). Final Rules, supra note 1, at 115-116, 118. The SEC estimates in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 unaccredited
investors joined only 6% of Reg D 506(b) offerings and raised between 2%-3% of Reg D 506(b) capital during that
time. Concept Release, supra note 2 at 79.
45
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
46
Reg D 504 permits issuers to raise up to $5 million in a 12-month period from an unlimited number of investors
without regard to whether those investors are accredited. The Final Rules raised the offer limit to $10 million.
Facilitating Capital Formation, supra n. 1 at 140. Issuers conducting a Rule 504 offering are not subject to the
information requirements in Rule 502(b) but are subject to Blue Sky laws. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2019).
47
The Commission repealed Reg D 505 in 2016. See Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities
Offerings, Release No. 33-10238, 81 Fed. Reg. 83494 (Nov. 21, 2016). Reg D 505 ceased on May 22, 2017.
48
Kellye Y. Testy, The Capital Markets in Transition: A Response to New SEC Rule 144A, 66 IND. L.J. 233, 242
(1990). Testy uses the term ‘private placement’ which connotes securities sold under Securities Act Section 4(a)(2),
not only Regulation D its Commission-created nonexclusive safe harbor. But as experience shows and noted by
Testy, Reg D is the primary means of effectuating private placements.
49
See supra note 17.
40
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18 to “cover” certain securities from Blue Sky laws, including Commission safe harbors under
Securities Act Section 4(a)(2).50 After NSMIA, the private-placement market exploded.51
JOBS Act Title II required the Commission to adopt rules for generally solicited accredited
investors. Instead of a simple declaration, issuers needed to verify status through “reasonable
steps.” Congress directed the Commission to define “reasonable steps.” It also exempted broker
dealer registration for website offers under the title meeting certain requirements.52
The Commission finalized rules on July 10, 2013.53 It split Reg D into two parts. Reg D
506(b) would remain the “old” Reg D that forbade general solicitation. Reg D 506(c) would sate
Title II.54 The Commission defined two “reasonable steps” methods. First was “principles
based.” The second was a non-exhaustive list of verification documents.
For the first, issuers could reasonably determine status by analyzing each purchaser and
transaction via ‘facts and circumstances.’ The Commission listed factors such as the nature of the
purchaser and the type of accredited investor the purchaser claimed; the amount and type of
information the issuer had about the purchaser, the offering nature, such as how the issuer
solicited the purchaser, and the offering terms, such as minimum investment.55
The non-exhaustive verification documents were imposing. Verifying through income
included: two most recent years of IRS forms including W2, 1099, Schedule K-1 to Form 1065,
and Form 1040, and a declaration stating the purchaser reasonably expected to reach necessary
income levels during the current year.56 Net-worth verification included: bank statements,
brokerage statements and other statements of securities holdings, certificates of deposit, tax
assessments, and independent third-party appraisal reports. With respect to liabilities: a
consumer report from at least one nationwide consumer-reporting agency. And a declaration
stating the purchaser had disclosed all liabilities needed to determine net worth. All only valid if
dated within three months.57 The Commission also allowed certain third-party professionals such
as broker dealers, investment advisors, attorneys, and CPAs to verify status.58
B. Regulation A+
Unlike Reg D, issuers had mostly shunned Regulation A. The Commission adopted
Regulation A under the authority of Securities Act Section 3(b) soon after the Securities Act of

50

See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(F) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a) (2019).
Rutheford B. Campbell, Comment Letter on Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering
Exemptions (June 18, 2019) at 9, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6240706-192714.pdf [hereinafter
Campbell Letter] (“The migration to the Rule 506 exemption was driven by state blue sky laws requiring
registration. State registration authority over Rule 506 offers was preempted by the National Securities Market
Improvement Act (15 U.S.C. § 77r (2019)).”); cf. Burton Letter, supra note 23, at 32 (“Regulation D is a success
story. . . . It is a success because it is a lightly regulated means of raising capital and because of the preemption of
state Blue Sky registration and qualification laws with respect to Rule 506 offerings since the enactment of the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996.”).
52
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 313–15 (2012).
53
Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A
Offerings, Release No. 33-9415, 78 Fed. Reg. 44771 (July 24, 2013).
54
Id. at 17-18.
55
Id. at 27-28.
56
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(A).
57
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(B).
58
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(C).
51
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1933 to shield smaller issuers from registration.59 Current Regulation A issuers must traverse a
Commission-led qualification process, which averages over two months and involves back and
forth between issuer and staff.60 The exemption floundered despite the Commission repeatedly
raising the offer limit and eventually loosening communication rules.61 Use spiked slightly after
1992 changes but quickly crested. Issuers filed 116 Regulation A offerings in 1997, dropping to
19 in 2011. Qualified offerings dropped from 57 in 1998 to 1 in 2011.62 Issuers spurned
Regulation A because of its complexities, time-consuming qualification process, lack of Blue
Sky preemption, low limits, and Reg D options.63
Congress again tried to boost Regulation A with JOBS Act Title IV, which added Section
3(b)(2) to Regulation A statutory authority in Securities Act Section 3(b). This became known as
Reg A+.64 It increased the offer limit from $5 million to $50 million, securities could be offered
and sold publicly, were “unrestricted” under federal law, and issuers could ‘test the waters.’
Congress also, however, mandated disclosure and compliance obligations including audited
financial statements and periodic reports. It also limited available security types. It ordered
biennial offer-limit reviews and commissioned a Government Accountability Office report on
Blue Sky-law impact.65 It also “covered” the securities from Blue Sky laws for “Qualified
Purchasers,” a term Congress charged the Commission with defining.66
The Commission adopted final rules on March 25, 2015.67 It split Reg A+ into two tiers. The
Commission limited Tier 1 to $20 million annually, while Tier 2 retained the $50 million limit.68
It cabined how much selling securityholders could sell at first offering and within the following
12 months to 30% aggregate offering price. And further limited affiliates to a hard ceiling.
Federally, Reg A+ shares would be freely tradable.69 Tier 2 accredited investors were uncapped
but the Commission limited unaccredited investors to the greater of 10% annual income or net
59

See generally Amend. to Rules of Prac., Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 33-632 (West) (Jan. 21, 1936).
Compare Get Your Reg A+ Offering Qualified by the SEC, MANHATTAN STREET CAPITAL,
https://www.manhattanstreetcapital.com/faq/for-fundraisers/get-your-reg-a-offering-qualified-sec (last visited Sept.
21, 2020) (pegging average time at 71 days and “dealing with the SEC is likely to be a multi-step process”), with
Rod Turner, These 32 Companies Raised $396 Mill Using Regulation A+, Entrepreneurs: You Have A New Option,
FORBES (Mar. 14, 2017, 6:54 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rodnturner/2017/03/14/how-they-did-it-32companies-successfully-raised-capital-via-regulation-a/#6e4c45f37cde (pegging the average at 78 days).
61
Concept Release, supra note 2, at 86 n.272. The initial Regulation A offering limit was $100,000. Id. The
Commission raised it several times thereafter. Id. Finally, in 1992, it raised it to $5 million and allowed ‘testing the
waters’ communications. Id.; see generally Small Business Initiatives, FR-391 (July 30, 1992) (as codified by 57 FR
36442-01 (Aug. 13, 1992)); Small Business Initiatives, Release Nos. 33-6949, 34-30968, 39-2287 (West) (July 30,
1992).
62
A. NICOLE CLOWERS, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: FACTORS
THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), at 8-9.
63
See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Article, Regulation A: Small Businesses’ Search for “A Moderate Capital”, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 77 (2006) and Brian T. Kloeblen, Comment, Splitting the Baby: The Death of Small Business, 48
SETON HALL L. REV. 535 (2018), for a review of Regulation A’s lack of use prior to the JOBS Act.
64
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401, 126 Stat. 306, 324 (2012) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2–5)); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.250–263.
65
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401, 126 Stat. 306, 323–25 (2012) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2–5)).
66
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D)(ii).
67
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Release No.
33-9741 (West) (Mar. 25, 2015) [hereinafter Regulation A Release]; 80 Fed. Reg. 21805 (Apr. 20, 2015).
68
17 C.F.R. § 230.251.
69
Regulation A Release, supra note 67, at 35 n. 98.
60
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worth.70 It defined Qualified Purchasers as any Tier 2 purchaser.71 The Commission
conditionally exempted Tier 2 from the 12(g) Rule provided issuers remained compliant with
ongoing reporting, hired a transfer agent, and remained under certain public float or revenue
thresholds,72 in addition to 12(g) Rule recordholder and asset criteria.73
The Commission made offering circulars and disclosures akin to smaller registered offerings,
especially for Tier 2.74 This meant ongoing reporting including annual reports,75 semi-annual
reports,76 and “current event” reports.77 Annual reports cover among other topics: three years’
business operations, interested transactions, beneficial ownership of voting securities, identities
of directors, officers, and significant employees, executive compensation, management
discussion and analysis of liquidity, capital resources, two years’ operation results, and two
years’ audited financial statements.78 Semi-annual reports include additional management
discussion and analysis and financial statements similar to registered offering’s Form 10-Q.79
Moreover Tier 2 issuers must disclose within four business days any Commission-deemed
“significant and substantial” event.80 The final rules did not require Tier 1 ongoing reporting.
These issuers must only file Form 1-Z exit reports 30 days after completing or terminating an
offering.81 This contains only summary information including qualification date, amount of
securities qualified, amount sold, price, amount sold by selling security holders, fees, and net
proceeds.82
The Commission reversed itself in one respect and failed to act in others. It originally
proposed to exempt offers from Blue Sky laws for both tiers and sales for Tier 2. But the final
rules exempted only offers and sales for Tier 2, Tier 1 offers and sales would be subject to stateby-state compliance.83 The Commission reasoned Tier 1’s anticipated local nature should
portend state regulatory authority. After a vigorous and coordinated effort to kill Reg A+
preemption,84 the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), the state
regulators’ association, responded to the JOBS Act and complaints about onerous double review
The Commission deserves credit for defining “Qualified Purchasers” in Tier 2 as purchasers of those securities
without additional complexities requested by state regulators and consumer groups. See generally 17 C.F.R. §
230.251(d)(2)(C) (2020); Regulation A Release, supra note 67, at 208–10 and attending footnotes.
71
17 C.F.R. § 230.256.
72
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1(a)(7).
73
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1.
74
Regulation A Release, supra note 67, at 98.
75
17 C.F.R. § 230.257(b)(1).
76
17 C.F.R. § 230.257(b)(3).
77
17 C.F.R. § 230.257(b)(4).
78
Part II of Form 1-K.
79
See Regulation A Release, supra note 67, at 170. Part I (Financial Information) of Form 10-Q, does not include
other parts of Form 10-Q like quantitative and qualitative market risk, controls and procedures, updates to risk
factors, or defaults on senior securities. Form 10–Q, for Quarterly and Transition Reports Under Sections 13 or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (2020).
80
Form 1-U, 17 C.F.R. § 230.257(b)(4).
81
17 C.F.R. § 230.257(a).
82
17 C.F.R. § 230.257(b)(4); Regulation A Release, supra note 67, at 160.
83
Id. at 206, 213-214.
84
Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The SEC's Regulation A+: Small Business Goes under the Bus Again, 104 KY. L.J.
325, 334 (2016), https://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1589&context=law_facpub [hereinafter
Campbell, Under the Bus]; cf. Letter from NASAA to Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n
(Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/NASAA-Letter-Regarding-RegA+_021914.pdf [NASAA Letter]
70
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with a “Coordinated Review Plan”85 it claimed would “ease regulatory burdens for filers without
sacrificing investor protection.”86 The Commission also declined to exempt Reg A+ secondary
trading despite commenter support.87 The Commission stated it needed time to “review and
consider changes” but preempting secondary trading would not be “appropriate at the outset.”88
Thus, despite Congress designating Reg A+ securities unrestricted, the Commission ensured Tier
1 offers, sales, and resales and Tier 2 resales would face state scrutiny.
C. Regulation Crowdfunding
JOBS Act Title III created a crowdfunding tool for smaller issuers and retail investors. It
amended the Securities Act to add Section 4(a)(6).89 Issuers could raise $1 million per 12-months
with periodic inflation adjudgments.90 In 2017, the Commission adjusted the limit to $1.07
million.91 The law set individual limits based on an aggregate net worth, annual-income formula.
Investors could devote $2,000 or 5% of annual income or net worth if either was less than
$100,000 (it did not specify which financial marker applied, for instance ‘greater of’ or ‘lesser
of’ the two) or 10% if either was equal or more than $100,000, with a maximum aggregate cap of
$100,000.92 Issuers would sell through broker dealers or a new statutory creation: funding portal
intermediaries (portals).93
The statute set issuer disclosures, including business plan, officers and directors, capital
structure, tiered financial documents up to audits, use of proceeds, amount sought, valuation,
risks, and promoter compensation. It restricted communication about offers and sales and
required annual reports.94 The statute restricted first-year resales except to certain offerees.95 It
directed the Commission to exempt Title III securities “conditionally or unconditionally” from
the 12(g) Rule,96 and preempted Blue Sky laws.97 Congress also limited state filing fees to issuer
principal place of business or where it sold 50% or more securities.98 Title III also ordered

NASAA’s Coordinated Review Program for Regulation A Offerings, NASAA, https://www.nasaa.org/industryresources/securities-issuers/coordinated-review/regulation-a-offerings/. Some states do not participate in program
including Arizona, Florida, and New York. See NASAA, APPLICATION FOR COORDINATED REVIEW OF REGULATION
A OFFERING, https://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/20160721-Coordinated-Review-Application-Sec3b.pdf [hereinafter NASAA APPLICATION].
86
See NASAA Letter, supra note 84, at 1.
87
Regulation A Release, supra note 67, at 212 n. 791 (listing commenters supporting state preemption of secondary
trading).
88
Id. at 228 n. 833.
89
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 315–23 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)).
90
Id. § 302(a)(6)(A) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A)).
91
Inflation Adjustments and Other Technical Amendments under Titles I and III of the JOBS Act (Technical
Amendments; Interpretation), Release No. 33-10332, 82 Fed. Reg. 17545 (Apr. 12, 2017).
92
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(a)(6)(B), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)).
93
Id. at § 302(a)(6)(C) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C)).
94
Id. at § 4A(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d–1(b)).
95
Id. at § 4A(e) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d–1(e)).
96
Id. at § 303 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(6)).
97
Id. at § 305 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(C)).
98
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 305(c)(F), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012), (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(2)(F)).
85
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certain portal requirements99and exempted them from state interference with respect to their
businesses as such.100
The Commission adopted Regulation Crowdfunding (Reg CF) rules on October 30, 2015.101
The rules restricted Reg CF further where the Commission deemed public interest required and
did not expand any material rules. For instance, despite warnings the modest $1 million statutory
limit would hamper use,102 the Commission kept it for consistency and because of Reg CF’s
novelty.103 The Commission also conservatively approached individual limits. The final rules
clarified limits applied to all Reg CF investors, even accredited investors. The Commission
recognized the capital-formation burden but justified it on Congressional intent and to minimize
investor risk in crowdfunding transactions.104 Final rules required investors to meet the $100,00
threshold for both annual income and net worth for the 10% bracket and $100,000 cap. If
investors did not meet both they faced the lower 5% bracket. And it imposed the lesser of annual
income or net worth as the limit once in either bracket. The Commission kept the statutory tiered
financial-statements review but did exempt first-time issuers from audits.105 It also kept the
statutory discussion of risk factors.106
The Commission required further disclosures beyond statutory mandates.107 For example,
while the statute only required director and officer names (and any persons occupying a similar
status or performing similar functions) the Commission required three-years’ business
experience including principal occupation and employment, including positions with other
corporations or organizations.108 It also regulated oversubscriptions,109 how investors could
complete or cancel investments,110 and required investors reconfirm commitments after material
changes, or the investment would cancel and funds automatically return.111
The Commission required several other ‘public interest’ disclosures.112 These included
intermediary compensation and other interests in the transaction,113 number of issuer
employees,114 material indebtedness,115 past three years of exempt capital raises,116 transactions
by interested persons including officers, directors, major equity holders, promoters, or family

99

Id. at § 304 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)–(h)).
Id. at § 305(d) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i)(2)).
101
Crowdfunding, Release No. 33-9974, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387 (Nov. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Crowdfunding Release].
Regulation Crowdfunding became effective on May 16, 2016.
102
Id. at 16 n. 21.
103
Id. at 17.
104
Id. at 25, 28.
105
17 C.F.R. § 227.201(t)(3).
106
17 C.F.R. § 227.201(f).
107
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 4A(b)(1)(F), 126 Stat. 306, 317 (2012) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d–1(b)(1)(F)); 17 C.F.R. § 227.201(g).
108
17 C.F.R. § 227.201(b).
109
Id. at § 227.201(h).
110
Id. at § 227.201(j).
111
Id. at § 227.201(k).
112
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 4A(b)(1)(I), 126 Stat. 306, 318 (2012) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d–1(b)(1)(I)).
113
17 C.F.R. § 227.201(o).
114
Id. at § 227.201(e).
115
Id. at § 227.201(p).
116
Id. at § 227.201(q)
100
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members that exceed a commission-defined 5% threshold,117 a narrative discussion and analysis
by management of financial condition, including, to the extent material, liquidity, capital
resources, and historical operation results.118 The Commission also mandated issuers include
additional material information to make the disclosures not misleading “in light of the
circumstances in which they were made.”119 And it required disclosure of any missed annual
reports.120 As for the 12(g) Rule the Commission conditionally exempted Reg CF provided
issuers remained current in reporting, had less than $25 million in assets, and hired a registered
transfer agent.121
The Commission also limited issuer communication aligned with and beyond the statute.
First it required all transactions occur through portals.122 This essentially forbade in person
investor meetings.123 The Commission restricted issuer advertising outside portals to
“tombstone” ads124 that contained statutory “terms” and other factual information about issuer
legal identity, location, contact information, and a brief business description.125 Adverts could
not include more information but instead must hyperlink to portals. The Commission further
clarified “terms” as amount of securities offered, security type, price, and offer closing date.126
The Commission did provide flexibility for the online and social-media environs offers would
appear.127

IV.

THE JOBS ACT FAILED TO CREATE EXPECTED OPPORTUNITIES

Despite President Obama’s hope, the JOBS Act changed little. Eight years hence, it has
not democratized investing.128 Critics have labeled various provisions “generally

117

Id. at § 227.201(r).
Id. at § 227.201(s).
119
Id. at § 227.201(y).
120
Id. at § 227.201(x).
121
Id. at § 240.12g–6.
122
Id. at § 227.100(a)(3).
123
Crowdfunding Release, supra note 101, at 31-32.
124
17 C.F.R. § 230.134.
125
17 C.F.R. § 227.204(b).
126
Instruction to 17 C.F.R. § 227.204.
127
Crowdfunding Release, supra note 101, at 140-141.
128
2018 Forum Report, supra note. 36
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disappointing,”129 a “dismal failure,”130 “unmitigated disaster for investors,” 131 and “widely
regarded as not being worth the effort.”132
Data confirm the sour labels. Through 2019 all JOBS Act titles had at least three-and-half
years to mature. Yet the SEC estimates Reg D still captured 95.7% of the main private
investment market.133

A. Regulation D 506(c) so far
Reg D 506(c) sought to widen accredited investor circles beyond known funding
channels through general solicitation. But Reg D 506(c) only dots the private-placement
landscape capturing 4.2% of the Reg D market.134 Reg D beats Reg D 506(c) both in aggregate
and average.135

Peter Rasmussen, ANALYSIS: Rule 506(c)’s General Solicitation Remains Generally Disappointing,
BLOOMBERG L., May 26, 2017, 3:00 PM, https://www.bna.com/rule-506cs-general-b73014451604/; cf. Sec. Indus.
& Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Comment Letter on Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions
(Sept. 24, 2019), at 3, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6193329-192494.pdf (stating that the
reliance on Reg D 506(c) is “lower than expected”); Xavier Becerra. et al., Comment Letter on Concept Release on
Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions (Sept. 24, 2019), at 6, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-0819/s70819-6193375-192522.pdf [Becerra Letter] (stating that participation in Reg CF and Reg A+ “significantly less
than anticipated” referencing comments by SEC Investor Advocate).
130
Campbell Letter, supra note 51 at 18.
131
Consumer Fed’n of Am., Comment Letter on Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering
Exemptions (Oct. 1, 2019), at 56, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6235037-192692.pdf
[hereinafter Consumer Federation Letter] (referring to Reg A+).
132
Usha R. Rodrigues, Financial Contracting with the Crowd, 69 EMORY L.J. 397, 400 (2019),
http://law.emory.edu/elj/content/volume-69/issue-3/articles/financial-contracting-with-crowd.html [hereinafter
Rodrigues, Financial Contracting] (referring to Reg CF); cf. Burton Letter, supra note 23, at 47 (“Few firms have
proven willing to deal with the costs and obligations of Regulation CF to raise under a million dollars.”).
133
This figure does not count “Other Exempt Offerings” which contain mainly Rule 144A buyers and Regulation S.
Rule 144A is a nonexclusive safe harbor for resales of restricted securities. It typically involves a two-step process
involving a sale to a financial institution and a resale to a “Qualified Institutional Buyer.” Regulation S transactions
involve offshore transactions not involving direct selling in the U.S. See Concept Release, supra note 2, at 19–20; 15
U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).
134
See Table 1.
135
Concept Release, supra note 2, at 80.
129
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B. Regulation A+ so far
From June 2015 through 2019, Reg A+ issuers raised $2.446 billion.136 Issuers preferred Tier
2 raising about 91% despite ongoing reporting.137 Even issuers who sought amounts within Tier
1 range and thus could choose either often chose to avoid state-level review. According to the
Commission, “The larger Tier 2 offering limit does not appear to be the sole factor for issuers’
decision between tiers, given that approximately 43% of filed Tier 2 offerings and 41% of
qualified Tier 2 offerings sought amounts not exceeding the Tier 1 offering limit of $20
million.”138 The reasons Tier 1 should be abandoned are discussed below. But after five years, its
disfavor is manifest.

136

RPT. TO THE COMM., REGULATION A LOOKBACK STUDY AND OFFERING LIMIT REVIEW ANALYSIS, at 5 (Mar. 4,
2020), https://www.sec.gov/files/regulationa-2020.pdf [hereinafter Regulation A Report].
137
Id. at 9.
138
Id.
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C. Regulation Crowdfunding so far
Unlike Reg A+ and Reg D 506(c), Reg CF had no analog and was Congress’s boldest move.
It has also disappointed though adoption has steadily grown as awareness increased and
successes emerged. Crowdfund Capital Advisors, which curates Reg CF data estimates that from
May 2016 through 2019 issuers raised almost $263 million, with gaudy 2018-2019 year-to-year
growth of 37%, and had pumped almost one billion into local economies.139

JD Alois, Sherwood Neiss of Crowdfund Capital Advisors Updates on Reg CF Progress: “Successful Reg CF
companies have pumped almost $1 billion into local economies.” CROWDFUND INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2020/02/157163-sherwood-neiss-of-crowdfund-capital-advisors-updates-on-regcf-progress-successful-reg-cf-companies-have-pumped-almost-1-billion-into-local-economies/.
139
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Despite impressive Reg CF growth,140 Reg D still dwarfs it with almost $1.5 trillion
raised in 2019.141 Comparing Reg D within Reg CF constraints, differences remain stark. By
SEC data, from mid-2016 through 2018 Reg CF had 519 completed raises totaling $108.2
million. During that time and within Reg CF limits, approximately 12,700 Reg D issuers raised
$4.5 billion.142
D. Critics contend JOBS Act disappointments mean its titles should be scrapped or curtailed
Despite progress and allowing issuer and regulator adjustment time, the JOBS Act has mostly
floundered. The Commission admits “modest” use.143 This has led hostile interests—state

140

Due in part to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has limited in-person issuer-investor interaction, Reg CF has
enjoyed exponential growth in 2020. According to Crowdfund Capital Advisors, as of October 31, 2020 nationwide
online investment is up 62.5% and the number of investors is up 80% from the first ten months of 2019. Crowdfund
Capital Advisors, Monthly Funding Recap October 2020: Highest Amount Ever for Investments as SEC Increases
Maximum Raise to $5M, (November 12, 2020), https://crowdfundcapitaladvisors.com/monthly-funding-recapoctober-2020-highest-amount-ever-for-investments-as-sec-increases-maximum-raise-to-5m/.
141
Final Rules, supra note 1 at 9.
142
Concept Release, supra note 2, at 148.
143
Facilitating Capital Formation, supra note 3, at 119 (“While the 2015 amendments have stimulated the
Regulation A offering market, aggregate Regulation A financing levels remain modest relative to traditional IPOs
and the Regulation D market.”); Facilitating Capital Formation, supra note 3, at 265 (“[T]he use of Regulation A by
reporting companies has been modest to date.”); Facilitating Capital Formation, supra note 3, at 126 (“The study
found that during the considered period, while the [Regulation Crowdfunding] market exhibited growth . . . the
number of offerings and the total amount of funding were relatively modest.”).
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regulators, consumer groups, and academics—to call for its elimination or severe curtailing,144
particularly the 12(g) Rule.145 In support they cite underuse and fraud concerns.146 Under this
view only the bulwark of registration and revitalized public markets can protect retail investors
and revive gloried mid-20th century days. But this path would hinder U.S. global
competitiveness, particularly with the emerging token economy, which will never conform to
registered offerings.

V.

THE JOBS ACT FAILURE IS A FAILURE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
A. SEC culture contributed to JOBS Act failures

Instead of scrapping the JOBS Act, a more fruitful analysis may explain why these
exemptions underperformed. This task must begin with the legal authority and people who made
the rules. The bureaucratic mindset is self-regarded, slow, ponderous, and risk averse.147
Bureaucrats view themselves as ‘white hat’ protectors, defending the public from dodgy privatesector actors. This view pervades Western tradition.148 But it did not originally ensconce the
See e.g., Consumer Federation Letter., supra note 131, at 103–04, (“[G]iven the abysmal performance of Reg A+
securities since the JOBS Act was adopted, the Commission should give serious consideration to whether the
exemption should be scaled back or eliminated entirely.”); Americans for Fin. Reform Educ. Fund & AFL-CIO,
Comment Letter on Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions (Sept. 30, 2019), at 3,
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6233332-192690.pdf (stating that further proposed expansion of
private exemptions to encourage utilization is “highly disturbing”); Letter from Tyler Gellasch, Exec. Dir., Healthy
Markets to the SEC on the Concept Release (Sept. 30, 2019), at 29, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-0819/s70819-6233891-192709.pdf (“[W]e urge the Commission to consider curtailing or eliminating some of the
obvious failures of past efforts to spur capital formation.”); Erik Gerding et al., Comment Letter on Concept Release
on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions (Sept. 24, 2019), at 9,15, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s708-19/s70819-6193340-192501.pdf (commenting that retail investors should be “encouraged” and “steered” into
low-cost index funds of public securities and stating that “Congress and the Commission may need to take more
aggressive action to usher firms into the public markets”); Christopher Gerold, Comment Letter on Concept Release
on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, (Oct. 11, 2019), at 1, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-0819/s70819-6288085-193367.pdf [hereinafter Gerold Letter] (“NASAA supports a reexamination of the private
offering framework with a goal towards strengthening and growing our public securities markets and rejects the
view that modernizing the securities regulatory framework requires expanding the availability of private
offerings.”).
145
Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company, 68
HASTINGS L. J. 445, 469 (2017) (stating that JOBS Act rendered Rule 12(g) “toothless”); cf. Written Testimony of
Renee M. Jones (Sep. 11 2019), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba16-wstate-jonesr20190911.pdf (“The most effective way for Congress to shore up shrinking public equity markets is to reverse the
JOBS Act amendments to Section 12(g).”); Usha R. Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section 12(G),
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1529 (2015).
146
Corrie Driebusch & Juliet Chung, IPO Shortcuts Put Burden on Investors to Identify Risk, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 6,
2018), http://on.wsj.com/2p4n8kf (stating that questionable offerings and fraud allegations have plagued some early
Reg A+ offerings as it finds its market footing); Bill Alpert et al., Most Mini-IPOs Fail the Market Test, BARRON’S,
(Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/most-mini-ipos-fail-the-market-test1518526753?mod=rss_barrons_this_week_magazine; Alexander Osipovich, Exchanges Shy Away From Mini-IPOs
After Fraud Concerns, WALL ST. J., (June 10, 2019), https://on.wsj.com/2lrPWET.
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American project. It prevailed only after intense early 20th Century battles.149 The thesis
professed during the Progressive Era and accepted during the New Deal was modern life was too
complex and its problems too complicated for legislators. A government of administration was
needed, one staffed with apolitical technocrats.150 In the decades since, these administrative-state
features have rarely been questioned.151 Administrative experts bathe in minutia. They disdain
hard rules in favor of nuanced multi-factor analysis. This provides officials maximum flexibility
and impedes courts from second guessing them.
Created as a direct response to the country’s worst economic crisis, the SEC, perhaps more
than any other agency, typifies the New Deal mindset.152 This culture tracks the larger
government mindset but is particularly pronounced given Commission prominence. Staff write
prolix rules, reserve immense power for themselves, are skeptical of innovation, and distrustful
of outsiders. Cultural hostility manifests through rules designed for established and familiar
actors.153 Despite stated Commission belief its “rules and regulations should be drafted to enable
market participants to clearly understand their obligations under the federal securities laws and to
conduct their activities in compliance with law.”154 And its aim to “promulgate rules that are
clearly written, easily understood, and tailored toward specific ends.”155 Reality is different.
Smaller issuers must traverse sprawling rules, many strewn with unweighted factors, that confuse
even seasoned securities lawyers.
As Commissioner Hester Peirce stated in 2019, “Entrepreneurship and innovation do not
have the happiest of relationships with regulation. Regulators get used to dealing with the
existing players in an industry, and those players tend to have teams of people dedicated to
dealing with regulators. . .. Regulators . . . tend to be skeptical of change because its
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consequences are difficult to foresee and figuring out how it fits into existing regulatory
frameworks is difficult.”156
The Commission’s enforcement-first mindset further augurs resistance to innovation and
outsiders.157 The SEC Enforcement Division has 1,400 Full Time Equivalent staff, more than any
other.158 The division’s FY 2019 budget request was its largest at almost $532 million.159 The
Commission’s enforcement approach explains stocked personnel and massive budgets. Staff
wrench potential violations through “facts and circumstances” analysis.160 This can mean
intrusive years-long investigations that bleed companies dry. The Commission meets its stated
goal to bring enforcement actions within two years of investigation starts barely half the time.161
One securities lawyer described SEC investigations like “living in hell without dying.”162 The
Commission boasts (though in bureaucratic terms) of its power to bleed companies that may or
may not have violated a law. “In addition to victories in the cases the agency brings to trial, the
SEC’s litigation efforts also help the SEC obtain strong settlements in other cases by providing a
credible trial threat and making it clear that the SEC will go deep into litigation and to trial, if
necessary, in order to obtain appropriate relief.”163
B. Overemphasis on Investor Protection Hurts Entrepreneurs and Curtails Innovation
The Commission justifies its approach through laudable investor-protection goals. The
Commission’s mission is tripartite, to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”164 But in practice, protecting investors always trumps
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its conflicting prongs.165 States go even further. Currently, thirty conduct merit review or reserve
the right to,166 despite past glaring failures.167
In balancing its conflicting mission, the Commission not only over-relies on investor
protection but also one type. David Burton states four investor-protection ideas.168 First is
prosecuting fraud. This is a clear government function and securities regulation reifies antifraud.
The second is providing potential investors with issuer background for informed decisions. This
requires weighing useful disclosure to ensure company validity with issuer-bourne costs. It is
worth noting Reg D has succeeded without mandatory disclosure.169 Third is protecting investors
from what regulators deem imprudent choices. The Commission does this by investment limits,
barring unaccredited-investor opportunities, favoring certain exemptions through policy, and
subjecting some exemptions to state-level registration and merit review. One Concept Release
commenter put it colorfully, “It feels absurd that the average person can buy a $5,000 wedding
cake and sit down in front of the bakery to eat the whole thing in one sitting… BUT they cannot
invest that same amount in a technology business. People make bad financial decisions every
day: drive cars they can’t afford, blow their whole paycheck at the casino, have a $50,000
wedding followed by a $50,000 divorce a year later… and the law is silent!”170 Fourth is
protecting investors’ freedom to risk their money. This was and remains a major flaw in the RegD-centric regime the JOBS Act sought to change.
The latter two investor-protection concepts are dubious government functions. Protecting
people from what regulators consider “bad” choices through either limits, “creeping federal merit
review,”171 or barred opportunities is paternalistic.172 Regulators are naturally risk averse and
have no special market acumen. Further, as explained below, private-ordering systems where
large investors perform due diligence and retail investors join has worked elsewhere.
Mandatory disclosure has sturdier foundation but questionable utility. This is particularly true
for small issuers and must be weighed against imposed costs. Disclosure has hallmarked federal
securities law since the Commission’s advent. Congress championed it among policy
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alternatives.173 Disclosure follows the aphorism ‘Sunlight is the best disinfectant.’ But it has
nebulous empirical value. In fact, much scholarly disclosure research shows no definitive
benefits.174 As former SEC Chair Mary Schapiro testified, “It is notoriously hard to quantify the
benefits of any regulation. How do you quantify the benefits of preventing a fraud?”175 Scholars
have criticized burdens on public companies for this difficult-to-quantify benefit.176 Those
companies can presumably absorb imposed costs. But it does not translate to smaller companies
the JOBS Act tried to help.
Regulators have not balanced fraud-prevention goals with its impact on legitimate issuers and
investors’ freedom to contract. No regulatory regime even in principle should aim to be
completely free of fraud.177 Costs are too high, and the goal contradicts human nature. And it has
proven impossible despite the best intentions, decades of experience, and rules designed solely to
prevent it.178 Comparing Reg A+, Reg D, and Reg CF illustrates this. Critics point to
questionable Reg A+ issuers in the first few years,179 and state regulators complain about Reg D
fraudsters.180 Yet Reg A+ issuers undergo a thorough Commission-led qualification process to
ensure adequate disclosure and accurate financial status. Reg D with the least oversight garners
more capital than public markets—an impossibility if investors feared fraud. Reg CF has avoided
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substantive fraud accusations thus far181 likely because portals are liable but as shown below
private-ordered systems function just as well.182 Thus of the three exemptions, the most regulated
had the highest proportion of questionable issuers. Yet not even the Commission shares critics
gloomy view, noting the dearth of legal actions under Reg A+.183 The contradiction should augur
a reexamination of the current Commission balance between investor protection and individual
and investor freedom.
C. SEC JOBS Act Hostility was Open and Straightforward
These factors: penchant for prolix rules, distrust of outsiders and innovation, and
overemphasis on investor protection converged in the Commission’s hostile attitude to the JOBS
Act.
Commissioners flaunted enmity from its start. While Congress debated, Chair Schapiro wrote
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs concerned the act would subject
investors to “fraudulent schemes designed as investment opportunities.”184 She specifically
deigned crowdfunding as lacking sufficient safeguards. In a later hearing Rep. Patrick McHenry
(R-NC) described the letter as “being sideswiped by a regulatory body at the eleventh hour” and
lamented the Chair hadn’t earlier addressed her concerns to the bill’s sponsors.185 Fellow
Commissioner Luis Aguilar was forthright, “I cannot sit idly by when I see potential legislation
that could harm investors. This bill seems to impose tremendous costs and potential harm on
investors with little or no corresponding benefit.”186 Commission opposition pervaded both
drafting and implementation.187 Edward Knight, Executive Vice President and General Counsel
of NASDAQ, testified in a congressional hearing: “From the outset the SEC’s view of [equity
crowdfunding] was they were not for this they and made it, shall I say, needlessly complicated

181

Securities and Exchange Commission, RPT. TO THE COMM. ON REGULATION CROWDFUNDING (Jun. 18, 2019), at
42 [hereinafter SEC, REGULATION CROWDFUNDING].
182
See infra Part VII.A.
183
Regulation A Report, supra n. 136 at 25 (While acknowledging concerns with certain Reg A+ issuers that
obtained exchange listings, describing “relatively few” legal proceedings and stating, it was “not clear additional
investor protections are necessary at this time.”).
184
Hon. Mary L. Schapiro SEC Chair letter to Chair Hon. Tim Johnson Chair and Ranking Member Hon. Richard
Shelby, Ranking Member, Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Sen. (Mar. 13, 2012).
https://www.aicpa.org/Advocacy/Issues/DownloadableDocuments/404b/3-1312_SEC_Chm_Schapiro_Letter_to_Johnson.pdf. Cf. David S. Hilzenrath, Jobs Act Could Remove Investor
Protections, SEC Chair Schapiro Warns, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/jobs-act-could-open-a-door-to-investment-fraud-sec-chiefsays/2012/03/14/gIQA1vx1BS_story.html; Edward Wyatt, Senate Seeks to Toughen a Bill Aimed at Startups, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 19, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/business/senate-seeks-to-toughen-jobs-bill-aimed-ateasing-rules-on-start-ups.html.
185
The JOBS Act in Action Part II: Overseeing Effective Implementation that can Grow American Jobs, supra note
175, at 26-7.
186
Hon. Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Comm., quoted in speech by Sen. Jack Reed (Mar. 16, 2012),
https://www.reed.senate.gov/news/speeches/jobs-act.
187
CrowdFund Beat, The JOBS Act – Legislative History and Future Opportunities (May 11, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zn97Cwzg5YA (Dina Ellis Rochkind discussing SEC opposition to the JOBS
Act during bill formation).

46

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:2: Feb. 2021

and did not approach it except as this this was something where the public is going to get harmed
and we need to narrow it as much as possible.”188
D. Hostility to JOBS Act Innovations has Far-Reaching Consequences for the Future U.S.
Economy
Commission hostility plagues more than Reg CF issuers raising small amounts. The JOBS
Act is currently the best available emissary to the approaching token economy because it can
meld network users and investors. Ongoing Commission grapples with token sales and
blockchain thwart this potential. These innovations will never fit registered offerings and thus
issuers must use private exemptions. Bitcoin, the first public blockchain, emerged out of the
2008-2009 financial crisis. The first Initial Coin Offering (ICO)—selling crypto tokens that act
as potential keys and currency on future blockchain ventures—occurred in 2013.189 Yet digital
assets so flummoxed the Commission, in 2018 it created a Senior Advisor for Digital Assets and
Innovation post and filled it with career SEC bureaucrat Valerie Szczepanik.190
After ICOs exploded in 2017, the Commission flooded issuers with subpoenas and
enforcement actions. To be sure, many ICOs were frauds deserving prosecution.191 Still, goodfaith actors requested Commission guidance. The Commission spent at least six months192
forming a 13-page “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets.”193 But
instead of clarifying, the document obfuscated. The guidance steeped numerous factors over
already unclear direction. While the unsigned document reiterated prior Commission statements
it would determine compliance via individual “facts and circumstances” grounded in the
decades-old Howey test,194 it expounded further factors that conceivably could trap anything
from baseball cards to premier liquors.195 Commissioner Peirce described the guidance as a
“Jackson Pollock painting,” further explaining, “While Howey has four factors to consider, the
framework lists 38 separate considerations, many of which include several sub-points. A
seasoned securities lawyer might be able to infer which of these considerations will likely be
188
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controlling and might therefore be able to provide the appropriate weight to each. . . . I worry
that non-lawyers and lawyers not steeped in securities law and its attendant lore will not know
what to make of the guidance.”196
The confusion should not surprise given Ms. Szczepanik’s disposition. When queried she
stated, “The lack of bright-line rules allows regulators to be more flexible.”197 She later opined
‘prescriptive rules’ may allow sneaky entrepreneurs to evade law.198 From the entrepreneur
standpoint this creates worry. First Commission “flexibility” under years-long investigations and
“facts and circumstances” analysis may benefit regulators but destroys companies exploring new
technologies and ideas. Unweighted multi-factor analyses that leave even Commissioners
guessing lends itself not to law but relationships. Clear rules and open competition, not which
law firm hires former regulators should dictate market winners.
When innovative companies try following the rules, Commission “flexibility” leads to legal
limbo and obscene bills. During the 2017 ICO craze Blockstack’s approach was different.
Blockstack is a decentralized platform trying to create a more user-controlled and directed
internet through blockchain, decentralized applications, and a tokenized ecosystem.199 Instead of
testing Commission resolve or wrangling with the Howey test, Blockstack ensured compliance
through Reg A+. The qualification process reportedly took 10 months and cost $2.8 million in
legal fees.200 It cost more than the average IPO for issuers with revenue less than $100 million.201
While “bleeding edge” companies can except higher costs, six-seven figure compliance budgets
will remain unviable for all but the most well-funded startups. And Blockstack’s qualification
does not end potential liability. It plans to stop reporting once “Stacks Tokens” are fully
decentralized,202 as SEC Director of Corporate Finance Bill Hinman approved in theory.203 But
should SEC staff decide “facts and circumstances” dictate prolonged reporting it could sue
Blockstack and kill the project.
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THE FINAL RULES WILL NOT REVIVE THE JOBS ACT OR ENCOURAGE THE FUTURE TOKEN
ECONOMY

The Commission’s Final Rules expose its lack of imagination and boldness. The Final
Rules repeatedly fall short despite some welcome steps such as higher overall and individual
limits. The Commission even mars outwardly promising changes with the incrementalism. In the
years since President Obama described JOBS Act provisions as “game changers,” the
Commission has proven incapable of fostering its lofty goals. Indeed, despite the thoroughness
of the review, its impact will likely be slight. And like the JOBS Act, commenters may years
later diagnose its failure. The Final Rules are a microcosm of why Congress must act.
Strikingly, the Commission avers—allegedly satisfied by Concept Release commenters—
that major changes are unnecessary.204 Some exemptions like Reg D work well. But recalling the
JOBS Act goals of expanding retail-investor wealth opportunities and capital options for
underserved entrepreneurs, the exemptions falter. The Final Rules do not substantively address
these goals.205
A second theme is Commission belief it can solve underuse by raising overall or
individual limits. From a relative standpoint these moves lower capital costs. But they do not
address underlying issues that plague exemptions save Reg D. Only rarely does the Commission
recognize its own or states’ rules as hardships. And any movement toward relaxing those rules is
cautious and halting—a movement befitting the Commission’s New Deal pedigree but
misaligned with modern capital raising.
Rule 241 is emblematic.206 Piggybacking on Regulation A Rule 255, Rule 241 exempts
issuers generally soliciting interest before committing to a particular exemption. This rule could
help novice issuers and those living outside areas concentrated with securities lawyers or angel
networks. Discerning appetite for a raise and addressing investor concerns beforehand could
tighten issuer planning and focus. All receivers of these solicitations would be offerees for
federal antifraud law.207 Rule 241 also includes logical disclaimers like legends, no acceptance of
funds, and no binding commitments.208 But Rule 241 is likely dead on arrival209 because it fails

Final Rules, supra note 1, at 9 and n.15 collecting supporting comments. (“[A] consistent theme . . . was that
many elements of the current structure work effectively and a major restructuring is not needed.”); Cf. Facilitating
Capital Formation, supra note 3, at 6.
205
According to SEC data Regulation A and Regulation CF along with Rule 504 account for only 0.1% of private
capital raised through exemptions. Regulation D 506(c) part of the JOBS Act boosts this total but only minimally,
see Facilitating Capital Formation, supra note 3, at 115.
206
Facilitating Capital Formation, supra note 3, at 349-350.
207
Id. at 349.
208
Id. at 350.
209
Letterfrom Sara Hanks, CEO, Crowdcheck, Inc., to Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (June
11, 2020) (on file with author) (“We believe that the lack of state preemption would make the exemption almost
useless.”) [hereinafter Hanks Letter]; Cf. Letter from David Burton, Senior Fellow, Heritage Found. To Vanessa A.
Countryman, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (June 1, 2020) (on file with author) (discussing added costs and delays
of Blue Sky laws and ineffectiveness of federal provisions that don’t preempt them.) [hereinafter Burton Letter];
Letter from Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Proffessor of Ky. Coll. of Law, to Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n (August 3, 2020) (on file with author) (“Rule 241 will be impossible (or at least nearly so) for an
issuer to use. This outcome is a result of the failure of the Commission to exercise its delegated authority to preempt
state registration requirements for an issuer’s testing the water under Rule 241.”) [hereinafter Campbell Letter].
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to preempt these solicitations of interest from Blue Sky laws.210 If from nothing else, the
Commission should have learned from its Reg A+ Tier 1 experiment, issuers will rarely suffer
state-level processes.
Rule 148 the Commission’s new “Demo Day” rule exempting some actions from the
throes of ‘general solicitation’ also shows its chary approach.211 Demo Days are sponsored
events where founders discuss their companies with potential investors. After years of questions
about whether these events invoke dreaded general solicitation, the Commission addressed the
issue. To be sure, after endless handwringing a limited safe harbor is welcome. But as proposed,
the rules may provide issuers and lawyers trouble, or may ultimately be ignored. The
Commission defines a discrete set of forums exempt from general solicitation. Specifically, the
exemption would cover “a seminar or meeting in which more than one issuer participates that is
sponsored by a college, university, or other institution of higher education, State or local
government or instrumentality thereof, nonprofit organization, or angel investor group,
incubator, or accelerator.”212 It then defines “angel investor groups.”213 It also bans sponsor
investment advice, recommendations or negotiations, bans fees for introductions and limits
sponsors to “reasonable administrative fees.”214 The Commission avers sponsor limitations will
deter “profit motive.”215
Most concerningly, are restrictions the Commission places on advertising, founder demo
“pitches,” and audience. Sponsor advertising cannot mention the Demo Day presenters are
offering or plan to offer securities.216 Founders are limited to a list of four bits of offer
information: (i.) the issuer is offering or planning to offer securities; (ii.) the type and amount of
securities offered; (iii.) the intended use of proceeds; and (iv.) the unsubscribed amount the
offering.217 The Commission’s policy goal is to prevent the Demo Day event from devolving into
a de facto mini-road show.218 But the limitations hinder Demo Day presenters from answering
basic and common questions about the investment and founders may just ignore them in the
adrenaline-infused rush of post-presentation Q&A. One commenter likened the restrictions to
forcing founders to read out tombstone advertisements on a platform and compared letter-of-thelaw compliance to a “Monty Python Cheese Shop sketch.”219 Finally the Commission restricted
the audience in virtual Demo Days,220 lest scores of unaccredited individuals have the
opportunity to attend.221 The Commission describes this as a “tailored approach.” Time will tell
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See Final Rules, supra note 1, at 77; Cf. Facilitating Capital Formation, supra note 3, at 95 (describing its refusal
to preempt Blue Sky laws as a “measured approach”).
211
Facilitating Capital Formation,, supra note 3, at 342-344.
212
Facilitating Capital Formation, supra note 3, at 342.
213
Id. at 343-344, Instructions to paragraph (a).
214
Id.
215
Id. at 82.
216
Id. at 342.
217
Id. at 343.
218
Transcript of SEC Small Business Capital Formation Advisory Committee (May 8, 2020), at 67,
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/sbcfac-transcript-050820.pdf.
219
Hanks Letter, supra note 209, at 8-9, (listing commonly asked questions the presenter would have to find various
ways to decline to answer).
220
Facilitating Capital Formation, supra note, 3 at 343.
221
Facilitating Capital Formation, supra note, 3 at 84 (agreeing with commenters worried large numbers of nonaccredited investors could be exposed to “broad offering-related communications” and thus imposing virtual Demo
Day restrictions).
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how workable it is, but Commission efforts to police human interaction with the precision of a
fitted suit are foreboding.
A. Final Rules for Regulation D 506(c)
The proposed Reg D 506(c) changes again typify Commission plodding. The Commission
realizes Reg D 506(c) has disappointed and proffers why: (i) the principles-based methodology
for “reasonable steps” heaps uncertainty on issuers fearful regulators will deem their steps
“unreasonable”; and (ii) the non-exhaustive documents list has privacy concerns.222 The
Commission admits the list, as the only surefire way to avoid “facts and circumstances”
inquiries, “may be creating uncertainty for issuers and inadvertently encouraging [them] . . . to
rely only on the non-exclusive list.”223 In Commission fashion, after years’ experience, it
proposes slight progress by adding investors may declare themselves accredited on subsequent
raises after previous verification.224 But in a change from the Proposed Rules, the Final Rules
added a five-year limit to this verification method.225
B. Final Rules for Regulation A+
The most important Reg A+ change is to raise the offer limit to $75 million.226 This marks
the first time the Commission upped the limit Congress requires it to review biennially.227 It also
raises the maximum amount security holders could sell under Tier 2 from $15 million to $22.5
million,228 consistent with its established 30% marker.229 Other Reg A+ changes involve
redacting confidential information from certain Form 1-A exhibits instead of having to apply for
confidential treatment beforehand230 and technical amendments to smooth the filing process.231
These will likely have little adoption effect.
222

Letter from Tom Quaadman, Exec. Vice President, Chamber of Commerce Ctr. for Capital Mkts.
Competitiveness, to Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n. 5 (Sept. 24, 2019) (Chamber
Letter), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6193319-192490.pdf [hereinfafter Quaadman Letter ] (“In
practice, the enhanced accredited investor verification requirements have discouraged many issuers from taking
advantage of Rule 506(c), and issuers continue to rely primarily on the Rule 506(b) exemption, which continues to
prohibit general solicitation.”); Cf. Manning G. Warren, The Regulatory Vortex for Private Placements, 45 SECS.
REG. L.J. 9 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3037492 (discussing chilling effect Reg D
506(c) requirements to turn over sensitive documents); Letter from Patrick Gouhin, CEO, et al., Angel Capital
Ass’n, to Hon. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n. 5(Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6170303-192393.pdf (“Many angels view getting a three-month
certification from a third party as being expensive and time-consuming and a major risk in terms of sensitive
personal and financial data.”).
223
Final Rules, supra note 1, at 87.
224
Id. at 88; Facilitating Capital Formation, supra note, 3 at 108.
225
Facilitating Capital Formation, supra note 3, at 109; Cf. id. at 359, § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(E).
226
Facilitating Capital Formation, supra note 3, at 350.
227
See Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401(b)(5), 126 Stat. 325 (15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(5) (2018)); Cf. Facilitating Capital
Formation, supra note 3, at 134.
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Facilitating Capital Formation, supra note 3, at 350.
229
Id. at 135 n. 380.
230
Id. at 120-22.
231
These include changes to how issuers make nonpublic correspondence public via EDGAR, the SEC database,
incorporating by reference previously filed financial statements in Form 1-A, and an amendment to the
abandonment provision of Regulation A, Rule 259(b). Id. at 113–14 (17 C.F.R. § 230.259(b) (2019)). See generally
Final Rules, supra note 1, at 119-127 (explaining these changes).
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C. Final Rules for Regulation Crowdfunding
The biggest disappointment is Reg CF. The Final Rules do make progress.232 For example
Reg CF issuers can now ‘test the waters’ before filing the legal document, Form C.233 The SEC
would require these solicitations to disclaim the inability to accept funds until filing and the
offer’s nonbinding nature.234 But importantly, because Reg CF offers are “covered” under 15
U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(c), Blue Sky laws are preempted.235 This change should benefit novice issuers
or those living outside entrepreneurial hotspots. Issuers must choose Reg CF beforehand to avoid
Rule 241 state processes. The Final Rules also helpfully clarify that issuers may discuss offers
orally after filing if they follow Rule 204 proscriptions.236
In response to comments, however, the Commission added two additional terms: “use of
proceeds” and “progress toward funding goals.”237 The Commission describes this as an
“incremental increase” in useful, nonharmful information for investors.238 In reality, it has likely
burdened issuers by further limiting “non-terms communications” allowed outside the portal or
beyond the strictures of tombstone adverts.239
Raising the aggregate offer limit from $1.07 million to $5 million also helps.240 Although this
contradicts the statute, the Commission used its general exemptive authority under Securities Act
Section 28.241 For individual limits, Congress hamstrung the Commission with confusing text.
But the Commission further clouded the situation by using “lesser of” instead of “greater of” in
the ambiguous statutory formula and not exempting accredited investors. The Commission now
seeks to remedy this by exempting accredited investors242 and using “greater of” for unaccredited
investors.243 However, welcomed unaccredited investor limits are still confusing and
unenforceable.
232

One area of progress came from a Commission reversal. The Proposed Rules sought to eliminate certain
nontraditional Reg CF financial instruments including Simple Agreements for Future Equity (SAFE), token
instruments, and revenue shares. Final Rules, supra note 1, at 157 & n. 351. The Final Rules rejected this proposal
in favor of adequate disclosure of the terms of these instruments. Final Rules, supra note 1, at 185.
233
Final Rules, supra note 1, at 333.
234
Id. Rule 206(b) [§ 227.206(b)].
235
15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(2)(A); Cf. Final Rules supra note 1 at 149 (“Currently, securities issued pursuant to the
exemption under Section 4(a)(6) are deemed to be “covered securities” and thus the offer and sale of such securities
by an issuer are not subject to State securities law registration and qualification requirements pursuant to Section 18
of the Securities Act.”). To allay any confusion about the covered nature of these offers and sales, the Commission
added 17 CFR 227.504. Id. It defines a “qualified purchaser” for the purposes of Section 18(b)(3) of the Securities
Act, as any Reg CF offeree or purchaser. Id. at 149 & n. 443, 338.
236
Final Rules, supra note 1, at 84–85; Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 227.204 (listing advertisement requirements).
237
Final Rules, supra note 1, at 103; Cf. Id. at 332-333 (providing instructions to § 227.204).
238
Id. at 103.
239
See Crowdcheck Letter, supra note 209, at 12 (“Most communications outside the investment platform are either
through social media, which by virtue of the character limits are limited to basic information about the company, or
are designed to be “non-terms communications” in which the issuer can freely discuss its business without
discussing any term of the offering. Adding additional categories of information to be considered “terms of the
offering” would work to limit what issuers may say, rather than enable additional disclosure about use of proceeds
or progress of the offering. This would have the effect of suppressing communications rather than providing more
flexibility”).
240
See Final Rules, supra note 1, at 325.
241
Final Rules, supra note 1 at 148.
242
Final Rules, supra note 1, at 154.
243
Id. at 325-26..
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Unfortunately, other Proposed Rules will likely have little impact despite positive baby steps.
First are the long-clamored-for Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). The JOBS Act Title III
prevented use of certain “investment companies” as defined or excluded in the Investment
Company Act of 1940.244 Practically, this means SPVs that invest in only one company could not
participate in Reg CF. From the start, government and market actors recognized how disallowing
SPVs would thwart Reg CF growth.245 In theory, SPVs could ease regulatory burdens for Reg
CF issuers by cabining all Reg CF investors in a separate legal entity. Concerns focus on
unwieldly numbers of record holders on issuers’ capitalization tables for the 12(g) Rule and other
administrative hurdles linked to unaccredited investors. The SEC proposed an exception to the
JOBS Act statutory prohibition through a “crowdfunding vehicle” SPV, that would channel all
Reg CF investors into one bucket.246 But in typical fashion, the Commission’s rule-heavy
approach may kill this innovation before it flourishes. At the least, the Commission admits its
crowdfunding-vehicle exception247 will limit its utility, forcing issuers into a cost-benefit
analysis.248
While the proposed rule purports to solve the capitalization table and 12(g) Rule issue, the
Commission larded in investor protections that will retard use. The Commission’s proposed
design “would serve merely as a conduit for investors to invest in a single underlying issuer and
would not have a separate business purpose.”249 The instrument’s structure “provide[s] investors
in the crowdfunding vehicle the same economic exposure, voting power, and ability to assert
State and Federal law rights, and receive the same disclosures under Regulation Crowdfunding,
as if they had invested directly in the crowdfunding issuer.”250
While supportive of the crowdfunding vehicle concept, critics panned the rule’s costs and
complexities.251 Wefunder, the largest portal by investment volume, has already stated it will not
support it.252 As envisioned, one raise may require multiple crowdfunding vehicles. The SPV
also saddles the issuer with cost burdens, substantially increasing upfront outlays for an already
expensive option. Even with proxies, the need to gain permission from security holders for
transactions will cost time and money. There are also additional disclosure obligations and
244

Pub. Jumpstart our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 4A(f)(3), 126 Stat. 306, 320; (2012) (banning
investment companies as defined in Section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)] or
those excluded from the definition of investment company by Sections 3(b) and (c) of that Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 80a3(b), (c)] from participating in Title III transactions). See also 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(f)(3) (2018); 17 C.F.R. §
227.100(b)(3) (20192020).
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See Crowdfunding Release, supra note 101, at 36-37 and n. 94; Cf. Final Rules, supra note 1, at 140-144; Final
Rules, supra note 1, at 158-59 (noting that by requiring investors to hold the investment in their own name, issuers
are somewhat restrained).
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See Proposed Rule 3a-9 under the Investment Company Act, Final Rules, supra note 3, at 144.
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See generally Final Rules, supra note 1, at 375-77. The Commission also altered the 12(g) Rule to ensure natural
persons investing through crowdfunding vehicles may be excluded when they are deemed to be co-issuers. Id. at
371.
248
See id. at 173-74 (acknowledging the “costs and burdens” of the crowdfunding vehicle’s structure and surmising
the “balance of tradeoffs” will likely vary depending on a number of factors and influence use).
249
Final Rules, supra note 1, at 159-160, 162 n. 477.
250
Final Rules supra note 1, at 173, Cf. Id. at 177-178.
251
See e.g. Burton Letter, supra note 209, at 12 (describing SPV structure as “so utterly prescriptive that it is
unlikely to be much used.”); Crowdcheck Letter, supra note 209, at 21 (describing SPV structure as “not workable
in practice.”); Letter from Nicholas Tommarello CEO, Wefunder, to the SEC on the Proposed Rules at 5 (May 28,
2020), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-05-20/s70520-7246786-217248.pdf (describing SPV structure as “too
costly with little benefit to either investors or issuers”) [Hereinafter Tommarello Letter].
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Tommarello Letter, supra note 251, at 5.
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questions about who will manage the crowdfunding vehicle and distribute required paperwork.253
These issues will hamper and may foreclose crowdfunding-vehicle use altogether.

VII.

FIXING THE JOBS ACT

The JOBS Act has not reached its promise. Geographic and demographic disparities
remain in who gets funded and who profits. Uncertainty also persists in Commission approaches
to the JOBS Act role in tokenized structures. After eight years and a complete private-exemption
framework review the Commission has few answers. Commissioners pay lip service to problems
but overemphasis on investor protection, insistence on “fact and circumstances” analysis, and a
lumbering bureaucracy thwart progress.
A. Lessons from Overseas
The United States is not alone in grappling with new capital-raising methods, token
economics, and disruptions to calcified monetary systems. In aligning America’s entrepreneurial
ambitions with changing global dynamics, we can see what works elsewhere and adapt our rules.
Fulbright Scholar and University of Colorado professor Andrew Schwartz has researched equity
crowdfunding models.254 His New Zealand study is particularly useful because it copied
Regulation Crowdfunding yet stripped it of obstacles domestic entrepreneurs face.255 The result
has been spectacular. Scaled for economy and focusing on the first year, New Zealand had
thirteen times more crowdfunding campaigns and raised thirty times more capital. And did so
without any reported fraud. Even accounting for Reg CF’s healthy year-to-year growth and other
available options for U.S. entrepreneurs, New Zealand’s model is notable. New Zealand focuses
on private ordering where portals and lead investors take responsibility for issuer quality.
Reputational awareness and financial skin-in-the-game self-regulate the system without
equivalents of Form Cs, Annual Reports, individual limits, or offer regulation.256
While New Zealand’s model may be too radical for the current Congress it presents a striking
alternative to the rule-heavy U.S. approach. Yet it is not only from this small country we can
learn. The U.K. with a comparable financial system has also succeeded. According to the 2019
SEC Regulation Crowdfunding Report257 in 2017 alone U.K. equity-crowdfunding issuers raised
$450 million, “significantly higher” than Reg CF’s first two-and-half-years. The SEC cautions
about comparisons because of “differences in regulatory regimes and tax treatments of
crowdfunding securities investments.”258 One difference is the U.K. “Regulatory Sandbox.”
Sandbox tools include “restricted authorization, individual guidance, informal steers, waivers
and no enforcement action letters.”259 Within its first two years the Sandbox accepted 89 firms
253

JD Alois, Crowdfunding Industry Insider Criticizes SEC Proposal on Special Purpose Vehicles for Reg CF,
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24, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6193349-192506.pdf [hereinafter Schwartz Letter].
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Andrew Schwartz, Equity Crowdfunding in New Zealand, 2018 NEW ZEALAND L. REV. 243 (2018).
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Professor Schwartz notes Australia has a flat individual limit of $5,000 instead of the clunky Regulation CF
formula, which avoids privacy concerns and is straightforward. Schwartz Letter, supra note 254, at 5.
257
SEC, REGULATION CROWDFUNDING, supra note 181, at 16.
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with innovative products. According to an outside report, “The unequivocal message is that the
sandbox has delivered real value to firms, ranging from guidance relating to the application of
regulation to innovative propositions, to ‘kicking the [tires]’ on the risks relating to their business
model.”260 It recently announced a partnership with the City of London Corporation to support
firms addressing the COVID-19 challenge.261 Commissioner Peirce has proposed the same
concept, though with less hands-on government guidance, for U.S.-based token projects.262
While this regulatory originality may or may not work for domestic firms, the U.K. embrace of
innovation is in short supply across the Atlantic.
B. Regulators must Heed Private Exemption Costs
Currently, and including the Final Rules, the costs of forgoing Reg D for retail-investor raises
are infeasible for most issuers. Reg A+ and Reg CF costs dwarf private-ordered Reg D. Reg A+
estimates range from lower six figures to well into seven figures.263 In relative costs, Reg CF is
potentially worse. The Commission estimates average Reg CF campaigns cost almost $22,500
and 241 manhours.264 Reg D 506(c) is not only more costly than Reg D but invites substantial
260

A Journey Through The FCA Regulatory Sandbox, The Benefits, Challenges, and Next Steps, DELOITTE, (2018)
at 2, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial-services/deloitte-uk-fca-regulatorysandbox-project-innovate-finance-journey.pdf.
261
JD Alois, UK Financial Conduct Authority Partners with City of London Corporation to Pilot Digital Sandbox
Supporting Firms Addressing COVID-19 Challenge, CROWDFUND INSIDER (July 16, 2020, 8:40 AM),
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Hon. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, SEC Comm., Speech: Running on Empty, A Proposal to Fill the Gap Between
Regulation and Decentralization (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-blockress-202002-06.
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JD Alois, How Much Does a Reg A+ Offering Cost?, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Nov. 6, 2019, 3:48 PM),
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2019/11/153797-how-much-does-a-reg-a-offering-cost/ (“In total, on the low
end, Manhattan Street Capital estimates a Reg A+ offering will cost $300,000 to complete. That amount will come
straight off of the top of any funding raised – which means a percentage of investor money.”); Anzhela Knyazeva,
REGULATION A+: WHAT DO WE KNOW SO FAR?, at 14 (Nov. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the SEC
Division of Economic and Risk Analysis), https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/whitepapers/Knyazeva_RegulationA-.pdf (The average costs including using an intermediary at over $1 million, without
an intermediary at $111k this doesn’t count other fees, for instance state filing fees which can be as much as $45k);
JD Alois, Report Updates on Reg A+ & Reg CF Investment Crowdfunding Progress During 2017, CROWDFUND
INSIDER (Feb. 25, 2018, 7:22 AM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2018/02/128794-report-updates-reg-reg-cfinvestment-crowdfunding-progress-2017/ (“The average company that reported costs associated with a Regulation
A+ offering spent just over $93,000 in legal fees. The average audit cost was reported as approximately $33,735.
Significantly fewer companies reported costs associated with remaining fees. From the limited data available, the
average costs were as follows: sales commissions, $1.8 million; finders’ fees, $800,000; underwriters’ fees, $1.3
million; promoters’ fees, $529,630; and Blue Sky compliance fees, $19,819.”); Campbell Letter, supra note 50, at
13 (discussing how Reg A+ is cost prohibitive for small issuers).
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SEC, REGULATION CROWDFUNDING, supra note 181, at 25; cf. A Financial System That Creates Economic
Opportunities Capital Markets, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, at 40 (Oct. 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/documents/a-financial-system-capital-markets-final-final.pdf (“[M]arket participants have
expressed concerns about the cost and complexity of using crowdfunding compared to private placement
offerings.”); Letter from David V. Duccini, Founder & CEO, Silicon Prairie Holdings, Inc., to the SEC on the
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privacy concerns.265 In fact, the Wefunder portal returned to Reg D after Reg D 506(c)
compliance headaches.266 In examining how to bring Reg D opportunities to all, cost of capital
must be paramount.
C. Where Congress Should Act
In our deeply polarized time, the JOBS Act convened supporters across ideological and
partisan lines to help America’s overlooked entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, one constituency not
on board was the Securities and Exchange Commission. The results speak for themselves. It is
Congress’s duty to intervene before another lost decade occurs. A JOBS Act sequel can succeed
where the first failed by adhering to a few key insights. First the Commission will not fix the
JOBS Act sua sponte. The Final Rules show that. Second, Congress should trust citizens to make
investment choices as they do other life choices. This means allowing options that fit their
budgets, aspirations, and risk tolerance subject to federal antifraud law. As Professor Usha
Rodrigues aptly states, “Securities law . . . in theory, as in practice, marginalizes the average
investor without acknowledging that it does so, let alone justifying it.”267 Third, states should
not conduct additional reviews or require fees that do not protect investors but harm
entrepreneurs.
Regulate sales not offers. Offer regulation has hallmarked U.S. securities law since its
federalization.268 The Commission interprets offers broadly and beyond common-law
understandings.269 That offers, in effect, speech can harm potential investors, even those not
websites) overwhelm the value of the Crowdfunding exemption for small businesses.”); Schwartz Letter, supra note
254, at 2 (“By imposing significant disclosure and regulatory hurdles, Regulation Crowdfunding imposes high costs
on issuers relative to the low level of funding startups can and do obtain, dissuading issuers from relying on the
exemption.”).
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have no relationship as the price of making an investment and, given the potential liability, accountants, lawyers and
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https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6132124-192256.pdf [hereinafter Tommarello Letter] (also noting
about 10% of accredited investors dropped out of potential investments because of the verification hassles, even if
they had previously verified the year before).
267
Rodrigues, Dirty Secret, supra note 28, at 3427.
268
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
269
Securities Offering Reform, Release No. 33-8591, [70 FR 44722 (Aug. 3, 2005)], at 39 n. 88 (July 19, 2005)
(“The term ‘offer’ has been interpreted broadly and goes beyond the common law concept of an offer.”(citing
Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871 (2d. Cir. 1971); SEC v. Cavanaugh, 1 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1998))).
cf. Securities Act of 1933 §2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (noting that an offer includes “every attempt to dispose of
a security or interest in a security, for value; or any solicitation of an offer to buy a security or interest in a
security.”); Cohn & Yadley, supra note 5, at 38 (“Although the 1933 Securities Act’s use of the term “offer” could
readily be interpreted in a contract sense, the SEC has interpreted the provision to encompass statements or notices
that fall far short of normal contractual concepts.”).
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investing is a uniquely American concept.270 And its repeal has been bandied since at least the
1990s.271 No one is harmed by receiving investment opportunities272 and that speech is still
subject to federal antifraud law. Speech policing factual information ties issuers and their
lawyers in knots, ups legal bills, and foments less information. This is true even for Reg D where
general solicitation squabbles spur angst, stalled raises, and minutia-level speech parsing.273
The Commission’s revised Demo Day rules illustrate the bizarre contradictions that can
result from trying to police truthful information. As noted above, the Commission will allow
presenters to state four information pieces: “(i.) Notification that the issuer is in the process of
offering or planning to offer securities; (ii.) The type and amount of securities being offered;
(iii.) The intended use of the proceeds of the offering; and (iv.) The unsubscribed amount in an
offering.”274 It considers this limitation an investor protection.275 Yet, it then states potential
investors can meet afterwards “outside of the event setting” to get further disclosure.276 Thus, the
same information that requires shielding at the event loses its investor-protection function at a
next-day lunch meeting.

270

Letter from Sara Hanks, CEO, Crowdcheck, to the SEC on the Concept Release, at 6 (Oct. 30, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6368811-196431.pdf [hereinafter Hanks Letter].
271
Linda Quinn, Dir. of SEC Div. of Corp. Fin., Speech: Reforming the Securities Act of 1933: A Conceptual
Framework, reprinted in INSIGHTS, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Jan. 1996),
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/reformingsa33.pdf.
272
Hanks Letter, supra note 270, at 2; Letter from Robert E. Buckholz Chair, Federal Regulation of Securities
Committee ABA Business Law Section, to the SEC on the Concept Release, at 4 (Oct. 16, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6297110-193413.pdf [hereinafter Buckholz Letter] (“Although the
Securities Act regulates offers and sales, true damage rarely occurs unless there is an actual sale.”); Burton Letter,
supra note 24, at 9 (“An offeree that never buys a security needs little ‘protection’.”); Barker Letter, supra note 170
(“[I]nvestors need protection, but that belongs at the point-of-sale.”); Letter from Georgia Quinn, Gen. Couns.,
Coinlist, to the SEC on the Concept Release, at 6 (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s708196220398-192608.pdf [hereinafter Quinn Letter] (“Instead of system of potential foot faults, issuers should be able to
communicate broadly as long as before investing, potential investors are directed to the intermediary with
appropriate education and risk disclosures.”); Campbell Letter, supra note 51, at 10 (“Issuers should be allowed
and, indeed, encouraged to solicit broadly for investors, so long as the investor protection condition is imposed at
sale.”).
273
Quaadman Letter, supra note 222, at 5 (“Determining what activities constitute general solicitation or general
advertising has been an area of uncertainty for years. . . . [T]he Staff’s guidance has been inconsistent at times and
still leaves open a number of compliance uncertainties.”); Letter from Maria Wolvin, Vice President & Sr. Couns.,
Pub. Pol’y Ass’n for Corp. Growth, to the SEC on the Concept Release, at 6 (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6190715-192477.pdf (“[Those] seeking to undertake a Rule 506(b)
offering [must] either navigate a host of SEC No Action Letters, staff guidance and enforcement activity, or expend
resources to retain outside counsel to determine the parameters of prohibited and permissible activities under Rule
506(b).”); Hanks Letter, supra note 270, at 5 (unfamiliarity with general solicitation nuances “leads to pointless
arguments between issuer and counsel as to what the issuer hopes to achieve with the communications they are
making, and frantic efforts to ‘fix’ communications that the issuer has made without realizing the light in which the
communication may be viewed by regulators.”); Letter from James P. Dowd, CEO, N. Cap. Inv. Tech., to the SEC
on the Concept Release, at 2 (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6193359192511.pdf [hereinafter Down Letter] (describing decades-long issues with when an investor relationship is
sufficiently “preexisting” and “substantive” to avoid general solicitation).
274
Final Rules, supra note 1, at 85.
275
Id. (finding the additional fourth prong “is unlikely to affect investor protection in light of the limits on the
overall information about the offering that may be conveyed . . . .”).
276
Id. (“[P]otential investors will be able to seek additional disclosure about the investment opportunity outside of
the event setting.”).
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The virtual-audience restriction is also head-scratching. The Commission distinguishes
in-person Demo Days, which have inherent physical limitations to curtail unaccredited investor
attendance from virtual Demo Days which lack such barriers.277 The Commission limits
attendance at these virtual events but allows certain unaccredited investors to attend, for instance
students, faculty, and alumni of a university host. The Commission is wary that unaccredited
persons may hear broad offering communications.278 But it does not explain why a student at the
hosting college benefits by virtually attending the event but her friend at a nearby junior college
or sibling saving to start a business does not.
Less experienced Reg CF issuers and investors are especially vulnerable to offer
proscriptions. Regulating speech between these parties for small-dollar amounts and often where
prior relationships exist runs counter to the crowdfunding model,279 as well as Reg CF’s goal to
democratize private investing.280 Offer strictures not only harm Reg CF issuers pre-raise but also
during, limiting term communications outside portals to nondescript ‘tombstone’ ads.281 This
confuses novice issuers and investors alike and factors into Reg CF’s soft start.282 The rules force
even knowledgeable issuers into vagaries and weasel words lest they trip the “terms” –
“nonterms” dichotomy.283 These issues will keep plaguing raises as new communication methods
emerge. One commenter described hours spent trying to format a Reg A+ solicitation in
Instagram Stories with proper text and links.284
The Final Rules embody Commission failure to address these concerns. Its refusal to
preempt Rule 241 from Blue Sky laws, laborious and mine-laden definitions for ‘Demo Days,’

277

Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 84, (“[S]ome commenters raised concerns about [Demo Day] events allowing for broad offering-related
communications to non-accredited investors. We share this concern, particularly in light of the increasing prevalence
of virtual “demo days” that are more accessible and widely attended by the general public.”).
279
Barker Letter, supra note 170 (“At this scale, the ROI for attempting to police the flow of information is futile at
best and oppressive at worse.”); Letter from Ed Engler, Managing Partner, Pittsburgh Equity Partners, to the SEC on
the Concept Release, at 6 (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6231639-192668.pdf
[hereinafter Engler Letter](“The goal of Reg CF should be to increase investor access to information and
transparency of the security being offered/sold.”); Letter from Mainvest, Inc. to the SEC on the Concept Release, at
1 (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6193357-192513.pdf [Mainvest Letter]
(discussing the localized nature of crowdfunding); Campbell Letter, supra note 81, at 7 (“The idea that a neutral
posting (my term) of investment with a third party, coupled with strict limitations on other contacts between the
issuer and investors, would enable issuers to sell securities obviously was misplaced.”).
280
See 2018 Forum Report, supra note 36, at 20.
281
17 C.F.R. § 227.204.
282
See Campbell Letter, supra note 51, at 19 (pointing toward limitations in marketing strategies as one reason Reg
CF has failed).
283
Quinn Letter, supra note 272, at 6; Engler Letter, supra note 279, at 6 (describing “very careful line” businesses
must walk when promoting their Reg CF raises); Tommarello Letter, supra note 266, at 7 (describing “absurd
result” that potential investors can’t look Reg CF issuers in the eye and ask them questions about their raise); Letter
from Sherwood Neiss, Principal, Crowdfund Cap. Advisors, LLC, to the SEC on the Concept Release, at 7 (Sept.
24, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6190712-192475.pdf [hereinafter Neiss Letter]
(suggesting only limitation on nonportal communication should be potential investors directed to portal for more
information); Letter from Hon. Patrick McHenry (R-NC), Vice Chair, H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., to the SEC on the
Concept Release, at 5 (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6293559-193383.pdf
[hereinafter McHenry Letter] (describing how current rules hamper issuers by limiting contact with third-party
media).
284
Hanks Letter, supra note 270, at 8.
278
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and the general desire to shield investors from information to protect them is paternalistic285 and
discordant with the nation’s free speech values.286
Exempt Secondary Trading for Regulation A+ and Regulation CF. A major barrier
for both Reg A+ and Reg CF is the lack of state preemption for secondary trading. Although
federally both are freely tradable (Reg CF after one year), Blue Sky laws thwart its potential.287
Impairing investor liquidity does not protect investors.288 The Commission has broad authority to
preempt Regulation A securities.289 But it refuses to act despite habitual cajoling both inside290
Mercantus Center Letter, supra note 176, at 5 (“The federal securities laws were meant to increase the flow of
accurate information and not to protect investors in a paternalistic way from potentially bad investments. . . .
Investor protection was the spirit of the federal securities laws, but it was protection consistent with the country's
history and tradition of freedom and self-reliance.”).
286
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
287
Dowd Letter, supra note 273, at 3 (“Simply put, without federal preemption, secondary markets for exempt
securities are dead before launch. They will be crippled by the high cost of compliance. The failure of Reg A / Tier 1
offers convincing evidence of this point.”); Burton Letter, supra note 24, at 38 (discussing unattractiveness of Reg
A+ because the lack of Blue Sky preemption in the secondary trading market means, “investors have no costeffective means of selling their investment.”); Hanks Letter, supra note 270, at 47 (“[T]he patchwork of rules
applying to [Reg A+] issuers and brokers facilitating secondary transactions makes secondary liquidity excessively
expensive and unavailable to many small issuers. This poses a harm to investors as well, as they do not have any real
opportunity for liquidity until an issuer is listed on a national securities exchange.”).The Final Rules reiterated the
Commission’s refusal to preempt secondary trading for Reg A+ Tier 2. Final Rules, supra note 1, at 137 n. 389, 148
n. 439 (stating any change would come through a specific proposal with notice and comment).
288
Letter from Mark Schonberger, Goodwin Proctor LLP, to the SEC on the Concept Release, at 9 (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6193382-192525.pdf [hereinafter Schonberger Letter] (“Public
policy suggests that impairing liquidity of securities does not protect investors.”); McHenry Letter, supra note 283,
at 7 (“The liquidity provided by a secondary market is an investor protection in and of itself, because it would allow
individuals whose financial situation has changed to exit these investments in times of need.”).
289
The Court of Appeals in Lindeen v. SEC confirmed the breadth of this delegation to the Commission to preempt
state registration authority over Regulation A+ offerings. 825 F. 3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
290
See generally ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALL AND EMERGING COMPANIES: RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
SECONDARY MARKET LIQUIDITY FOR REGULATION A , TIER 2 SECURITIES (May 15, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-recommendation-051517-secondary-liquidity-recommendation.pdf
(recommending Commission preempt from state regulation the secondary trading in securities of Tier 2 Regulation
A issuers current in their ongoing reports); FINAL RPT. OF THE 2019 SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL
BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION, at 10 (Aug. 2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/small-business-forum-report2019.pdf; 2018 Forum Report, supra note 35, at 21; FINAL RPT. OF THE 2017 SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM
ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION, at 17 (Mar. 2018), https://www.sec.gov/files/gbfor36.pdf
(recommending Commission preempt Blue Sky laws for secondary trading of securities issued under Tier 2 of
Regulation A and consider overriding advance notice requirements and limit fees); FINAL RPT. OF THE 2016 SEC
GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION, at 16 (Nov. 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor35.pdf (recommending preempting all secondary sales of Reg A+ Tier 2);
FINAL RPT. OF THE 2015 SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION, at 23
(Nov. 2015), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor34.pdf (describing the status of issuers that have satisfied for
the past two years and are current in their reporting obligations); FINAL RPT. OF THE 2014 SEC GOVERNMENTBUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION, at 29 (May 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor33.pdf (including Tier 1); U.S. Treasury Dep’t, supra note 264, at 40
(recommending state securities regulators update their regulations to exempt from state registration and qualification
requirements secondary trading of securities issued under Tier 2 of Regulation A or alternatively that the
Commission use its authority to preempt state registration requirements for such transactions). Unfortunately, this is
not a new development. See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 5, at 3–4 (“The Small Business Forum, mandated by
Congress as an annual SEC event, has resulted in 25 years of repeated and strongly-worded recommendations from
small business advocates to lessen the SEC's regulatory burdens on raising capital. Yet, with rare exception, the SEC
has turned a deaf ear to the Forum's recommendations and concerns.”).
285
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and outside government.291 If Reg A+ and Reg CF are to emerge from novelty stage and counter
Reg D dominance, Congress must cover resales. It is telling that well before the JOBS Act, the
Commission had broad authority to “cover” securities to “Qualified Purchasers” which it could
freely define, limited only by investor protection and public interest.292 Congress even amended
Securities Act Section 2(b) to make the Commission “consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition and capital formation.”293 A
quarter century hence, the Commission has not materially acted without Congressional
mandate.294
Secondary trading also has massive future implications. Blockchain-based endeavors and
tokenized systems are incompatible with state-by-state secondary-trading regimes.295As tokens
express multiple uses acting as network keys, as well as having currency and security traits, it is
imperative states with their stifling and dissonant rules not interfere. While some states have
sought to brand themselves blockchain havens296 others cannot even define the term.297 Little
reason exists to think this ineptitude will dissipate as technology advances and digital assets
acquire more and varying functions.
Preempt state filing requirements and notice fees for Regulation A+ and Regulation
Crowdfunding. State filing and notice fees serve no cognizable purpose. They do not protect
investors, facilitate capital, or improve markets. They are regressive, expensive, and
disproportionately hurt smaller issuers.298 Reg A+ fees are littered with waste, inconsistencies,
and timing issues, with no related benefit.299 This model departs from Reg D, where issuers
291

See SEC, supra note 87 (collecting support in Regulation A Release); cf. Burton Letter, supra note 24, at 38 (Reg
A+ has been a disappointment because of two Commission decisions, “Probably the most important reason was the
Commission’s decision to not preempt Blue Sky laws for Tier 1 offerings or Tier 2 secondary offerings.”); Dowd
Letter, supra note 273, at 3 (“Simply put, without federal preemption, secondary markets for exempt securities are
dead before launch.”); Schonberger Letter, supra note 288, at 9 (“[T]he pre-emption of state laws with respect to
resales of Tier 2 offerings needs to be reviewed and addressed.”); Quinn Letter, supra note 272, at 5 (Blue Sky
preemption would make Reg A+ Tier 2 more workable); Hanks Letter, supra note 270, at 47; Campbell Letter,
supra note 51, at 15 (“The failure of the Commission to preempt, to the full extent of its Congressionally delegated
power, state registration authority has been a significant failure on the part of the Commission.”).
292
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 §18(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3).
293
15 U.S.C. § 77b(b).
294
Campbell, supra note 84, at 348 (describing Commission’s decades-long failure to expand preemption over
exempt offerings “even as states’ registration obligations have continued to choke small business capital formation
and wreck the Commission's rational, efficient exemptions from federal registration.”); Id. at 350 (“Indeed, a
moment of reflection reveals that the only preemptions of state authority over exempt offerings by small businesses
have been the result of statute, specifically the preemption over Rule 506 offerings and crowdfunding.”).
295
See Schonberger Letter, supra note 288, at 9–10 (discussing Reg A+ potential for blockchain-related endeavors).
296
Gregory Barber, The Newest Haven for Cryptocurrency Companies? Wyoming, WIRED (June 6, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/newest-haven-cryptocurrency-companies-wyoming/.
297
Preston J. Byrne, The States Can’t Blockchain, COINDESK (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/the-statescant-blockchain.
298
Engler Letter., supra note 279 at 2, (discussing burden of filing requirements and fees on Reg CF issuers).
299
Barker Letter., supra note 170 (discussing state regulators lack knowledge about newer exemptions and inability
to interpret federal statutes, and in the case of Reg A+ issuers often pay fees by to states where no transaction
occurs); Schonberger Letter, supra note 288, at 8 (“Tier 2 issuers, some issuers pay upwards of $25,000 per year in
notice and filing fees to the 50 states – and, because this fee is paid before sales take place, it is a cost that issuers
must incur regardless of whether an offering ultimately has a single investor in a given state in which the fee is
paid.”); Hanks Letter, supra note 270, at 29 (“[T]he states have differing requirements with respect to the timing of
notice filings ranging from requiring filing 21 days prior to ‘offers’ (which is not consistent with the ability to test
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invoke state filing costs only after local sales. Reg A+ and Reg CF issuers place all offer
documents on EDGAR300 making them publicly available for fraud investigations. At the least,
Congress should reconcile Reg A+ issuers that often pay fees to all possible jurisdictions with
Reg CF where at most issuers pay two.301
Exempt Regulation A+ and Regulation Crowdfunding from the 12(g) Rule. The
Commission in its familiar style conditionally exempts these issuers from the 12(g) Rule.
Congress could simplify worries for those choosing these innovative exemptions by removing
this hinderance completely. The 12(g) Rule constantly foments angst for growing companies.302
Even if applied to Reg D, where investors are likely accredited, it should not worry issuers
crowdfunding investment from ordinary Americans.303
Raise the Regulation A+ Offer Limit to $100 million. Congress should raise the Reg
A+ 12-month aggregate offer limit to $100 million. After previous considerations, the
Commission has now raised it to $75 million.304 Given the usual pace it may be several more
years before it is raised again, despite Congressional directive.305 Congress should skip this
potentially years-long wait while keeping Title IV’s biennial review.
Raise the Regulation Crowdfunding Offer Limit to $20 million. Congress should raise
Reg CF’s 12-month aggregate offer limit to $20 million and add a statutory requirement like Reg
A+ that the Commission biennially review it. The Commission raise to $5 million took almost
four years and another change will likely follow this pace. Without significant encouragement to
monied investors, Reg CF adoption will remain hampered despite recent spectacular gains.306
Simplify or eliminate individual limits for Regulation A+ and Regulation
Crowdfunding. Congress should remove individual formulas for unaccredited investors in Reg
A+ and Reg CF and replace them with hard dollar amounts per investment, not aggregate per 12
months. The Commission has now eliminated Reg CF accredited investor limits.307 But both Reg
A+ and Reg CF still impede unaccredited investors with annual income, net worth formulas.
This confuses investors and invokes security and privacy concerns.308 A hard inflation-adjusted

the waters under Rule 255) to requiring filing prior to qualification, to not accepting filings before qualification.”);
Buckholz Letter, supra note 272, at 12 (“State advance notice and filing fee requirements for Tier 2 offerings
impose a substantial burden on the issuers without any corresponding benefit.”).
300
About EDGAR, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/about.
301
15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(2)(F).
302
Hanks Letter, supra note 270, at 24 (“Issuers and their counsel currently contort themselves into legal pretzels
trying to structure deals in such a way that 12(g) is not triggered.”); cf. Concept Release, supra note 2, at 141
(discussing reluctance by issuers using Reg CF to take more than 500 unaccredited investors because of Rule 12(g)
concerns).
303
Campbell Letter, supra note 51, at 14–15 (discussing how Rule 12(g) and reporting requirements impose “what
amounts to penalties on small issuers using particular exemptions from registration, such as Regulation A+ (or
Crowdfunding.)”).
304
See Final Rules, supra note 1, at 117–120 for Commission rationale.
305
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 401(a)(5), 126 Stat. 325 [15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(5)].
306
See, supra note 140.
307
Final Rules, supra note 1, at 147-148.
308
Schwartz Letter, supra note 254, at 5 (discussing privacy and security concerns investors have with the current
model and the benefits of Australia’s hard-number model).
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number would be simpler and straightforward. For instance, $10,000 per Reg CF investment and
$20,000 per Reg A+.309 Alternatively, Congress should remove the limits completely.
Limit financial and reporting requirements for Regulation A+ and Regulation CF.
Without a robust secondary market, post-raise reports for Reg A+ and Reg CF make no sense.310
These reports are expensive and time consuming. Moreover, audits make no sense for companies
with little operating history.311 Congress should limit Reg A+ post-raise reports to annual and
remove Reg CF post-raise reporting altogether. It should also end Reg CF audit requirements and
allow CPA financial-statement reviews for all raises over $250,000, including subsequent
raises.312
Combine Regulation D 506(b) and Regulation D 506(c) and allow accredited
investor verification via affidavit. The Commission’s Reg D 506(c) “reasonable steps”
verification methods are cumbersome and invasive. Congress should allow investors to represent
under penalty of perjury they understand the accredited investor definition and meet the
thresholds. If investors willfully lie, fault should lie with them.
Upon these changes, issuers may split between consumer-focused companies that thrive
with heavy adoption choosing Reg A+/Reg CF and issuers with business to business focus
choosing Reg D. Or issuers may tailor combinations. But under simplified rules accepting
numerous unaccredited investors as brand ambassadors would be more appealing for issuers and
potentially profitable for those investors. This is especially true of tokenized offerings.
D. Where the SEC Should Act
The Commission should recognize its failures. When state regulators meddle, policy failures
occur. The Commission should not encourage state-review mechanisms.313 It sometimes dryly
309

Duccini Letter, supra note 264, at 8 (contrasting the simple $10,000/investor/year individual investment limit for
the Minnesota intrastate crowdfunding to the “largely ineffective (and wholly unenforceable)” federal model).
310
Quinn Letter, supra note 272, at 5 (“It is not clear what the necessity of providing ongoing disclosure is if the
securities cannot be transferred.”); cf. Rodrigues, Dirty Secret, supra note 28, at 3427 (“The secondary market is
where the payoff for issuer disclosure really emerges.”).
311

Letter from Nicholas Tommarello, Chief Exec. Officer, Wefunder, to Countryman, Secretary, U.S. Sec. and
Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 13, 2019) (on file with author) (“We know from three years of experience that the accounting
requirements are the single most burdensome disclosure requirement (arguably, the only burdensome disclosure
requirement) of Regulation Crowdfunding.”); Burton Letter, supra note 24, at 46 (“Requiring audited financial
statements for a crowdfunding company is ludicrous. It is one of the most obvious examples of how the disclosure
requirements do not fit together across exemptions. Issuers offering ten times this much (or more) need not obtain
audited financials using other exemptions.”); Schwartz Letter, supra note 254, at 4 (“[A] significant percentage of
crowdfunding issuers have very little income or assets to report, making financial statements practically irrelevant
for them.”); Mainvest Letter, supra note 279, at 6 (“In most cases, adding the CPA review to the upfront costs,
provides almost no value to investors and adds an often-prohibitive cost to entrepreneurs.”).
312
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission temporarily allowed Reg CF issuers offering under $250,000
in securities to have the principal executive officer certify the financial statements and certain information from the
issuer’s Federal income tax returns instead of an independent public accountant. Temporary Amendments to
Regulation Crowdfunding, 85 Fed. Reg. 27116 (proposed May 7, 2020)].) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227, 239).
The Final Rules extended this relief until August 28, 2022. Final Rules, supra note 3, at 284-85.
313
Final Rules, supra note 3, at 125 (“We believe that raising the threshold would permit issuers to seek more
capital at a lower marginal cost than under the current [Reg D 504] rule and may encourage regional multistate
offerings and the use of state coordinated review programs, resulting in more issuers conducting offerings under the
exemption . . . .”).

62

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:2: Feb. 2021

notes how Blue Sky laws affect exemption use314 but never completely solves it. The
Commission should admit private markets will never return to 1970s bad old days or preNSMIA. States should prosecute fraud after citizen complaints, in other words, reactive.315 No
evidence shows career civil-service personnel have the acumen or mindset to evaluate new
companies or ideas.
Eliminate Regulation A+ Tier 1. No issuer should be subject to double review. Federal
processes suffice. Efforts by state regulators to streamline reviews have failed and should be
acknowledged as such.316 After five years, the plague-like attitude toward Tier 1 should provide
ample evidence the Commission should scrap it. Raising Reg CF to $20 million and Reg A+ to
$100 million provides a better solution.317
Eliminate Regulation D 504. The same issues that animate Reg A+ Tier 1 resound to Reg D
504. The Final Rules raise the Reg D 504 offer limit to $10 million from $5 million.318 The
Commission should not keep trying to “fix” decades-old failures with higher caps without
addressing underlying reasons for nonuse. Eliminating the Reg D 504 cap completely will not
boost it given looming Blue Sky burdens. As it stands Reg D 504 (and the now-repealed Reg D
505) account for 2% of all Regulation D raises under $5 million.319 One must wonder what
raising the Reg D 504 limit to $10 million will achieve.320 Would raising the 2% level to 5% (an
unlikely outcome) be good public policy? If so straightforward rules with three exemptions
would be better.

CONCLUSION
Despite Commission belief, private-capital raising needs a paradigm shift. The
Commission should recognize its presuppositions do not match the current age much less the one
coming. Paternalistic investor protections that deter capital formation and efficient markets
hamper America’s global competitiveness. Its tendency to include state brethren leads to policy
See, e.g., Regulation A Report, supra note 136, at 9 (“The larger Tier 2 offering limit does not appear to be the
sole factor for issuers’ decision between tiers . . . Blue sky law preemption, facilitating nationwide solicitation and
solicitation over the Internet, may have contributed to the popularity of Tier 2 offerings among issuers seeking the
lower amount.”); Id. at 15 (“Some commenters have noted that state registration requirements for secondary market
transactions in Regulation A securities limit liquidity in the Regulation A market.”); Concept Release, supra note 2,
at 87 (discussing the vast differential in number of states issuers offer in Tier 2 compared to Tier 1, “We recognize
that this differential observed in the data may be related to the fact that, under the 2015 Regulation A amendments,
state registration requirements apply to Tier 1 but not to Tier 2 offerings.”)..
315
Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Federalism Gone Amuck: The Case for Reallocating
Governmental Authority over the Capital Formation Activities of Businesses, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 573, 573–574
(2011) (arguing that states should reallocate “scarce state resources to their most efficient use, which is the support
of the states' enforcement of their antifraud provisions”).
316
Burton Letter, supra note 24, at 38 (“The NASAA coordinated review program is a failure and should be
acknowledged as such.”); cf. Campbell, Under the Bus, supra note 83, at 339 (describing previous failed NASSA
attempts at uniformity).
317
Neiss Letter, supra note 283, at 4 (suggesting eliminating Reg A+ Tier 1 because Blue Sky laws make it
impractical and replacing it with Reg CF at $20 million offering limit).
318
Facilating Capital Formation, supra note, 3 at 125.
319
Id. at 122-123.
320
In 2016 the Commission raised the aggregate amount an issuer may offer and sell in any 12-month period for Reg
D 504 from $1 million to $5 million but notes, “[The] data suggests that the higher threshold limits have not
encouraged more issuers to conduct new offerings under the Rule 504 exemption, although those using the
exemption are able to raise more capital in each offering and in the aggregate.” Id. at 124.
314
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failures that can last decades.321 The Commission recognizes these failures begrudgingly if at all.
Its inability to adjust to innovation and New Deal era “fact and circumstances” analysis already
harm domestic entrepreneurs.
As David Burton aptly states, “The core problem with the current U.S. securities
regulation system is its negative impact on small, start-up and emerging growth companies and,
therefore, the adverse impact it has on entrepreneurship and the growth potential of the
economy.”322 This is not a new insight. Four decades ago, Congress and the Commission
recognized the capital-raising burdens it placed on small businesses and entrepreneurs.323 In
2012, Congress tried to help via the JOBS Act. Unfortunately, even before enactment, the
Commission treated the law as adversarial with predictable results. The future U.S. economy is
too important to leave to well-intentioned Commission staff. Congress should improve the JOBS
Act with a second try that fulfills the first’s promise while curtailing discretionary powers that
caused it to falter.

321

Campbell, Under the Bus, supra note 84, at 347 (describing Commission actions and inactions over the last 20
years that have enabled NASAA obstruction of small business capital formation); Id. at 350 (“Simply stated, my
conclusion is that the Commission will continue to enable NASAA and state regulators to preserve a regime to
makes it unnecessarily difficult, inefficient, and unfair for small businesses to access external capital. My other
simple, related conclusion is that only Congress can break this gridlock by enacting statutory preemptions of state
authority over registration.”).
322
Burton Letter, supra note 24, at 22.
323
See Martin & Parsons, supra note 14.
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INTRODUCTION

How do firms supposedly engaged in earnings management respond to the filing of fraudbased legal actions and to the issuance of fraud-based legal rulings? Do they cease or continue
their suspected earnings management activities? Using data analytics, this paper examines the
impact of fraud-based legal actions on earnings management.
Corporate governance is the responsibility of an entity to any persons or groups who are
affected by the various decisions, policies and operations of that entity.1 While corporate
governance is a significant factor in ensuring the presence of control mechanisms, it sometimes
fails to prevent financial malpractice.2
Investors’ trust in corporate financial reporting has been seriously shaken in recent decades.
The corporate accounting scandals involving large well-known companies such as Enron,
WorldCom, Xerox, Tyco and a number of lesser known companies – all audited by large
accounting firms – suggest serious deficiencies in the accounting standards and corporate
governance and regulatory systems designed to guide and monitor the financial information
process.3 Recent examples include Microsoft smoothing its earnings in order to stabilize profits
and Coca-Cola overstating its assets by $9 million.4
Financial statement fraud occurred more frequently in smaller companies (companies with
total assets of less than $100 million) than larger ones. In other findings of the study, computer
companies were among those who topped the list of companies involved in financial statement
fraud, according to a study done by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission.5
Research confirms the anecdotal evidence that the quality of reported earnings has
deteriorated starting in the 1990s. For example, the gap between taxable corporate income and
aggregate earnings has been continuously widening throughout the 1990s.6 Another example
would be the gap between corporate profits and earnings reported in the national product and
income accounts, which are based on firms’ taxable income adjusted for current values of
depreciation and inventory. Although part of the gap between corporate profits and earnings may
be due to the increasing sophistication of tax planning, earnings manipulation plays a major role.7
There is evidence indicating that both CFOs and CEOs have idiosyncratic styles in withholding
1

Ayu Laksmi & Zulfia.Kamila, The Effect of Good Corporate Governance and Earnings Management to Corporate
Social Responsibility Disclosure, 22 ACAD. OF ACCT. & FIN. STUD. J. 1–16 (2018).
2
Malek El Diri, Costas Lambrinoudakis & Mohammad Alhadab, Corporate Governance and Earnings Management
in Concentrated Markets, 108 J. OF BUS. RES. 291, 291–92 (2020).
3
Baruch Lev, Corporate Earnings: Facts and Fiction, 17 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 27, 27 (Spring 2003).
4
El Diri, supra note 2, at 291.
5
MARK S. BEASLEY, JOSEPH V. CARCELLO, DANA R. HERMANSON &THE COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING: 1987-1997 AN ANALYSIS
OF U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES 17 (1999).
6
Francois Degeorge, Jayendu Patel & Richard Zeckhauser, Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds, 72 THE J.
OF BUS. 1, 29 (1999); Mihir Desai, The Corporate Profit Base, Tax Sheltering Activity, and the Changing Nature of
Employee Compensation, 1–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8866,2002); Lev, supra note 3,
at 27.
7
Baruch Lev & Doron Nissim, Taxable Income as an Indicator of Earnings Quality (N.Y. Univ., Working Paper,
2002); Baruch Lev, Corporate Earnings: Facts and Fiction, 17 J. OF ECONOMIC PERSP. 27, 27 (Spring 2003).
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bad news;8 apparently, more competent managers tend to be overconfident about future outcomes
and therefore more likely to withhold bad news.9
Firm-specific data corroborates the use of earnings manipulation or earnings management
by corporations. The number of earnings restatements by listed companies, often after admitted
irregularities, has tremendously increased in the last several years.10 In addition, the frequency of
firms beating analyst’s earnings forecasts increased sharply in the 1990s, suggesting earnings
management as a possible cause.11 Lev and Zarowin12 provide evidence that the usefulness of
reported earnings, cash flows, and equity values has been deteriorating for two decades. Rayman13
stated a case that accounting is often distorted and inaccurate and called for a revision of the
conventional accounting system nearly five decades ago.
Data analytics has been a growing field in the past two decades and, more recently, an
emerging field in the legal sector.14 Analytics can help predict outcomes in court.15 Legal services
providers need to go beyond merely accessing copies of statutes, regulations, interpretive
documents and other primary law sources.16 Client cases include more than substantive law issues
and a regulatory question may involve accounting, finance, marketing and other issues. 17 While
data analytics are not infallible, they can provide insights that increase the odds of an accurate
prediction, enabling lawyers and clients to pursue a more accurate litigation strategy.18 This paper
employs the data analytic technique of linear regression to examine how fraud-based legal actions
impact earnings management policies.

II.

DEFINITION OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT

Since earnings management is deemed to be a critical factor affecting the quality of
earnings in recent decades, a definition of earnings management is in order. Earnings management
is when managers use their judgment in financial reporting and transaction structuring in order to
alter their firms’ financial reports so as to either mislead some stakeholders (i.e., investors,
creditors, employees, regulatory authorities) about the basic economic and financial performance
8

Jiaxin Liu, Do Executives Have Fixed Effects on Firm-Level Stock Price Crash Risk? (2016) (PhD. dissertation,
CUNY) (on file with CUNY Academic Works).
9
Jeong-Bon Kim & Liandong Zhang, Accounting Conservatism and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm-Level Evidence,
33 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 412, 413 (2016).
10
Min Wu, Earnings Restatements: A Capital Market Perspective (N.Y. Univ., Working Paper, 2002).
11
Russell Lundholm, Reporting on the Past: A New Approach to Improving Accounting Today, 13 ACCT. HORIZONS
315, 315 (1999).
12
Baruch Lev & Paul Zarowin, The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to Extend Them, 37 J. OF ACCT.
RES. 353, 365 (1999).
13
R. Anthony Rayman, An Extension of the System of Accounts: The Segregation of Funds and Value, 7 J. OF ACCT.
RES. 53, 54 (1969).
14
Patrick Flanagan & Michelle H. Dewey, Where Do We Go from Here? Transformation and Acceleration of Legal
Analytics in Practice, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1245 (2019).
15
Marilyn Odendahl, Big Data Is Predicting Outcomes in Court, THE IND. LAW. (May 13, 2020),
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/big-data-is-predicting-outcomes-in-court.
16
Kenneth A. Grady, Mining Legal Data: Collecting and Analyzing 21 st Century Gold, in DATA-DRIVEN LAW 11, 18
(Ed Walters ed., 2017).
17
Id. at 19.
18
Owen Byrd, Moneyball Legal Analytics Now Online for Commercial Litigators, COM. L. WORLD, Apr.-June 2017,
at 12, 16.
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of the firm or to obtain more favorable contractual and/or legal results that depend on accounting
numbers.19
This definition of earnings management merits discussion. Managers may exercise their
judgment in financial reporting in many ways. Their judgment is required in estimating various
future economic events such as obligations for pension benefits, losses from asset impairments
and bad debts, deferred taxes and salvage values of long-term assets. Managers can choose among
many acceptable accounting methods for reporting the same economic transactions, such as the
LIFO, FIFO, weighted-average inventory valuation methods or the accelerated or straight-line
depreciation methods. Managers can exercise their judgment in working capital management, such
as the timing of inventory purchases/shipments, receivable policies and the maintenance of
inventory levels, which affects net revenues and cost allocations. Managers can also choose to
make or defer expenses such as advertising, maintenance, or research and development. 20
Furthermore, managers can manage earnings in the form of transaction structuring. For example,
lease contracts can be structured so that lease obligations are on- or off-balance sheet and equity
investments can be structured to require or avoid consolidation.21

III.

DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS

One common form of earnings management is the use of discretionary accruals. 22 Under
accrual-basis accounting, transactions that change a firm’s financial statements are recorded in the
same periods in which the events occur. Under the accrual basis, revenues are recognized when
earned rather than when the cash is actually received and expenses are recognized when incurred
rather than when the cash is paid. On an accrual basis, information presented reveals relationships
likely to be important in predicting future results.
Under cash-basis accounting, revenues are recorded only when received in cash and
expenses are recorded only when paid in cash. Because cash-basis accounting does not always
match earned revenues with expenses, it is not in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles. Cash basis accounting may be used by individuals and small companies because they
usually have few receivables and payables but most companies use accrual-basis accounting.23
Accruals, in particular, are the non-cash items that determine regular accounting income.24

19

Paul M. Healy & James M. Wahlen, A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for
Standard Setting, 13 ACCT. HORIZONS 365, 368 (1999).
20
See Sterling Huang, Sugata Roychowdhury & Ewa Sletten, Does Litigation Deter or Encourage Real Earnings
Management?, 95 THE ACCT. REV., no. 3, 2020, at 251.
21
Paul Healy & James M. Wahlen, A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and its Implications for
Standard Setting, 13 ACCT. HORIZONS 365, 369 (1999); see generally François Degeorge, Jayendu Patel and
Richard Zeckhauser, Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds, 72 THE J. OF BUS. 1 (1999).
22
Scott B. Jackson & Marshall K. Pitman, Auditors and Earnings Management, THE CPA J. (July 2001) Available
at http://archives.cpajournal.com/2001/0700/features/f073801.htm.
23
Jerry J. Weygandt et al., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 91 (7th ed. 2005).
24
Gene D’Avolio et al., Technology, Information Production and Market Efficiency, HARV. INST. OF ECON. RSCH.,
Sept. 2001, at 20 (explaining that Net income = Cash Flows + Accruals; Accruals = Δ Current Assets (excluding
cash) – Δ Current Liabilities – Depreciation).
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By their very nature, accruals require subjective judgments and estimation. Before they are
realized, accruals are difficult for auditors to objectively verify.25 Though determining what
component of accruals is discretionary is also difficult, empirical models have been developed to
measure discretionary accruals26
As an illustration of how discretionary accruals reflect earnings management, consider
“channel stuffing.” Channel stuffing is the process of “borrowing” sales from future periods by
persuading customers to purchase large inventory amounts before these amounts are actually
needed. The customers are not expected to pay for these inventory amounts for several months and
the retailers possess the right to a full refund for any unsold items; furthermore, the original
company pays for the storage of the inventory until it is sold. The sudden surge in accounts
receivable may be classified by one or more of the empirical models as an abnormal or
discretionary accrual.27
The Securities Exchange Commission investigated Sunbeam, Inc., a United States electric
home appliance company, for channel stuffing. Industry insiders claimed that Sunbeam’s revenues
were padded because its chief executive officer at the time, Albert John Dunlap, strong-armed
retailers into buying a lot more merchandise than they needed. The retail stores became hopelessly
overstocked and unsold inventory piled up in Sunbeam’s warehouses. Eventually investors
panicked, and Dunlap was fired. Sunbeam was forced to restate its earnings and file for bankruptcy
in 2001. Dunlap agreed to pay $15 million to settle a shareholder lawsuit.28

IV.

THE IMPACT OF FRAUD-BASED LEGAL ACTIONS

After years of engaging in earnings management, suppose a firm is facing a fraud-based
lawsuit or regulatory enforcement action and the court or regulatory authority issues a legal ruling.
How would this legal ruling impact managerial incentive for discretionary accruals-based earnings
management? If the legal ruling is in the firm’s favor, would the firm continue its current accruals
policy or change it? If the firm does change it, would the change lead to an income-increasing
accruals policy or an income-decreasing accruals policy? The same questions can be asked if the
legal ruling is against the firm. Furthermore, are there industry factors that determine the way a
firm changes its discretionary accrual policy in response to a fraud-based legal ruling, regardless
of whether it is favorable or unfavorable? The prior discretionary accrual models and studies do
25

Jackson, supra note 22.
See Jennifer Jones, Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations, J. OF ACCT. RSCH. 193, 212
(Autumn 1991); Patricia Dechow et al., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms
Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH., Spring 1996, at 23-24; Sok-Hyon Kang & K.
Sivaramakrishnan, Issues in Testing Earnings Management and an Instrumental Variable Approach, J. OF ACCT.
RSCH. 353, 354 (Autumn 1995); Xavier Garza-Gómez et al., Discretionary Accrual Models and the Accounting
Process 10-12 (Nagoya City University, Working Paper No. 259, 1999)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=209073; K. V. Peasnell et al., Detecting Earnings Management
Using Cross-Sectional Abnormal Accruals Models, 30 ACCT. & BUS. RSCH. 318 (2000); Jacob Thomas & Xiao-Jun
Zhang, Identifying Unexpected Accruals: A Comparison of Current Approaches, 19 J. OF ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 347
(2000).
27
D’Avolio, supra note 24, at 20-21.
28
Kelly Greene, Dunlap Agrees to Pay $15 Million to Settle Lawsuit Filed by Sunbeam Shareholders, THE WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2002) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1011029024354167520.
26

69

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:3: Feb. 2021

not directly address these questions or the effects of a lawsuit and subsequent ruling on the
magnitude of entity discretionary accruals; rather the prior discretionary accrual studies focus on
how economic, contractual, and regulatory conditions affect discretionary accruals.
It can be argued that when faced with a favorable legal ruling, a firm will either: (1)
continue to use the same discretionary accruals policy it did before the legal action since a court
or regulatory authority found in the firm’s favor, thereby “validating” the policy; or (2) change its
discretionary accruals policy so as to avoid a fraud-based legal action in the future. Of course, how
the firm changes its discretionary accruals policy depends on what type of discretionary accruals
the firm was using before the favorable legal ruling was issued. If the firm used income-increasing
discretionary accruals before the ruling, it may now use income-decreasing discretionary accruals
after the ruling. Following the same logic, if it used income-decreasing discretionary accruals
before the ruling, it will use income-increasing discretionary accruals after the ruling.
When faced with an unfavorable legal ruling, it can be reasoned that a firm will try to adopt
a more conservative discretionary accrual policy because it does not want to report larger net
income that will be used to calculate larger litigation awards or penalties in the future. On the other
hand, it can be argued that when faced with an unfavorable legal ruling, a firm will try to report
larger net income to provide assurance to its stockholders and creditors that it can easily pay off
any litigation awards or penalties it may have to pay and still be profitable.
This study empirically examines how fraud-based legal rulings impact discretionary
accruals. It extends extant research on discretionary accruals by providing another possible
incentive – a legal incentive – for earnings management besides capital market, contracting and
regulatory incentives.

V.

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

For the purposes of this study, the following hypotheses were formulated to accompany
various legal settings and outcomes:

A. Hypothesis 1: The Impact of a Legal Action Filing
By the time a legal ruling is issued, a firm is already aware that there is a legal action
pending against it; therefore, this firm adjusts its discretionary accrual policy in response to the
filing and notice of the legal action. Legal actions are more common against firms that use incomeincreasing discretionary accruals29,30￼ The decrease in the use of income-increasing discretionary
accruals leads to an increase in the transparency of accounting information. This leads to the
following hypothesis:

29

Orie Barron, Jamie Pratt & James Stice, Misstatement Direction, Litigation Risk, and Planned Audit Investment,
39 J. OF ACCT. RSCH. 449, 451 (2001).
30
Mark Bradshaw, Scott Richardson & Richard Sloan, Do Analysts and Auditors Use Information in Accruals?, 39
J. OF ACCT. RSCH. 45, 70 (2001).
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H1: When a firm manages its earnings via discretionary accruals, the magnitude of the
firm’s discretionary accruals decreases in response to the filing of a fraud-based legal action
against that firm in the measurement period after the filing when compared to the measurement
period preceding the filing.

B. Hypothesis 2: The Impact of a Favorable Fraud-based Legal Ruling
When a firm receives a favorable fraud-based legal ruling from a court or regulatory
authority, it is a general indication that the firm has not engaged in any fraudulent accounting
practices. A favorable fraud-based legal ruling provides assurance as to the reliability of that firm’s
financial information. Once a firm has been through the legal process, this firm may not want to
be sued again on the basis of providing fraudulent financial or accounting information.
Consequently, the firm will reduce the use of discretionary accruals because it has become more
risk-adverse from a legal standpoint. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: When a firm manages its earnings via discretionary accruals, the magnitude of this
firm’s discretionary accruals decreases in response to the issuance of a favorable fraud-based
legal ruling in the measurement period after the issuance when compared to the measurement
period preceding the issuance.

C. Hypothesis 3: The Impact of an Unfavorable Fraud-Based Legal Ruling
If the firm was using income-increasing discretionary accruals before the issuance of the
unfavorable legal ruling, it can be argued that the firm will now reverse this policy and use incomedecreasing discretionary accruals after the issuance of the unfavorable legal ruling because it does
not want to incur more litigation risk in the future. By the same token, if a firm was using incomedecreasing discretionary accruals before the issuance of the unfavorable legal ruling, that firm may
now use income-increasing discretionary accruals after the issuance of such a ruling. Basically, an
unfavorable fraud-based legal ruling will lead a firm to reverse its discretionary accrual policy
because the firm managers may feel that it was this policy that led to that adverse ruling. This leads
to the following hypothesis:
H3: When a firm manages its earnings via discretionary accruals, the magnitude of the
firm’s discretionary accruals decreases in response to the issuance of an unfavorable fraud-based
legal ruling in the measurement period following the issuance when compared to the measurement
period preceding the issuance.

D. Hypothesis 4: The Impact of a Mixed Fraud-Based Legal Ruling
Not all legal rulings are entirely favorable or unfavorable to a firm. In some cases, the court
or regulatory authority dismisses some of the fraud charges against the firm but maintains others.
In other cases, the firm wins on some charges but loses on the other charges. In still other cases,
the firm agrees to settle without admitting any guilt or fault. These cases, where there are no clear
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and concise favorable or unfavorable legal rulings, are called mixed rulings for the purpose of this
study.
How a mixed ruling impacts the discretionary accrual policy of a firm may depend on the
terms and conditions that accompany the mixed legal ruling. In some cases, a court or regulatory
authority may dismiss certain charges if the defendant company agrees to comply with certain
terms. In some settlement cases, the defendant company admits no guilt or fault but agrees to fulfill
certain conditions in order to end the case. The nature of these settlement negotiations and
agreements may not always be public information, which means that it may not be possible to
ascertain why a defendant company’s managers changed their discretionary accrual policies in the
way that they did after the issuance of a mixed legal ruling; however, it is logical to assume that a
defendant company would reduce the magnitude of its discretionary accruals after the issuance of
a mixed legal ruling because it does not want to go through the laborious legal and settlement
process again. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H4: When a firm engages in earnings management via discretionary accruals, the
magnitude of the firm’s discretionary accruals decreases in response to the issuance of a mixed
legal ruling in the measurement period following the issuance when compared to the measurement
period preceding the issuance.

E. Hypothesis 5: The Impact of Industry Factors
Industry factors affect firm managers’ decisions to implement earnings management via
discretionary accruals. Firms in a particular industry adjust discretionary accruals based on their
relative earnings performance, which is defined against industry. Furthermore, firm-industry
earnings correlation and relative announcement timing, along with industry-defined relative
earnings performance, are significant factors affecting individual firms’ discretionary accrual
decisions.31
Some industries may have more incentives than others to manage earnings via
discretionary accruals. Certain industries, such as the pharmaceutical, airline, and motor carrier
industries, are either the subjects of stringent government regulations or the recipients of certain
government benefits when compared with other industries; therefore, they may use discretionary
accrual policies in order to avoid the consequences of tight government regulations or to reap the
rewards of generous government benefits.32 In particular, it has been claimed that the value
relevance of accounting information provided by firms in the high-technology, knowledge-

31

Myung Park & Byung Rob, The Effect of Firm-Industry Earnings Correlation and Announcement Timing on
Firms’ Accrual Decisions, 36 BRIT. ACCT. REV. 269-89 (2004).
32
Kurt Wojdat, Politically Motivated Accounting Choice and Financial Indicators of Political Risk: The
Pharmaceutical Industry (Apr. 30, 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. Univ. of N.Y. at Buffalo); Joseph
Legoria, Political Costs, Health Care Reform and Earnings Management in the Pharmaceutical Industry (May, 1997)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Ark.); Lydia Rosencrants, Conflicting Incentives for Earnings
Management in Regulated Companies: A Study of the United States Airline Industry (1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Mich. St. Univ.); Kevin Sachs, Accounting and Deregulation: The Case of Motor Carriers (Mar. 5,
1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. Univ. of N.Y. at Buffalo).
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intensive, service-oriented industry has declined over time.33 Furthermore, Healy and Wahlen
(1999)34 have pointed out that the banking, insurance and utility industries deal with regulation
that is specifically tied to accounting numbers. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H5: When a firm engages in earnings management via discretionary accruals there is an
industry-differential impact on the magnitude of discretionary accruals in response to the issuance
of a fraud-based legal ruling in the measurement period following the issuance when compared to
the measurement period preceding the issuance.

VI.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This study extends existing literature and develops an empirical model that emphasizes and
explains how firm managers adjust their discretionary accrual policies in response to the issuance
of a fraud-based legal ruling.

A. Sample Selection
A sample of 183 firms facing fraud-based financial reporting legal rulings was selected by
searching the Commerce Clearinghouse Federal Securities Law Reports for the years 1982 to
2007. A 25-year period was selected to obtain more trend information. Since legal actions can take
years and are sometimes settled out of court, obtaining cases after 2007 that included both lawsuits
and rulings was limited. Accounting data needed to estimate accruals35 for these 183 firms was
obtained from the COMPUSTAT Industrial Quarterly database. Of these 183 firms, 106 had to be
eliminated from the final sample due to missing information in the COMPUSTAT database.
Missing information means either that the company was not listed at all in the COMPUSTAT
database or was listed but had either large gaps of missing accounting variables or no accounting
variables at all. If a particular firm had less than 20 observations for each predictor variable, 36 or
had 20 or more sporadic observations, then the firm was eliminated from the final sample.

33

Robert Elliot & Peter Jacobsen, U.S. Accounting: A National Emergency, 172J. OF ACCT. 54 (1991); Edmund L.
Jenkins, An Information Highway in Need of Capital Improvements, 177 J. OF ACCT. 77 (1994); Mark Sever and
Ronald Boisclaire, Financial Reporting in the 1990s, 170 J. OF ACCT. 36-41 (1990); K. Ramesh and R. Thiagarajan,
Inter-Temporal Decline in Earnings Response Coefficients (Northwestern Univ.Working Paper, Paper No. #, 1995);
Raymond Chiang & P. C. Venkatesh, Insider Holdings and Perceptions of Information Asymmetry: A Note, 43 THE
J. OF FIN. 1041, 1046 (1988); Baruch Lev & Paul Zarowin, The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to
Extend Them, 37 J. OF ACCT. RSCH. 353, 361 (1999); Jennifer Francis & Katherine Schipper, Have Financial
Statements Lost Their Relevance?, 37 J. OF ACCT. RSCH. 319 (1999); Stephen Brown, Kin Lo & Thomas Lys, Use of
R2 in Accounting Research: Measuring Changes in Value Relevance Over the Last Four Decades, 28 J. OF ACCT.
AND ECON. 83 (1999); Alex Dontoh, Suresh Radhakrishnan &Joshua Ronen, The Declining Value Relevance of
Accounting Information and Non-Information-Based Trading: An Empirical Analysis, 21 CONTEMP. ACCT.
RSCH.795 (2004).
34
Paul M. Healy & James M. Wahlen, A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and its Implications for
Standard Setting, 13 ACCT. HORIZONS 365, 380 (1999).
35
William G. Heninger, The Association Between Auditor Litigation and Abnormal Accruals, 76 THE ACCT. REV.
111 (2001).
36
JOSEPH F. HAIR, JR., ET AL., MULTIVARIATE DATA ANALYSIS 258 (7th ed. 1998).
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The sample selections by type of legal ruling and industry category are presented in Tables
1 and 2, respectively. Note that in Table 2, the industries with the largest and second largest
number of fraud-based legal rulings in the sample happen to be the science/technology and
brokerage/investment/financial services industries, respectively. These outcomes are consistent
with those of the Treadway Commission’s financial statement fraud study,37 which found that
computer companies (considered part of the science/technology industry) and financial service
providers topped the list of companies involved in financial statement fraud.

Table 1: Sample Selection by Type of Legal Ruling
Type of Legal Ruling
Number of Companies
Favorable
27
Unfavorable
42
Mixed
8
TOTAL
77

Table 2: Sample Selection by Industry Category
Industry Category
Retail/Food Service
Waste Management/Environmental Compliance/Sewers,
Tunnels, Pipelines
Pharmaceuticals
Healthcare
Brokerage/Investment/Financial Services
Science & Technology
Aerospace/Airlines
Media
Vehicles/Transportation
Natural Resources (Oil, gas, petroleum
production/exploration/mining)
Utilities/Power Supply
TOTAL

Number of Companies
10
3
7
5
14
20
2
6
4
4
2
77

B. Measures of Accounting Discretion
The main proxy for client managers’ reporting flexibility will be the income-increasing
discretionary accruals estimated using the Modified Jones model because although other models
may provide better results in certain manipulation tests, the Modified Jones model is consistently

37

Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, Shedding Light on Fraud, J. OF ACCT.
(September 2003).
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better overall for measuring discretionary accruals and in detecting earnings management 38￼ The
Modified Jones model estimates discretionary accruals (DISCRETIONARY_ACCRUALS) as
the prediction error from firm-specific ordinary least square regressions:
(1) TOTAL_ACCRUALSit = A0 + A1(Δ REVit – Δ RECit) + A2(PPEit) + εit
where:
TOTAL_ACCRUALSit = Δ Current assetst – Δ Casht – Δ Current liabilitiest +
Δ Current portion of long-term debt – Depreciation and amortization expense;
A0 = the intercept or an item of the regression equation indicating the criterion score when all the
predictor variables are zero;39
Δ REVit = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1;
Δ RECit = receivables in year t less receivables in year t-1;
PPEit = gross property, plant and equipment in year t;
εit = prediction errors;
i = 1…..n firm index; and
t = 1…..T(i) year index for the number of years included in the estimation period for firm i.
DISCRETIONARY_ACCRUALS are the prediction errors (εit) from applying the
Modified Jones model to estimate normal accruals in the year of the legal ruling:
(2) DISCRETIONARY_ACCRUALSit = TOTAL_ACCRUALSit – A0 + A1(Δ REVit – Δ
RECit) + PPEit

C. Specification of the Discretionary Accrual Model
The model in this study investigates the possibility that firm managers change their
discretionary accrual policies in response to the issuance of legal rulings. This model specifies
control variables that may contribute to changes in discretionary accrual policies that are unrelated

38

Patricia M. Dechow, Richard G. Sloan & Amy P. Sweeney, Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation:
An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, CONTEMP. ACCT. RSHC. 1, 19 (1996); Eli Bartov,
Ferdinand Gul & Judy Tsui, Discretionary Accruals Models and Audit Qualifications, 30 J. OF ACCT. AND ECON.
421, 425 (2001); Alcarria Jaime &Gill de Albornoz Noguer, Specification and Power of Cross-Sectional Abnormal
Working Capital Accruals Models in the Spanish Context, 13 EUR. ACCT. REV. 73-104 (2004); Ho Young Lee &
Vivek Mande, The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Accounting Discretion of Client
Managers of Big 6 and Non-Big 6 Auditors, 22 AUDITING: A J. OF PRAC. & THEORY 93, 97 (2003); Mary L. Chai &
Samuel Tung, The Effect of Earnings-Announcement Timing on Earnings Management, 29 J. OF BUS. FIN. & ACCT.
1337, 1341 (2002).
39
See LAURENCE G. GRIMM & PAUL R. YARNOLD, READING AND UNDERSTANDING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 137
(1995).
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to the issuance of legal rulings. Specifically, coefficients are estimated in the following
discretionary accrual regression model:
(3) DiscAccr = A0 + A1(FEarnGrowthit) + A2(FGrowthit) + A3(FLeverageit) + A4(FSizeit) +
A5(LAWSUIT) + A6(RULING) + εit
where:
DiscAccr = Dependent variable: DISCRETIONARY_ACCRUALS or the prediction errors (εit)
derived in estimating TOTAL_ACCRUALS in regression equation (1) (the Modified Jones
model) above. (Income-increasing discretionary accrual: DiscAccr ≥ 0; Income-decreasing
discretionary accrual: DiscAccr < 0);40
A0 = the intercept or an item of the regression equation indicating the criterion score when all the
predictor variables are zero;41
FEarnGrowthit = Independent control variable: Firm earnings growth measured by the percentage
changes in net income. Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 1990)42 and Defond and Jiambalvo (1993)43
both have claimed that management compensation, such as bonuses and pay increases tied to
earnings growth, may provide firm managers with strong incentives to manage discretionary
accruals; therefore, the percentage change in net income is included as a control variable in this
model;44
FGrowthit = Independent control variable: Firm growth measured by the percentage changes in
total assets. Dechow and Skinner (2000)45 claim that growth firms have capital-market motivations
to manipulate earnings in order to meet earnings benchmarks, so the percentage change in total
assets is used as a control variable for firm growth;46
FLeverageit = Independent control variable: Firm leverage measured by total liabilities/total
assets. Since debt contracts employ accounting numbers in deciding whether a debtor has behaved
unfavorably, the firm managers of debtor companies may choose accounting methods that

40

Ho Young Lee and Vivek Mande, The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on
Accounting Discretion of Client Managers of Big 6 and Non-Big 6 Auditors, 22 AUDITING: A J. OF PRACTICE &
THEORY 97 (2003).
41
Id. at 102.
42
Ross L. Watts and Jerold L. Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory at 74 (Prentice-Hall) (1986); Ross L. Watts
and Jerold L. Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten-Year Perspective, 65 THE ACCT. REV. 131–56
(1990).
43
Mark L. DeFond and James Jiambalvo, Factors Related to Auditor-Client Disagreements Over Income-Increasing
Accounting Methods, 9 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 415, 425 (1993).
44
Id. at 419.
45
See Patricia Dechow and Douglas J. Skinner, Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting
Academics, Practitioners and Regulators, 14 ACCT. HORIZONS 235, PG (2000).
46
Id. at 243.
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minimize debt costs so as not to violate debt contract covenants; 47 therefore, this variable is
included to control for the effects of high leverage;48
FSizeit = Independent control variable: Firm size measured by the log of total assets.
Large firms are more likely to use earnings management to reduce their costs than small firms
according to the political cost hypothesis;49 therefore, the log of total assets is used as a proxy for
firm size;50
LAWSUIT = Independent categorical variable: Equals -1 in the 12 firm-quarters before the filing
of the legal action, 1 in the 12 firm-quarters after the filing, and 0 otherwise;
RULING = Independent categorical variable: Equals -1 in the 12 firm-quarters before the issuance
of the legal ruling, 1 in the 12 firm-quarters after the issuance, and 0 otherwise;
εit = prediction errors;
i = 1…n firm index; and
t = 1…(i) year index for the number of years included in the estimation period for firm i.
LAWSUIT and RULING are independent dummy variables used to account for the effect
that the filing of a legal action and the issuance of a legal ruling, respectively, have in predicting
the dependent variable, discretionary accruals, or DiscAccr. Dummy variables are qualitative
variables (e.g., gender, race, religion, wars, lawsuits, legal rulings, etc.) that are quantified by
assigning them numerical values such as 1 or 0, 0 indicating the absence of a qualitative factor and
1 indicating the presence of that factor (it is not essential that the dummy variables only take the
values of 0 and 1). Dummy variables are also referred to as binary variables, categorical variables,
dichotomous variables, indicator variables, and qualitative variables.51
The method of assigning the reference group the value of -1 for the dummy variables is
termed “effects coding.” This differs from the more commonly used method of indicator coding,
where the reference group is assigned the value of 0 for the dummy variables. Both forms of
dummy variable coding will give the same predictions, coefficients of determination, and
regression coefficients for the continuous variables; however, there will be differences in the
interpretation of the dummy-variable coefficients.52
Effects coding provides an advantage over indicator coding in the interpretation of the
dummy-variable coefficients. In effects coding, the dummy-variable coefficients represent
47

Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. OF
FIN. ECON. 117, 144 (1979); Richard Leftwich, Accounting Information in Private Markets: Evidence from Private
Lending Agreement, 58 THE ACCT. REV. 23, 24 (1983); Ross L. Watts and Jerold L. Zimmerman, Positive
Accounting Theory: A Ten-Year Perspective, 65 THE ACCT. REV. 131, 133 (1990).
48
Mary L. Chai and Samuel Tung, The Effect of Earnings-Announcement Timing on Earnings Management, 29(9)
& (10) J. OF BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1340, 1348 (2002).
49
Kurt Wojdat, Politically Motivated Accounting Choice and Financial Indicators of Political Risk: The
Pharmaceutical Industry, (Apr. 30, 1999) (Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo) (ProQuest);
Doreen Gilfedder and Ciaran O’Hogartaigh, The Grasshoppers and the Great Cattle: Participation and NonParticipation in the ASB’s Standard-Setting Process, 2 J. OF MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 287, pg. number (1997).
50
See Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, supra note 37.
51
DAMODAR N. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRICS 77 (2nd ed. 1988).
52
JOSEPH HAIR, JR. ET AL., MULTIVARIATE DATA ANALYSIS 235 (5th ed.1998).
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differences for any group from the mean of all groups, whereas in indicator coding the dummyvariable coefficients represent differences only to the omitted category of the nominal scale.53 This
means that effects coding is a more appropriate method whenever the group variables are to be
compared to all other groups rather than to just one reference group.54
Effects coding is ideally suited to the analysis in this study because the baseline for
comparison can be interpreted as a comprehensive average for all of the years (rather than just the
omitted three years or 12 quarters before the filing of the lawsuit or issuance of the legal ruling, as
with indicator coding). Under effects coding, the intercept is the grand mean, and the regression
coefficients of the dummy variables are such that they specify the deviation of the identified group
(i.e., the legal action or legal ruling) from the grand mean or intercept.55 As a result, an analysis of
the impact of a legal action and/or a legal ruling on a firm’s discretionary accrual policy over a
long period can be done instead of an analysis of the short period immediately before the
filing/issuance of the legal action/legal ruling.
The NCSS statistical program generates four variables in the regression equation related
to the effects coding of the dummy variables, LAWSUIT and RULING:
(LAWSUIT = -1) = the period of reference for the LAWSUIT dummy variable, which is the 12
firm-quarters before the filing of the legal action;
(LAWSUIT = 0) = the period of interest for the LAWSUIT dummy variable, which is the 12
firm-quarters after the filing of the legal action;
(RULING = -1) = the period of reference for the RULING dummy variable, which is the 12
firm-quarters before the issuance of the legal ruling; and
(RULING = 0) = the period of interest for the RULING dummy variable, which is the 12 firmquarters after the issuance of the legal ruling.

VII.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The value of the regression coefficient indicates how much change occurs in the dependent
variable (DiscAccr) for a one-unit change in the particular independent variable when the
remaining independent variables are held constant. The regression coefficients for the independent
variables for the various sample categories are presented in Table 3.

A. The Regression Coefficients
The regression coefficients for the variables (LAWSUIT = -1) and (LAWSUIT = 0)
represent deviations from the intercept (or sample mean for discretionary accruals when all the
predictor variables are zero) for the 12 firm-quarters before and after, respectively, the filing of the
legal action. The regression coefficients for the variables (RULING = -1) and (RULING = 0)

53

Id.; William J. Dixon & S.M. Gaarder, Presidential Succession and the Cold War: An Analysis of SovietAmerican Relations, 1948-1988, 54 J. POL. 156, 156–75 (1992).
54
Dixon & Gaarder, supra note 53, at 156–75.
55
Id.

78

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:3: Feb. 2021

represent deviations from the intercept for the 12 firm-quarters before and after, respectively, the
issuance of the legal ruling.
According to Table 3, the greatest deviation between the intercept and the (LAWSUIT = 1) variable is among the sample of companies that are in the science and technology industry with
a deviation of -5,489.47 percent [(134.3326 – (-2.4925))/(-2.4925%)]. The deviation between the
intercept and the (LAWSUIT = 0) variable is -6,367.97 percent [(156.2293 – (-2.4925))/(2.4925%)], indicating an overall industry increase in the use of income-increasing discretionary
accruals by 878.50 percent [(-6,367.97%) – (-5,489.47%)] (compared to the sample mean for
discretionary accruals used in the science and technology industry) after the filing of the legal
action. In a direct comparison between the variables (LAWSUIT = 0) and (LAWSUIT = -1), the
use of income-increasing discretionary accruals increased by 16.30 percent [(156.2293 –
134.3326)/134.3326%] in the 12 firm-quarters after the filing of the lawsuit when compared to the
12 firm-quarters before the filing of the legal action.
Table 3: Regression Coefficients for the Independent Variables
DiscAccr = A0 + A1(FEarnGrowthit) + A2(FGrowthit) + A3(FLeverageit) + A4(FSizeit) + A5(LAWSUIT) + A6(RULING)
Sample
Category

A0
Intercept

A1
FEarnGrowth

A2
FGrowth

A3
FLeverage

A4
FSize

A5
(LAWSUIT = -1)

A5
(LAWSUIT = 0)

A6
(RULING = -1)

A6
(RULING = 0)

All companies

-273.4083

0.0328

15.0375

9.8142

22.9360

176.7795

187.2059

140.6360

39.8986

t-value

-2.645

0.033

0.136

0.213

1.143

1.718

2.379

1.389

0.508

Favorable rulings

-356.8550

-0.0344

-85.6371

21.7957

29.3361

356.4621

225.0149

346.7699

12.9523

t-value

-2.039

-0.021

-0.589

0.341

0.905

2.210

1.794

2.161

0.106

Unfavorable rulings

-281.4777

0.0758

135.1413

16.3508

22.5929

80.7080

192.1265

40.0185

72.1394

t-value

-1.827

0.057

0.717

0.222

0.750

0.527

1.659

0.268

0.622

Mixed rulings

-49.0404

-0.0194

24.5722

-51.6314

2.7165

87.8554

20.9649

90.9502

46.7108

t-value

-1.004

-0.024

0.373

-0.959

0.302

1.148

0.368

1.203

0.797

Retail/food service

25.9540

-0.2177

-4.5095

-12.3492

7.1394

-65.8218

-59.8221

28.0719

16.8055

t-value

1.347

-0.423

-0.164

-0.677

1.556

-3.726

-4.568

1.628

1.296

Waste management

85.5367

1.6249

-21.5787

-166.0287

18.0543

-31.7641

-29.1671

-10.3982

-21.6713

t-value

1.499

0.272

-0.224

-1.821

0.971

-0.536

-0.642

-0.175

-0.473

Pharmaceuticals

-150.0035

0.1871

-1.0648

-39.7318

8.5034

119.9101

85.2534

143.7851

66.5850

t-value

-2.574

0.031

-0.027

-0.710

0.612

2.072

1.859

2.453

1.500

Health care

-70.9538

0.2091

-6.4371

172.4326

6.5858

-5.3304

61.5394

-52.5209

-70.6523

t-value

-0.902

0.194

-0.060

2.013

0.395

-0.075

1.121

-0.740

-1.294

Brokerage/investment

-1,338.7058

0.1087

195.2954

-108.7428

80.6945

807.8754

806.7775

534.7754

526.0587

t-value

-2.627

0.039

0.286

-0.307

0.857

1.548

1.962

1.022

1.273

Science & technology

-2.4925

0.0629

-9.8619

15.3813

11.7132

134.3326

156.2293

131.6102

-249.8072

t-value

-0.027

0.073

-0.140

0.611

0.654

1.560

2.290

1.540

-3.765

Aerospace/airlines

-46.9819

0.9586

-0.1282

77.8240

-17.3394

12.6469

1.7077

33.4602

40.3122

t-value

-1.911

0.628

-0.003

3.061

-2.044

0.467

0.089

1.314

2.085

Media

-104.6009

-0.2373

41.5709

213.4780

-32.5735

118.2540

47.8812

25.6184

11.1106

t-value

-2.409

-0.781

0.876

4.974

-3.307

3.603

1.931

0.775

0.431

Vehicles/transportation

-8.4148

-0.0083

10.9570

2.7041

0.1007

8.8095

8.6954

-12.6761

0.8923

t-value

-2.441

-0.081

1.575

1.717

0.129

2.682

3.871

-4.666

0.428

Natural resources

36.9567

1.1129

75.1580

-96.2370

17.4102

-320.4834

-111.8918

236.0789

55.8625

t-value

0.611

0.633

0.550

-1.574

1.696

-5.048

-2.736

4.341

1.302

Utilities/power supply

-22.7668

-16.7454

112.5409

38.2768

13.6383

-71.9264

-40.8041

8.0597

23.1075

t-value

-0.232

-1.257

0.822

0.441

0.476

-0.581

-0.463

0.065

0.263

79

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:3: Feb. 2021

The second greatest deviation between the intercept and the (LAWSUIT = -1) variable
appears in the natural resources industry with a deviation of -967.19 percent [((-320.4834) –
36.9567)/36.9567%]. The deviation between the intercept and the (LAWSUIT = 0) variable is 402.76 percent [((-111.8918) – 36.9567)/(36.9567%)], indicating an overall industry decrease in
the use of income-decreasing discretionary accruals by 564.43 percent [(-402.76%) – (-967.19%)]
(compared to the sample mean for discretionary accruals used in the natural resources industry)
after the filing of the legal action. In a direct comparison between the variables (LAWSUIT = 0)
and (LAWSUIT = -1), the use of income-decreasing discretionary accruals decreased by 65.08%
[((-111.8918) – (-320.4834))/(-320.4834%)] in the 12 firm-quarters after the filing of the legal
action when compared to the 12 firm-quarters before the filing of the legal action.

B. Hypothesis 1 Contradicted
As noted in Table 4, the sample categories in which the use of discretionary accruals
increased after the filing of the legal action are: (1) all companies; (2) companies with unfavorable
rulings; (3) health care companies; and (4) science and technology companies.
Table 4: Use of Discretionary Accruals Increased After Legal Action Filed
Category
Percent Increase
All companies
164.66%
Companies with unfavorable rulings
128.67%
Health care companies
92.49%
Science & technology companies
878.50%
In the remaining 11 sample categories, the use of discretionary accruals decreased after the filing
of the legal action. These results contradict Hypothesis 1, which postulates that the magnitude of
a firm’s discretionary accruals decreases in response to the filing of a fraud-based legal action
against that firm.

C. Hypothesis 2 Supported
Of the categories based on type of legal ruling, companies that received favorable rulings
had the second largest percentage deviation between the (RULING = -1) variable and the intercept
with -197.17 percent [(346.7699 – (-356.855))/(-356.855%)]; however, these companies had the
third largest percentage deviation between the (RULING = 0) variable and the intercept with 103.63 percent [(12.9523 – (-356.855)/(-356.855%)]. The favorable ruling companies decreased
the use of income-increasing discretionary accruals by 96.26 percent [(12.9523 –
346.7699)/346.7699%] in a direct comparison of the (RULING = -1) and (RULING = 0) variables.
This result supports Hypothesis 2, which postulates that the magnitude of a firm’s discretionary
accruals decreases in response to the issuance of a favorable fraud-based legal ruling.
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D. Hypothesis 3 Contradicted
As noted in Table 5, companies with unfavorable rulings had the third largest deviation
among the categories based on the type of legal ruling between the (RULING = -1) variable and
the intercept, with a percentage deviation of -114.22 percent [(40.0185 – (-281.4777))/(281.4777%)]. The companies with unfavorable rulings had the second largest deviation between
the (RULING = 0) variable and the intercept with a percentage deviation of -125.63 percent
[(72.1394 – (-281.4777))/(-281.4777%)]. In a direct comparison of the (RULING = -1) and
(RULING = 0) variables, it appears that companies with unfavorable rulings increased the use of
income-increasing discretionary accruals by 80.27% [(72.1394 – 40.0185)/40.0185%] in the
period after the issuance of the unfavorable legal ruling when compared to the period before the
issuance of that ruling. This result contradicts Hypothesis 3, which postulates that the magnitude
of a firm’s discretionary accruals decreases in response to the issuance of an unfavorable fraudbased legal ruling.
Table 5: Use of Discretionary Accruals Increased After Ruling Issued
Category
Percent Increase
Companies with unfavorable rulings
114.20%
Science & technology companies
5,380.25%
Natural resources companies
538.80%

E. Hypothesis 4 Supported
When it comes to the type of legal ruling (i.e., favorable, unfavorable and mixed), the
greatest deviation between the (RULING = -1) and the intercept appears in the sample of
companies that received mixed rulings with a deviation of -285.46 percent [(90.9502 – (49.0404))/(-49.0404%)]. The deviation between the intercept and the (RULING = 0) variable for
companies with mixed rulings is -195.25 percent [(46.7108 – (-49.0404))/(-49.0404%)], indicating
a decrease in the use of income-increasing discretionary accruals by mixed ruling companies of
90.21 percent [(-195.25%) – (-285.46%)] (compared to the sample mean of -49.0404 for
discretionary accruals used by the mixed ruling companies). In a direct comparison of the
(RULING = -1) and (RULING = 0) variables, the use of income-increasing discretionary accruals
by companies with mixed rulings decreased by 48.64% [(46.7108 – 90.9502)/90.9502%] in the 12
firm-quarters after the issuance of the mixed ruling when compared to the 12 firm-quarters before
the issuance of the mixed ruling. This supports Hypothesis 4, which postulates that the magnitude
of the firm’s discretionary accruals decreases in response to the issuance of a mixed fraud-based
legal ruling.
Among the sample of companies categorized by industry type, the greatest deviation
between the (RULING = -1) and the intercept once again appears in the sample of companies that
are in the science and technology industry with a deviation of -5,380.25 percent [(131.6102 – (2.4925))/(-2.4925%)]. The deviation between the intercept and the (RULING = 0) variable is
9,922.36 percent [((-249.8072) – (-2.4925))/(-2.4925%)] indicating an overall industry switch
from the use of income-increasing discretionary accruals to the use of income-decreasing
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discretionary accruals, or a change of 15,302.61 percent [9,922.36% - (-5,380.25%)] (compared to
the sample mean for discretionary accruals used in the science and technology industry), after the
issuance of the legal ruling. In a direct comparison of the (RULING = -1) and (RULING = 0)
variables, it also appears that the science and technology industry used income-increasing
discretionary accruals before the issuance of the legal ruling and then switched to incomedecreasing discretionary accruals after such issuance, resulting in a change of -289.81 percent [((249.8072) – 131.6102)/131.6102%].
The companies in the natural resources industry have the second greatest deviation
between the (RULING = -1) variable and the intercept, with a deviation of 538.80 percent
[(236.0789 – 36.9567)/36.9567%] (compared to the sample mean for discretionary accruals used
in the natural resources industry). The deviation between the (RULING = 0) and the intercept for
the natural resources industry is 51.16 percent [(55.8625 – 36.9567)/36.9567%]. When directly
comparing the (RULING = -1) and (RULING = 0) variables with each other, it appears that the
use of income-increasing discretionary accruals decreased by 76.34% [(55.8625 –
236.0789)/236.0789%] after the issuance of the legal ruling.

F. Hypothesis 5 Supported
Upon examination of the industry categories as presented in Table 3, it appears that four
industries increased their use of discretionary accruals, while five industries decreased their use of
discretionary accruals. The remaining two industries either switched from income-increasing
discretionary accruals to income-decreasing discretionary accruals (i.e., the science and
technology industry) or vice versa (i.e., the vehicles/transportation industry). These results support
Hypothesis 5, which postulates that the magnitude of a firm’s discretionary accruals depends upon
industry factors in response to the issuance of a fraud-based legal ruling.

VIII. NULL HYPOTHESIS CONCLUSIONS: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
To test a hypothesis regarding a regression coefficient, the following equation is used:

where p
S(bk)

=
=

tn-p-1 = bk/S(bk)
number of independent variables in the regression equation;
standard error of the regression coefficient bk

In order to determine whether one of the independent variables (such as FEarnGrowth,
LAWSUIT, or RULING) has a significant effect on discretionary accruals, the null and alternative
hypotheses would be:56
H0: beta = 0
H1: beta ≠ 0
If the null hypothesis, H0, is rejected then the conclusion is that there is a significant
relationship between the independent variable and discretionary accruals. The test of significance
56

MARK L. BERENSON & DAVID M. LEVINE, BASIC BUSINESS STATISTICS 121 (4th ed. 1989).
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for a particular regression coefficient is a test for the significance of adding a particular variable
into the multiple regression model given that the other variables have been included. The null
hypothesis conclusions for each regression coefficient tested at the five percent level of
significance are presented in Table 6. A “Yes” means that the null hypothesis is rejected and that
there is a significant relationship between that independent variable and discretionary accruals. A
“No” means that the null hypothesis is accepted and that there is no significant relationship
between that independent variable and discretionary accruals.
According to the results presented in Table 6, there does not appear to be that many
significant relationships between the control variables (FEarnGrowth, FGrowth, FLeverage, and
FSize) and discretionary accruals at the five percent level of significance. It appears that there is
no significant relationship at all between the FEarnGrowth and FGrowth variables and
discretionary accruals at the five percent level of significance. As for the FLeverage and FSize
variables, some significant relationships exist for these variables in the health care (only for the
FLeverage variable), aerospace/airlines, and media industries at the five percent level of
significance.
It seems that at the five percent level of significance, the categorical variables [(LAWSUIT
= -1), (LAWSUIT = 0), (RULING = -1), and (RULING = 0)] have more significant relationships
with discretionary accruals than the control variables do, according to Table 6. In particular, the
LAWSUIT variables have more of a significant relationship with discretionary accruals than the
RULING variables do. It also appears that the (LAWSUIT = -1) and the (RULING = -1) have
more significant relationships with discretionary accruals than the (LAWSUIT = 0) and the
(RULING = 0) variables do, respectively.
Table 6: Null Hypothesis Conclusion Concerning the Regression Coefficients (5%)
DiscAccr = A0 + A1(FEarnGrowthit) + A2(FGrowthit) + A3(FLeverageit) + A4(FSizeit) + A5(LAWSUIT) + A6(RULING)
Reject Null Hypothesis (H0): beta (βj) = 0 at 5%?
Sample
Category

A0
Intercept

A1
FEarnGrowth

A2
FGrowth

A3
FLeverage

A4
FSize
No

A5
(LAWSUIT
= -1)
No

A5
(LAWSUIT
= 0)
Yes

A6
(RULING
= -1)
No

A6
(RULING
= 0)
No

All companies

Yes

No

No

No

Favorable rulings

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Unfavorable rulings

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Mixed rulings

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Retail/food service

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Waste management

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Pharmaceuticals

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Health care

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Brokerage/investment

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Science & technology

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Aerospace/airlines

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Media

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Vehicles/transportation

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Natural resources

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Utilities/power supply

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No
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DISCUSSION

A. Analysis of Results
The results of this study indicate that the magnitude of a firm’s discretionary accruals: (1)
increases in response to the filing of a fraud-based legal action; (2) decreases in response to the
issuance of a favorable fraud-based legal ruling; (3) increases in response to the issuance of an
unfavorable fraud-based legal ruling; (4) decreases in response to the issuance of a mixed fraudbased legal ruling; and (5) increases, decreases, and/or changes from the income-increasing type
to the income-decreasing type and vice versa depending upon industry factors in response to the
issuance of a fraud-based legal ruling.
These results warrant further discussion. It is expected that a firm would decrease the
magnitude of its discretionary accruals after the filing of a fraud-based legal action against that
firm because the firm will now try to reverse the discretionary accrual policy that may have led to
this legal action. To this extent, it is logical to assume that a firm will cease its alleged fraudulent
financial reporting after receiving an unfavorable ruling in a fraud-based legal action or at least
diminish it to some extent thereby resulting in a decrease in discretionary accrual magnitude.
What seems less plausible are the findings that a firm would increase the magnitude of its
discretionary accruals after the filing of a legal action and increase it after the issuance of an
unfavorable legal ruling. If a fraud-based legal action is initiated against a firm it is logical to
assume that the firm would decrease the magnitude of its discretionary accruals since its
accounting policies would now be under the scrutiny of a court or judicial authority. Furthermore,
if that court or other judicial authority has found against the firm in a fraud-based legal action, it
can be logically assumed that the firm would see this legal loss as a reason to decrease the
magnitude of its discretionary accruals out of fear that another legal action would be initiated
against that firm for continuing to engage in deceptive accounting practices.
There are plausible explanations for these somewhat surprising results. The control
variables of firm leverage and firm size do show statistically significant relationships with
discretionary accruals. It is quite possible that the amount of debt a firm has incurred and the size
of the firm may affect the way a firm reacts to the issuance of a legal ruling.
Debt contracts often use accounting numbers to decide whether a debtor firm has behaved
unfavorably;57 therefore, a highly-leveraged firm that has received an unfavorable fraud-based
legal ruling may have no choice but to continue the discretionary accrual policy that appeases its
creditors if that firm wants to continue its operations.
By the same token, a large firm that has received an unfavorable fraud-based legal ruling
may have no choice but to continue to use the discretionary accrual policy that reduces its political
visibility. According to the political cost hypothesis,58 a large firm’s reported earnings increase its
57

See Clifford Smith & Jerold Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON.
117, 125–26 (1979); Richard Leftwich, Accounting Information in Private Markets: Evidence from Private Lending
Agreement, 58 ACCT. REV. 23, 26 (1983); Ross Watts & Jerold Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory: A TenYear Perspective, 65 ACCT. REV. 131, 132–33 (1990).
58
See Kurt Wojdat, Politically Motivated Accounting Choice and Financial Indicators of Political Risk: The
Pharmaceutical Industry (1999) (Doctoral Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo) (ProQuest);
Robert Hagerman and Mark Zmijewski, Some Economic Determinants of Accounting Policy Choice, J. OF ACCT. &
ECON. 141–61 (1979); Richard Bowen, John Lacey and Eric Noreen, Determinants of the Decision by Firms to
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political visibility, which increases that firm’s bookkeeping costs, regulatory costs, taxes, and
wage claims. As a result, a larger firm will use earnings management to reduce its costs59 even in
the face of an unfavorable fraud-based legal ruling.
Thus, it would appear that a larger, high-leveraged firm may choose to increase the
magnitude of its discretionary accruals, even in the wake of an unfavorable legal ruling, in order
to avoid problems with corporate stakeholders. On the other hand, a smaller, low-leveraged firm
may decide to decrease the magnitude of its discretionary accruals in the wake of an unfavorable
fraud-based legal ruling simply because it wants to avoid future legal problems and does not have
to appease corporate stakeholders in the way a larger, high-leveraged firm does.
Of course, firm leverage and firm size are not the only explanations as to why a firm may
increase the magnitude of its discretionary accruals even though it received an unfavorable fraudbased legal ruling. The results of this study indicate that industry factors play a role in the reaction
of a firm to a legal ruling. Certain industries showed significant relationships with the issuance of
a fraud-based legal ruling more than other industries did in this study. Some industries do have
more incentives than other industries to manage earnings through the use of discretionary accrual
policies, either because they are the subjects of government regulation that may be tied to
accounting numbers,60 or because particular industries adjust discretionary accrual policies based
on industry-defined relative earnings performance.61
In one particular industry, firms appeared to have switched from income-increasing
discretionary accruals to income-decreasing discretionary accruals after the issuance of fraudbased legal rulings. This indicates that these firms switched from upward earnings management to
downward earnings management as a result of these legal rulings, which means that the magnitude
of their discretionary accruals did not necessarily improve after the issuance of the legal rulings.
Downward earnings management can also reduce the quality of accounting information62 as much
as upward earnings management does because financial statement users are not seeing a true
picture of the firm’s financial position.
The findings of this study indicate that the filing of fraud-based legal actions and the
issuance of fraud-based legal rulings impact discretionary accrual policies; however, this impact
may not necessarily increase the reliability of the affected firms’ financial statements. Other
factors, such as firm size, firm leverage, and industry characteristics also help to determine how
firms adjust their discretionary accrual policies so that financial statement reliability is either
increased or decreased based on their particular operating needs. This study has found that fraudCapitalize Interest Costs, J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 151–79 ( 1981); Mark Zmijewski and Robert Hagerman, An Income
Strategy Approach to the Positive Theory of Accounting Standard Setting Choice, J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 129–49
(1981).
59
Doreen Gilfedder and Ciaran O’Hogartaigh, The Grasshoppers and the Great Cattle: An Exploration of
Participation in the ASB’s Standard-Setting Process, (Dublin City Univ. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 29 (1997),
http://www.dcu.ie/dcubs/research.
60
Susan Moyer, Capital Adequacy Ratio Regulations and Accounting Choices in Commercial Banks, 13(2) J. OF
ACCT. & ECON. 123–54 (1990); Myron Scholes, G. Peter Wilson and Mark Wolfson, Tax Planning, Regulatory
Capital Planning, and Financial Reporting Strategy for Commercial Banks, 3 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 625–50 (1990); J.
Collins, D. Shackelford and J. Wahlen, Bank Differences in the Coordination of Regulatory Capital, Earnings and
Taxes, 33(2) J. OF ACCT. RES. 263–91 (1995).
61
Myung Seok Park and Byung Ro, The Effect of Firm-Industry Earnings Correlation and Announcement Timing
on Firms’ Accrual Decisions, 36 BRIT. ACCT. REV. 269–89 (2004).
62
Baruch Lev and Paul Zarowin, The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to Extend Them, 37 J. OF ACCT.
RES. 353–385 (1999); Stern Stewart & Co., Accounting is Broken, Here’s How to Fix It, 5 Eval. (2002).
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based legal actions do not generally improve corporate governance – at least with respect to
financial reporting activities.

B. Implications
In light of this study, independent auditors should more closely examine more closely the
discretionary accrual policies of firms that have recently: (1) been served with legal papers; and/or
(2) received legal rulings concerning their accounting information and financial reporting. It is true
that discretionary accruals are very difficult to audit or verify63 and independent auditors cannot
be expected to gather all of the information and resources necessary to develop statistical
discretionary accrual models; however, there are certain field procedures that can be used to
determine a firm’s discretionary accrual policy to some extent.
The independent auditor can compare the bad debt expense policy before the issuance of a
fraud-based legal ruling with the bad debt expense policy after such issuance in order to determine
if any significant changes have been made. Specifically, the auditor should examine the Allowance
for Bad Debts (or the Allowance for Doubtful Accounts) to see if any changes have been made in
estimating bad debts after a legal ruling has been issued. If this allowance account had been
understated (income-increasing discretionary accrual) before the issuance of a legal ruling and
overstated (income-decreasing discretionary accrual) after such issuance, it could be that the
change may have been made in response to the legal ruling.
Another field procedure the independent auditor can use to detect the possible use of
discretionary accruals after the issuance of a fraud-based legal ruling is to examine the depreciation
account of the firm in question. The auditor should see if there have been any changes in
depreciation estimates and/or a switch from one depreciation method to another around the period
of the legal ruling issuance. The purchase and/or sale of assets around the time of the issuance of
the legal ruling should be examined to see if assets were acquired or disposed of in order to
manipulate discretionary accruals with corresponding increases or decreases in depreciation
expenses.
The inventory amounts of a firm that has just received a fraud-based legal ruling should be
carefully examined by the independent auditor. The auditor should verify the ownership of these
inventory amounts by requesting the proper documentation and pay particular attention to
inventories that were purchased and sold around the period of the legal action. The relationship of
the firm with its retailers should be investigated in order to determine if the firm has been
pressuring retailers to purchase more inventory than is needed (channel stuffing) in light of the
legal ruling.
The auditor can also find out how employees of a firm that has just received a fraud-based
legal ruling feel about the ruling by: (1) interviewing the employees on an informal basis or (2)
checking the Internet for any possible employee chat rooms discussing the legal ruling (SAS 99).64
Any information the employees provide about the legal ruling issued against their employer firm
can become part of an audit plan.

63

Scott Jackson and Marshall Pitman, Auditors and Earnings Management, 2001 THE CPA J. 38–40. Available at
http://www.nysscpa.org.
64
CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 § 603 (AM. INST. OF
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2002). Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit.
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The list of procedures an independent auditor can conduct in order to determine how a firm
has adjusted its discretionary accrual policy in response to the issuance of a fraud-based legal
ruling is by no means limited to what has been discussed here. The independent auditor does have
guidance in the form of accounting and auditing standards issued by various authorities. What the
auditor should consider, however, is that the type of legal ruling (i.e., favorable, unfavorable, or
mixed) a firm receives may not necessarily mean the end of any discretionary accrual policy. A
firm may simply end one policy and begin another, which is why the auditor should take special
precautions in dealing with a firm that has been through litigation recently.

C. Limitations
While this study has provided valuable implications for accounting research and audit
fieldwork, it is subject to certain limitations. First, the sample was not drawn from the full
population of United States fraud-based legal actions, but from a group of federal legal cases listed
in the Commerce Clearinghouse Federal Securities Law Reports. Although many attorneys,
judges, researchers, and others use this federal reporter in their work, it does not include financial
reporting fraud cases of firms that are not subject to United States federal securities law.
Second, the final sample in the study was not taken from all of the annual volumes of the
Commerce Clearinghouse Federal Securities Law Reports. It only includes companies taken from
cases litigated in the years 1982 to 2007 and companies whose financial information was available
in the COMPUSTAT database. The process of finding financial reporting fraud cases for
companies that have extensive financial information publicly available for the purposes of this
study has been difficult.
Lastly, the total sample consists of only seventy-seven companies categorized into eleven
industries. A follow-up study with a sample consisting of a larger number of companies
representing a wider variety of industries may obtain results different from the results obtained in
this study.

D. Suggestions for Future Research
This study provides a number of opportunities for further research. First, the results of this
study indicate that the filing of a legal action and the issuance of a legal ruling further down the
road do have an effect on discretionary accruals, which affects the reliability of financial
statements. Another study could consider another variable, namely appeals. Many firms appeal
their legal rulings and a study analyzing the period starting with the legal filing, the initial legal
ruling, and the legal appeals process may provide insights into how the legal system impacts the
reliability of financial statements from the beginning of the litigation to its final resolution.
Second, the study of the legal process should not be limited to United States firms. Fraudbased financial reporting legal actions occur in nations around the world and a comparative study
of how firms in different nations adjust their discretionary accrual policies in response to legal
rulings would be a benefit to many international stakeholders such as investors, creditors,
employees, tax authorities, and many others. Cultural and economic factors could be integrated
into the model as control variables to see how they impact discretionary accrual policies along
with the legal process.
Third, a study of how other types of legal actions besides fraud-based financial reporting
legal actions could be done in order to determine their impact on discretionary accrual policies. A
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comparative study of the different types of legal actions could be done to see how each type
impacts accounting information; for example, a study comparing the impacts of environmental,
wrongful termination, accident-related, discrimination, and financial reporting-related legal
actions could be done to determine if any of these types of legal actions impact the reliability of
accounting information more than others.
In general, this study provides useful information about the impact of the legal process on
earnings management and the reliability of financial statements. In a world characterized by
increasing amounts of litigation, an examination of the role litigation plays in the accounting
information process is necessary in order to increase the quality of such information. I hope that
the findings of this study are a benefit to both academics and practitioners alike and lead to more
insightful and interesting research opportunities in the field of law.
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ABSTRACT

We present a study of Jerome Kerviel, a trader at Société Générale, and how he racked up
positions far exceeding his authorized risk limits resulting in a spectacular loss and in the process
becoming the perpetrator of the biggest rogue trading scandal, thus far, in recorded history. We focus
on many aspects of the financial markets and attempt to provide an appropriate context to the
proceedings by considering some historical matters and furnishing an alternate definition for a rogue
trader. With the goal of highlighting policy relevant insights, we look at the organization structure,
trading profits, risk management, regulation, ethics and the many conflicts that arise therein with
some focus on Kerviel and his immediate environment. We provide a simple guide for the budding
rogue trader that could also be helpful for the aspiring control agent. We conclude by delving
deeper into the ethical issues regarding rogue trading and provide possible ways to mitigate, if not
resolve, the many moral dilemmas that arise in business, life and elsewhere.
We consider many conundrums related to: the question of size of financial firms,
organization behavior, designing social systems, ethics, enhancing human welfare, excessive
reliance on mathematics, the role played by auditors, better comprehension of history, evolution and
the need for universal education. We have strived to ensure that the manuscript is written in a style
such that it can be read by almost anyone, with or without a strong business background. Some of
the topics we discuss are: A Joke at First and Also at Last; History: A Product Structured by
Winners; Rogue One on Delta One; Depart-Mental Drill Down; Confessions of The Control
Agents; A Slow Walk On A Tight Rope; The Glass Castle Called Basel; “e” for Everything,
Everyone, Everywhere including Evolution, Education and Ethics; Sick Lesson from Nick
Leeson; Rogue Trading Guide for Dummies; Mathematically Sophisticated Models or Merely
Superior Mora.

II.

A JOKE AT FIRST AND ALSO AT LAST

On January 24, 2008, Société Générale (SG) declared a “[l]oss of EUR 4.9 billion (US $7.2
billion) on position of EUR 50 Billion (US $73.26 billion)”1. This was the largest rogue trading
scandal, thus far, in recorded history.2 One of the biggest scandals in the financial markets and the
1

A few additional sources have been used to get a good understanding of Jerome Kerviel and the trading losses he
brought about (Weiss 2008; Canac & Dykman 2011; Gilligan 2011; Rafeld, Fritz-Morgenthal & Posch 2017)
2
The following are some references and links related to the list of rogue trading scandals in (Figure 1):Orlando
Joseph Jett (born 1958) is an American former securities trader, known for his role in the Kidder Peabody trading
loss in 1994. At the time of the loss it was the largest trading fraud in history (Egan & Kaeter 1994; Freedman &
Burke 1998; Werhane 1998; CEO MAGSylvia Nasar, Kidder Scandal Tied to Failure of Supervision, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 1994, https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/05/us/behind-kidder-scandal-overview-kidder-scandal-tied-failuresupervision.html.; Nick Leeson (Section 4.8)Toshihide Iguchi (born 1951) was an Executive Vice President and U.S.
Government Bond trader at Daiwa Bank’s New York Branch, who was responsible for $1.1 billion in unauthorized
trading losses accumulated over a period of 12 years beginning in 1983 (Walker 1995; Kane & DeTrask 1999;
Weston 2005;
Katie Holliday, I'm not a criminal: Daiwa rogue trader who lost $1billion, CNBC, Apr. 29, 2014,
https://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/29/im-not-a-criminal-daiwa-rogue-trader-who-lost-1-billion.html;The Serious Fraud
Office (SFO) has charged Peter Young, the former Morgan Grenfell fund manager, with conspiracy to defraud and
offenses under the 1986 Financial Services Act. Although Peter Young was found guilty on all charges, the judge
promptly voided the verdict due to reasons of insanity. (Leith 2002; Ramage 2005; Peter Young Charged, The
Independent Link; How Did Rogue Trader Peter Young Become Infamous?, Investopedia Link; How to lose a
billion?, NYU Stern Link); Yasuo Hamanaka (born 1950) was the chief copper trader at Sumitomo Corporation, one
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largest ever Ponzi scheme3 happened when Bernard Madoff “made off” with $64.8 billion dollars
of investor funds.4 There have been other spectacular trading scandals, though they have not been
labeled as rogue trading incidents since there was no suspicion of fraudulent activity5,6.
of the largest trading companies in Japan. He was known as "Mr. Copper" because of his aggressive trading style,
and as "Mr. Five Percent" because that is how much of the world’s yearly supply he controlled. On June 13, 1996,
Sumitomo Corporation reported a loss of US$1.8 billion in unauthorized copper trading by Hamanaka on the
London Metal Exchange. In September 1996, Sumitomo disclosed that the company’s financial losses were much
higher at $2.6 billion (285 billion yen) (Nasi 1996; Kozinn 2000; Weston 2003; Futures black as copper boss shows
his mettle, THE IRISH TIMES, June 15, 1996, https://www.irishtimes.com/business/futures-black-as-copper-bossshows-his-mettle-1.58775.; John Rusnak is a former currency trader at Allfirst bank, then part of Allied Irish Banks
Group, in Baltimore, Maryland, United States. On January 17, 2003 he was sentenced to 7½ years in prison for
hiding US$691 million in losses at the bank in 2002, after bad bets snowballed in one of the largest ever cases of
bank fraud (Burke 2004; Butler 2009; Wexler 2010;
Erik Portanger et al., Allied Irish Banks Say a Rogue Trader Lost $750 Million in Unauthorized Deals, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 7, 2002.
Former senior National Australia Bank trader Luke Duffy has been sentenced to at least 16 months jail for his part in
an alleged $360 million unauthorized trading scandal (Ford & Sundmacher 2004; Dellaportas, Cooper & Braica 2007;
Wexler 2010; NAB rogue trader jailed, Sydney Morning Herald Link); Chen Jiulin (born October 20, 1961) is the
former Managing Director and CEO of China Aviation Oil (Singapore) Corporation Ltd (CAO). During his leadership
CAO’s net asset worth increased from US$176,000 to US$150,000,000, an increase of 85,200%. In 2004 CAO suffered
huge losses due to oil future trading. Chen Jiulin was forced to leave the company and was arrested by the Singapore
police. In March 2006, the Singapore court sentenced Chen Jiulin to four years and three months imprisonment
(Wexler 2010; Hornuf & Haas 2014; Lessons from History's Worst CEOs, CEO MAG., July 18, 2018,
https://www.theceomagazine.com/business/management-leadership/lessons-from-historys-worst-ceos/;
Former
Goldman Sachs Group Inc trader Matthew Taylor was sentenced Friday to serve nine months in prison and pay $118
million in restitution to his former employer after he pleaded guilty to pursuing an unauthorized $8.3 billion futures
trade in 2007 (Becker, ... & Watt 2013; Goldman rogue trader gets Prison, Reuters Link); Kweku Adoboli (born 1980)
is a Ghanaian born investment manager and former stock trader. He was convicted of illegally trading away US$2
billion (GB£1.3 billion) as a trader for Swiss investment bank UBS. While at the bank he primarily worked on UBS’
Global Synthetic Equities Trading team in London where he engaged in what would later be known as the 2011 UBS
rogue trader scandal (Scholten & Ellemers 2016; Rafeld, Fritz-Morgenthal & Posch 2017a; b; Rocchi & Thunder
2017; Paul Clarke, Ex-UBS rogue trader Adoboli seeks $6m for Ghana bond venture, FIN. NEWS, Jan. 22, 2020,
https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/ex-ubs-rogue-trader-adoboli-seeks-6m-for-ghana-bond-venture-report-20200122.
3
A Ponzi scheme (also a Ponzi game) is a form of fraud that lures investors and pays profits to earlier investors with
funds from more recent investors. The scheme leads victims to believe that profits are coming from product sales or
other means, and they remain unaware that other investors are the source of funds. The scheme is named after
Charles Ponzi, who became notorious for using the technique in the 1920s. Greg Iacurci, Ponzi Schemes, Other
Investment Fraud on Rise During Pandemic, SEC Says, CNBC, Dec. 15, 2020,
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/15/ponzi-schemes-other-investment-fraud-on-rise-amid-pandemic-sec-says.html.
4
Bernard Lawrence Madoff (born April 29, 1938) is an American former market maker, investment advisor and
financier who is currently serving a federal prison sentence for offenses related to a massive Ponzi scheme. Prosecutors
estimated the fraud to be worth $64.8 billion based on the amounts in the accounts of Madoff’s 4,800 clients as of
November 30, 2008. Martha Graybow, Madoff Mysteries Remain as He Nears Guilty Plea, REUTERS, Mar. 11, 2009,
https://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE52A5JK20090311?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp
=true.
5
Long-Term Capital Management L.P. (LTCM) was a hedge fund management firm based in Greenwich, Connecticut
that used absolute-return trading strategies combined with high financial leverage. LTCM was founded in 1994 by
John W. Meriwether, the former vice-chairman and head of bond trading at Salomon Brothers. Members of LTCM’s
board of directors included Myron S. Scholes and Robert C. Merton, who shared the 1997 Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economic Sciences for a "new method to determine the value of derivatives". Ron Rimkus, Long-Term Capital
Management,
FINANCIAL
SCANDALS,
Scoundrels
&
Crises
(Apr.
18,
2016),
https://www.econcrises.org/2016/04/18/long-term-capital-management/.
6
Brian Hunter (born 1974) is a Canadian former natural gas trader for the now closed Amaranth Advisors hedge fund.
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This loss by one trader, Jerome Kerviel, wiped out almost an entire year’s profits by all
other employees at SG.7 Nicolas Rutsaert, an analyst for European banks at Dexia in Brussels said,
“[a]t first, this seemed like a Joke . . . SG was a leader in derivatives and was considered one of
the best risk managers in the world.”8 While funny now, Kerviel’s conduct gets more hilarious as
other events happen
We attempt to provide an appropriate context to the proceedings. Section (3) considers
some historical matters, definitions and the main question we wish to answer. Section (4) is about
organizational structure, trading, risk management, profits, regulation and the many conflicts that
arise therein with some focus on Kerviel and his surroundings. Section (5) provides a simple guide
for the budding rogue trader that could also be helpful for the aspiring control agent. Section (6)
delves deeper into the ethical issues regarding rogue trading and concludes by providing possible
ways to mitigate, if not resolve, the many moral dilemmas that arise in business, life and everywhere
else. We have tried to ensure that the bulk of the narrative within the main body of the paper is
mostly self-contained so that it can be easily followed by a wider audience. But for those wishing
to have more details and a deeper comprehension we have provided a rich set of End-notes that
supplement the central arguments and provide explanations for terms that might not be easily
understood by someone not intimately familiar with the workings of the financial industry and
other professional areas.
Though the paper has numerous policy relevant insights, it is written in a style such that it
can be read by almost anyone, with or without a strong business background. We consider many
conundrums related to: the question of size of financial firms, organization behavior, designing
social systems, ethics, enhancing human welfare, excessive reliance on mathematics, the role
played by auditors, better comprehension of history, evolution and the need for universal education.
Some of the topics we discuss are: A Joke at First and Also at Last; History: A Product Structured
by Winners; Rogue One on Delta One; Depart-Mental Drill Down; Confessions of The Control
Agents; A Slow Walk On A Tight Rope; The Glass Castle Called Basel; “e” for Everything,
Everyone, Everywhere . . . including Evolution, Education and Ethics; Sick Lesson from Nick
Leeson; Rogue Trading Guide for Dummies; Mathematically Sophisticated Models or Merely
Superior Morals?
All of this is funny only if our goal is to have a good time; if this is not our intention we need
to consider what else would be a better option in the face of such incidents? As we proceed further,
let us remind ourselves that a good joke gets funnier as it unfolds.

A. The Jokers are Among Us
French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, called for the resignation of SG CEO and Chairman,
Daniel Bouton9. Monsieur Sarkozy was furious to have been kept in the dark10. This makes us
Amaranth had over $9 billion in assets but collapsed in 2006 after Hunter’s gamble on natural gas futures market went
bad. Leah M. Goodman, The 'Rogue Trader' Who Got Away with It, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 17, 2014.
7
Jérôme Kerviel (born 11 January 1977) is a French trader who was convicted and imprisoned for the 2008 Société
Générale trading loss for breach of trust, forgery and unauthorized use of the bank’s computers, resulting in losses
valued at euro 4.9 billion. Nicola Clark, Rogue Trader at Société Générale Gets 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010.
8
The events surrounding this incident are covered by the popular press and include statements by many of the parties
involved.Rogue trader blamed for $7.3B loss 5 Billion Euro fraud drains off capital at SocGen.
9
Sarkozy strongly hinted that he wanted Daniel Bouton, the boss, to quit. Sarkozy v Jerome Kerviel.
10
France’s top banker will be hauled before French MPs this week to explain why he and Société Génerale kept the
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wonder why he believed he had to be in the light especially when most of high finance and the
biggest trades happen in the dark11,12. Perhaps he knew (or merely had a hunch), that everyone else
was in the light and felt left out. We are even more curious as to what Monsieur Sarkozy would
have done if he had been brought into the light. Also, it remains to be completely pinned down as
to who should have been responsible for bringing him into the light.
The Prime Minister, Francois Fillon, somehow sensed that this incident was distinct from
the financial market turmoil.13 Christine Lagarde, Ministry of Finance jumped in with more
skipping rope (regulations) to tighten the players14,15. We need to be fair and give others the benefit
of doubt. Just because we do not know something does not mean others do not; perhaps some of
us might know, “everything about everything”. With so much happening, of course, how could the
rest of France stay out of this? The French public known to criticizing financial circles showed
support to Kerviel and grieved that “he was a victim of greed . . . of a large, profit-obsessed bank.”16
If this sounds like echoes of a distant past (French revolution), let us leave it at that.17 Lastly, was

French government in the dark for nearly four days about the impending fraud crisis. Nicolas Sarkozy furious at
SocGen delay.
11
In finance, a dark pool (also black pool) is a private forum for trading securities, derivatives, and other financial
instruments. Liquidity on these markets is called dark pool liquidity. The bulk of dark pool trades represent large
trades by financial institutions that are offered away from public exchanges like the New York Stock Exchange and
the NASDAQ, so that such trades remain confidential and outside the purview of the general investing public.
GARY SHORTER & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH. SERVS., DARK POOLS IN EQUITY TRADING: POLICY
CONCERNS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1-3 (2014).
12
A block trade is a permissible, noncompetitive, privately negotiated transaction either at or exceeding an exchange
deter- mined minimum threshold quantity of shares, which is executed apart and away from the open outcry or
electronic markets. Major broker-dealers often provide "block trading" services—sometimes known as "upstairs
trading desks"—to their institutional clients. James F. Gammill, Jr. & Terry A. Marsh, Trading Activity and Price
Behavior in the Stock and Stock Index Futures Markets in October 1987, 3 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 25, 33 (1988).
13
Both the governor of the French central bank, Christian Noyer, and the French prime minister, François Fillon,
insisted that the Kerviel case had nothing to do with the volatile stock markets around the world, or with the
subprime mess. French Trader Is Remembered as Mr. Average.
14
On February 4th Christine Lagarde, the French finance minister, published her hastily produced report into the
affair. Ms Lagarde’s report identified no fewer than eight ways in which SocGen (SG) should have kept a tighter
watch, including a more skeptical attitude to “atypical behavior”, such as not taking any holiday. The rogue rebuttal
15
Any attempt at regulatory change is best exemplified by the story of Sergey Bubka, the Russian pole vault jumper,
who broke the world record 35 times. Attempts at regulatory change can be compared to taking the bar higher.
Clearly regulatory efforts in this case are to ensure that no fraud or scandals take place in the financial markets.
Sergey Nazarovich Bubka (born 4 December 1963) is a Ukrainian former pole vaulter. He represented the Soviet
Union until its dissolution in 1991. Sergey has also beaten his own record 14 times. He was the first pole vaulter to
clear 6.0 meters and 6.10 meters. Bubka was twice named Athlete of the Year by Track & Field News and in 2012
was one of 24 athletes inducted as inaugural members of the International Association of Athletics Federations Hall
of Fame. Surgey Bubka Press Kit, SURGEYBUBKA.COM,
http://www.sergeybubka.com/frontend/www/uploads/PressKitList/file Biography%20and%20achievements.pdf (last
visited Jan. 18, 2021).
16
Many French citizens saw the situation differently: Kerviel was the victim of a profit-obsessed bank, which
largely existedto extract revenue from the struggling working and middle classes while enriching its top officers and
shareholders. The Omen
17
Historians have pointed to many events and factors that led to the Revolution. Rising social and economic
inequality, new political ideas emerging from the Enlightenment, economic mismanagement, environmental factors
leading to agricultural failure, unmanageable national debt, and political mismanagement have all been cited as
laying the groundwork for the Revolution. Keith Michael Baker, French Political Thought at the Accession of Louis
XVI, 50 J. OF MODERN HIST. 279 (1978).
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this event a tipping point18 for the financial crisis or was it just pure coincidence that the largest
rouge trading scandal until this point in time happened around the time of the largest financial crisis
till date?19 Are these connections to be discerned beyond our five senses? How badly do we need
a sixth or seventh sense?

III. HISTORY: A PRODUCT STRUCTURED BY WINNERS
History is generally forgotten because “His-Story” is not of great interest to a specific
individual. Is it any wonder that Mysteries (My-Stories) are more appealing than Histories (HisStories)? But, if the message from history books are made applicable to everyday life, it stays
relevant. What we can learn from the simple yet perhaps tough lessons from the financial
markets are that, if wealth is lost, nothing is lost; if health is lost, something is lost; if character is
lost, everything is lost. What we see in scandal after scandal in finance and everywhere else is
that we usually end up losing everything for nothing.
To make it a proper historical narrative let us now look at some facts, which we cannot
easily remember. Facts can be helpful if we remember that history books are written by the
winners and the losers are made to seem like whiners. SG was founded in 1864. It was listed on
the French Stock Exchange in 1871. It was nationalized in 1945, and the government sold its
interest in SG to the public in July 19, 1987—not too long before another crisis in the financial
markets20,21.

18

Gladwell defines a tipping point as "the moment of critical mass, the threshold, the boiling point". The book seeks
to explain and describe the "mysterious" sociological changes that mark everyday life. As Gladwell states: "Ideas and
products and messages and behaviors spread like viruses do". MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW
LITTLE THINGS MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 12 (Little, Brown and Company, 2000).
19
The financial crisis of 2007–2008, also known as the global financial crisis and the 2008 financial crisis, was a
severe worldwide economic crisis considered by many economists to have been the most serious financial crisis
since the Great Depression of the 1930s, to which it is often compared. Gita Gopinath, The Great Lockdown: Worst
Economic Downturn Since the Great Depression, INT’L. MONETARY FUND BLOG (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economic-downturn-since-the-great-depression/.
20
Société Générale S.A. is a French multinational investment bank and financial services company headquartered in
Paris, France. More details about its history and expansion can found at this link: Societe Generale, Wikipedia Link;
see also Our History, SOCIETE GENERALE, https://www.societegenerale.com/en/societe-generalegroup/identity/history (last visited Jan. 18, 2021).
21
Black Monday on October 19, 1987 was the date when a sudden and largely unexpected stock market crash affected
markets around the world. The crash began in Hong Kong and spread west to Europe, hitting the United States after
other markets had already sustained significant declines. Black Monday (1987).
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Rogues and Traders as Entertainers and Educators

Questions & Answers (Q&A) are important, but Definitions & Assumptions (D&A) are,
perhaps, more important. If we change the latter, the former might change. The good news is that
Q&A and D&A might be in our very DNA, the biological one.22 We start with one widely accepted
definition for a rogue trader. “A rogue trader is an employee authorized to make trades on behalf
23
of their employer [subject to certain conditions] who makes unauthorized trades.”
The unapproved financial transactions can of course turn out to be profitable or cause a loss.
Generally, the profits are overlooked, though it is not uncommon for traders to get warnings when
such unauthorized trades are made. Though, as is widely acknowledged in the financial markets, the
profits take care of themselves, it is the losses that keep us at work for long hours or lead to loss
of employment. The other aspect to keep in mind is that when losses happen, the heat is turned up
on whoever is causing the losses. It is then said that the trader has turned rogue. This last aspect
provides us with an alternate definition of not just rogue traders, but rogues in general.
Definition 1. Let us define “Rogues” as those that are not limited by the limits under which
they are supposed to operate.
With this new definition, some people might think that “Rogue” means being street-smart.
We simply note that being street-smart is considered an education in itself, which allows us to steer
away from providing detailed and complex clarifications for what street-smart is. With this alternate
meaning for rogues, we hope to cast the Rogue, the central figure or the real hero of the plot, in a
more positive light. With this definition, we can view “Rogues and Traders as Entertainers and
Educators.” This brings up the most important question of this article, as hinted at in the very title
of this paper.
Question 1. Do Traders become Rogues? Or Do Rogues become Traders?
We will attempt to address this question more concretely towards the conclusion (Section
6), but first we portray the specifics of what happened and how they happened.
B. A Popularity Contest
Returning to the historical focus of this section, we consider first whether rogues will be
remembered by history. Surely, this is more important than how someone will be remembered by
history, which could be distorted in many ways as discussed in the introduction to this section. It
22

Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a molecule composed of two chains that coil around each other to form a double
helix carrying the genetic instructions used in the growth, development, functioning, and reproduction of all known
living organisms and many viruses. Maybe, DNA hold the lessons from the lives of every ancestor we have ever
had. Evolution is constantly coding the information, compressing it and passing forward what is needed to survive
better and to thrive building what is essential right into our genes. For information storage in DNA and related
applications see, Church, Gao & Kosuri (2012). Gregory A. Wray, Dating branches on the Tree of Life using DNA,
3 Genome Biology 0001.1, (2001).
23
The term rogue trader is most often applied to financial trading, when professional traders make unapproved
financial transactions. This activity is often in the Grey area between civil and criminal transgression, because the
perpetrator is a legitimate employee of a company or institution, yet enters into transactions on behalf of their
employer without permission. In several cases traders have initially made very large profits for their employers, and
bonuses for themselves, from trades in breach of the rules, and it has widely been said that employers turned a blind
eye to transgressions due to the profits involved. Christopher Land, Scott Loren & Jorg Metelmann, Rogue Logics:
Organization in the Grey Zone, 35 Organizational Studies 233, 239 (2014).
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would not be entirely incorrect to state that the more popular someone is, the more they will be
remembered. If the popular ones can be deemed celebrities, it still begs a proper definition
appropriate for this age of too much information.
Definition 2. We define a celebrity as someone who has a Wikipedia page in their name.
The longer the page, the more famous the person.
The following examples illustrate: Michael Jackson is a Megastar (223 pages long); Isaac
Newton is an Icon (197 pages long); and Jerome Kerviel is somebody Cool (58 pages long).24
Jerome Kerviel has one of the longer Wikipedia pages among individuals involved in finance and
economics, but it is much shorter than the Wikipedia page for someone in the natural sciences and
much shorter still than artists. Perhaps, this is another way of telling us that artists are the ones
that people resonate with the most. An additional point to be noted, which can seem like an
objection voiced by some parties, is that the Wikipedia page can be edited and its contents change
over time. But surely, we don’t expect popularity to stay the same always, do we?

IV. ROGUE ONE (ALONE?) ON DELTA ONE
Rogue One is the name of a popular movie within the Star Wars franchise (Edwards 2017).25
In this film, there are a group of rebels who are in conflict with an evil empire. As the plot unfolds
there arises another group of rebels, within the original group of rebels, who are the main
protagonists of the story. These rebels within rebels decide to do all that is needed to stop the evil
empire from engaging in certain destructive activities. Referring to Definition (1), tells us that
Rogues in movies and elsewhere can sometimes simply be heroes that are prepared to transcend
boundaries that might seem restrictive to do what they deem necessary.
In our case study, as many have maintained over the years and many others have pointed out
otherwise, there was only one Rogue operating alone on a trading desk called Delta One26,27. To
better understand what might have actually transpired we need to delve deeper into “Extremely

24

The page counts indicated include all text when we export the Wikipedia web page. As an alternative, we could,
of course use the size of the file as well. Though this is sometimes misleading due to presence of pictures and other
graphics. Jerome Kerviel, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C3%A9r%C3%B4me_Kerviel; Isaac Newton,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isaac_Newton; Michael Jackson, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Jackson.
25
Rogue One: A Star Wars Story (or simply Rogue One) is a 2016 American epic space-opera film directed by
Gareth Edwards.Rogue One follows a group of rebels on a mission to steal the plans for the Death Star, the Galactic
Empire’s super-weapon, just before the events of A New Hope. Rogue One, STAR WARS,
https://www.starwars.com/films/rogue-one (last visited Jan 18, 2021).
26
Delta One products are financial derivatives that have no optionality and as such have a delta of (or very close to)
one– meaning that for a given instantaneous move in the price of the underlying asset there is expected to be an
identical move in the price of the derivative. Delta one products can sometimes be synthetically assembled by
combining options. What is Delta One Trading?, FINANCIAL EDGE TRAINING (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://www.fe.training/free-finance-resources/trading-ideas/what-is-delta-one-trading/.
27
In finance, a derivative is a contract that derives its value from the performance of an underlying entity. This
underlying entity can be an asset, index, or interest rate, and is often simply called the "underlying." Derivatives can
be used for a number of purposes, including insuring against price movements (hedging), increasing exposure to
price movements for speculation or getting access to otherwise hard-to-trade assets or markets. Derivatives, OFFICE
OF THE CONTROLLER OF CURRENCY, (2021), https://occ.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/capitalmarkets/financial-markets/derivatives/index-derivatives.html.
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28 29 30
Exotic Structured Products, also known as, Business Divisions.” , , .

A. Depart-Mental Drill Down!!!
Most of the large financial firms are divided into three important departments each with
numerous compartments. While reminding ourselves that divisions are usually created for ease of
governance and sometimes to appease the politics of power brokers,31 we note that within SG the
three main entities were: Retail Banking and Financial Services; Global Investment Management
Services; and Corporate and Investment Banking (“SGCIB”). There were three more subdepartments within SGCIB: Global Equities and Derivatives Solutions (“GEDS”); Fixed Income,
Currency and Commodities (“FICC”); and Capital Raising and Financing. Such an organizational
structure tells us that when we perform a depart-mental drill down, large companies are somewhat
like a not so small, Matryoshka doll.32
Within any business, executives from different divisions rise to the top of the management
hierarchy or dominate senior level positions at different times depending on how much their
departments have contributed to the total profits of the firm. Traders had come to rule the roost
around the time of the financial crisis. Trading divisions had become the engines of success with
traders being lauded for their ability to anticipate and execute profitable trades. In 2007, the Equity

28

A structured product, also known as a market-linked investment, is a pre-packaged structured finance investment
strategy based on a single security, a basket of securities, options, indices, commodities, debt issuance or foreign
currencies, and to a lesser extent, derivatives. Katrina Lamb, An Introduction to Structured Products,
INVESTOPEDIA, (Jan. 12, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/optioninvestor/07/structured_products.asp.
29
An exotic derivative, in finance, is a derivative which is more complex than commonly traded "vanilla" products.
This complexity usually relates to determination of the derivative payoff. The category may also include derivatives
with a non- standard subject matter (i.e., underlying), developed for a particular client or a particular market. The
term "exotic derivative" has no precisely defined meaning, being a colloquialism that reflects how common a
particular derivative is in the marketplace. As such, certain derivative instruments have been considered exotic when
first conceived of and sold, but lost this status when they were traded with significant enough volume. Exotic
Derivatives, FINANCIAL ADVISORY, (2021), https://www.financialadvisory.com/dictionary/term/exotic-derivatives/.
30
In finance, an exotic option is an option which has features making it more complex than commonly traded vanilla
options. Like the more general exotic derivatives they may have several triggers relating to determination of payoff. An
exotic option may also include non-standard underlying instrument, developed for a particular client or for a
particular market. Exotic options are more complex than options that trade on an exchange, and are generally traded
over the counter (OTC). Exotic Options, CORPORATE FINANCE INSTITUTION (2021),
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/exotic-options/.
31
An Investment bank is a financial services company or corporate division that engages in advisory-based financial
trans- actions on behalf of individuals, corporations, and governments. Such a bank might assist in raising financial
capital by underwriting or acting as the client’s agent in the issuance of securities. An investment bank may also assist
companies involved in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and provide ancillary services such as market making,
trading of derivatives and equity securities, and FICC services (fixed income instruments, currencies, and
commodities). Most investment banks maintain prime brokerage and asset management departments in conjunction
with their investment research businesses. See Sean Ross, How Do Investment Banks Help the Economy?,
INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/032515/how-do-investment-banks-helpeconomy.asp.
32
Matryoshka dolls, also known as Babushka Dolls, Russian Tea dolls, stacking dolls, or Russian dolls, are the set
of wooden dolls of decreasing size placed one inside another. See Mary Stillwell, What You Ought to Know About
Russian Nesting Dolls, Nesting Dolls (Mar. 15, 2018), https://nestingdolls.co/blogs/posts/russian-nesting-dollswhat-you-ought-to-know.
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Derivatives SGED trading division accounted for twenty percent of the entire bank profits.33 It was
widely hailed by wall street analysts that “SGED are probably the best, quantitatively and
qualitatively, in the world.” The SGED division had made profits in every quarter since 1993, and
between 2003 and 2006, had only thirteen days with losses of more than EUR five million. It is to
be noted that SG has invested significantly in improving its technology and infrastructure, the
result of which was its reputation in having a sophisticated risk management process. In 2006, there
were fifty-nine profit centers within this division and all of them profitable and none contributed
more than ten percent of revenues.34
Achieving such stable and diverse source of revenues is an amazing feat. If this sounds like
a money machine, we need to bring ourselves down to Earth since money machines generally exist
only for central banks. SG also hired many individuals with quantitative training from the
prestigious Grandes Ecoles,35 which is known for imparting rigorous education in mathematics
and financial principles. 385 of the 1,365 employees in GEDS worked in arbitrage and volatility
trading and Jerome Kerviel was one of them.
B. “e” for Everything, Everyone, Everywhere ... including Evolution, Education and Ethics
“e”, is commonly known in mathematics and finance as the exponential constant.36
Arguably, it is the second most important number after zero.37,38. The exponential is commonly
33

Profit in the derivatives unit mounted as swiftly as one of the graphs in their elegant mathematical models. A French
style of capitalism is now stained, New York Times, January 2008
34
Merrill Lynch estimates that SocGen has 59 separate profit centers in equity derivatives, offering products linked
to everything from European hedge funds to U.S. equity volatility to Asian equity indexes. Every one of those centers
is profitable, and none accounts for more than 10 percent of overall revenues, according to Merrill. "The diversity and
resilience of its revenues should not be underestimated." SocGen may be smaller than most of its rivals, but it outshines
them in profit margins. Deutsche Bank had nearly three times as much investment banking revenue last year, E15.9
billion, but its pretax profits were E4.3 billion, only 72 percent larger than SocGen’s E2.5 billion. Barclays Capital’s
revenues were 9 percent greater, at E6.2 billion, but its pretax profits were 27 percent lower at E1.84 billion. The
French bank’s core equity derivatives business is anything but volatile, executives insist. Pardon my French,
Institutional Investor, April 2006.
35
The grandes écoles (literally in French "High Schools") of France are higher education establishments that are
outside the main framework of the French public university system. Grandes écoles are highly selective, elite, and
prestigious institutions; their graduates have dominated upper levels of the private and public sectors of French
society for decades. Barsoux JL & Lawrence P, The making of a French manager, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
(June 30, 1991) https://europepmc.org/article/med/10112921.
36
The number e is a mathematical constant that is the base of the natural logarithm: the unique number whose
natural logarithm is equal to one. It is approximately equal to 2.718281828, and is the limit of 1 + 1 n as n
approaches infinity, that is as n → ∞, an expression that arises in the study of compound interest; hence e is found in
many mathematical models used in financial theory. The pattern that repeats itself twice towards the beginning,
1828, is the birth year of Leo Tolstoy, something that individuals familiar with Russian culture and having a
fondness for mathematics are likely to be aware of. It can also be calculated as the sum of the infinite series, e,
Mathematical Constant, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E_(mathematical_constant); James Chen, Exponential
Growth, Investopedia (April 2, 2020) https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/exponential-growth.asp.
37
In mathematics, an exponential function is a function of the form, f (x) = abx, where b is a positive real number,
and in which the argument x occurs as an exponent. The real exponential function, ex {exp : R → R} can be
characterized in a variety of equivalent ways. Most commonly, it is defined by the following power series, See
Exponential Function, Wikipedia Link. As in the real case, the exponential function can be defined on the complex
plane in several equivalent forms. Exponential Function, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exponential_function.
38
The importance of the exponential function in mathematics and the sciences stems mainly from its definition as the
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used to indicate variables that rapidly go up or increase exponentially. It could also denote change
in the other way or a decrease.39,40. In finance, it is used for the compounding and discounting of
money due to interest rates, a concept studied under the banner of time value of money.41
Derivatives in finance have a namesake, and are best understood using derivatives, which is a
fundamental tool of mathematical calculus.42,43 If the derivative of one variable with respect to
another is one, they change at the same rate. Also, the exponential function is the unique function
which is equal to its derivative. “e" shows up in many others areas of life as well.44
It is tempting to conclude that e stands for Everything, Everyone, Everywhere, including
Evolution, Education and Ethics given how prevalent it is. The importance of evolution for all life
and its perpetuity is not a matter up for debate. To connect evolution with ethics we suggest that one
goal of all evolution would be to reach a state where ethics are no longer a primary concern. A
highly-evolved being would not be bothered about ethical issues and would have no hesitation
making decisions that are unencumbered by ethics. In other words, he would immediately know
what is the right thing and how to do the right thing without getting drawn into the ethical
implications of the situations. Education is meant to accelerate or to be a catalyst for Evolution.
Kerviel started working for SG in 2000 in the middle office. His supervisors noted that he
excelled at using information technology and was efficient. Within two years, he moved to the front
unique function which is equal to its derivative and is equal to 1 when x = 0. That is, d/ex = ex and e0 = 1*dx, See
Duane Q. Nykamp, The Exponential Function, MATH INSIGHT (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://mathinsight.org/exponential_function.
39
Exponential growth is exhibited when the rate of change—the change per instant or unit of time—of the value of
amathematical function is proportional to the function’s current value, resulting in its value at any time being an
exponential function of time, i.e., a function in which the time value is the exponent. See James Chen, Exponential
Growth, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/exponentialgrowth.asp#:~:text=Exponential%20growth%20is%20a%20pattern,curve%20of%20an%20exponential%20function.
&text=The%20population%20is%20growing%20to,case%20(i.e.%2C%20exponentially); Exponential Growth,
Mathworld Link. The exponential function x(t) = x(0)ekt , k > 0 , satisfies the linear differential equation: dx/dt =kx,
saying that the change per instant of time of x at time t is proportional to the value of x(t), and x(t) has the initial
valuex(0). In the above differential equation, if k < 0, then the quantity experiences exponential decay.
40
A quantity is subject to exponential decay if it decreases at a rate proportional to its current value. See Duane Q.
Nykamp, The Exponential Function, MATH INSIGHT (Jan. 14, 2021), https://mathinsight.org/exponential_function;
Exponential Decay, Mathworld Link. Symbolically, this process can be expressed by the following differential
equation, where N is the quantity and λ (lambda) is a positive rate called the exponential decay constant: dN/dt= λN.
The solution to this equation is: N (t) = N0e−λt where N (t) is the quantity at time t, and N0 = N (0) is the initial
quantity, i.e. the quantity at time t = 0.
41
Compound interest is the addition of interest to the principal sum of a loan or deposit, or in other words, interest
on interest. Compound Interest, Wikipedia Link; ; Jason Fernando, Compound Interest, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan 13,
2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/compoundinterest.asp#:~:text=Compound%20interest%20(or%20compoundi
ng%20interest,accumulated%20interest%20from%20previous%20periods. The present value, PV, at time 0 of a
future payment, FV, at time t can be restated in the following way, where e is the base of the natural logarithm and r
is the continuously compounded rate: PV = FV · e−rt.
42
In finance, a derivative is a contract that derives its value from the performance of an underlying entity. This
underlying entity can be an asset, index, or interest rate, and is often simply called the "underlying". Derivatives,
OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, https://occ.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/capitalmarkets/financial-markets/derivatives/index-derivatives.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2020).
43
The derivative of a function of a real variable measures the sensitivity to change of the function value (output
value) with respect to a change in its argument (input value). The process of finding a derivative is called
differentiation. GILBERT STRANG & EDWIN "JED" HERMAN, CALCULUS Volume 1 224 (Rice Univ. ed. 2016).
44
The following link has a list of topics that are related to exponential functions: List of Exponential Topics,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_exponential_topics.
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office as a trading assistant to assist other senior traders—this essentially involves answering phones
and maintaining records for senior traders. A trading assistans other duties may include getting
traders coffee, breakfast and running other such errands. As any apprentice would admit, it is a rite
of passage and a good way to learn the ropes from an experienced individual on how to manage
the risk of derivative trades. Around 2005, Kerviel became part of the Delta One Listed Products
(“DLP”) trading desk on the back of a budding reputation as someone that could design complicated
derivative trading strategies. He then received a warrant to turbo-charge his career. Essentially, he
started trading a specialized product called turbo warrant, a kind of stock option with a knock-out
barrier feature.45
Soon, his contribution to the profits of the desk seemingly sky rocketed displaying an almost
exponential increase. At one point, around 59 percent of DLP profits and 27 percent of all Delta
One Trading were due to Kerviel’s positions. As we explore how he was able to generate such
high profits and became known among his colleagues as a “cash machine,” let us remind ourselves
again that cash machines (more formally referred to in monetary policy circles under the banner
of quantitative easing)46 exist only for central banks. We also need to note that listed products are
traded on an exchange and generally do not generate huge commissions, fees, spreads and hence
profits.
C. Confessions of The Control Agents
Financial trading firms have elaborate structures of people assigned to monitor and support
the activities of trading desks. Most of the support functions are handled by operations teams in
terms of booking trades, ensuring they are cleared on the exchanges or settlement houses and the
reporting into the technology infrastructure is done correctly and on time. The monitoring roles
can be broadly viewed as: controllers, compliance officers and risk managers, while keeping in
mind that there are significant overlaps in the day to day tasks and responsibilities of these groups
of individuals. Risk managers focus on obtaining numeric measures indicating the extent of risk
or the potential for loss due to trading activities. Controllers focus on ensuring that trades are
booked correctly, that the counterparties are valid organizations, and that the Profits and Losses,
(P&L) and related accounting is accurate and reported correctly. Compliance officers ensure
compliance with current and expected regulatory guidelines.
In addition, traders on each desk are quizzed in an in-depth manner about the trades that
are being conducted by desk heads and trading managers who are experienced traders
themselves. Along with the products he was authorized to trade, Kerviel started taking
45

Turbo warrant (or Callable bull/bear contract) is a kind of stock option. Specifically, it is a barrier option of the
Down
and Out type. For comparison, a regular call option will have a positive value at expiry whenever the spot price settles
above the strike price. A turbo will have a positive value at expiry when the spot settle above the strike and the spot has
never fallen below the strike during the life of the option (if it had done so the option would have crossed the barrier and
would have become
worthless).
James
Chen,
Warrant,
INVESTOPEDIA,
(Feb.
4,
2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/warrant.asp.
46
Quantitative easing (QE), also known as large-scale asset purchases, is a monetary policy whereby a central bank
buys predetermined amounts of government bonds or other financial assets in order to inject liquidity directly into
the economy. A central bank enacts quantitative easing by purchasing, regardless of interest rates, a predetermined
quantity of bonds or other financial assets on financial markets from private financial institutions including commercial
banks, thus raising the prices of those financial assets and lowering their yield, while simultaneously increasing the
money supply. This action increases the negative effect of that event on the insurance sector.

100

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:4: Feb. 2021

directional bets on many securities. The first instance of such unauthorized activity happened
around July 2005 by which time Kerviel had figured out that intraday trades—trades opened and
closed within a single day—did not show up as open positions on the bank’s daily account
reconciliations. His experience in the middle office and his knowledge of the accounting system
proved valuable, and he knew how to enter fictitious trades and conceal his trading records. He
made decent profits on some of these unauthorized trades. He claimed later that he revealed some
of his initial profits to his supervisors who told him things could have just as easily gone the other
way; though Kerviel sensed that they were mostly satisfied with the outcome. This indicates that
he might have even received mild warnings for some of these positions at times.
As he was taking bigger unapproved positions without the bank batting an eye, he took it
as tacit agreement regarding his actions from his supervisors. Also, over a period of time, when
his immediate supervisor resigned and a new one took over, who was more trusting, he had
sometimes traded positions worth billions of dollars, far in excess of the position limits that he
was supposed to adhere to. In July 2005, Kerviel built a short position of about EUR 10 million on
Allianz shares, one of the world’s largest insurance companies. Clearly, such a directional
position was outside his remit of trading turbo warrants. His position received some good fortune
in terms of the terrorist bombings in London and he realized large profits due to excess reserves
that banks hold. The goal of this policy is to ease financial conditions, increase market liquidity,
and facilitate an expansion of private bank lending.
In 2006, Kerviel started increasing his directional bets on equities to about EUR 135
million. He had positions in Allianz and two German companies who specialized in photo-voltaic
products. He also traded heavily on futures contracts on the DAX, one of the major German stock
indices.47,48. By early 2007, as the U.S. subprime crisis was developing, Kerviel was betting that
the crisis would spill over to Europe and the major market indices would crash. He took a short
position on DAX futures to the tune of around EUR 850 million on January 24, 2007 and kept
increasing it to EUR 2.5 billion by the end of February and reaching almost EUR 5.6 billion by the
end of March. By July his futures position had reached a peak of around EUR 30 billion. He also
had individual stock positions of around EUR 350 million.
To conceal his real trades, he booked many fake offsetting trades. Figure 14 shows his
actual earnings on unauthorized positions; Figure 15 shows his official or reported earnings; Figure
16 shows his official or reported earnings versus his actual earnings plotted on the same graph
along the same axis to illustrate how disproportionate they were; and Figure 17 gives an estimate
of the earnings from the fictitious offsetting index trades. He closed out most of his trades by the
end of December 2007 and he later claimed a realized gain of nearly EUR 1.5 billion or $2.2
billion from this unwinding. Specifically, to offset the gains for 2007 he created eight fictitious

47

The DAX (Deutscher Aktienindex, German stock index) is a blue chip stock market index consisting of the 30
major Germancompanies trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. It is the equivalent of the FT 30 and the Dow
Jones Industrial Average, and because of its small selection it does not necessarily represent the vitality of the
economy as whole. James Chen, DAX Stock Index, Investopedia (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.dax-indices.com/indexdetails?isin=DE0008469008.
48
In finance, a futures contract (more colloquially, futures) is a standardized forward contract, a legal agreement to
buy or sell something at a predetermined price at a specified time in the future, between parties not known to each
other. Contracts are negotiated at futures exchanges, which act as a marketplace between buyers and sellers. See
CFTC v. Zelener, 373 F.3d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 2004).
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trades on money losing forward contracts.49 Though in a few days, between January 2 and 18,
2008 he built up a long position on index futures for a total of EUR 49 billion, before being
apprehended.
While all these unauthorized transactions were happening, Kerviel, due to the fear of
being discovered, did not take any vacations. He managed to get around the regulation that frontoffice personnel are required to take two-weeks mandatory vacation every year, which ensured
that someone else would take over his accounts, by saying that he was troubled by the recent
passing of his father. Given this situation of working without vacations, it is very likely that
Kerviel was even dreaming of work and somehow balancing his life, unlike many of us who
dream of our lives and try to balance that with work. Kerviel also recorded pairs of fictitious
trades that offset each other in terms of the quantities of shares but not prices. For example, on
March 1, 2007 he booked a fake trade to purchase 2,266,500 shares of SolarWorld at EUR 63 per
share and a sale of the same number of shares at EUR 53 each, hence recording a fictitious loss
of around EUR 22.7 million. He would cancel most of these fictitious trades before they could be
picked by internal control systems. It is believed that he had made at least 115 transactions of
this nature.
For about two years, the controllers received numerous email alerts (at least 93) regarding
abnormalities in Kerviel’s trading patterns. They merely paid lip service to these alerts. To be fair
to them, several hundred emails are received by controllers and operations personnel related to
various aspects of different trades.50 While there are many valid reasons as to why controllers, risk
managers and compliance officers cannot fully be expected to completely understand the
intricacies of every trade they are monitoring, we highlight a few subtle points about what stands
in the way of more precise monitoring in Section 4.4.
D. A Slow Walk On A Tight Rope
As an aside, it is worth looking at the role of a Risk Manager. If they do their job well, it is
hard to know the extent of the risks they have averted. If there is a blow up, such as a huge loss in a
portfolio, they have failed at their jobs. The one way they can do their jobs perfectly, is by not
letting their traders or portfolio managers take on risky trades. But, then again, they get
compensated by the very profits from the P&L of their traders that depends on taking on bigger
risks. So really, what risk managers look for is some way to identify portions of the portfolio they
are risk managing using some criteria and issue reports saying these are risky trades and hope that
if there is a blow up the risky trades are in those outlier reports they had put out earlier. Let us just
say their daily work lives might feel like a slow walk on a tight rope.
Another aspect to consider are the motivations for someone to become a trader or a risk
49

In finance, a forward contract or simply a forward is a non-standardized contract between two parties to buy or
sell an asset at a specified future time at a price agreed on at the time of conclusion of the contract, making it a type
of derivative instrument. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 25(a) (West 2020).
50
A study conducted in one of our previous employers about the extent of emails being received by various trading
desks
showed that on average there would be a minimum of around three hundred emails that were sent to the main group
mailing list on a daily basis from clients inquiring about various aspects of their trading positions. In addition, there
would be many messages on Bloomberg, internal chat applications and hundreds of automated messages related to
their trading positions. Also, there would be emails received as part of being other mailing groups and numerous
emails each person received individually. Staying on top of all these sources of information can be a challenge and
we were exploring various automated technology solutions for the same.
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manager. Any talented individual starting a career in financial services would be keener to become
a trader rather than a risk manager. This is because traders are generally compensated more than
risk managers. This leads to a bias within and even outside the organization that someone that ends
up as a trader is more skilled. Viewing this from the flip side leads to be belief that someone ends
up as a risk manager because they could not become a trader or they were bad at performing the
role of a trader or even because they lack the necessary skills to make complex decisions involved
in deciding which trades to execute. This perception is fueled regularly on trading desks when
traders routinely tell risk managers they do not understand certain aspects of trading when asked
about why a certain trade was made. Sometimes this can even be via the use of condescending
words such as, “you don’t even know such simple things or how did someone make you a risk
manager?”
Nobody likes to be told they cannot understand something and certainly not by someone
who is deemed to have less knowledge. This bias means that many times risk managers do not
challenge traders or try to pursue matters in depth when they fail to comprehend certain things
related to trading strategies they are supposed to risk manage. We will see a classic example of this
in Section (4.6). We wish to emphasize that there are many excellent risk managers who are
passionate and extremely skilled at what they do. The discussion here covers more common
observations rather than the exception.
E. The Glass Castle Called Basel
Basel is a set of risk guidelines.51 There have been three sets of accords over time, which
indicates trial and error or iterations with changes based on outcomes from the previous ones. The
one concern is that these rules are getting more complex in each iteration implying that more
regulation seems to be answer. It is important to consider whether this is really the case since more
regulation and/or more complex rules are generally easier to break. This makes the guidelines more
fragile, which leads us to wonder if the Rules of Basel are like a Glass Castle.
F. Cooke Ratios and the Way the Cookie Crumbles
On January 2, 2008, new risk guidelines went into effect in Europe as a result of the Basel
II accord. The Cooke ratio is a Basel II measure for capital adequacy. This ratio for a counterparty
on eight forward contracts entered by Kerviel was abnormally high. Kerviel had entered the name
of Baader Bank, a German brokerage, as a counterparty. When asked to name the counterparty in
those fictitious trades, Kerviel sent the following email to the control agent: “This materialized the
give up of puts made late; I owe money to the counter-party. We’ll re-book it a.s.a.p.” The control
agent later confessed that he did not understand Kerviel’s explanation, but did not follow up on it

51

The Basel Accords refer to the banking supervision Accords (recommendations on banking regulations)—Basel I,
Basel II
and Basel III—issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). They are called the Basel Accords as
the BCBS maintains its its secretariat at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland and the
committee normally meets there. The Basel Accords is a set of recommendations for regulations in the banking
industry. See James Chen, Basel Accord, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/basel_accord.asp#:~:text=The%20Basel%20Accords%20are%20three%20se
ries%20of%20banking%20regulations%20set,was%20agreed%20in%20November%202010 (last updated July 22,
2019).
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either.52 We have asked many individuals to explain what they understand by the explanation
Kerviel provided and most people say that it is something related to the trades he was doing. No
one had previously said that the sentence makes no sense, which is the most likely conclusion.
After this incident, there was greater scrutiny on Kerviel’s actions. Compliance officers
checked the data regarding the forward trades more closely and called for a meeting with Kerviel.
Kerviel admitted that he made a mistake with respect to the identity of the counterparty. He said it
was Deutsche bank and forwarded two emails, which were forged, to substantiate his explanation.
However, a control agent eventually decided to contact Deutsche Bank, which found no record of
those transactions.
G. Paying Billions with Less Than a Million
Sensing that the discrepancies were much larger than what they seemed, the auditors
escalated the matter internally to the highest levels of management. Kerviel was asked to cut short a
weekend getaway and return to the office. There were many senior officials who questioned him
wanting to know the exact details of his trading strategies. Kerviel still tried to mislead them by
initially stating that he had found an angel for speculators called the martingale strategy53,54.
Repeated inquiries and further investigation by the bank officials and auditors revealed that there
were unhedged long futures positions worth about EUR fifty billion. Kerviel was asked not to return
to work, not to speak to anyone regarding this matter and to stay at home. He was formally charged
on January 28, 2008 with abuse of confidence and illegal access to computers.
His trial began on June 8, 2010. On October 5, 2010, he was found guilty and sentenced
to five years imprisonment with two years suspended. If it seemed like a joke at first, the courtroom
must be filled with a sense of humor since he was told to fully restore the $6.7 billion which was
lost. He also faced a permanent ban from working in financial services. Caroline Guillaumin, a
spokeswoman for Société Générale, stated that the restitution was "symbolic," and that the bank
had no expectation that the sum would be paid. Olivier Metzner, Kerviel’s lawyer, described the
sentence as "extraordinary" and said that Kerviel would appeal. Kerviel’s sentence was suspended
until his appeal was completed. On 24 October 2012, a Paris appeals court upheld the October
2010 sentence to three years in prison with another two suspended, and ordered Kerviel to
reimburse EUR 4.9 billion to Société Générale for its loss—even though his largest bonus was well short of
that. In March 2014, a French high court upheld Kerviel’s prison sentence but ruled he would not
When asked for an explanation, Kerviel replied, “This materialized the give up of puts made late; I owe money to
the counter-party. We’ll re-book it a.s.a.p.” According to SocGen’s internal report, the risk-control officer later
admitted that he did not understand this explanation. On January 9th, Kerviel annulled the contracts and was told
that the problem had been resolved. The Omen
53
A martingale is any of a class of betting strategies that originated from and were popular in 18th century France.
The simplest of these strategies was designed for a game in which the gambler wins the stake if a coin comes up
heads and loses it if the coin comes up tails. The strategy had the gambler double the bet after every loss, so that the
first win would recover all previous losses plus win a profit equal to the original stake. The martingale strategy has
been applied to roulette as well, as the probability of hitting either red or black is close to 50%. Since a gambler with
infinite wealth will, almost surely, eventually flip heads, the martingale betting strategy was seen as a sure thing by
those who advocated it. Nigel E. Turner, Doubling vs. Constant Bets as Strategies for Gambling, 14 J. GAMBLING
STUD., 413, 414 (1998).
54
More generally, in probability theory, a martingale is a sequence of random variables (i.e., a stochastic process) for
which, at a particular time, the conditional expectation of the next value in the sequence, given all prior values, is
equal to the present value. Yuan Shih Chow & Henry Teicher 239 Probability Theory: Independence,
Interchangeability, Martingales (Stephen Feinberg et al. eds., 3rd ed. 1997).
52
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have to repay EUR 4.9 billion.55
H. Sick Lesson from Nick Leeson
Nick Leeson, another trader, caused United Kingdom’s oldest merchant bank, Barings, and
one of the oldest banks in the world to go bankrupt56, 57,58. On February 26, 1995, when Barings
bank declared bankruptcy, it came as a big surprise and shock to everyone and especially to the
financial industry. Nick Leeson, one of the bank’s traders in Singapore had lost $1.4 billion on
derivatives trading while the bank’s reported capital was only about $600 million. The loss came
principally from a long position in the Nikkei 225 futures of notional value around $7 billion on
the Osaka and Singapore Exchanges.59 What Nick Leeson’s employers believed was that he was
arbitraging the Nikkei 225 futures contracts on two different exchanges, the Singapore
International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) and the Osaka Stock Exchange (OSE), by buying the
same futures at a low price in one exchange and selling simultaneously at a higher price on the other
exchange.60 Such a trading strategy has little to no risk exposure as the long position offsets the
short position and hence from the official view point of Barings London, Nick Leeson was
presumably fully hedged.
A key similarity with Kerviel’s case was that due to the rapid expansion of Barings
settlements, Nick quickly found himself in charge of both the front and back office. He was
responsible for trading on the futures market and he was also in charge of booking and reporting the
various trades. This meant that Nick Leeson would be the only one to check and to know if the
records matched the actual trades. It is conventional practice that a different person is meant to be
doing the back-office accounting, to detect any misconduct in the deals. However, this was not the
case at Barings, which meant that Nick Leeson had the power to cover his tracks in case there were
55

In answer to the rumors that Kerviel had fled Paris following the discovery of the unauthorized trading, on 24
January 2008
Kerviel’s lawyer denied that he attempted to disappear and said he remained in Paris to face the accusations. Also on 24
January 2008, Société Générale filed a lawsuit against "a 31-year-old person" for creating fraudulent documents,
using forged documents and making attacks on an automated system, according to Clarisse Grillon, a spokeswoman
for the Nanterre prosecutor. Gilligan, George & Jérôme Kerviel. The 'Rogue Trader' of Société Générale:
Bad Luck, Bad Apple, Bad Tree or Bad Orchard? 32, 12 T HE C OMPANY L AWYER , 355, 355.
56
Barings Bank was a British merchant bank based in London, and the world’s second oldest merchant bank (after
Berenberg Bank). Ian Greener, Nick Leeson and the Collapse of Barings Bank: Socio-Technical Networks and the
‘Rogue Trader’, 13 ORGANIZATION 421, 425 (2006).
57
Nicholas William "Nick" Leeson (born 25 February 1967) is a former English derivatives broker famous for
bringing down Barings Bank, the United Kingdom’s oldest merchant bank, into bankruptcy. Andrew D. Brown,
Making sense of the collapse of Barings Bank, 58 HUMAN RELATIONS 1579, 1579 (2005).
58
Rogue Trader is a 1999 British biographical drama film written and directed by James Dearden and starring Ewan
McGregor and Anna Friel. The film centers in the life of former derivatives broker Nick Leeson and the 1995
collapse of Barings Bank. It was based on Leeson’s 1996 book Rogue Trader: How I Brought Down Barings Bank
and Shook the Financial World. Rogue Trader (Granada Film Productions and Newmarket Capital Group 1999).
59
The Nikkei 225, more commonly called the Nikkei, the Nikkei index, or the Nikkei Stock Average, is a stock
market index for the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). Oliver Dale, What is the Nikkei 225? Complete Begginers
Guide, MoneyCheck, (March, 15, 2019). https://moneycheck.com/what-is-the-nikkei-225/.
60
In economics and finance, arbitrage is the practice of taking advantage of a price difference between two or more
markets: striking a combination of matching deals that capitalize upon the imbalance, the profit being the difference
between the market prices at which the unit is traded. James Chen, Arbitrage, Investopedia, (Feb. 1,2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/arbitrage.asp.
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substantial losses.
Barings London thought that Leeson’s long futures position on the OSE, which was publicly
known since the exchange reports such positions each week, was matched by a short position of
the same notional value on the SIMEX. This implied being short twice as many contracts since a
SIMEX contracts has a notional value of half as that of one OSE contracts. Nick Leeson was in
fact long the same amount on the SIMEX exchange and this was completely contrary to what the
senior managers at Barings were thinking. Nick Leeson had managed to hide his real position in a
secret account, which was known as an error account and had the famous number of 88888. On
January 17, 1995, the Kobe earthquake sent the Asian financial markets, and with that Leeson’s
investments, into a tailspin. As the value of the futures contracts started falling, the exchanges
started issuing massive margin calls on the long positions. Despite urgent transfer of funds from
Barings Tokyo and London to Barings Singapore in January and February to cover the margin calls
on SIMEX, the continued decline in the value of the positions and the extent of the margin calls
made Barings bankrupt.

V.

ROGUE TRADING GUIDE FOR DUMMIES

Let us imagine that we are in scenario where we are on the trading desk of a large financial
firm, struggling to make profits by finding good trading strategies. If it seems like all else has
failed, we have nothing to worry since we have the following guide to become a rogue trader and
bring in lots of cash. Surely, this guide will also be useful to train good auditors who can watch out
for the below signs.
Covering up is crucial. This requirement is the most important of all the guidelines since if
we are unable to cover our tracks thoroughly, whatever will do will be eventually found out.
As discussed earlier, an understanding of how the middle office works is extremely valuable.
In particular, knowing how trades are recorded, how they can be amended or moved to different
accounts and canceled is useful. Given the number of transactions that a decent sized bank
will see on a daily basis, there will be error accounts where trades that cannot be reconciled
will be moved till they can be settled or sorted out. It is important to know who is taking care
of the error accounts and if possible learn how to designate certain accounts as error accounts
or create new error accounts for our own use. The good news is that there will be a lot of
electronic information, noise and footprints. Initially, as we start our rogue journey, we can
hide things without too much worries for a while and any trail we leave will be lost in too
much information. But given the amount of electronic records, it is hard to wipe all traces of
our actions and to remain unnoticed for a long time. It is important to keep moving our trades
and records so that auditors will go around in circles. Mastery of this element will ensure
survival for a long time and will make the difference between a great rogue and a decent
one. Clearly, the longer we can cover our tracks the better, or at the very least, we need to
remain clear and eliminate all our trails until we can find alternate employment or leave the
country with enough money to find a paradise where there are no extradition treaties with
our home country. If you have not done your time in the middle office, there are ways in
which you can make up for it. Ask someone in the middle office to explain to you how things
work, dangle the “soon you can be a trader” carrot in front of him. Remember someone in
the middle office is stuck in a tedious job with long hours and would welcome the
opportunity to be a part of the front office glamour.
• Fictitious trades will keep us within trading limits and far away from the risk managers. All
•
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the trades we execute will show up in risk reports and financial firms are keen to ensure that
most positions are hedged. What this also means is that profits from one trade will be
balanced by the profits from other trades. If we venture down the rogue track, we do not want
to bother with trades that make pennies. We are after the real money. This means taking
directional bets and not hedging all our trades. So, we need to book fake trades that hedge the
risk from some of our real trades. Many times, it is also useful to book trades with different
prices but with the same quantity. This can show up as a profit or a loss and can reduce the
risk we are holding. While losses will bring tons of attention, profits can cause lots of
surveillance as well.
Create a “Technical/Unknown” counterparty. All trades we do need someone on the other
side who takes the opposing position. If we are booking fictitious trades, we need to assign
some counterparty for those. These days, there is increased due diligence regarding
counterparties in all financial institutions since there are many concerns about money
laundering and funding for terrorist organizations and arms dealers. Since the due diligence
can take many days, book new counterparties but make sure before they go into due diligence
you change them. Kerviel was undone by this particular facet of rogue trading. It would be
beneficial to have friends at other financial institutions with whom you trade sometimes so
if they get questioned, they will say you have done trades with them before. Why stop there,
see if you can bring them into the action. What one rogue can do, two can do better and a
dozen can excel at misleading anyone investigating the matter. Create a network early on an
and unknown counterparties while essential for loners, known friends who are rogues
working as a team means greater chances of evasion. This of course means ensuring that
none of them turns on you. Everyone needs to be equally involved.
All models are wrong, but some are useful. In our case, it does not matter if the model is
right or wrong. We will leave that debate for the quants, mathematicians and philosophers.
For our purposes, the more complicated the model the more useful it will be. Every day we
need to mark the positions in our trading book with the latest price point for the corresponding
securities. This is known as marking the book. We can mark the book using market prices
for instruments that are regularly traded. For illiquid instruments, we need to use a model
price. But, the main thing we are trying to do is that we are trying to mark using whatever
source so that the risk managers will believe the price is valid. We need to understand that
this is the essential goal of marking the books. If the models are complex, there is less
understanding and more leeway in terms of which model parameters we can tweak and hence
the price we can use. When questioned about this, we can say that we are correcting modeling
bias or we are making a provision for model errors.
Unlocked computers of other traders or other personnel on the trading floor are like gold
mines. But if we need to educate someone on some of the potential uses of unlocked
computers towards rogue trader status, perhaps it is time to rethink if rogue trading is meant
for that someone. Suffice is to say, unlocked computers can be used for to create lots of
mischief and mayhem such as booking trades from different user accounts, and sending
emails to controllers or senior managers to mislead or confuse them. If you find unlocked
computers of senior managers and you play your cards right, it might even be possible for
you to take the throne for yourself.
Forge emails to clear up any inquiries from controllers or better still provide clarifications
using forged emails before any questions arise related to fictitious trades or counterparties.
Forging an email does not need a certificate in computer engineering. All that is necessary is
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the header from one email copied onto another one so that wrong information can be made
to seem like a legitimate email forward or reply. For the more sophisticated rogue, figuring
out more technical details about how email headers are created and the protocols used can
be priceless to evade discovery.
• For the serious rogue trader, vacations are an annoying distraction. Not to mention there
could be unwanted and unwelcome visitors that will probe and get their dirty paws all over
your trades. Find ways in which you can postpone vacations till your job is done. Making up
sob stories about dead family members that haunt your memories when you are away from
work. And when you run out of close family members, remember the dead aunt that raised
you and made you the person you are up. Send mild clues that you might be a jumper.61 Such
passive threats that you might one day succumb to the pressures of trading and all the stress
created by wrong suspicions will unnerve any trading manager and he is likely to cover for
you with controllers. No one wants a dead subordinate and no one wants to spend months
answering questions about how they might have caused someone in their team to commit
suicide and the cruel and terrifying methods they used to improve employee productivity.
• Ernst and Young have re-branded themselves as EY, perhaps because it was becoming wellknown that they were too Earnest and certainly not Young.62 If you have some influence in
who gets hired to do your external audit, make sure it is EY. Even if you have no direct powers
in deciding who your external auditor will be, sing praises about EY and the wonderful work
ethic they follow. You might just be pleasantly surprised that EY will be the one to check if
you are cooking your books. Chances are they won’t find a thing wrong with your trading
books. Do not worry, they are on your side because you are paying them. This issue of
potential conflicts of interest between a client and its auditor is a topic that has spawned many
papers and will be material for many more papers and books.
• Bury compliance, risk managers, controllers and auditors in emails and ask them for
information that you don’t really need but is hard for them to obtain. Say that you need all
this information to ensure you stay within risk limits and to understand the full extent of
scenarios that can potentially cause losses. If you have assigned them a lot of hard tasks and
follow up regularly asking for updates and more information, they will be less likely to show
up to ask you something since they will worried about providing you updates. Remind them
who is the rainmaker and emphasize that their inputs are crucial to ensure that the trading
profits are sustained. In addition to asking for information send them updates, alerts and
The phone calls from the bank persisted, and Kerviel replied to one, in a text message, “I don’t know if I’m going
to come back or throw myself under a train.” How serious was he? When he sent the message, he was just outside
the bank headquarters, far from a railroad track. But bank officials were alarmed that he might be suicidal, and not
without reason: the previous summer, a SocGen trader had jumped off a bridge, reportedly after unauthorized
trading losses were uncovered. So, when Kerviel called to say that he was in the lobby, the bank dispatched a
physician to evaluate his mental state. After concluding that he was stable, the doctor took him to a conference
center on the sixth floor. The Omen.
62
Ernst & Young (doing business as EY) is a multinational professional services firm headquartered in London,
England, United Kingdom. Along with Deloitte, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), EY is considered one
of the Big Four accounting firms. The firm dates back to 1849 with the founding of Harding & Pullein in England.
The current firm was formed by a merger of Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young & Co. in 1989. It was known as
Ernst & Young until 2013 when it underwent a re-branding to EY. Jeff Swystun, Ewww & Why?: The Ernst &
Young Rebranding, Business 2 Community, (July 21, 2013).
https://www.business2community.com/branding/ewww-why-the-ernst-young-rebranding0559411#:~:text=The%20Ernst%20&%20Young%20Rebranding%20Jeff%20Swystun%20July,provided%20some
%20really%20weak%20rationale%20for%20the%20change.
61
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reminders about many aspects of your trading desk. Almost everyone in big business these
days and especially in big banks is struggling with too much information, add more noise to
the already noisy and chaotic environment. It is also helpful if you can benefit from the
efforts of the many academics that are creating lots of papers. Universities that fund all this
research are secretly concerned that not much of it is being used and that there is not enough
of an audience for all this work. Get to know some academics and send some of their long
and technical articles to the auditors to read, you will win some friends that will be pleased
with material they can to add to their resume about how applied their research is and friends
in such circles will lend you more credibility. Suggest to the controllers that these research
papers are crucial to understanding the business, the products, their risk management and the
regulatory implications. When you see them, quiz them about the material you have sent
them. The papers will not only create an amazing impression of you as someone who has a
strong foundation and has a sound knowledge of the products, but most importantly if
someone owes you many answers, they are unlikely to come up with questions for you.
• Despite all these precautions, there will always be a controller or two brave enough to venture
close to you. Tell those controllers, who are hard to shake off and keep showing up, that you
are working with someone else in their group and prefer it that way because the other person
understands these things better and is a team player who is easier to work with. No one wants
to be branded as abrasive and hard to work with, especially these days when all the business
world is prioritizing teamwork and communication. Promotions, bonuses, entire careers, and
sometimes even your very job, hinges onbeing seen as someone who can take one for the team.
In spite of all that you have said and done, if someone persists in pestering you, tell them that
they do not have a clue how these complex positions work and you do not have the time to give
them a risk management certification or a beginner financial products course.
• Hire a few disabled assistants who can keep their silence and will not hear or realize most
things happening around them. This might even get you some badges for helping the
disabled. Every company wants to do more for causes that help the less fortunate and
employees that show that they care by willing to work with such people will be prized. Even
if they are not really disabled, but if they play the part of the assistant that is mute and hearing
impaired it can be a valuable asset. If things go really south, you also have some suckers to
blame for the mistakes for which you are being held responsible. To put it more subtly, it is
priceless having an internal accomplice who could be the clueless criminal.

VI.

MATHEMATICALLY SOPHISTICATED MODELS OR MERELY SUPERIOR MORALS?

With the above background, let us now attempt to answer the most important question
related to this case by considering a few related questions. We try to weave in varying points of
view since a difference of opinion is what makes horses race, markets trade, and life interesting.
A. What would you do if you find yourself in situations similar to those faced by Jerome
Kerviel?
i.

If you believe that no one is watching, would you build up positions outside your authorized
limits?

We need to understand the environment in which traders operate. They are under tremendous
pressure to generate profits. The lives of traders can be epitomized by the adrenaline-charged
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behavior of race car drivers63 and fighter pilots in the early era of jet engines.64
Many a time, corporate success in most spheres of the business realm simply boils comes
down to kicking the asses you can and kissing the asses you have to. Trading is freedom from
having to follow this unwritten rule of the modern business conglomerate. A trader’s profits provide
a more objective view of his efforts and contribution. In addition to the thrill of the trade, this
promise of independence from kowtowing to others, partly explains the allure of making a living
as a trader. A good sequel to the book “Men are from Mars and Women are from Venus” from
celebrated author John Gray would be, “Sales/Trades people are from Saturn and Product
Managers are from Pluto.” What this highlights is that depending on what identity we assume, our
views change and conflicts are natural when there are different perspectives.
Any trader, good or bad in terms of P&L, will lose money at some point. This can be
summarized in terms of what life throws at all of us. There are days we get paid; there are days we
get laid; and there are days we get laid off . . . that is life. The financial speculators that adorn
magazine front pages have obtained winning gambles before losers. George Soros has suffered
from many Gorge Soros (bad bets),65 but he is remembered most vividly as the man who broke the
Bank of England. This suggests that lady luck might not have smiled favorably at the right time
upon many a rogue.
Surely, there are many differences in terms of the authorized trades that speculators on the
buy side and traders, such as Kerviel, on the sell side are permitted.66,67. But, their fundamental
63

Rush is a 2013 biographical sports film centered on the Hunt–Lauda rivalry between two Formula One drivers, the
British James Hunt and the Austrian Niki Lauda during the 1976 Formula 1 motor-racing season. Rush (Exclusive
Media Group 2013).
64
The Right Stuff is a 1979 book by Tom Wolfe about the pilots engaged in U.S. postwar research with
experimental rocket-powered, high-speed aircraft as well as documenting the stories of the first Project Mercury
astronauts selected for the NASA space program. The Right Stuff is based on extensive research by Wolfe, who
interviewed test pilots, the astronauts and their wives, among others. Wolfe wrote that the book was inspired by the
desire to find out why the astronauts accepted the danger of space flight. He recounts the enormous risks that test
pilots were already taking, and the mental and physical characteristics—the titular "right stuff"—required for and
reinforced by their jobs. Tom Wolfe, The Right Stuff (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 1979).
65
George Soros, (born Schwartz György; August 12, 1930) is a Hungarian-American investor and philanthropist.
Soros is known as "The Man Who Broke the Bank of England" because of his short sale of US$10 billion worth of
pounds sterling, which made him a profit of $1 billion during the 1992 Black Wednesday UK currency crisis on 16
September, 1992. Andrew Beattie, How Did George Soros Break the Bank of England?, Investopedia, (September
18, 2020) https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/08/george-soros-bank-of-england.asp. After gaining more than
100 percent in 1980, the Quantum fund was down 23 percent the following year, its first ever loss, and Soros was hit
by a wave of redemptions that halved his capital from $400 million to $200 million. The Quantum Funds lost $800
million a short while before the October, 1987, stock market crash, betting the wrong way on Japanese stocks
(Mallaby 2010). Quantum Funds suffered a $600 million loss on Feb. 14, 1994 the first full day of trading after trade
talks between the United States and Japan collapsed. A $600 Million Miscalculation,
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/26/business/a-600-million-miscalculation.html.
66
Buy-side is a term used in investment firms to refer to advising institutions concerned with buying investment
services. Private equity funds, mutual funds, life insurance companies, unit trusts, hedge funds, and pension funds
are the most common types of buy side entities. In sales and trading, the split between the buy side and sell side
should be viewed from the perspective of securities exchange services. The investing community must use those
services to trade securities. The "Buy Side" are the buyers of those services; the "Sell Side", also called "prime
brokers", are the sellers of those services. Julie Young, Buy-Side, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 28, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/buyside.asp.
67
Sell side is a term used in the financial services industry. The three main markets for this selling are the stock,
bond, and foreign exchange market. It is a general term that indicates a firm that sells investment services to asset
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goal of pursuit of profits by combating uncertainty in the financial markets, requires that they have
to possess a certain amount of aggressiveness to put on seemingly risky trades. That very aggression
can sometimes take one too far across the line.
B. Would you believe that because no one is telling you anything, someone is watching and
implicitly permitting?
There are cameras everywhere and this means that we are not just being watched but
whatever else we do is also being monitored in various ways. Phone conversations are tapped;
emails are read and even our internal organs are scanned, many times without our awareness or
consent. The day when someone would be reading even our very thoughts and dreams does not seem
far off, if it is not already happening. Given this state of affairs, it is proper to live under the
assumption that everything we do can be known by everyone. If that is the case, we should only
do something that we are okay to admit to everyone.
When we look back many years later at present day human resource practices such as:
productivity incentives, time logs, email and chat filters, phone conversation recording,
management notifications, performance reviews, evaluations and ratings, these methods of today
can be compared and might one day seem like the whipping of slaves in ancient times.
While Point (1a) conveys the message that desperation combined with frustration could
lead to unethical behavior, there could be many benefits to having formal corporate ethics
programs. It also seems sensible that organizational structures try and weave the ethical dimension
into their process, especially in terms of education and development. This can be construed as an
open invitation to ramp up our efforts at education aimed at better values from all corners of life
since if all of us could clear our doubts ourselves, we would not need universities and Nobel prizes,
right?
C. You have received a bonus of less than EUR one million, how would you pay back a loss of
around EUR five billion?
The one way in which we can come up with EUR five billion starting with a EUR one
million is by going about putting on another set of rogue traders or we would need to create another
scam or a Ponzi scheme. The courtroom is implicitly suggesting that the accused must perpetrate
another crime. If not, the courtroom must be filled with jokers.
This brings up the topic of why people crave astronomical salaries. We could state that we
live in a world that requires around 2000 IQ points to consistently make correct decisions.68 But,
the problem is that the best of us has around 200 IQ points. No matter how intelligent one is, the
management firms, typically referred to as the buy side, or corporate entities. One important note, the sell side and the
buy side work hand in hand and each side could not exist without the other. These services encompass a broad range of
activities, including broking/dealing, investment banking, advisory functions, and investment research. Adam
Barone, Sell-Side, INVESTOPEDIA (Jul. 7, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sellside.asp.
68
Ismail (2014) mentions the following quote from Taleb, “Knowledge gives you a little bit of an edge, but
tinkering (trial and error) is the equivalent of 1,000 IQ points. It is tinkering that allowed the industrial revolution”.
This means that to match trial and error we need 1000 IQ points. But trial and error could still give the wrong
outcomes. We can try and fail many times and still be wrong. So in our paper we make the assumption that we need
2000 IQ points to consistently make the right decisions. The subtle point that arises from this discussion is that: we
need 2000 IQ points to be right all the time, but the problem is that the best of us has somewhere around 200 IQ
points. Nassim Taleb and Daniel Kahneman discuss Trial and Error / IQ Points, among other things, at the New
York Public Library on Feb 5, 2013.
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intelligence of the world that we confront around us is many times more. Hence many human
actions might seem that they are motivated by stupidity, envy and flashes of brilliance; though the
common element we can trace in all these efforts is that they can be viewed as the pursuit of
happiness, well-being and a perpetual desire to have more or to breach any boundaries that we
encounter. There is no everlasting success. This does not make one short sighted. We do need to
have long-term goals. But a goal once reached becomes another milestone and it must point us in
the direction of what to do next. This explains our longing to have large bonuses, promotions and
the next level of advancement.
If we did not have this eternal craving for more and if we had started living within our means,
we would still be living in caves—which may or may not be a bad thing. The question of what is
absolutely imperative to lead a good life is a constantly changing one, as luxuries end up becoming
necessities. To determine what is intrinsic to well-being, requires acknowledging its subjectivity.
While well-being has dependencies on the external environment, the most crucial elements for
contentment are internal. Poverty is a state of mind and happiness must come from our hearts. If
people start offering more than what is asked, there will be no need for businesses and profit
maximization. A small price to pay for perhaps peace on Earth. The parallels between profit
maximization and piracy are worth pondering about. If everyone pursues profit maximization, we
will only end up as a society of rich pirates. It seems that all the tools of modern business such as
economics, finance, marketing, law, accounting, management, organization behavior and such other
disciplines are sciences created to give legitimacy to profit maximization or a less crude form of
piracy.
D. What would be your verdict regarding the following vital and broader questions which
necessitates that we ponder them more carefully?
We need to remember this before passing our judgment: there are no good or bad people, just
seemingly tough situations and mediocre role models. Most would agree that there is no bad child;
but if the good child might later come up with questionable conduct, there must have been bad
examples that the good child might have been exposed to. There is strong evidence suggesting that
high profile business persons serving as ethical role models can make a difference in developing
the proper behavior within an organization, while the reverse also holds true when unethical
charismatic leaders take charge.
i.

Was SG trying to pick a scapegoat?

Scandals and secrets are like mice, where there is one there are usually many more. But a
scapegoat, or the fall guy, is generally a solitary creature. Once someone has been picked to take
the blame, the focus shifts on putting the matter to the grave and moving further away from it.
Selecting a whipping boy, which has always been a clever ruse given our affinity to history and
how less of it we generally incorporate into our lives, will take care of the rest and the topic gets
forgotten. Kerviel was the undisputed King of Liars Poker since his deception went unnoticed.69
69

A game often associated with Wall Street traders who use statistical reasoning and behavioral psychology tactics
to gamble. Liar’s Poker is fairly similar to the card game "cheat." Players hold random dollar bills with close
attention to their own bill serial number and without letting any other players see it. Each player has to guess how
often a particular digit appears among all the bills held by all the players. Each guess or bid must be higher in
quantity, or equal in quantity but higher in value, than the previous bid. The round ends when all the other players
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Despite many speculations regarding whether he was a sole operator and who else on the desk
might have been aiding him, he was the only one convicted. Whenever someone stands accused of
any criminal charges, a well-known way to reduce your sentence is to provide information about
others who might be violating any regulations. The norm in rogue trading scandals seem to that
very few others are shown to be deeply involved in the wrong doings. Clearly, in this case, Kerviel
was the master mind behind what happened.
ii.

Is this a question of too big to be good or excellent? Are small partnerships better than large
public companies?

When the question of size comes up, we need to acknowledge that: what one person can do,
two or more people can do better if the social issues in this situation are handled appropriately. This
implies that bigger companies are better and brings to light many the social issues inherent in large
firms. Tremendous amount of resources are expended in balancing the power and politics within
large organization. Where there are people there will be politics.
The recent financial crisis raised the related question of too big to fail. It has been much
talked about that the financial crisis was a credit problem. People need to get credit for what they
do, but they should only get as much credit as they deserve. Because, if too many people that do
not deserve credit get too much credit, people that really deserve credit will not get any and we will
have a crisis on our hands. So, this financial crisis, is no longer just a credit problem. It is about
what is fair and it becomes an ethical issue. So, unless we tackle this real credit problem, there will
always be issues when someone will get too much monetary or other forms of credit. We can extend
this ethical and fairness credit issue and try and explain almost every crisis we have on planet Earth.
As financial firms have moved from being partnerships, where the net worth of the partners
was directly tied to the risks the firms could take, to public companies, where much of the capital
comes from shareholders, there have been lapses in oversight. When playing with other people’s
capital, especially when you benefit from the profits and you are not penalized by the losses, there
is every incentive to take riskier bets. Hence, it is especially important that when the business risks
can be extremely high such as in the trading of financial instruments, it is wiser to curtail the extent
of investments and also hold people accountable for the losses.
E. Do the managers at SG and other large public financial services firms no longer have their
skin in the game?
The previous Point makes it explicit that there has been a trend towards decreasing
ownership and lack of accountability. But here we clarify many difference between management
and leadership. Management is about making sure things are done. Leadership is about making
sure the right things are done. Let us say there will be a team lunch meeting. The manager is the one
challenge a bid. The objective of the game is to bluff the opponents into believing that your bid does not exceed the
combined sum of all of the serial numbers. For example, if the first player bids three 6s, he is predicting there are at
least three 6s among all the players including himself (that is, he predicts that within all of the dollar serial numbers
held by all players, there are at least three 6s). The next player can bid a higher number (or digit) at that level (or
frequency) (three 7s), any number at a higher level (four 5s), or challenge the previous player’s bid (this means the
previous player’s bluff is called). The game continues clockwise around the table until a particular bid is challenged
by every other player. If the challenge is correct, and the total number of the digit on all the bills is lower than the
bid, the bidder loses. If the challenge is incorrect, the bidder wins. Will Kenton, Lier's Poker, INVESTOPEDIA
(Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liars-poker.asp.
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to call for the meeting, ensure that people show up and the relevant discussions happen. There is no
real need for a leader here. The true leader in this scenario would arise only when there is no food
on the lunch menu.
Let us illustrate further with the titles we have in the corporate world. We might report to
Executive Directors (ED) or Managing Directors (MD), but we need to remember that who we
ultimately report to is the Greatest Of Directors (GOD), our conscience. There is a method to (or a
message in) this madness where we have people titled Managing Directors and Vice Presidents, but
no Leading Directors and Wise Presidents. This is because leadership and wisdom can come from
anyone.
It is widely expected that the corporate executive will be a philosopher king, a concept
dating back to Plato, someone wise enough to know what is right, with the authority to enforce it
and the self-control to not abuse his power. But, philosophers do not want to be kings and the ones
that end up as kings are, let us just say, not philosophers. Smart men fulfill needs and wise men
eliminate needs. Smart men solve problems and wise men eliminate problems or ensure that
problems do not arise in the first place. Until philosophers kings rule, the best we can do is ensure
that the power vested in anyone is not enormous.
F. Is right or wrong easier to determine than legal or illegal?
Right or wrong has been around for much longer than legal or illegal. It is generally true that
our sense of ethics will change with cultures and with time; but the variation in right or wrong will be
less so than the differences in legal intricacies. Also, the basic intuition to differentiate right from
wrong is more abundant in most of us than the ability to call something legitimate or not. There
are principles and then there are rules that dictate many aspects of our lives. The rules or the legality
of situations are driven by the principles. The rules are tweaked to ensure that they adhere to certain
principles. Hence, the rules can change more easily and generally do change more often than the
principles. Living by the rules when the principles are forgotten is a pointless and pathetic
existence, which can be the cause of many a caucus; whereas it might be more tolerable if rules
are overlooked, when necessary, to uphold principles. Many enthusiastic students arrive at law
school enamored about the law’s capacity to further social justice. However, soon they are
disillusioned once they start perceiving that lawyers wield law without regard for its impact on
society.
This implies that lawyers are extremely intelligent people with perhaps a misguided or
foolish sense of purpose, which at times makes them more dangerous to society when compared to
foolish people with or without a sense of purpose. The discussion in Point (1c) suggests that
everyone is an idiot, though here we make are making a relative comparison. This is simply because
lawyers are more empowered with their education, their license to practice, their representation of
the law and their intelligence. Lawyers are accused of living in their world of fancy frameworks
and legal precedents. But then again, if you are not living in your own world, you are living in
somebody else’s world.
Ethics can be understood as doing the right thing so that it increases human well-being, which
may be at odds to many conventional rules or guidelines. Ethical issues arise and are exacerbated
when erroneous decisions are justified by subsequent atrocious actions. This can be understood as
consciously performing wrongful deeds to defend the earlier blunder. This is mostly because the
focus shifts to proving someone correct or wrong rather than on deciding what is correct or wrong.
That is the emphasis rests on showing who is right rather than on discerning what is right. The
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solution to such issues is greater disclosure of information and repeated interactions among the
participants. It is prudent to aim for complete transparency unless it is established that such a state
can be harmful. Hence, we need to design social systems that minimize complexity and establish
an ambience where repeated games can be played with public transparency, so that guileful
practices are curtailed.
Art, science and love can transcend the boundaries of region, religion, race and language,
but, so can hatred, violence and weapons. If we are to make the right choices, perhaps it is education
which will lead to faster evolution and better ethics as discussed in Section 4.2. As we go about
creating knowledge by trying to understand the world better and disseminating this knowledge,
which we can term education, we might just end up understanding one another better, perhaps,
becoming more tolerant in the process, an unintended yet very welcome consequence. This must
make us wonder whether the true purpose of all knowledge, creation and education might be to
make us more tolerant. We need everyone to be educated so they can make their choices
independently or we can just educate a few people who can tell others what to do or decide for them.
This suggests that universal education is one way to ensure that we do not put too much power in
someone’s hands.
G. What do we need more of: Mathematically Sophisticated Models or Merely Superior Morals?
Thankfully the models used in the financial industry are not as sophisticated as the models
that come to the minds of most people when they hear the word model. Perhaps, the financial
models are not even the models that most people wish to work with. Despite the relative simplicity
of the models used in finance and admitting the fact that there is long way to go before models can
determine morals, we need to question the over-dependence on very complex mathematical models
for decision making in financial services.
As models get more complex the assumptions behind the models stand upon shakier
ground. Assumption is the mother of all “duck-ups.” Here we define a duck-up as a beautiful
mistake that teaches us how to make something better. Models are filled with assumptions and
morals are hindered by suspicions. Another fundamental objection to greater morals might stem
from the very intrinsic selfish behavior of organisms to ensure survival of oneself. The one way
around these obstacles is trial and error and trust, which happens with evolution and education.
Our present attempts at moral education will run into a wall unless we can address the issue
of trust. There will always be distrust when we see ourselves as separate and distinct from the others
around us. Education, which is empowerment, must start by imparting everyone a cosmic identity.
What this means is that each person must view himself as an extension of the universe around him.
As an example, if every human being were to view trees as an extension of their lungs or their
breathing apparatus, no one would have to be drilled on the finer points of protecting trees. To
illustrate this further, on the flip side, if someone is getting trained to become a nuclear scientist and
associates themselves with a nation, a terrorist organization or with any limited group of people,
they would have fewer qualms regarding the use of their training to possibly obliterate the group
they deem themselves not to belong to.
Hence, if we associate ourselves with our nation or our religion or our business or our
university, we will make decisions to benefit the restricted identity we have chosen and our ethics
will be aligned towards that parochial goal. This means that we might be willing to compromise
on our ideals to benefit what we consider to be who we are or what is closer to us and even possibly
act to the detriment of or sacrifice what we deem to be further away from us. The way around this
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is a belief that we are deeply connected to everything around us, which will obliterate the artificial
boundaries we have erected all around us. Our ever-present longing to have more taken to the
extreme or asymptotically, can become a belief that everything in the universe is a part of us, or
that we are a part of everything. Such an attitude can be inculcated by first transferring to everyone
a limitless identity and then beginning the rest of their schooling or any form of formal or informal
training that molds the person and develops their abilities. When this happens, we will trust others
just as much or just as little as we would trust ourselves. Also, our well-being or the well-being of
all of existence will be identical from our perspective, which is the key to superior morals. A
research agenda with an objective of finding efficient techniques that can transcend bounded
identities will prove to be highly fruitful.
As we wait for the perfect solution it is worth meditating upon what superior beings would
do when faced with an intriguing situation such as the one we are in. Surely, it is sheer arrogance,
possibly bordering stupidity, to think that we can change the world that has existed for a very long
time in our blink of a lifetime. But we offer the following hope and solace. While it is a hard ask to
change the world we are in, it might not be that cumbersome to create a new one. It is said that the
universe is but the Brahma’s (creator’s) dream.
Research can help us understand this world and maybe decipher the key to unencumbered
ethics. Sleep can help us create our own world, where we can lay down the ethical framework we
deem perfect. We just need to be mindful that the rosiest and well intentioned dreams can have
unintended consequences and turn to nightmares. When dreams become nightmares, perhaps due
to bad ethics, it is time for a new universe. Suffice it to say, we might just as well conclude that the
rogue must have been created long before he became a trader.

VII.

SOME SLEEPING AIDS (REFERENCES)

1.
Acevedo, A. (2013). But, is it ethics? Common misconceptions in business ethics
education. Journal of Education for Business, 88(2), 63-69.
2.
Acharya, V. V., & Richardson, M. P. (Eds.). (2009). Restoring financial stability: how to
repair a failed system (Vol. 542). John Wiley & Sons.
3.
Ahuvia, A. (2008). If money doesn’t make us happy, why do we act as if it does?. Journal of
Economic Psychology, 29(4), 491-507.
4.
Allport, G. W. (1947). Scientific models and human morals. Psychological Review, 54(4),
182.
5.
Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1988). Liquidity and Asset Prices: Financial Management
Implications. Financial Management, 17(1), 5-15.
6.
Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1991). Liquidity, maturity, and the yields on US Treasury
securities. The Journal of Finance, 46(4), 1411-1425.
7.
Arel, B., Brody, R. G., & Pany, K. (2005). Audit firm rotation and audit quality. The CPA
Journal, 75(1), 36.
8.
Bagley, C. E. (2008). Winning legally: The value of legal astuteness. Academy of
Management Review, 33(2), 378-390.
9.
Barnett, L. D. (1907). The Brahma Knowledge. An Outline of the Philosophy of the
Vedanta as Set Forth by the Upanishads and by Sankara. Wisdom of the East series. E.P. Dutton
Publishing, Boston, Massachusetts.

116

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:4: Feb. 2021

10. Becker, L., Cameron, M., Carver, L., Cesa, M., Davidson, C., Madigan, P., ... & Watt, M.
(2013). Bank risk manager of the year Goldman Sachs. Risk, 26(1), 66.
11. Benhamou, E. (2005). Barings Bank, Risk Management Disaster. Barings Bank, Risk
Management Disaster by Eric Benhamou
12. Berman, M. (2010). Street-smart advertising: How to win the battle of the buzz. Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers.
13. Blinder, A. S. (2010). Quantitative easing: entrance and exit strategies. Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis Review, 92(6), 465-479.
14. Bloomfield, D., & Shackman, J. (2008). Non-audit service fees, auditor characteristics and
earnings restatements. Managerial Auditing Journal, 23(2), 125-141.
15. Blum, J., & Hellwig, M. (1995). The macroeconomic implications of capital adequacy
requirements for banks. European Economic Review, 39(3-4), 739-749.
16. Blum, J. (1999). Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking? Journal of
Banking & Finance, 23(5), 755-771.
17. Blyth, M., & Lonergan, E. (2014). Print less but transfer more: Why central banks should
give money directly to the people. Foreign Aff., 93, 98.
18. Boling, T. E. (1978). The management ethics “crisis”: An organizational perspective.
Academy of Management Review, 3(2), 360-365.
19. Boot, A. W., & Ratnovski, L. (2016). Banking and trading. Review of Finance, 20(6),
2219-2246.
20. Bose, M. (Ed.). (2004). The Ramayana Revisited. Oxford University Press.
21. Box, G. E. (1979). All models are wrong, but some are useful. Robustness in Statistics,
202, 549.
22. Braun, B. (2016). Speaking to the people? Money, trust, and central bank legitimacy in the
age of quantitative easing. Review of International Political Economy, 23(6), 1064-1092.
23. Brekke, K. A., Kverndokk, S., & Nyborg, K. (2003). An economic model of moral
motivation. Journal of public economics, 87(9-10), 1967-1983.
24. Briers, B., Pandelaere, M., Dewitte, S., & Warlop, L. (2006). Hungry for money: The desire
for caloric resources increases the desire for financial resources and vice versa. Psychological
science, 17(11), 939-943.
25. Brochet, F. (2010). Societe Generale (A): The Jerome Kerviel Affair. HBS Case, (110029).
26. Brown, S. J., & Steenbeek, O. W. (2001). Doubling: Nick Leeson’s trading strategy.
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 9(2), 83-99.
27. Buck, W. (1981). Ramayana. Univ of California Press. Chicago
28. Buck, W. (2019). Mahabharata. University of California Press.
29. Burdett, K., & O’hara, M. (1987). Building blocks: An introduction to block trading.
Journal of Banking & Finance, 11(2), 193-212.
30. Burke, S. (2004). Currency Exchange Trading and Rogue Trader John Rusnak. Concept,
27.
31. Burnes, B., & By, R. T. (2012). Leadership and change: The case for greater ethical clarity.
Journal of business ethics, 108(2), 239-252.

117

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:4: Feb. 2021

32. Buti, S., Rindi, B., & Werner, I. M. (2017). Dark pool trading strategies, market quality
and welfare. Journal of Financial Economics, 124(2), 244-265.
33. Butler, R. J. (2009). The role of spreadsheets in the Allied Irish Bank/Allfirst currency
trading fraud. arXiv preprint arXiv:0910.2048.
34. Canac, P., & Dykman, C. (2011). The tale of two banks: Société Générale and Barings.
Journal of the International Academy for Case Studies, 17(7), 11.
35. Carlson, D. S., & Perrewe, P. L. (1995). Institutionalization of organizational ethics
through transfor- mational leadership. Journal of business ethics, 14(10), 829-838.
36. Cavanagh, G. F., Moberg, D. J., & Velasquez, M. (1981). The ethics of organizational
politics. Academy of Management Review, 6(3), 363-374.
37. Chen, K. M., Chen, M. H., Chao, H. C., Hung, H. M., Lin, H. S., & Li, C. H. (2009). Sleep
quality, depression state, and health status of older adults after silver yoga exercises70: cluster
randomized trial. International journal of nursing studies, 46(2), 154-163.
38. Cheng, Y., Liu, M. H., & Qian, J. (2006). Buy-side analysts, sell-side analysts, and
investment decisions of money managers. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 41(1),
51-83.
39. Chhabra, G. S., & Bajwa, D. S. (2015). Review of E-mail System, Security Protocols and
Email Forensics. International Journal of Computer Science & Communication Networks, 5(3),
201-211.
40. Church, G. M., Gao, Y., & Kosuri, S. (2012). Next-generation digital information storage
in DNA. Science, 337(6102), 1628-1628.
41. Cichello, M. S., Fee, C. E., Hadlock, C. J., & Sonti, R. (2009). Promotions, turnover, and
performance evaluation: Evidence from the careers of division managers. The Accounting
Review, 84(4), 1119-1143.
42. Clark, M. (1993). History of Australia. Melbourne University Publish.
43. Cohen, L., Warneke, C., Fouladi, R. T., Rodriguez, M., & Chaoul-Reich, A. (2004).
Psychological adjustment and sleep quality in a randomized trial of the effects of a Tibetan yoga
intervention in patients with lymphoma. Cancer, 100(10), 2253-2260.
44. Cooter, R. (1998). Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control and SelfImprovement for the Bad Man of Holmes. BUL Rev., 78, 903.
45. Crane, A. (2013). Modern slavery as a management practice: Exploring the conditions and
capabilities for human exploitation. Academy of Management Review, 38(1), 49-69.
46. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1993). Why we need things. History from things: Essays on
material culture, 20-29.
47. Cuillerier, I., & Fleitas, K. (2008). Amaranth Advisors and the FERC’s regulatory
authority. Journal of Derivatives & Hedge Funds, 14(2), 70-77.
48. Darwin, C. (1859). On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (PT. 1); Or, the

70

Yoga is a group of physical, mental, and spiritual practices which originated in ancient India. The Sanskrit noun
yoga is derived from the root yuj "to attach, join, harness, yoke". The word yoga is cognate with English "yoke". The
ultimate goal of Yoga is the raising and expansion of consciousness from oneself to being coextensive with everyone
and everything. See Marlynn Wei, MD, JD, Yoga for better sleep, HARVARD HEALTH BLOG (Dec. 4, 2015, 9:00 AM),
https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/8753-201512048753.

118

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:4: Feb. 2021

Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life. General Books LLC.
49. Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford university press. 31.
50. De Goede, M. (2001). Discourses of scientific finance and the failure of long-term capital
management. New Political Economy, 6(2), 149-170.
51. Degryse, H., De Jong, F., & Kervel, V. V. (2015). The impact of dark trading and visible
fragmentation on market quality. Review of Finance, 19(4), 1587-1622.
52. Dellaportas, S., Cooper, B. J., & Braica, P. (2007). Leadership, culture and employee
deceit: The case of the National Australia Bank. Corporate governance: an international review,
15(6), 1442-1452.
53. Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Huizinga, H. (2013). Are banks too big to fail or too big to save?
International evidence from equity prices and CDS spreads. Journal of Banking & Finance,
37(3), 875-894.
54. De Mesquita, E. B. (2005). The terrorist endgame: A model with moral hazard and
learning. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(2), 237-258.
55. De Vries, M. F. K. (1991). Whatever happened to the philosopher-king? The leader’s
addiction to Power. Journal of Management Studies, 28(4), 339-351.
56. Domowitz, I., Finkelshteyn, I., & Yegerman, H. (2008). Cul de sacs and highways: an
optical tour of dark pool trading performance. The Journal of Trading, 4(1), 16-22.
57. Donaldson, G. (2013). James Hunt: The Biography. Random House. Chicago
58. Drummond, H. (2003). Did Nick Leeson have an accomplice? The role of information
technology in the collapse of Barings Bank. Journal of Information Technology, 18(2), 93-101.
59. Drumond, I. (2009). Bank capital requirements, business cycle fluctuations and the Basel
accords: A synthesis. Journal of Economic Surveys, 23(5), 798-830.
60. Dubins, L. E., & Savage, L. J. (1965). Inequalities for stochastic processes: How to gamble
if you must. Dover Publications.
61. Dutt, R. C. (2012). The Ramayana and the Mahabharata.
62. Edward, F. R. (1999). Hedge funds and the collapse of long-term capital management.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13(2), 189-210.
63. Edwards, G. (2017). Rogue One: A Star Wars Story.
64. Egan, M. E., & Kaeter, M. (1994). Ethics 1994: The Year in Review. Business Ethics: The
Magazine of Corporate Responsibility, 8(6), 24-27.
65. Epstein, J. (2008). Security lessons learned from Société Générale. IEEE Security &
Privacy, 6(3), 80-82.
66. Eriksson, J. (2006). Explicit pricing formulas for turbo warrants. RISK magazine.
67. Fehr, R., Yam, K. C., & Dang, C. (2015). Moralized leadership: The construction and
consequences of ethical leader perceptions. Academy of Management Review, 40(2), 182-209.
68. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. (2011). The financial crisis inquiry report: The final
report of the National Commission on the causes of the financial and economic crisis in the
United States including dissenting views. Cosimo, Inc..
69. Fohlin, C. (2014). A brief history of investment banking from medieval times to the
present. In The Oxford Handbook of Banking and Financial History.
70. Ford, G., & Sundmacher, M. (2004). Leading indicators for operational risk: case studies

119

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:4: Feb. 2021

in financial services. In Proceedings of the First Annual Conference of the Applied Business and
Entrepreneurship Association International, held in Maui, Hawaii, 16-20 November, 2009.
71. Freedman, R. D., & Burke, J. R. (1998). Kidder, Peabody and Co. New York University,
Stern School of Business.
72. Fritzsche, D. J., & Becker, H. (1984). Linking management behavior to ethical
philosophy—An empir- ical investigation. Academy of Management journal, 27(1), 166-175.
73. Furet, F. (1981). Interpreting the French revolution. Cambridge University Press.
74. Ghatage, S. (2010). Brahma’s Dream. Anchor Canada, Penguin Random House,
Manhattan, New York.
75. Giacalone, R. A., & Jurkiewicz, C. L. (2003). Right from wrong: The influence of
spirituality on perceptions of unethical business activities. Journal of business Ethics, 46(1), 8597.
76. Giacalone, R. A., & Thompson, K. R. (2006). Business ethics and social responsibility
education: Shifting the worldview. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 5(3), 266277.
77. Gilligan, G. (2011). Jerome Kerviel the "rogue trader” of Societe Generale: Bad luck, bad
apple, bad tree or bad orchard?. Company Lawyer, 32(12), 355-362.
78. Gladwell, M. (2006). The tipping point: How little things can make a big difference. Little,
Brown.
79. Gold, S., Trautrims, A., & Trodd, Z. (2015). Modern slavery challenges to supply chain
management. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 20(5), 485-494.
80. Greener, I. (2006). Nick Leeson and the collapse of Barings Bank: Socio-technical
networks and the ‘Rogue Trader’. Organization, 13(3), 421-441.
81. Guo, H., Jin, B., & Qian, W. (2013, April). Analysis of email header for forensics purpose.
In 2013 International Conference on Communication Systems and Network Technologies (pp.
340-344). IEEE.
82. Haka, S., & Chalos, P. (1990). Evidence of agency conflict among management, auditors,
and the audit committee chair. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 9(4), 271-292.
83. Heid, F. (2007). The cyclical effects of the Basel II capital requirements. Journal of Banking
& Finance, 31(12), 3885-3900.
84. Henderson, B. R. (2003). Asking the lost question: what is the purpose of law school. J.
Legal Educ., 53, 48.
85. Herring, R. J. (2004). The subordinated debt alternative to Basel II. Journal of financial
stability, 1(2), 137-155.
86. Hess, J. (2008). How Arbitrary Really Was the SEC’s" Hedge Fund Rule"? The Future of
Hedge Fund Regulation in Light of Goldstein, Amaranth Advisors, and Beyond. West Virginia
Law Review, 110(2), 13.
87. Hiltebeitel, A. (1976). Ritual of Battle, The: Krishna in the Mahabharata. SUNY Press.
88. Holm, O. (1999). Analyses of longing: Origins, levels, and dimensions. The Journal of
Psychology, 133(6), 621-630.
89. Hornuf, L., & Haas, G. (2014). Regulating fraud in financial markets: can behavioural
designs prevent future criminal offences?. Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions,

120

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:4: Feb. 2021

7(2), 192-201.
90. Howell, J. M., & Avolio, B. J. (1992). The ethics of charismatic leadership: submission or
liberation?. Academy of Management Perspectives, 6(2), 43-54. The impact ethical and unethical
charismatic leaders have on followers and how organizations can develop ethical charismatic
leaders.
91. Hull, J. C. (2003). Options futures and other derivatives. Pearson Education India.
92. Huxley, T. H. (1899). Evolution & Ethics. Princeton University Press.
93. Hollenbeck, G. P. (1994). CEO selection: A street-smart review (No. 164). Center for
Creative Leadership.
94. Hunter, M., & Smith, N. C. (2011). Société Générale: The rogue trader. Fontainebleau,
France: INSEAD.
95. Ismail, S. (2014). Exponential Organizations: Why new organizations are ten times better,
faster, and cheaper than yours (and what to do about it). Diversion Books.
96. Jayan, A., & Dija, S. (2015, December). Detection of spoofed mails. In 2015 IEEE
International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Computing Research (ICCIC) (pp.
1-4). IEEE.
97. Jensen, K. (2007). The desire to learn: an analysis of knowledge-seeking practices among
professionals. Oxford review of education, 33(4), 489-502.
98. Johns, G. (2006). The essential impact of context on organizational behavior. Academy of
management review, 31(2), 386-408.
99. Jones, D. (2000). Emerging problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory capital
arbitrage and related issues. Journal of Banking & Finance, 24(1-2), 35-58.
100. Joyce, M., Miles, D., Scott, A., & Vayanos, D. (2012). Quantitative easing and
unconventional monetary policy–an introduction. The Economic Journal, 122(564), F271-F288.
101. Joyner, B. E., & Payne, D. (2002). Evolution and implementation: A study of values,
business ethics and corporate social responsibility. journal of Business Ethics, 41(4), 297-311.
102. Kane, E. J., & DeTrask, K. (1999). Breakdown of accounting controls at Barings and
Daiwa: Benefits of using opportunity-cost measures for trading activity. Pacific-Basin Finance
Journal, 7(3-4), 203-228.
103. Kashyap, R. (2015). A Tale of Two Consequences. The Journal of Trading, 10(4), 51-95.
104. Kashyap, R. (2015b). Financial Services, Economic Growth and Well-Being: A FourPronged Study. Journal of Finance, 9(1), 9-22.
105. Kashyap, R. (2016). Notes on Uncertainty, Unintended Consequences and Everything
Else. Working Paper.
106. Kashyap, R. (2017). Microstructure under the Microscope: Tools to Survive and Thrive in
The Age of (Too Much) Information. The Journal of Trading, 12(2), 5-27.
107. Kashyap, R. (2018). Seven Survival Senses: Evolutionary Training Makes Discerning
Differences More Natural than Spotting Similarities.
108. Kashyap, R. (2019). Concepts, Components and Collections of Trading Strategies and
Market Color. Journal of Wealth Management.
109. Khalsa, S. B. S. (2004). Treatment of chronic insomnia with yoga: A preliminary study with
sleep–wake diaries. Applied psychophysiology and biofeedback, 29(4), 269-278.

121

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:4: Feb. 2021

110. Koehn, D. (2001). Ethical issues connected with multi-level marketing schemes. Journal
of business ethics, 29(1-2), 153-160.
111. Kozinn, B. E. (2000). The great copper caper: Is market manipulation really a problem in
the wake of the sumitomo debacle. Fordham L. Rev., 69, 243.
112. Krawiec, K. D. (2000). Accounting for greed: Unraveling the rogue trader mystery. Or. L.
Rev., 79, 301.
113. Krawiec, K. D. (2009). The return of the rogue. Ariz. L. Rev., 51, 127.
114. Kumar, V., & Kumar, P. S. (2019). Using a Utopia to Facilitate Conversations about a
Dystopia in the Society. Films as Rhetorical Texts: Cultivating Discussion about Race, Racism,
and Race Relations, 137.
115. Lauda, N. (1986). with Völker, Herbert. To Hell and Back.
116. Lehrer, J. (2010). The Neuroscience of Inception. Wired 26 Jul. 2010. Web. 13 Aug. 2013.
117. Leith, W. (2002). How to lose a billion. The Guardian, 26.
118. Lewis, M. (2010). Liar’s poker. WW Norton & Company.
119. Liaw, K. T. (2011). The business of investment banking: A comprehensive overview. John
Wiley & Sons.
120. Lim, C. Y., Woods, M., Humphrey, C., & Seow, J. L. (2017). The paradoxes of risk
management in the banking sector. The British Accounting Review, 49(1), 75-90.
121. Linstead, S., Maréchal, G., & Griffin, R. W. (2014). Theorizing and researching the dark
side of organization. Organization Studies, 35(2), 165-188.
122. Lissack, M. R., & Richardson, K. A. (2003). Models without morals: toward the ethical use
of business models. Emergence, 5(2), 72-102.
123. Lowenstein, R. (2001). When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital
Management. Random House.
124. Luthar, H. K., & Karri, R. (2005). Exposure to ethics education and the perception of
linkage between organizational ethical behavior and business outcomes. Journal of Business
Ethics, 61(4), 353-368.
125. Mallaby, S. (2010). More money than god: Hedge funds and the making of the new elite.
A&C Black.
126. Manjunath, N. K., & Telles, S. (2005). Influence of Yoga & Ayurveda on self-rated sleep
in a geriatric population. Indian Journal of Medical Research, 121(5), 683. Chicago
127. Maor, E. (2009). " e": The Story of a Number. Princeton University Press.
128. Mayser, S., Scheibe, S., & Riediger, M. (2008). (Un) reachable? An empirical
differentiation of goals and life longings. European Psychologist, 13(2), 126-140.
129. McClymont, G. L. (1970). The perpetual pentagram: evolution, ecology, economics, ethics
and educa- tion. In Proceedings of the Ecological Society of Australia (Vol. 5, pp. 169-182).
130. Medby, J. J., & Glenn, R. W. (2002). Street smart: Intelligence preparation of the battlefield
for urban operations. Rand Corporation.
131. Melé, D. (2008). Integrating ethics into management. Journal of Business Ethics, 78(3),
291-297.
132. Melé, D., Rosanas, J. M., & Fontrodona, J. (2017). Ethics in finance and accounting:
Editorial introduction. Journal of Business Ethics, 140(4), 609-613.

122

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:4: Feb. 2021

133. Mikes, A. (2008). Chief risk officers at crunch time: Compliance champions or business
partners?. Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 2(1), 7-25.
134. Mishkin, F. S. (2006). How big a problem is too big to fail? A review of Gary Stern and Ron
Feldman’s too big to fail: the hazards of bank bailouts. Journal of Economic Literature, 44(4),
988-1004.
135. Mittal, H. (2008). Are You Playing in a Toxic Dark Pool?: A Guide to Preventing
Information Leakage. The Journal of Trading, 3(3), 20-33.
136. Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., & Eslinger, P. J. (2003). Morals and the human brain: a
working model. Neuroreport, 14(3), 299-305.
137. Moosa, I. A. (2010). Basel II as a casualty of the global financial crisis. Journal of Banking
Regulation, 11(2), 95-114.
138. Moosa, I. A. (2016). Good Regulation, Bad Regulation: The Anatomy of Financial
Regulation. Springer.
139. Morrison, A. D., & Wilhelm, W. J. (2007). Investment banking: Institutions, politics, and
law (Vol. 10). Oxford.
140. Moyal, A. (Ed.). (2008). Koala: a historical biography. CSIRO PUBLISHING.
141. Myerson, R. B. (2012). A model of moral-hazard credit cycles. Journal of Political
Economy, 120(5), 847-878.
142. Nagy, K. A., & Martin, R. W. (1985). Field Metabolic Rate, Water Flux, Food
Consumption and Time Budget of Koalas, Phascolarctos Cinereus (Marsupialia: Phascolarctidae)
in Victoria. Australian Journal of Zoology, 33(5), 655-665.
143. Narayan, R. K. (2000). The Indian Epics Retold: The Ramayana, the Mahabharata, Gods,
Demons, and Others. Penguin Books India.
144. Narayan, R. K. (2006). The Ramayana: a shortened modern prose version of the Indian
epic. Penguin.
145. Nasi, I. (1996). The Sumitomo Scandal: Another Embarrassment for UK Regulatory
Authorities?. Journal of Financial Crime, 4(2), 182-184.
146. Natenberg, S. (1994). Option volatility & pricing: advanced trading strategies and
techniques. McGraw Hill Professional.
147. Nolan, C. (2010). Inception [film]. Warner Bros.: Los Angeles, CA, USA.
148. Rafeld, H., Fritz-Morgenthal, S., & Posch, P. N. (2017). Behavioural patterns in rogue
trading: Analysing the cases of Nick Leeson, Jérôme Kerviel and Kweku Adoboli—Part 1.
Journal of Financial Compliance, 1(2), 156-171.
149. Rafeld, H., Fritz-Morgenthal, S., & Posch, P. N. (2017a). Behavioural patterns in rogue
trading: Analysing the cases of Nick Leeson, Jérôme Kerviel and Kweku Adoboli—Part 1.
Journal of Financial Compliance, 1(2), 156-171.
150. Rafeld, H., Fritz-Morgenthal, S. G., & Posch, P. N. (2017b). Behavioural patterns in rogue
trad- ing: Applying control balance theory to the rogue traders Nick Leeson, Jérôme Kerviel and
Kweku Adoboli—Part 2. Journal of Financial Compliance, 1(3), 276-284.
151. Rajagopalachari, C. (1970). Mahabharata. Diamond Pocket Books (P) Ltd..
152. Ramage, S. (2005). Insanity plea: A retrospective examination of the verdict of “not
guilty” on the ground of insanity. EHRLR, (4), 363-372.

123

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:4: Feb. 2021

153. Ramamurthi, B. (1995). The fourth state of consciousness: The Thuriya Avastha.
Psychiatry and clinical neurosciences, 49(2), 107-110.
154. Ravicz, L. (1999). The experience of longing.(desire, yearning) (Doctoral dissertation,
ProQuest Infor- mation & Learning).
155. Rocchi, M., & Thunder, D. (2017). Can a good person be a good trader? An ethical defense
of financial trading. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-15.
156. Ross, S. A., Westerfield, R. W., & Jaffe, J. F. (2002). Corporate Finance.
157. Rowlinson, M., Hassard, J., & Decker, S. (2014). Research strategies for organizational
history: A dialogue between historical theory and organization theory. Academy of Management
Review, 39(3), 250-274.
158. Rudin, W. (2006). Real and complex analysis. Tata McGraw-hill education.
159. Sarachek, B. (1968). Greek concepts of leadership. Academy of management journal,
11(1), 39-48. Chicago
160. Schama, S. (2004). Citizens: A chronicle of the French Revolution. Penguin UK.
161. Scholten, W., & Ellemers, N. (2016). Bad apples or corrupting barrels? Preventing traders’
misconduct. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 24(4), 366-382.
162. Schulte, A. A. (1966). Management services: A challenge to audit independence?. The
Accounting Review, 41(4), 721-728.
163. Schwandt, D. R. (2005). When managers become philosophers: Integrating learning with
sensemaking. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 4(2), 176-192.
164. Segon, M., & Booth, C. (2015). Virtue: The missing ethics element in emotional
intelligence. Journal of Business Ethics, 128(4), 789-802.
165. Seppi, D. J. (1990). Equilibrium block trading and asymmetric information. the Journal of
Finance, 45(1), 73-94.
166. Shanti, N., & Mittal, P. K. (2005). Differential Calculus. S. Chand Publishing.
167. Shell, G. R. (1991). When is it Legal to Lie in Negotiations?. MIT Sloan Management
Review, 32(3), 93.
168. Sims, R. R., & Brinkman, J. (2002). Leaders as moral role models: The case of John
Gutfreund at Salomon Brothers. Journal of business ethics, 35(4), 327-339.
169. Singer, P. (2011). The expanding circle: Ethics, evolution, and moral progress. Princeton
University Press.
170. Simon, C. P., & Blume, L. (1994). Mathematics for economists (Vol. 7). New York:
Norton.
171. Smith, M. (1979). Behaviour of the Koala, Phascolarctos Cinereus Goldfuss, in Captivity. 1.
Non-Social Behaviour. Wildlife Research, 6(2), 117-129.
172. Sorkin, A. R. (2010). Too big to fail: The inside story of how Wall Street and Washington
fought to save the financial system–and themselves. Penguin.
173. Sprague, R. K. (1976). Plato’s philosopher-king: a study of the theoretical background (p.
29). Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
174. Stern, G. H., & Feldman, R. J. (2004). Too big to fail: The hazards of bank bailouts.
Brookings Institution Press.
175. Stonham, P. (1996a). Whatever happened at barings? Part one: The lure of derivatives and

124

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:4: Feb. 2021

collapse. European Management Journal, 14(2), 167-175.
176. Stonham, P. (1996b). Whatever happened at Barings? Part Two: Unauthorised trading and
the failure of controls. European Management Journal, 14(3), 269-278.
177. Takala, T. (1998). Plato on leadership. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(7), 785-798.
178. Taleb, N. N., & Tapiero, C. S. (2010). Risk externalities and too big to fail. Physica A:
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 389(17), 3503-3507.
179. Taleb, N. N. (2020). Skin in the game: Hidden asymmetries in daily life. Random House
Trade Paperbacks.
180. Trevino, L. K., & Brown, M. E. (2004). Managing to be ethical: Debunking five business
ethics myths. Academy of Management Perspectives, 18(2), 69-81.
181. Treviño, L. K., Weaver, G. R., & Reynolds, S. J. (2006). Behavioral ethics in
organizations: A review. Journal of management, 32(6), 951-990.
182. Thoraval, P. Y. (2006). The Basel II framework: the role and implementation of Pillar 2.
Financial Stability Review, 9, 117-132.
183. Upfal, E., & Mitzenmacher, M. (2005). Probability and computing: randomized
algorithms and prob- abilistic analysis (Vol. 160). Cambridge university press.
184. Valentine, S., & Fleischman, G. (2008). Ethics programs, perceived corporate social
responsibility and job satisfaction. Journal of business ethics, 77(2), 159-172.
185. Vasudev, J. (2016). Inner engineering: A yogi’s guide to joy. Spiegel & Grau.
186. Vera, F. M., Manzaneque, J. M., Maldonado, E. F., Carranque, G. A., Rodriguez, F. M.,
Blanca, M. J., & Morell, M. (2009). Subjective sleep quality and hormonal modulation in long-term
yoga practitioners. Biological psychology, 81(3), 164-168.
187. Walker, J. L. (1995). Daiwa’s losses spell a scandal too far. International Financial Law
Review, 14(12), 12.
188. Warren, D. E. (2003). Constructive and destructive deviance tn organizations. Academy of
management Review, 28(4), 622-632.
189. Weaver, G. R., Trevino, L. K., & Cochran, P. L. (1999). Integrated and decoupled
corporate social performance: Management commitments, external pressures, and corporate
ethics practices. Academy of Management Journal, 42(5), 539-552.
190. Webb, J. W., Tihanyi, L., Ireland, R. D., & Sirmon, D. G. (2009). You say illegal, I say
legitimate: Entrepreneurship in the informal economy. Academy of Management Review, 34(3),
492-510.
191. Weiss, J. (2008). Business ethics: A stakeholder and issues management approach.
Cengage Learning.
192. Werhane, P. H. (1998). Moral imagination and the search for ethical decision-making in
management. Business Ethics Quarterly, 75-98.
193. Weston, R. (2003). The Sumitomo Copper Fraud: Were There Signs?. In Allied Academies
Interna- tional Conference. Academy of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues. Proceedings (Vol.
7, No. 1, p. 7). Jordan Whitney Enterprises, Inc.
194. Weston, R. (2005). The NAB foreign currency option losses in the context of a disaster
myopia model. Journal of Financial Services Marketing, 9(3), 259-271.
195. Wexler, M. N. (2010). Financial edgework and the persistence of rogue traders. Business

125

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:4: Feb. 2021

and Society Review, 115(1), 1-25.
196. Wolfe, T. (2005). The right stuff. Random House.
197. Wong, H. Y., & Chan, C. M. (2008). Turbo warrants under stochastic volatility. Quantitative
Finance, 8(7), 739-751.
198. Wong, H. Y., & Lau, K. Y. (2008). Analytical valuation of turbo warrants under double
exponential jump diffusion. The Journal of Derivatives, 15(4), 61-73.
199. Zuckoff, M. (2006). Ponzi’s scheme: the true story of a financial legend. Random House
Trade Paper- backs.

126

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

VIII.

SOME MORE SLEEPING AIDS (APPENDIX OF FIGURES)

Figure 1: List of Rouge Trading Scandals & Financial Market Losses

Vol.2:4: Feb. 2021

127

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Figure 2: Societe Generale Selected Financial Statements from 2003 to 2007
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Figure 3: Societe Generale Selected Financial Statements, Income Comparison of 1999 with 2006
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Figure 5: Business Entities and Matryoshka Dolls
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Figure 6: Societe Generale Global Equities & Derivatives Solutions Organizational Structure

Figure 7: Societe Generale Trading Organizational Structure Around Jerome Kerviel
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Figure 8: Time Value of Money: Discounting and Compounding

Figure 9: Exponential Growth and Decay

Figure 10: Fundamentals of Turbo Warrants
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Figure 11: Arbitrage on Turbo Warrants
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Figure 12: Earnings from Delta one Trading

Figure 13: Delta One Traders Profit Distribution
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Figure 14: Kerviel’s Actual Earnings on Unauthorized Positions

Figure 15: Kerviel’s Reported or Official Earnings
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Figure 16: Kerviel’s Actual versus Reported or Official Earnings

Figure 17: Estimation of Earnings on Kerviel’s Offsetting Index Trades
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Assume that Pied Piper, a small startup technology company headquartered in
Silicon Valley, hires a prominent Chinese engineer from Intel in 2018. This employee will
work at the California office and assist Pied Piper in creating a new Internet that will
revolutionize the technology industry. The company believes that the new engineer’s
expertise in semiconductor manufacturing equipment (“SME”) will allow the team to
finally complete this project. Once completed, Pied Piper plans to take the new Internet to
the market where the product will compete with both U.S. and foreign competitors. This
type of advanced technology is classified as “dual-use”1 by the federal government and
accordingly is subject to export controls and regulations (“Export Controls”). Since the
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2022, Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law.
1
See 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2020) (referring to the catchall designation of technology deemed to have both civil
and military applications under the Export Administration Regulations).
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new employee is a Chinese National, Pied Piper must obtain a deemed export license for
this engineer to work with the emerging technology—regardless of the fact that this
engineer is already located in the United States or if the employee has a legal work visa. 2
Prior to 2018, when the engineer was working at Intel, the licensing requirement was never
an issue because licenses were routinely granted after a one-month period.
In 2018, the Trump Administration began implementing a protectionist foreign
policy. Under this new policy, the approval process for deemed export licenses transitioned
from regularly being granted to a presumption of denial. This protectionist approach aligns
with the federal government’s philosophy to “ensure that U.S and allied country firms
retain a dominant position in the global semiconductor market.” 3 This assumes that
companies, including startups like Pied Piper, have the compliance resources in place to
comply with Export Controls. This policy leaves companies with two options: first, not
hire or fire the foreign employee or alternatively, transfer the employee to a different
position that does not involve regulated technology and therefore will not require a license.
In either situation Piped Pier must replace the engineer, ideally with a U.S. citizen, to work
on the regulated Internet—assuming such a qualified person exists in the job market.4
Technological advancements, amid the Sino-American Trade War, are delayed
because of Export Controls. Companies are reluctant to hire foreign employees subject to
Export Controls, regardless of whether they are the most qualified job candidates.
Generally, employers are prohibited from discriminating against any employee because of
the individual’s nationality or race under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645
and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. 6 Yet, distinctions based on
citizenship are often synonymous with the protected classes of nationality or race. 7
However, these classifications appear to be permissible under exceptions to federal antidiscrimination laws regarding BFOQs, 8 national security requirements, 9 or general

2

See 15 C.F.R. § 734.13(a)(2) (2020) (deeming any transfer of the information regarding the regulated
technology as a direct export to China).
3
NAT’L SEC. COMM’N ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, INTERIM REPORT (Nov. 2019),
https://epic.org/foia/epic-v-ai-commission/AI-Commission-Interim-Report-Nov-2019.pdf.
4
Alison D. Raymore, CIO Jury: 83% of CIOs Struggle to Find Tech Talent, TECHREPUBLIC (June 16, 2017),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/cio-jury-83-of-cios-struggle-to-find-tech-talent/;
Elizabeth
L.
LaRocca & Erin N. Bass, Export Control Hiring Practices Continue to Challenge Employers, STEPTOE (Nov.
1, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ec27f5b2-f6e4-430d-8fed-9f28a9c7b982.
5
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 2020) (prohibiting employers from discriminating employees because of
national origin or race, among other protected classes and specifying that it is unlawful for employers to
practice employment practices that adversely affect or deprive employees of work opportunities based on
national origin or race).
6
8 U.S.C.A. § 1324b(a)(1) (West 2020) (prohibiting employers from discriminating employees because of
their national origin).
7
LaRocca & Bass, supra note 4; see generally 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324.
8
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (West 2020) (stating that employers may lawfully make employment
decisions because of national origin in circumstances when such a classification is a “bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise”).
9
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(g) (West 2020) (allowing employers to lawfully consider an individual’s
national origin in making employment decisions — such as hiring or firing an employee — when the
performance of the job is subject to any national security requirement imposed by the United States and the
individual has not satisfied that requirement).
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compliance with other U.S. laws.10 At this time, it is unclear whether an exception to the
anti-discrimination statutes would apply to a license requirement based purely on economic
policy—rather than national security concerns. However, more importantly, it remains
unknown whether the current deemed export requirement is constitutional under an Equal
Protection Analysis.
Despite potential constitutional issues with Export Controls, companies seeking to
operate in the advanced technology industries included in the dual-use classification must
consider alternative measures to address this complex and important area of law. The
United States is recognized as a leader in technological innovations, 11 yet companies
operating within the U.S. are constantly restrained by Export Control requirements. 12
These requirements delay corporate transactions by requiring that companies must perform
due diligence about the conduct, nationality, and items’ end use internally and with their
customers’. The constant broadening of Export Controls is likely to result in companies
leaving the United States or prioritizing the development of technology that is not subject
to heightened regulation. Additionally, this protectionist policy serves as a further incentive
for regulated countries, such as China, to strive for technological self-sufficiency.13 Both
results are contrary to the federal government’s initiative that U.S. companies retain a
dominant global position in SME and other emerging industries.
One possible solution is blockchain technology. The research and funding of
blockchain technology have exponentially increased since Bitcoin first brought the
technology to the international stage.14 Potential applications of blockchain have emerged
in various sectors from finance, energy, government, real estate, health care, and even
international trade.15 The application of blockchain and distributed ledger technology has
the capability to revolutionize industries by providing more efficient methods and rapid
transactions and record keeping.16
10

See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324b(a)(2) (West 2020) (stating that employers can consider citizenship status where a
citizenship requirement is necessary to comply with any Federal, State, or local law, or when the citizenship
status is determined by the Attorney General as essential for an employer to do business with any U.S.
government).
11
Walter Isaccson, How America Risks Losing Its Innovation Edge, TIME (Jan. 3, 2019),
https://time.com/longform/america-innovation/; America Will Dominate the Industries of the Future, THE
WHITE HOUSE: INFRASTRUCTURE AND TECH. (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/america-will-dominate-industries-future/.
12
LaRocca & Bass, supra note 4; Jenny Leonard & David McLaughlin, U.S. Presses Ahead on Plan to Limit
High-Tech Exports, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-11/us-plan-to-limit-high-tech-exports-forges-on-amid-trade-truce.
13
Open standards, not sanctions, are America’s best weapon against Huawei, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 11,
2020 at 10, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/04/08/open-standards-not-sanctions-are-americasbest-weapon-against-huawei.
14
Jesse Yli-Huumo et al., Where Is Current Research on Blockchain Technology?—A Systematic Review,
PLOS ONE, Oct. 3, 2016, at 9–10; Dave Berson & Susan Berson, Blockchain Law 101: Understanding
Blockchain Technology and the Applicable Laws, 88 J. KAN. B. ASSN. 40, 40 (2019).
15
Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond Block Chain, U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., 64–71 (2016),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/g
s-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf; Katharine Gammon, Experimenting with Blockchain: Can One
Technology Boost Both Data Integrity and Patients’ Pocketbooks?, 24 NATURE MED. 378, 381 (2018); Mike
Orcutt, How Blockchain Could Give Us a Smarter Energy Grid, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609077/how-blockchain-could-give-us-a-smarter-energy-grid/.
16
Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV. 118 (Jan.–Feb. 2017).
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This Note analyzes the constitutionality of the deemed export requirement and
proposes blockchain technology as a solution for businesses to comply with Export
Controls. Part II explains the licensing requirements of Export Controls and the impacts
the current policy has on business and employees. Part III considers the constitutionality
of Export Controls under an Equal Protection Analysis in light of the national security and
foreign policy considerations. This Note takes the position that export control regulations
are constitutional when tailored around the protection of information related to national
security—rather than economic policy based on the national origin of the employee. Part
IV, irrespective of the constitutional analysis, proposes that the application of blockchain
technology has a potential solution for businesses to comply with export laws. This section
begins with an overview of blockchain and how this technology applies to Export Controls.
It then evaluates the benefits and challenges associated with integrating blockchain
technology to data security systems. Lastly, Part IV explains how the blockchain addresses
national security concerns and why companies using this technology will obtain more
deemed export licenses.
II.

BACKGROUND: U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS

The two relevant regulations are the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (the
“ITAR”) and the Export Administration Regulations (the “EAR”). The ITAR and EAR
are created by different congressional acts, enforced by different government agencies, and
tasked with regulating different exports. Both laws seek to promote the general policy of
protecting United States defense technology from going to foreign adversaries.17 However,
these regulations are also based on economic considerations. 18 Export Regulations are
mainly executed through licensing requirements. 19 One way to trigger the license
requirement is by exporting regulated technology, software, and equipment to a foreign
person. 20 This transfer requires a license because Export Controls deem this a transfer to
the foreign person’s country of citizenship.21 A license is also required when technology is
reexported or transferred outside of the United States and then is released to a foreign
person. While these definitions appear simple enough, compliance with Export Controls is
notoriously complex.
Export Controls substantially burden corporate supply chains. For example, if Pied
Piper released their regulated source code to the Chinese National engineer, this transfer is
considered an export and a license would be required to make the release. If Pied Piper
were to transfer their source code to a supplier in Europe and the supplier had Chinese
Nationals working on the project, this is considered a reexport and a license is required to
make this release. In other words, companies subject to Export Controls must obtain the
required authorizations internally, with customers, with vendors, and even to visitors or
affiliates of employees. As a result, companies have expanded their workforce and

17

See 22 C.F.R. § 120.3; 15 C.F.R. § 730.6.
See NAT’L SEC. COMM’N ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 3, at 4–6.
19
See 22 C.F.R. § 120.20; 15 C.F.R. § 730.7
20
22 C.F.R. § 120.17; 15 C.F.R. § 734.13.
21
22 C.F.R. § 120.17; 15 C.F.R. § 734.13.
18
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operations dedicated to ensure that the business remains compliant with Export Controls.22
Failure to comply with any license requirement can result in significant civil and criminal
penalties—including imprisonment—to all individuals involved in the export. 23
Depending on the severity of the violations, companies that violate Export Controls may
also lose exporting privileges, effectively ending business operations.24
A. International Traffic in Arms Regulations
The ITAR regulates the export of a broad range of technology that is deemed a
defense article or service. Pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (the “AECA”), the
President has authority to “control the export and import of defense articles and defense
services.”25 The ITAR is primarily administered through the Directorate of Defense Trade
Controls (the “DDTC”), because the AECA delegates this authority to the Secretary of
State. 26 The Department of State, in concurrence with the Department of Defense,
determines what items are designated as defense articles or services.27 Defense articles
and services include technology defined under the U.S. Munitions List (“USML”)28 and
technology deemed to provide “a critical military or intelligence advantage” to warrant
regulation.29 ITAR does not consider the intended use of the export—such as military or
civilian purposes—in determining whether the item is subject to regulations.30
Corporate supply chains can trigger the license requirement under the ITAR when
exporting to citizens of foreign nations, based on the citizenship of the person receiving
the exports. Under the ITAR, a license from DDTC is required to export31 or reexport32
any technical data or defense article to a foreign person or foreign end-use.33 “Technical
data” includes information required for the “design, development, production,
manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification” of a
defense item or software directly associated with defense articles.34 The ITAR defines a

22

Andrea Stricker & David Albright, U.S. Export Control Reform: Impacts and Implications for Controlling
the Export of Proliferation-Sensitive Goods and Technologies, INST. FOR SCI. AND INT’L. SEC. (May 17,
2017),
https://isis-online.org/uploads/isisreports/documents/Export_Control_Reform_Initiative_Review_and_Recommendations_May_2017_Final.p
df.
23
22 C.F.R. § 120.27; 15 C.F.R. § 764.3.
24
22 C.F.R. § 120.27; 15 C.F.R. § 764.3.
25
22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a).
26
Id. at (b)(2).
27
22 C.F.R. § 120.2.
28
Cecil
Hunt,
Understanding
the
Rules
of
Trade,
TRADEPORT,
(Dec.
2006),
https://tradeport.org/index.php/trade-toutorials-130?id=67. See also 22 C.F.R. § 120.3(a) (describing “items
specifically designed or modified for military use, but designations and determinations have extended ITAR
jurisdiction to some items with non-military use as well” such as semiconductor memory and logic chips.).
29
22 C.F.R. § 120.3(b).
30
22 C.F.R. § 120.3.
31
22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(2). Export, among other things, includes “releasing or otherwise transferring
technical data to a foreign person” in the U.S. (a “deemed export”).
32
22 C.F.R. § 120.19(a)(2). Reexport includes the “release of technical data to a foreign person” that is a
citizen of a country different from the foreign country that the release takes place (a “deemed reexport”). Id.
33
22 C.F.R. § 127.1(a).
34
22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a).
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“foreign person” as any natural person that is not a citizen or lawful permanent resident of
the United States.35
To address the strict ITAR regulations, companies like Boeing implement rigorous
security measures. Companies hire armed guards to monitor the perimeter of research and
manufacturing facilities. 36 The employees work on limited scope projects rather than
building the entire product.37 At Boeing, for example, employees are hired to work on a
particular wing for a plane. Additionally, the company’s information only allows for single
person computer access. The heightened regulation hinders foreign nationals’ employment
opportunities, and the pool of qualified candidates and companies would prefer to simply
hire U.S. persons to avoid all the extra security measures. The employment issue expands
beyond commercial operations as academic institutions working on regulated technology
are also subject to these regulations.38
B. Export Administration Regulations
The EAR regulates a broad spectrum of items including commercial, “dual use”
and certain military goods, equipment, materials software and technology.39 The EAR is
promulgated pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act (the “ECRA”) as of August 2018,
formerly the Export Administration Act (“EAA”) and International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (“IEEPA”) during the EAA lapse.40 The Department of Commerce administers
the EAR through the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”).41 Items subject to the EAR
include all U.S. origin items regardless of location, including foreign-made products that
incorporate U.S. origin commodities and foreign-made products directly based on U.S.
origin technology or software.42 The EAR also applies to items produced outside of the
U.S. that incorporate more than de minimis controlled U.S. content.43
There are four primary factors that determine whether a license is required: (1) the
item exported; (2) where the export is going; (3) who is involved in the transaction; and (4)
the item’s use. The first step in the license determination process is to determine the Export
Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) of the item. ECCNs are categorized on the
Commerce Control List (“CCL”). If the item does not fall into any of the categories, then
the item is labeled as EAR99. The second step is to consider the country of destination by
22 C.F.R. § 120.16. This definition includes “any foreign corporation, business association, partnership,
any other entity or group that is not incorporated or organized to do business in the United States, as well as
international organizations, foreign governments.” Id.
36
See What is an ITAR Controlled Facility, NEWSTREAM ENTERS.: NEWSTREAM BLOG (Oct. 31, 2019, 12:50
PM), https://www.newstreaming.com/blog-hub/what-is-an-itar-controlled-facility.
37
See Martin Horan, Data Security Best Practices for ITAR Compliance, FTP TODAY (Oct. 9, 2019),
https://www.ftptoday.com/blog/data-security-best-practices-for-itar-compliance.
38
Julie
T.
Norris,
Export
Controls:
The
Challenge
for
U.S.
Universities,
https://www.uh.edu/research/compliance/export-controls/Export_Controls_PPT.pdf.
39
See 15 C.F.R. § 730.3.
40
15 C.F.R. § 730.2.
41
15 C.F.R. § 730.1.
42
Geroge R. Tuttle, U.S. Controls on the Texport and Re-export of U.S. Origin Goods & Technology - EAR,
https://www.tuttlelaw.com/subjects/us_control_exp_re-exp_orig_of_tech/us_control_exp_reexp_orig_of_tech_ear.html (last visited Sep. 28, 2020); see also 15 C.F.R. § 734.3.
43
15 C.F.R. § 734.3(a); 15 C.F.R. § 734.4 (providing a ten percent threshold for exports to Cuba, Iran, North
Korea, Sudan, and Syria and a twenty-five percent threshold for all other destinations).
35
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referencing the CLL Country Chart.44 Under the current regulations a license is unlikely to
be granted for embargoed countries. Third, businesses must consider who is the intended
end-user and which individuals are involved in the transactions. The last step in the license
determination process is to review the end use of the item. If a license requirement exists,
then companies should review the license exceptions to see if they may proceed without a
license under a particular license exception. Absent any license exception, a license must
be obtained before any export occurs by filing a BIS-748P form.
Corporate supply chains can trigger the license requirement under the EAR when
exporting to citizens of foreign nations. An export and reexport is defined as any release of
regulated technology or source code to a foreign person (a “deemed export”).45 However,
one distinction from the ITAR, is that the release of U.S. technology is considered an export
to only the foreign person’s current country of citizenship and residency. 46 A foreign
person under EAR is synonymous with a foreign person defined in the ITAR—any natural
person, company, or government that is not a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the
United States—and with the phrase foreign national used in EAR.47
The EAR impacts more companies than the ITAR because of the “dual-use”
catchall. The companies vary from cutting-edge startups to large companies like Intel. Due
to the broad inclusion of the regulations, companies do not implement solidified security
measures like those subject to the ITAR. Additionally, the unpredictability of the EAR
makes it difficult for companies to develop any plans. The EAR includes emerging
technologies or new technologies that could be used in a military capacity but are not
currently associated with weapons. An example of this would be drones. Drones are a new
technology that is not associated with defense or weapons, but the technology has clear
military applications—a bomb could be added and dropped from a drone.
Alternatively, the EAR does not include foundational technology or older
technology commonly found in the marketplace. This is largely because such technology
is widely available to foreign adversaries. The fluctuation and depreciation of technology
makes it difficult to quickly establish adequate regulations that address national security
concerns. The federal government must remain knowledgeable of all cutting-edge U.S.
technology to address potential national security concerns before foreign adversaries
receive the technology. For example, how could a government regulate AI and super
computers? The government’s analysis usually focuses on the key components required to
create the final product. However, under a protectionist policy and especially for emerging
technology, the regulations favor overinclusion. These broad Export Controls allow the
federal government to regulate technology before understanding its capabilities. However,
even if the emerging technologies capability is ultimately limited to commercial use, there
is little incentive to withdraw such regulations.
C. Impacts on Businesses and Employees
The rigorous application of deemed export requirements under the Trump
Administration have hindered employers from seeking licenses for employees
44

15 C.F.R. § 738.4(a).
15 C.F.R. § 734.13(a)(2); 15 C.F.R. § 734.14(a)(2).
46
15 C.F.R. § 734.13(b); 15 C.F.R. § 734.14(b).
47
15 C.F.R. § 772.1.
45
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characterized as “foreign persons.” According to the data released by BIS, over eighty-four
percent of the deemed export applications were approved in 2018.48 However, this number
is deceiving. In 2017, BIS approved a record 1,394 deemed export licenses.49 This record
year was followed by an approval of less than 850 licenses in 2018.50 The changes in the
geopolitical climate have noticeably impacted the administration of Export Controls.
The disparity for Chinese Nationals attempting to obtain licenses is even more
skewed. Chinese Nationals are far and away the most common example of licenses
approved by BIS, accounting for more than over one-third of all deemed export licenses.51
In 2018, Chinese Nationals accounted for the most commonly deemed export license
approved by BIS, totaling 350. The Top ECCN for 2018 is the 3E001 license for products
in the SME industry.52 This number is less than half of the 771 licenses granted to Chinese
Nationals in 2017. 53 For reference, the countries with the next highest deemed export
license approval are Iran and India, countries that account for a combined 25 percent of
licenses. Though Iran obtained less than 200, the deemed export numbers for Iran have
largely remained consistent since 2013.54 The decline in approved deemed export licenses
is a direct representation of both the federal government’s protectionist policy and the
challenges U.S. businesses must undergo to hire qualified foreign nationals. Why would a
company hire a foreign national that requires a deemed export license when a U.S. citizen
could perform the exact same job without any Export Controls requirements?
To avoid the licensing requirement, U.S. companies began limiting employment
opportunities to only U.S. citizens. The Department of Justice recently found that three
different companies—a manufacturer, law firm, and engineering firm—unlawfully
required job candidates to be U.S. citizens or permanent residents.55 The law firm, Clifford
Chance US LLP, argued that these hiring decisions were made in “good faith.”56 The DOJ
rejected this argument, stating that no such exception exists in the federal antidiscrimination law.57 This prohibits companies from requiring U.S. citizenship to proceed
in the employment process—regardless of whether the employer intends to hire someone
not subject to Export Controls. This makes it difficult for companies to hire the best and
brightest candidates while also complying with Export Controls and anti-discrimination
laws.58
2018 Statistical Analysis of BIS Licensing – Deemed Export 2013-2018, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/technologyevaluation/ote-data-portal/licensing-analysis/2410-2018-statistical-analysis-of-bis-licensing-pdf/file.
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Export Controls are implemented to prevent foreign adversaries from obtaining
U.S. weapons and technology, thus promoting cooperation with American allies and U.S.
foreign policy.59 As noted in the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence,
SME requires extensive expertise and financial support to develop the necessary
infrastructure. Currently, “[a]bout 90 percent of the SME industry is located in the United
States, Japan, and the Netherlands.” 60 The federal government contends that extensive
regulations to the SME industry, which is dominated by the U.S. and American allies,
provides “that small group of allies a major advantage.”61 While this advantage is likely
true in the short-term, the long-term impact of this protectionist foreign policy may not
only hinder global technology advancements but also end the United States’ control over
the SME industry.
Early signs indicate the beginning of the United States’ decline in the SME
industry. Intel recently announced concerns over the manufacturing process of 7nanometer transistors, the most advanced chip on the market, and agreed to outsource chip
manufacturing to TSMC, a Taiwanese competitor.62 This is significant because for decades
Intel led the chip industry. However in 2018, Intel’s decline in the SME industry first
became apparent when TSMC began manufacturing the 7-nanometer chip while Intel was
struggling to bring the previous generation 10-nanometer chip to market.63 If protectionist
foreign policy is to succeed, then U.S. companies must retain the dominance in cuttingedge technology and not rely on outsourcing manufacturing to foreign competitors.
III.

EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

The constitutionality of the Export Controls depends on three pivotal questions.
First, what type of classification is created by Export Controls? Second, what level of
scrutiny should courts apply to Export Controls? Lastly, what is the federal government’s
interest: national security or economic policy? Before a court, or this Note, can address
these questions, there are preliminary considerations and background required to determine
whether an Equal Protection analysis is applicable to export controls. Additionally, it is
important to note that if a court was to consider the constitutionality of a specific deemed
export license, the holding would likely be limited to the facts of the case and regulation in
question. Precedent from such cases is likely because Export Controls create distinct
classifications, and the regulations are based on various government interests.
As set forth more fully below, this section will analyze whether the Equal
Protection Clause applies to export controls, the appropriate standard of review, the merit
of the government’s interest, and whether the Export Controls are properly tailored to this
government purpose.

See NAT’L SEC. COMM’N ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 3, at 41.
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A. The Equal Protection Clause Applies to Export Controls and Regulations
The Equal Protection Clause applies to the federal laws and regulations responsible
for the deemed export license requirements. Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 64 The language of the Fourteenth
Amendment suggests that the Equal Protection Clause only applies to the States and
requires state action.65 However, the United States Supreme Court has applied the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against the federal government through
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.66 Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, “[n]o
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”67 This
is not to suggest that due process and equal protection rights are interchangeable, rather
that “[t]he ‘equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited
unfairness than ‘due process of law.’”68 The logic behind this application of constitutional
protections is that if a law violates equal protection then it also violates due process.
The constitutional right of equal protection applied to all people living in the United
States, however, is unlikely to include foreign employees working outside the United
States. All U.S. residents—whether a citizen or non-citizen—are considered a “person”
under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “[a]ll
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.” 69 Although
constitutional protections expand beyond citizenship, equal protection rights are not
afforded the same force and effect outside of United States territory.70 For example, after
World War II, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Eisentrager held that German nationals
had no right to a writ of habeas corpus.71 Furthermore, the Court rejected the interpretation
that the term “any person” used in the Fifth Amendment spread to all alien enemies.72 Here,
Export Controls are based around protecting U.S. weapons and advanced technology.
Accordingly, a court would likely follow similar reasoning in rejecting an equal protection
claim from a nonresident alien that worked for a U.S.-based company or with U.S.
technology. Since aliens do not enjoy the same advantage as residents,73 a nonresident alien
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is unlikely to succeed on equal protection grounds—even if the challenger has substantial
connections to the United States.74
B. Export Controls Impose a Suspect Classification and is Subject to Heightened
Scrutiny
The Equal Protection Clause arises when government classifications impose an
exclusive burden or benefit to one group of persons.75 Legislation can create classifications
either facially or in effect. Facial classifications occur when the face of the statute creates
the classification.76 Alternatively, the Equal Protection Clause is also applicable to laws
that are facially neutral but create burdensome classifications in effect. 77 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that racial classifications are reviewed under strict scrutiny.78
For legislation to be constitutional under a strict scrutiny the laws must be narrowly tailored
to further a compelling government interest.79
Deemed export requirements facially categorize people based on alienage;
however, the application of Export Controls’ in effect creates classifications based on
national origin.80 Citizenship and national origin are distinct legal classifications; however,
this distinction creates inconsistency that ultimately result racial and national origin
classifications. For this reason, the Supreme Court extended strict scrutiny to national
origin classifications.81 Beyond simple inconsistencies in how other countries determine
citizenship, a rational basis test is inappropriate because the role of the judiciary is to
protect “discrete and insular minorities.” 82 For example, under the Nationality Law of the
People’s Republic of China, a “Chinese citizen” is defined as a person of Chinese
nationality.83 Additionally, China does not recognize dual citizenship.84 In other words, a
person of Chinese descent is considered a Chinese citizen, so long as they have not formally
changed nationalities. Such fluidity between citizenship and national origin throughout the
world supports the applicable of strict scrutiny because the deemed export requirement
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expressly—or at the very least in effect—classifies people based on race and national
origin.
The determination of classification imposed by Export Controls and in turn, the
appropriate standard of review, is further complicated by Executive and Legislative powers
to regulate foreign affairs. Congress has plenary power over the immigration and
naturalization process, 85 and the power to regulate commerce among foreign nations.86
Generally, these legislative powers are “immune from judicial control.”87 However, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “within its jurisdiction” broadly, and have
repeatedly found that resident aliens also enjoy constitutional protections.88 Additionally,
the Executive has broad authority when regulating foreign nationals because the President
has constitutional obligations to regulate foreign affairs. In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme
Court recognized that there is minimal judicial review of Executive actions concerning
foreign nationals because courts generally lack the competency to determine national
security questions.89 Any judicial action regarding foreign nationals entering the country
and national security must be highly constrained because any action that would “inhibit the
flexibility of the President to respond to changing world conditions should be adopted only
with the greatest caution.”90 Export controls, however, are not related to whether foreign
nationals are allowed to enter into the country; rather, the deemed export-licensing
requirement affects individuals who are already in the United States legally and seeking
employment in regulated industries.
Since Export Controls arise from congressional acts delegating to executive
agencies the authority to regulate various exports, a court may not apply strict scrutiny but
rather some form of heightened scrutiny in these cases. Accordingly, Export Controls must,
at the very least, be necessary to achieve an important government interest.91
C. Export Controls are Broadly Tailored around a Compelling Government Interest
The government must satisfy two prongs under a heightened scrutiny analysis.
First, the government has the burden of showing that the classification is based on a
compelling interest. 92 Second, the laws must be narrowly tailored to achieve the
compelling interest.93 Both prongs empower courts to ensure lawmakers are “pursuing a
goal important enough to warrant [the] use of a highly suspect tool.”94 Courts should not
85

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
87
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)).
88
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
resident aliens); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (holding that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
protect illegal or involuntary aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
211–12 (1982) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause protects illegal aliens).
89
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018).
90
Id. (quoting Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81–82).
91
Graham v. Richarson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984); In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
92
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (classifications are inherently suspect because they “raise
special fears that they are motivated by an invidious purpose.”).
93
Id.
94
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
86

148

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:5: Feb. 2021

blindly defer “to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity” in an equal
protection analysis.”95 This section first considers the government’s interest in protecting
advanced U.S. technology from China through deemed export license, then considers
whether the licensing requirements are narrowly tailored to address their concerns.
i.

Compelling-Interest Prong

The federal government contends that preventing Chinese espionage and
intellectual property theft, particularly in the semiconductor industry, is vital to national
security. Since 2011, more than 90 percent of Americans prosecuted for economic
espionage had ties to China.96 At the end of 2019, a cancer researcher at a Harvard research
center was arrested for allegedly smuggling information to China.97 On May 3rd, 2019, in
the biggest trade secret infringement case in history, the Superior Court of the State of
California ordered an $845 million judgment against XTAL Inc., a semiconductor
manufacture.98 The jury found XTAL guilty of stealing trade secrets from ASML US Inc.,
the United States branch of the largest supplier of photolithography systems in the
semiconductor industry. 99 XTAL was founded by two long time employees of Brion
Technologies, a light source company that was later acquired by ASML.100 The court found
that prior to leaving Brion, these engineers copied company information onto an external
storage device.101 This case exemplifies the importance of company security measures that
limit an employee’s access to and transferability of regulated information. Additionally,
this example supports the federal government’s concern regarding foreign adversaries
obtaining U.S. technology. Semiconductor companies such as ASML, Intel, and TSMC are
the driving forces behind Moore’s law, or the exponential increase in transistors on
computer chips every 18 months.102
The United States is not alone in its distrust of China’s business and politics; this is
a feeling shared by most Western countries.103 In an effort to block ASML from selling a
machine to China, President Trump sent Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to pressure the
Dutch Prime Minster into granting an export control license.104 Secretary Pompeo even
95
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provided the Dutch leader with a classified intelligence report.105 This defensive maneuver
by the White House indicates that the protection of semiconductor technology from China
is not only a compelling interest for the United States, but also internationally. Ironically,
most American electronic devices are assembled in China. 106 Often however, these
Chinese firms are utilizing foreign suppliers to provide advanced technology such as
robotics, cloud computing, and semiconductors. This disparity is most notable in
semiconductors, as China imports nearly all of its semiconductor equipment from foreign
companies. Currently, China lacks the infrastructure and technical know-how to compete
in this market. Experts have estimated that China would need at least ten years, but likely
more, to develop competitive computer chip facilities.107
The modern-day arms race is not fought on the battlefield but rather through
intrusion software. In November, the federal government began a national-security
review of ByteDance, a Chinese company and owner of the popular video app TikTok.108
Last year, TikTok was downloaded more than 750 million times.109 ByteDance’s
connection to China brings up issues regarding data geopolitics and information transfer
from the United States to China, an issue that is largely the reason for the sanctions
against Huawei, a Chinese telecom manufactory. These spies are not the James Bond
type—they can vary from students, to academics, to entrepreneurs, to even journalists.110
By requiring licenses before receiving regulated U.S. technology, companies must
perform due diligence to ensure their customers intend to use the export for civilian
purposes. However, this is easier said than done, because in countries like China, the
funding and research of commercial sectors are often intertwined with military efforts. 111
ii.

Narrowly Tailored Means Prong

Under a heightened scrutiny analysis, it is likely unconstitutional for the federal
government to create nationality classifications when the government’s interests are
tailored around economic policy. When it comes to military authority the Supreme Court
has applied an “exceedingly deferential” approach. After World War II in Korematsu v.
holding-usa-china-insight/trump-administration-pressed-dutch-hard-to-cancel-china-chip-equipment-salesources-idUSKBN1Z50HN.
105
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United States, the internment camps from Japanese Americans was upheld under the Equal
Protection Clause.112 Although this case was widely criticized, the context of a world war
is distinguishable from the current situation 113￼ The United States should not succumb to
Chinese espionage, but, at the same time, should not stray from the values of liberty and
equal protection.
With broadening export control regulations, companies must perform due diligence
about the conduct, nationality, and items’ end use internally and with their customers.
However, this is easier said than done, because in countries like China, the funding and
research of commercial sectors are often intertwined with military efforts.114 In a response
to the new export rules, the Semiconductor Industry Association President, John Neuffer,
recognized that “while we understand military-civil fusion trends demand smart and
targeted national security responses, we are concerned these broad rules will unnecessarily
expand export controls for semiconductors and create further uncertainty for our industry
during this time of unprecedented global economic turmoil.”115 The global semiconductor
industry accounted for over $400 billion in revenue in 2019, a decrease of twelve percent
from the previous year.116 As American companies are losing customers, suppliers, and
profits, Chinese companies such as Huawei are finding alternative sources for U.S. import
components.117
National security and foreign policy efforts by the White House to address the threat
from China avoid judicial interpretation. In the modern digital world, there is no doubting
that the semiconductor industry will largely impact future economic growth. However,
there is no linear connection of semiconductor technology to national security. Export
Controls are clouded under an umbrella of “national security,” yet the impact is directed at
consumer technology. These regulations all stem from the Trump Administration, which
is known for impulsive actions and the use of economic sanctions in negotiations. 118
Initially, the administration and “national-security hawks” utilized the entity list to separate
commercial relations from China. 119 Now, in light of future assets, the Department of
Commerce implements Export Controls as the main protection of American content from
China.120
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“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.” 121 The importance of
discovering spies is undeniable. However, in this effort to limit China’s bad actors the
United States must be democratic and vigilant when implementing regulation to protect
American technology. Broad restrictions and a presumption of denial in the export process
suggests that fear drives these policies—which is particularly concerning for a country
rooted in capitalism. Export Controls should prevent Chinese spies from creating “shadow
labs” to replace American research facilities122;￼ however, they should not eliminate all
qualified researchers from working in the United States. This reduction of talent in the
hiring process includes American universities, as there are nearly twenty universities.123
Moving forward, the Trump Administration must work with American companies to
accelerate the research and development of mobile networks. Protectionism will not allow
America to “win the tech cold war,” and a new approach is imperative to ensure that China
does not control the global digital infrastructure.
The economic correlation of the deemed export requirement is supporting America
first in the short-term. However, the long-term impacts could be detrimental to the United
States role as a leader in cutting-edge technology. The lack of American innovation from
companies, like Intel, will hinder the dominance of United States and American allies from
competition with lower cost options provided by Chinese firms. 124 Moreover, the
complexities surrounding Export Controls could drive business away from America, thus
resulting in a loss of jobs, economic power, and the ability to regulate information from
China.
IV.

PROPOSAL: BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY

There are two options for technology companies to address U.S. Export Controls.
On one hand, companies can increase their lobbying presence in Washington, D.C. and
attempt to negotiate less complex and stringent regulations for emerging technologies. On
the other hand, private industries can seek to establish a precedent with the federal
government of receiving deemed export licenses based on limited exposure to regulated
technology. This process requires, among other things, financial and labor resources
dedicated to enhancing the company’s IT security. In light of the two options, companies
responsible for bringing cutting edge technology to market should not shy away from the
opportunity to take matters into their own hands—in a multibillion-dollar industry like
SEMI,125 this would likely be the general public and federal government’s perspective as
well.
Creating this precedent with the federal government requires companies to
revolutionize their current security system. BIS, in regards to deemed export licenses,
recommended that companies write a Letter of Explanation (“LOE”) describing the
organizations IT security system. 126 To improve a company’s likelihood of obtaining a
121
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deemed export license, the LOE must explain the internal protection mechanisms and detail
the security protocols when foreign nationals are working on regulation technology. 127
Companies must show they benefit more than the employee in this transaction.128 At the
same time, this distinction of benefits obtained ensures that the foreign person’s country of
citizenship does not obtain general knowledge of this regulated technology. This proposal
by BIS appears promising. However, when dealing with federal laws that are based on
national security the federal government wants more than merely adequate parameters.
As set forth more fully below, regulated companies can utilize the transparency,
immutability, and cryptography functions inherent to blockchain technology as a means to
exceed the LOE recommendation by BIS. This section begins with an overview of
blockchain technology and how it applies to data security. It then proposes various
approaches to how businesses can integrate blockchain and why this technology would
enhance current cybersecurity systems. Additionally, this section details the merits of this
technology, and how it addresses the federal government’s national security concerns and
current issues within the SME industry. Finally, it considers the governance and
confidentiality challenges and other mediums capable of achieving comparable results.
Before beginning, this note recognizes that a commercial blockchain security system is not
a revolutionary implementation of distributed ledge technology’s potential. However, such
a system can address complex issues, like Export Controls, that demand transaction
efficiency and in-time record keeping.
A. Blockchain’s Applications to Data Security Systems
The concept of blockchain was first made popular through Bitcoin after the
inventor(s) under the name Satoshi Nakamoto published a whitepaper. Bitcoin is a
decentralized cryptocurrency that allows users to engage in transactions on a peer-to-peer
network without the need for a central bank to serve as an intermediary. 129 The name
cryptocurrency is associated with the application of cryptographic hash functions in
cryptocurrencies. 130 Cryptography has also been applied to public and private keys
allowing individuals to verify their ID and ensure privacy by protecting the transaction’s
information. 131 The research and funding of blockchain technology has exponentially
increased in recent years. 132
Potential applications of blockchain have emerged in various sectors from finance,
government, real estate, health care, and even international trade. 133 One major benefit
associated with blockchain is that data entries can be accessed in real time.134 The modern
applications of blockchain and distributed ledger technology are beginning to revolutionize
127

Id.
Id.
129
Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last
visited Sep. 28 2020).
130
Dylan Yaga et al., Blockchain Technology Overview, U.S. NAT’L. INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., (Oct.
2018), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2018/NIST.IR.8202.pdf.
131
Id. at 11.
132
Jesse Yli-Huumo et al., supra note 14, at 9–10.
133
U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., supra note 15.
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Lucas Mearian, What is blockchain? The complete guide, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 29, 2019),
computerworld.com/article/3191077/what-is-blockchain-the-complete-guide.html.
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industries based on transactions and record keeping.135 Constant access to information has
the potential to diminish transaction times and bureaucratic delays. Another important
aspect of blockchain is the government avoidance as a means to uphold privacy in the
digital age. The “cyberpunk’s” movement is rooted in the libertarian principles that, as a
society, privacy should not be based on the good faith efforts of governments or
corporations but rather in the hands of the people.136
Blockchains empower people by creating a trusted distributed ledger that details
transactions over public networks. Put simply, a blockchain is just a ledger, similar to an
excel spreadsheet, that is maintained from a decentralized network rather than through one
central server.137 This technology can be applied to almost any transfer once the digital
asset and transaction protocols have been determined. While blockchain technology may
not be applicable to every industry or transaction, numerous industries are enticed by the
transparency and immutability functions inherent to blockchain. The transparency element
allows everyone that is a part of the network to access the information in in real time.138
By collecting all transactions, the blockchain creates an auditable record or ledge of all
data transfers. 139 Once a “block” in the blockchain is created all future blocks will be
formed based on the information of the previous block. This chronological ledger creates
the “chain.” The chain is immutable across the entire decentralized network because
everyone has access to the prior records and if any block were changed then the chain
would be incorrect.140
There are various types of blockchain that impact the network access, system
scalability, and the consensus protocols of transactions. Blockchains are classified as public
or private and permissioned or permissionless. From a purist libertarian point of view, like
the cyberpunk’s perspective, the only type of blockchain is a public permissionless chain
such a Bitcoin. In a public permissionless system anyone can participant and no specific
person or entity can manage the transactions on the platform. Generally in public
blockchains the participants are anonymous, the scalability is low, and the computing
power necessary to operate the system is high and often results in slow transaction
validation periods. 141 Alternatively, blockchains classified as consortium or private
permissioned only include identified participants that obtained prior authorization and are
managed by a select people or entities.142 Since a permissioned system is inherently smaller
and available to less people, companies are attracted to this form of blockchain systems
because they are easy to scale and allow for quick transaction speeds.143
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See Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV., 1, 3–4 (2017).
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B. Corporate Implementation of Blockchain
Before revolutionizing any data system, it is important for businesses to understand
the vulnerabilities of current data systems and how the implementation of blockchain
technology can address any weaknesses. In the highly advanced industries, such as SME,
information is valuable. In turn, the protection of all proprietary information is vital. Yet,
traditional security systems often apply the “security through obscurity” approach to
database engineering. 144 The theory behind this approach is to keep the security
mechanisms a secret. However, a major problem associated with this approach is that the
entire system is vulnerable if someone were to hack the security mechanism. In other
words, if a security breach were to occur then all of the data is accessible, and the system
could collapse. By contrast, blockchain has no single point of vulnerability. As noted by
Marhsall Gerstien & Borun LLP, an intellectual property law firm, blockchain is “a
distributed ledger network using public-key cryptography to cryptographically sign
transactions that are stored on a distributed ledger, with the ledger consisting of
cryptographically linked blocks of transactions.” 145 So instead of implementing one
security mechanism for the entire database, blockchain individually encrypts each
transaction stored in the chain.146
Blockchain eliminates the internal bad actor or spy problem. Information stored on
a blockchain is accessible to authorized parties, however the information on the chain can
be limited to viewing while downloading or copying functions are disabled. Genomic
companies are implanting this type of blockchain for DNA data storage. 147 Nebula
Genomics, for example, allows third parties to access the whole-genome sequences under
certain specified conditions. 148 However, the information is limited to the blockchain
platform. Third parties do not have the capability to download or transfer the information
for personal use, allowing consumer to utilize their genetic information in a protected
system. 149 As such, employees, customers, and vendors are put in a better position to
exchange or release such information.
Consortium permissioned or private blockchain systems with business-togovernment (B2G) capabilities can revolutionize Export Controls compliance by allowing
companies to program the system around their specific security and industry needs. The
scalability of private systems allows companies150to access data such as internal designs,
developments, productions, manufacturing, assembly, operations, repairs, testing,
maintenance or modification of regulated software. The decentralized blockchain system
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provided heighted security because the standard centralized cloud model is susceptible to
manipulation and requires companies to share data with third parties.
The cybersecurity capabilities of blockchain address the federal government’s
national security concerns. In a blockchain, the system maintains an immutable real-time
ledger of all data transfers while also allowing different levels of access to certain users.
The “super audit trail” is one of the major factors behind other industries’ building and
testing blockchain applications.151 Companies subject to Export Controls have the option
of connecting the federal government to their distributed ledgers or providing a current
blockchain record upon request or audit. Since the information is not stored in a single
centralized location, all servers will need a consensus protocol to protect the record changes
from discrepancies. The record details every transaction including the parties involved and
information exchanged in an encrypted form. The transaction of information will only
occur if both parties are authorized by the system. In the Export Controls context, the
system could be programmed to limit access to foreign persons while providing U.S.
persons not subject to regulations access to sensitive information. Such protection
procedures ensure compliance with Export Controls by allowing only authorized persons
to access regulated information or technology.
Additionally, blockchain technology can assist supply chain operations in
complying with Export Controls by utilizing “smart contracts,” coded computer functions
that self-execute based on activities in the chain, 152 in transactions subject to Export
Controls. For example, whenever a transaction involves delivering a dual-use technology
to an employee, customer, or vendor, a smart contract could require proof of authorization
or licensing prior to enabling the transaction. This system would also limit administrative
costs and the potential for fraud by implementing an automated process. The
interconnection of the parties’ involved, including regulators, can exponentially increase
international transaction speeds.153
C. Corporate Challenges Associated with Blockchain Systems
Blockchain offers many of benefits; however, it does present numerous, varying
challenges. Export controls are constantly changing, and regulators are constantly working
to account for new emerging technology. Additionally, the constant advancements in hightech industries can make currently regulated technology obsolete in the near future. The
policy and administration regarding Export Controls will always be subject to political
changes in Congress and the Executive. Under President Trump, the federal government
has adopted a protectionist foreign policy against China. This policy could change very
soon if someone else were elected president in 2020, though it is unlikely that the federal
government’s concerns of espionage and economic espionage will change—even if a
commercial trade agreement was established.
Implementing blockchain technology in a company’s IT system is not the only way
for companies to seek compliance with Export Controls. A persuasive LOE formatted
around BIS’s recommendations for obtaining more deemed export licenses can be obtained
151
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through an encrypted database or managed database capable of comparable features. These
systems lack documentation of who accessed data when. Rather, they can only provide
similar firewall mechanisms and security measures. While any data system is susceptible
to hackers, companies may prefer to implement a cybersecurity strategy that will not
concern stakeholders, as the value of a company is inherently tied to the risk of potential
government enforcement actions.154 Another major fault associated with blockchain is the
need for more research and development of appropriate consensus models. Bitcoin
currently utilizes a proof-of-work consensus model. This model requires a lot of computing
power to validate the transactions because it must solve a computationally intensive puzzle
to verify blocks on the chain.155 This type of consensus model is not sustainable, as Bitcoin
uses as much energy as the entire country of Switzerland.

V.

CONCLUSION

Blockchain represents a powerful emerging technology capable of enhancing
Export Controls compliance and corporate record keeping. The technology has numerous
features that can address the federal government’s concerns regarding U.S. technology. By
providing an immutable record to a highly secure cyber system, corporations can discover
bad actors before they can use any company information to steal clients or, worse, provide
their information to foreign adversaries. However, the creation and implementation of a
blockchain system will require businesses to devote substantial manpower and funding to
address the technical challenges.
More importantly, once a blockchain system is developed, there is still no guarantee
that this type of system will result in deemed export licenses. The federal government needs
to work with advanced technology companies on solutions for export licensing. Highly
advanced companies should not attempt to solve such a complex problem with an
elementary tactic such as lobbying. Rather, businesses in the SME and other regulated
industries need to reevaluate their cybersecurity to address faults in traditional methods
and work with the federal government to navigate the governance challenges associated
with Export Controls. The successful development of private permissioned blockchains
will contribute to a robust American economy that is equipped to protect against espionage.
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INTRODUCTION

For Nobel economist Milton Friedman, it was simple: “There is one and only one social
responsibility of business . . . to engage in activities designed to increase its profits.” 1 Companies
must obey the law, Friedman noted, but beyond that, a company’s job is to earn a profit for its
shareholders.2 In the American economy, Friedman’s view prevailed.3 For the last fifty years,
Friedman’s philosophy of “shareholder primacy” has been the core operating principle of public
companies, both on Wall Street and in the corporate boardroom. The ideology of shareholder
primacy defined American corporate culture. Indeed, it was this mindset that informed corporate
raiders like the late T. Boone Pickens,4 and contributed to an unwavering focus on quarterly
earnings reports.5 From economics, to law,6 to pop culture,7 shareholder primacy and the idea that
“greed is good” is the lens through which American business is viewed.
Shareholder primacy is the principle that the board of directors of for-profit, business
corporations have a fiduciary duty to shareholders that takes priority over whatever duties they
might have to other corporate constituencies, such as consumers, employees, and the communities
in which their business is located. Shareholder primacy gives shareholders significant authority
in corporate affairs such as the power to elect directors, amend corporate charters and hold
shareholder referenda on business decisions.
By the mid-1980s, the doctrine of shareholder primacy had become settled law and policy.
The courts in the state of Delaware—home to more than 66% of all Fortune 500 companies8—
began to issue key decisions, and the legislature enacted key statutes, firmly establishing the
board’s duty to its stockholders. Also during this period, a coalition of investors, business leaders,
academics, economists, lawyers, and policy makers coalesced around the concept. 9 Finally in
1997, the Business Roundtable, an influential lobbying group composed of chief executives of the
nation’s largest corporations,10 enshrined the philosophy of shareholder primacy in its Statement
on Corporate Governance: “the paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the

1

Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times
Mag., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, 126.
2
See id.
3
Steve Denning, Making Sense of Shareholder Value: 'The World's Dumbest Idea', Forbes (July 17, 2017, 07:29 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2017/07/17/making-sense-of-shareholder-value-the-worlds-dumbestidea/?sh=1de49b6a2a7e. For a detailed report on corporate governance theory across European states see Int’l Fin.
Corp., A Guide to Corporate Governance Practices in the European Union 13-108 (2015).
4
See Editorial Board, T. Boone Pickens Jr., Wall St. J., (Sept. 11, 2019, 7:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tboone-pickens-jr-11568243724.
5
David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. St. Thomas L.J. 1013, 1018 (2013).
6
See generally Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 1951, 1990 (2017); Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 679 (Mich. 1919).
7
Wall Street (American Entertainment Partners & Amercent Films 1987); Wolf of Wall Street (Red Granite Pictures
et al. 2013).
8
Brett Melson, 200,000 New Delaware Companies in 2017, Delaware Inc. (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:kQW4BydVFJAJ:https://www.delawareinc.com/blog/new
-delaware-companies-2017/+&cd=11&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
9
David J. Berger, Reconsidering Stockholder Primacy in an Era of Corporate Purpose, 74 Bus. Law. 659, 662 (2019).
10
Signatory companies include Amazon, American Express, Goldman Sachs, Lockheed Martin, Pfizer Inc., Walmart,
etc. See Press Release, Bus. Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (Aug. 19, 2019) (on file with
author), https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/BRT-StatementonthePurposeofaCorporationOctober2020.pdf.
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corporation's stockholders.”11 Each subsequent version of the Statement, published over the next
twenty years, stated that corporations exist principally to serve their shareholders.
Times change.
In August 2019, 181 members of the Business Roundtable, including the leaders of Apple,
JPMorgan Chase, and Walmart eschewed decades of long-held corporate orthodoxy in an attempt
to redefine “the purpose of a corporation.”12 Breaking with the established idea that the primary
responsibility of a corporate board and senior management should be to maximize shareholder
value the Business Roundtable issued a statement (the “Statement”) arguing that instead, corporate
boards must make “a fundamental commitment to all . . . stakeholders.”13 This reimagined idea of
a corporation dispenses with the notion that for-profit corporations function first and foremost to
serve their shareholders and maximize profits. Rather, investing in employees, delivering value to
customers, dealing ethically with suppliers, and supporting outside communities are goals to be
taken into account when setting corporate policy, according to the Statement.
Though a shock to the system, this change was not unexpected. With corporate leaders
facing widening social and political pressure in areas such as corporate governance, the
environment, and what many see as a failure of capitalism to serve the broader needs of society,
many believe the Statement to be a reflection of the current business environment. This shift in
corporate priorities comes at a moment of increasing distress in corporate America as big
companies face mounting global discontent over income inequality, harmful products, and poor
working conditions.14
The Statement received intensive media coverage across the United States.15 Skeptics aptly
point out that the Business Roundtable did not accompany its Statement with a plan of action.16
Indeed, the Business Roundtable’s decision to change the definition of corporate purpose is not
11

Bus. Roundtable, Statement on Corporate Governance 3 (1997), http://www.ralphgomory.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/Business-Roundtable-1997.pdf.
12
Bus. Roundtable, supra note 10, at 1.
13
Id.
14
Some economic experts suggest business leaders are feeling pressure to rethink the role of business in society for a
number of reasons. First, social norms are changing and expectations from employees, customers, and even investors
are rising fast. Second, there’s a growing realization that a focus on one key stakeholder or metric is flawed. Third,
investors like Blackrock’s CEO, Larry Fink, are increasingly pressing companies to focus on their purpose and how
they contribute to society. But fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the world faces enormous, thorny challenges that
business is feeling: climate change, growing inequality, awareness CEOs make hundreds of times more than their
employees, water and resource scarcity, soil degradation and loss of biodiversity, and more. These issues require
systemic efforts, cooperation, and pricing of those “externalities”—like pollution and carbon emissions—that business
has been able to push off to society. The current shareholder-obsessed system is not fit for this purpose, critics suggest.
Individual profit-maximizing businesses will not be incentivized to tackle shared global challenges. See Andrew
Winston, Is the Business Roundtable Statement Just Empty Rhetoric?, Harv. Bus. Rev., Aug. 30, 2019,
https://hbr.org/2019/08/is-the-business-roundtable-statement-just-empty-rhetoric.
15
See, e.g., David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Everything, Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y.
Times (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html;
Alan Murray, America’s CEOs Seek a New Purpose for the Corporation, Fortune (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://fortune.com/longform/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations-purpose/; Jim Ludema & Amber Johnson, The
Purpose of the Corporation? Business Roundtable Advances the Conversation, Now We all Need to Contribute, Forbes
(Aug.
20,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/amberjohnson-jimludema/2019/08/20/the-purpose-of-thecorporation/#a0cf05c3846c; Should Business Put Social Impact Above Profit?, Aljazeera (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/businesses-put-social-impact-profit-190819184121676.html; Corporate Leaders
Scrap Shareholder-first Ideology, BBC News (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49400885.
16
See Winston, supra note 14.
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legally binding. Although the organization may have decided to not put shareholders first, in
virtually all 50 states shareholder primacy is still the law.
Approximately 66% of all Fortune-500 companies are organized under Delaware corporate
law.17 For this reason, and because the Delaware courts have a body of well-developed case law
concerning the duties of directors of Delaware business corporations, this Paper will focus on
Delaware corporate law and governance in addressing the challenge posed by The Business
Roundtable’s 2019 Statement. In the exercise of their authority and discretion, should the Board
of Directors of for-profit, business corporations be deemed to have a fiduciary duty to take into
account and act to benefit the interests of all stakeholders in the corporation, including nonshareholder stakeholders, and if so, does this affect or change their fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care to shareholders?

A. A Review of Delaware Fiduciary Law
Under current law, a director of an United States corporation still owes her fiduciary duty
to the corporation and its stockholders. In fact, just prior to the Roundtable’s issuance of the 2019
Statement, Delaware’s highest court reaffirmed the long-held doctrine that corporate management
is beholden to shareholders alone.18 Is such a fiduciary-duty mandate inconsistent with the
Roundtable’s new commitment to other constituencies?
How this tension will be resolved remains to be seen.19 Such a change in corporate culture
has the potential to prompt new developments in the law, potentially leading to new rules about
the factors a board of directors must take into account when considering the best interests of
company shareholders. Such change may lead to more litigation over board decisions. Many of
these legal disputes would likely be heard in the Chancery Court of Delaware, the state under
whose laws more major U.S. corporations are incorporated than any other.
Delaware has served as the premier state for the incorporation of business entities since the
early 1900s. Why does the second smallest state in the United States occupy such a large place in
the world of business entities? A number of factors have led to Delaware’s dominance in business
formation.
First, the statute—the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”)- is the foundation on
which Delaware corporate law rests.20 Lauded for offering “predictability and stability,”21 DGCL
is shaped by the Delaware General Assembly based on advice provided by The Council of the
Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association, a group comprised of more than
500 Delaware attorneys, judges, and academics.22 “The Delaware legislature every year reviews

17

About the Division of Corporations, Delaware.gov, https://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2021).
18
Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 808 (Del. 2019).
19
For a thought-provoking reflection on the Business Roundtable Statement one year later, see Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Business Roundtable’s Statement on Corporate Purpose One Year Later, DIRECTORS &
BOARDS, https://www.directorsandboards.com/articles/singlebusiness-roundtable%E2%80%99s-statementcorporate-purpose-one-year-later (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
20
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 (2020).
21
Why Businesses Choose Delaware, Delaware.gov, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/why-businesses-choose-delaware/
(last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
22
About the Section of Corporation Law, Del. State Bar Ass’n, https://www.dsba.org/sections-committees/sectionsof-the-bar/corporation-law/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
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the DGCL to ensure its ability to address current issues.”23 The DGCL is not a detailed, prescriptive
“company law.” Instead, the DGCL includes a select number of mandatory requirements “to
protect investors and otherwise provide[] flexibility for corporations to carry out their business.”24
Second, the courts—as important as the DGCL itself are the courts that interpret it.
Delaware is hailed for its judicial system and the expert and impartial judges of the Court of
Chancery that decide its corporate cases.25 Unlike in many other states, Delaware corporate law
cases are tried exclusively by professional judges, not by juries.26 The Delaware Court of Chancery
is a specialized court of equity with specific jurisdiction over corporate disputes.27 Without juries
and with only five jurists selected through a bipartisan, merit-based selection process,28 “the Court
of Chancery is known for its prompt, efficient and balanced adjudication of business disputes.”29
Cases from the Court of Chancery are appealed directly to the Delaware Supreme Court, which
has final appellate jurisdiction on matters including corporate law.30 The Delaware Supreme Court
has five justices, some of whom served as Chancery Court judges before being elevated to the
Delaware Supreme Court. Each justice has considerable experience with Delaware’s business
law.31 Delaware’s courts also offer a number of options for dispute resolution outside of
litigation.32
Third, the case law—the Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court both have a
history of issuing reasoned, well-written opinions supporting their decisions, thus allowing a
significant body of precedent to accumulate over many decades. Judges, not juries, decide all
corporate cases33 and must give reasons for their rulings. The resulting body of case law provides
detailed and substantive guidance to corporations and their advisors. One of the key concepts
embodied in Delaware case law is the “business judgment rule,” which is a judicial recognition
that law-trained judges should not second-guess business decisions made in good faith and with
due care by corporate directors—even if the decisions turn out badly.34 Along with the business
judgment rule, case law includes guidelines for directors in upholding their fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care.35
23

Why Businesses Choose Delaware, supra note 20.
Id.
25
Article IV, Section 3 of the Delaware Constitution requires that that state’s judiciary be nearly equally balanced
between Democrats and Republicans. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review of this recently. See Michael C. Dorf,
If There Are No “Obama Judges” or “Trump Judges,” Does the Constitution Permit Delaware to Require Partisan
Balance on its Courts? The Supreme Court Will Decide, Verdict (Dec. 11, 2019),
https://verdict.justia.com/2019/12/11/if-there-are-no-obama-judges-or-trump-judges-does-the-constitution-permitdelaware-to-require-partisan-balance-on-its-courts.
26
See Litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court, Delaware.gov,
https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delaware-court-chancery-supreme-court/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
27
Court of Chancery, Del. Cts., https://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
28
Litigation in the Delaware Court, supra note 25.
29
Delaware Court of Chancery Practice, Polsinelli, https://www.polsinelli.com/services/delaware-court-of-chancerypractice (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
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Supreme Court, Del. Cts., https://courts.delaware.gov/supreme/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
31
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32
See Delaware’s Options for Alternative Dispute Resolution, Delaware.gov https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delawaresalternatives-corporations/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
33
Jeremy Reed & Paul Sponaugle, What Is the Delaware Court of Chancery?, Delaware Inc. (June 22, 2020),
https://www.delawareinc.com/blog/what-is-the-delaware-court-of-chancery/.
34
For a detailed discussion of the Business Judgment Rule, see discussion infra Section I.A.1.
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Fourth, the legal tradition—along with a sophisticated judiciary, Delaware has an ample
supply of lawyers who are experts in Delaware corporate law.36 Delaware’s statutes and case law
provide a base of knowledge for attorneys who specialize in Delaware transactional matters and
who practice in front of Delaware’s courts. These professionals also assist the legislature by
continually reviewing the business statutes and annually recommending changes to keep
Delaware’s law current.37
Fifth, the Delaware Secretary of State—the Division of Corporations of the Delaware
Secretary of State’s Office exists to provide corporations and their advisors with prompt and
efficient service. Incorporations provide a major portion of the State’s revenue. Accordingly,
Delaware takes its role seriously. The personnel of the Division of Corporations view themselves
as employees of a service business, and the Division meets worldwide quality standards as
evidenced by its ISO 9001 certification.38
A cornerstone of Delaware corporate law is DGCL § 141(a): “the business and affairs of
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .” 39
Pursuant to statute, directors serve as agents and fiduciaries to the owners of the corporation—
shareholders. DGCL assigns both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to corporate boards of
directors.40
1. Duty of Care
The duty of care requires a fiduciary to be informed of all material information reasonably
available before making a business decision on behalf of the corporation.41 The fiduciary must act
with a level of care that ordinarily careful and prudent persons would use in similar circumstances.
In reviewing whether a director has satisfied the duty of care, Delaware courts have looked at the
information available to a director and the process followed by the board in reaching its decisions.42
In evaluating a director’s actions under the duty of care standard, courts apply the “business
judgment rule.”43 The rule is a standard of review, not a separate standard of conduct. Under the
business judgment rule, courts will presume that disinterested directors have made decisions on an
informed basis with a good faith belief that the decisions are in the best interests of the
corporation.44 Parties challenging board decisions can rebut this presumption by demonstrating
that the directors were grossly negligent in their decision- making in violation of their duty of
care.45 If this presumption is overcome, the directors will have the burden of proving the
reasonableness of the challenged action.
36

As a state, Delaware has a relatively small bar, approximately 967,171,000, while a state such as New York has
approximately 19,542,209,000. However, of those 967,171,000, a significant percentage of Delaware lawyers practice
corporate law or serve as local counsel to corporations.
37
See About the Section of Corporation Law, supra note 21.
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Delaware Division of Corporations, ISO 9001 Statement, Delaware.gov,
https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/CorpISO9001Statement.pdf (last updated Apr. 8, 2019).
39
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141 (2020).
40
William M. Lafferty et al., A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of Directors Under Delaware Law, 116
Penn. St. L. Rev. 837, 841 (2012).
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Id. at 842.
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Id. at 841.
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Under the business judgment rule, courts focus on the board’s process in making a decision,
rather than the outcome of the decision. In determining whether the directors have satisfied their
fiduciary duties, courts generally give deference to the board and will not substitute their own
judgment for the board’s judgment, even if a decision turned out to be unwise, so long as the
directors acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the rational belief that the decision made
was in the best interests of the company and its stockholders.46
2. Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty prohibits self-dealing by directors and requires that directors adhere to
their fiduciary duty as directors of the corporation.47 It requires them to act in good faith and in a
manner they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders.
A guiding principle of this duty is that a director’s own financial or other self-interest may not take
precedence over the interests of the corporation and its stockholders when making decisions on
behalf of the corporation.48 Also, an integral component of the duty of loyalty is the obligation to
act in good faith in the oversight of the corporation.49 While some U.S. courts characterize good
faith as a separate duty, the courts in Delaware generally treat it as subsumed within the duty of
loyalty.50
A director’s duty of loyalty is often implicated in connection with (i) conflicts of interest
and (ii) corporate opportunities:51
A conflict of interest may exist when a director has a direct or indirect personal or financial
interest in a transaction or other matter involving the corporation. As a general matter, directors
should promptly disclose potential conflicts of interest to the board and describe all material facts
concerning the transaction or other matters that are known to the director.52 Following disclosure,
an interested director should not vote on the matter that involves the conflict of interest. In some
circumstances it may be appropriate for the director to refrain from participating in discussions of
the matter, or to excuse himself from the board meeting during such discussions.
Transactions that present conflicts of interest should be approved by a majority of the
disinterested directors after full disclosure of all material information regarding the transaction and
the nature of the director’s interest in the transaction.53 Directors have a duty to disclose to the
board material information in their possession bearing upon a board decision, particularly where
the directors have a personal interest in the outcome of the board decision. When such approval is
obtained, if a shareholder sues the board of directors for a breach of the duty of loyalty, the burden
of proving that the transaction is not fair to the corporation generally shifts to the person
challenging the transaction.54 In the absence of such approval, if a particular transaction is
challenged, the presence of a conflict will not automatically void a transaction, but the company
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and the interested director have the burden of establishing the fairness of the transaction to the
corporation.55
In reviewing the fairness of a transaction where a conflict of interest exists, courts will look
at the terms of the transaction as well as the process used by the board in approving the
transaction.56 With regard to terms, courts will examine the economic considerations relied upon
when valuing the proposed transaction and whether the transaction is on arms-length terms. In
order to mitigate risks, disclosure of conflicts of interest and the results of deliberations by
disinterested directors concerning such matters should be reflected in board minutes.57
Additionally, the duty of loyalty generally requires that if a director gains access to a
corporate opportunity related to the business of the corporation, the director must make that
opportunity available to the corporation before pursuing it on his own behalf. Directors should
consider the following factors when deciding whether a potential business transaction is a
corporate opportunity: the relevance of the opportunity to the corporation’s existing or proposed
business; the context in which the director became aware of the opportunity; the possible impact
of the opportunity on the corporation and the level of interest of the corporation in the opportunity;
and the reasonableness of any corporate expectation that the director should present the
opportunity to the corporation.58
If a director presents the opportunity to the board and the disinterested directors disclaim
interest in the opportunity, the director may pursue the opportunity on the director’s own behalf.
The director should be careful, however, to consider any negative publicity or impact on investor
relations before pursuing the opportunity.

B. Discussion Roadmap
If CEOs truly wish to consider other corporate stakeholders on an equal footing with
shareholders, Delaware law, as currently written and interpreted, bars their way. Thus, at present,
the aspirations raised in the Business Roundtable statement are not enforceable. Indeed, a
stakeholder perspective, as contemplated in the Business Roundtable’s Statement is implausible.
The Statement contains no legally binding obligation. What the CEOs “commit” to in the Business
Roundtable’s Statement is almost certainly not legally enforceable under a contract theory. 59 To
be sure, stakeholders—employees especially—do possess legal remedies but such remedies are
based on statutes and regulations, not agency law.60
Under current law, the board or a business corporation does not owe a fiduciary duty to
any constituent other than its shareholders. The Delaware Courts have consistently confirmed this
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See Shant H. Chalian & Kristen M. Bandura, The Business Judgement Rule and the Entire Fairness Doctrine,
Robinson & Cole,
http://www.rc.com/documents/primer%20on%20business%20judgment%20rule.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2020).
56
Id.
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See id.
58
See Matthew R. Salzwedel, A Contractual Theory of Corporate Opportunity and a Proposed Statute, 23 Pace L.
Rev. 83, 100-01 (2002).
59
In order to enforce anything under a contract theory, the elements of a valid contract must be present. Those include,
offer, acceptance, and consideration, or some type of justifiable reliance on behalf of a party. No such elements are
present here.
60
See, e.g., The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201; Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
29 C.F.R § 1910; The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401.

165

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:6: Feb. 2021

single obligation.61 Most recently, the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed this duty in Marchand
v. Barnhill, when, for the first time, it reversed dismissal of derivative claims based on a board’s
alleged failure to act in good faith toward company shareholders.62 Like its predecessor cases,
Marchand illustrates just how paramount the board’s duty to shareholders is.63 But might this
change?
This Paper examines the legal implications of enacting the objectives of the Business
Roundtable statement into Delaware law and explores the question: Should a duty to nonshareholder corporate stakeholders be formally woven into law?
The Business Roundtable Statement and prevailing Delaware law are at odds. To
harmonize the desire of the Business Roundtable and the jurisprudence of the courts, several
avenues exist. First, there is the possibility that the Business Roundtable Statement will be codified
into Delaware law. Second, is the possibility that Delaware adopts a permissive constituency
statute, much like Pennsylvania or Illinois. Third, is the possibility that Delaware law remains
unchanged, allowing for only informal and collateral benefits to stakeholders.
This Paper suggests that avenue number one is the least likely and least favorable, as
corporations already have the option of amending their articles (certificates) of incorporation and
electing to become a benefit corporation, providing for expanded stakeholder rights. Instead, this
Paper advocates for possibility three. Option two, the addition of a permissive constituency statute,
allows for board deference, which comports with current law and history but often proves
inadequate. Option three, while actively implementing no change in the law still allows for the
implementation of other measures to balance the stakeholder-rights space. Already, an optionthree-like outcome has been endorsed by Delaware Supreme Court Justice Leo Strine.64
This Paper is organized as follows. Part two discusses the historic trajectory of the
corporation and its long-debated purpose—from its inception to modern-day. Part three explores
the trifold of possibilities that could emerge in Delaware corporate governance should the
Delaware legislature act on the Business Roundtable Statement. Part four opines whether codifying
the Statement is the best option for Delaware and presents arguments in favor and against each of
the three presented legal possibilities. Part five concludes that, despite the fluid nature of the debate
on corporate purpose, it is possible to maintain shareholder primacy while equitably accounting
for the legitimate interests of other stakeholders.

II.

THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE CORPORATION

The public business corporation in the United States and England has served a variety of
roles and interests for over two hundred years. The business corporation began as an institution
chartered by the sovereign specifically to serve designated public functions, such as building
61

E.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del.
Ch. 1996); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and
Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 761, 766
(2015).
62
Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 808 (Del. 2019); see also Jason J. Mendro et al., 'Blue Bell' Reaffirms but
Does Not Expand the Boundaries of Oversight Liability, Law.com (July 17, 2019, 9:07 AM),
https://www.law.com/delbizcourt/2019/07/17/blue-bell-reaffirms-but-does-not-expand-the-boundaries-of-oversightliability/?slreturn=20190908165655.
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Strine, supra note 60, at 786.
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bridges, dredging canals and constructing railroads. Corporations chartered to perform specific
public functions had many of the characteristics of joint ventures, with charters that lasted between
ten and forty years, often requiring the termination of the corporation on completion of a specific
task, setting limits on the kinds of commercial enterprises the corporation could engage in and
prohibiting corporate participation in the political process.65 The corporate format eventually
evolved into an independent institution governed by an influential board of directors enjoying a
significant amount of discretion and often tasked with the singular goal of maximizing the wealth
of its private citizen investor-owners, called shareholders.
In the landmark decision, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (The Dartmouth
College Case),66 Chief Justice Marshall opined that a corporation, though an “immortal” and
“artificial being,” “may act as a single individual.”67 This decision and Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion would mark the advent of corporations as we know them. The passing of the Joint Stock
Companies Act of 184468 represents another milestone of the metamorphosis of the corporation,
as it authorized the registration and incorporation of companies without specific legislation and
allowed them to define their own purpose.69 As states began to enact incorporation laws that
permitted persons to incorporate at will, courts began to entrust them with more autonomy. In
1855, under the Limited Liability Act, shareholders were awarded limited liability: their personal
assets were protected from the consequences of their corporate behavior.70 In 1886, the United
States Supreme Court recognized the corporation as a “natural person” under law.71
By the end of the nineteenth century, the idea of the public business corporation in America
as a generator of wealth and prosperity had achieved widespread acceptance. The same was true
for the American ideology of corporate capitalism. This generated a backlash among progressives
and laborers, who bristled at the size, power, and behavior of giant industrial enterprises, which
65

A Short History of Corporations, New Internationalist (July 5, 2002),
https://newint.org/features/2002/07/05/history.
66
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
67
Id. at 636-37.
68
Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844, 7 & 8 Vict. c.110 (Eng.).
69
Prior to the 1844 Act, in general, incorporation was only possible by royal charter or private act. See John D.
Turner, The Development of English Company Law Before 1900 4 (QUCEH Working Paper Series, No. 2017-01),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/149911/1/877815712.pdf. The privilege of incorporation was closely
guarded and rarely granted, because of the government’s strict protection over the advantages thereby granted.
Before the passage of general incorporation laws, corporations in America existed as specially chartered non-profit
organizations, whose special status depended upon their promise to provide some sort of public function. The king
of England, and later state governments in the U.S., would grant special charters to schools, churches, and
municipalities, allowing such organizations to act as legal persons, i.e., to own property and to enter into binding
contracts. Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst's Study of
Corporations, 49 Am. U. L. Rev. 81, 84, 104 n.94 (1999). As artificial entities granted life by virtue of the state,
they were subject to regulation by the state. Their special, nearly government-like, status in society meant that such
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91. The state would also grant charters for corporations serving an economic purpose. Yet it granted corporate status
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provide. Usually, the government would task the corporation to fulfill a specific need of the state's economy, e.g., to
build bridges or roads. Id. at 105 n.95. The charters of these corporations were, therefore, specifically tailored to the
corporation's specific business function. Here, too, the state would cede pieces of its sovereignty, endowing
corporate managers with powers usually reserved for government.
70
See Derek James Brocklehurst, Limited Liability (Part 1): Heads I Win, Tails You Lose, Managerism (Oct. 10, 2018)
1, https://www.managerism.org/images/pdf/Limited_Liability-oct2018.pdf.
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were dominated by power players including railroad magnates and robber barons.72 As massive
labor unrest brewed, the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 were enacted.
The Clayton Act proscribed monopolies that sought to enable the amassment of wealth and power
in the hopes of empowering state regulation. Soon, American industry came to rely less on the
“capitalist”73 class, and corporate finance began to emanate from an array of equity investors, who
placed their wealth into the hands of specialized corporate managers.74 Weak were the voices of
these neophyte shareholders. Capitalizing on the inexperience of these new equity investors,
corporate directors retained company earnings rather than distributing dividends.75 As the size and
prevalence of the American business corporation grew, the American economy was transformed.
Such transformation inspired competing theories of corporate purpose: stockholder primacy versus
stakeholder primacy.
The modern debate over the purpose of a corporation can be traced back to 1931, at the
height of the Great Depression, when the Harvard Law Review published opposing positions from
two leading corporate scholars: Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd.76 Berle, along with colleague
Gardiner Means, made the case for what came to be known as ‘shareholder primacy,’ the idea that
a corporation exists to make a profit for its shareholders. The authors argued that “all powers
granted to a corporation or the management of a corporation . . . are necessarily and at all times
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders.”77 Berle sought to emphasize the
negative implications of the concentration of exorbitant power and wealth in the hands of a
corporation’s board of directors. By surrendering control and responsibility over their investments,
Berle argued, contemporary shareholders created a new form of property, one over which
shareholders could claim ownership, but no control.78 Shareholders of public corporations had lost
their ability to control firm policies; their stocks were considered investments rather than an
ownership stake that conferred control over the firm. Berle and Means used this development to
justify the promulgation of a different kind of property theory that accounted for the unique
characteristics of dispersed stock ownership.79 Their solution was to name a corporation's board
of directors as the trustee of this new form of property, controlled for the benefit of shareholder
profit.80
Not so, Dodd countered. Dodd maintained that corporations are economic institutions that
have “a social service as well as a profit-making function.”81 Under this theory, corporations are
not simply economic vehicles to produce shareholder returns, but are vital societal entities that
72
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share interests with multiple groups including employees, consumers, and the general public. Dodd
called for a dramatic revision in corporate legal theory that recognized not only investors as the
focal point of the enterprise, but suggested that each of these other groups should share equally in
the benefits of, and the responsibility for, the operation of the modern corporation.

A.

Stakeholder Primacy: Misfortune for Shareholders, Upswing for Other Stakeholders

Dodd’s theory of stakeholder primacy gained significant support following the Great
Depression.82 From the end of World War II until the late 1970s, corporate leaders underscored
the ideology that a company’s primary purpose was to serve all of the various stakeholders who
supported the enterprise.83 Under this theory, stockholders constituted one category of stakeholder,
but stockholders were not necessarily afforded priority.
Corporate stakeholders included the workers who built the products sold by the
corporation; suppliers who created the tools the corporation needed to build its
products; the communities where the corporation operated (and its employees
lived); and the creditors who invested in the corporation by loaning it funds.
Under the stakeholder primacy theory, the role of the board of directors was to manage the
corporation for the benefit of all these groups, rather than concentrate solely on shareholder
value.84 Consistent with this theory, The Business Roundtable published a policy position that
stated:
Corporations have a responsibility, first of all, to make available to the public
quality goods and services at fair prices, thereby earning a profit that attracts
investment to continue and enhance the enterprise, provide jobs, and build the
economy. . . . The long-term viability of the corporation depends upon its
responsibility to the society of which it is a part.85
By the late 1970s, however, the tides began to turn.
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Id. at 1145-63; Berger, supra note 9, at 660 (stating that following the 1929 stock market crash and the Great
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B. The Rise of Shareholder Primacy
Nearly forty years after Berle and Dodd squared off in the Harvard Business Review, the
clear ascendance of shareholder primacy theory began. In the 1970s, as inflation surged, the
economy witnessed recession. In response, the government set out to jumpstart the stagnating
economy by reducing the costs of doing business. Corporate tax rates plummeted while free trade
increased.86 The federal government began to deregulate. As American political discourse
concentrated on the pruning of government power, the corporation as an expression of private
economic power became a paradigm of the new economic order.
Accompanying the new economic order was new economic orthodoxy: the ‘social
responsibility of business is to increase its profits.’87 The ideology of shareholder primacy spread
widely among academics and managers, fueled in part by what became known as “agency theory”
— built on the idea that managers serve as agents for the shareholders, who are the principals of
the corporation.88 Friedman, a principal crusader of the theory, became President Ronald Reagan’s
most trusted economic adviser. Soon shareholder primacy became a lynchpin of Reaganomics and
American capitalism.
So rapidly did this ideology of shareholder primacy take hold, that by the mid-1980s, the
doctrine was codified into law.89 Courts in Delaware and elsewhere issued a series of key decisions
firmly establishing the corporate board’s duties to stockholders as their primary fiduciary
responsibility.90 This judge-made common law serves as foundational precedent in the modern
corporate governance space, and is now supplemented by statute.91
The legal theory of shareholder primacy appealed to the media— “the idea that
shareholders were king simplified the confusing debate over the purpose of a corporation.”92[9More
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powerfully, it helped spawn the rise of stock-option pay,93 corporate raiders,94 and an unswerving
focus on quarterly earnings reports.95
In 1997, The Business Roundtable adopted shareholder primacy, writing that “the
paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the corporation’s stockholders; the
interests of other stakeholders are relevant as a derivative of the duty to stockholders.”96 Notably,
each version of its principles published over the past twenty years has stated that corporations exist
principally to serve their shareholders.97
Yet today, in an atmosphere of widening economic inequality and deepening distrust of
business that is similar to the ethos that many felt in late 19th and early 20th century America, this
influential group has redefined its position.

C. The Reemergence of a Broader Corporate Purpose
Despite the late 20th century eclipse of Dodd’s push to treat shareholders and stakeholders as
equivalent within the corporation, in recent years the growing question of corporate purpose has
led to renewed calls for a paradigm shift towards a stakeholder theory.

93

Stock options are a form of compensation. Companies can grant them to employees, contractors, consultants and
investors. These options, which are contracts, give an employee the right to buy or exercise a set number of shares of
the company stock at a pre-set price, also known as the grant price. See Elvis Picardo, Employee Stock Option,
Investopedia (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/eso.asp.
94
The presence of corporate raiders illustrates the principle that the primary responsibility of corporate boards and
senior management is to their shareholders, to maximize the return on their shareholders’ investment in the company.
While the twentieth century saw the nationalization of the public corporation in the United States, the twenty-first
century bears witness to its internationalization throughout the world. The elimination of barriers to capital markets,
along with privatization of national enterprises and pensions, yielded a new breed of investors with never-before-seen
influence on capital markets and, therefore, corporate decision-making. See Leo E. Strine, Towards Common Sense
and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of
Corporate Governance, 33 J. Corp. L. 1, 4 (2007). Many of these investors clamored for profits, i.e., short-term
increases in share price. Id. at 13. Flooding the world's burgeoning securities markets, these investors are often
institutional and managed by intermediaries who do not necessarily share the same values as the companies in which
they invest. Indeed, they often do not share the same values as the beneficiaries on whose behalf they invest-many of
whom are themselves, ironically, corporate stakeholders. Id. at 4-5. An increasingly active hostile takeover market,
prompted by stagnating securities markets in the 1970s, likewise turned directors' attention from long-term growth to
their short-term job security, and, therefore, short-term stock prices. See Mizruchi & Hirschman, supra note 75, at
1100. Corporate managers, also aware that unhappy investors could move their money abroad and into to the budding
global capital markets, would work hard to keep their stockholders happy. Cynthia Estlund, Who Mops the Floors at
the Fortune 500? Corporate Self-Regulation and the Low-Wage Workplace, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 671, 679
(2008). Quarterly financial reporting requirements, in addition, focused management not on long-term sustainable
growth, but short-swing profits.
95
Lynn A. Stout, Response, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 16 U. Penn. L. Rev. 2003, 2019 (2013).
96
Bus. Roundtable, supra note 11, at 3.
97
Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘an Economy that Serves All Americans’,
Bus. Roundtable (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-ofa-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans (“Since 1978, Business Roundtable has periodically
issued Principles of Corporate Governance. Each version of the document issued since 1997 has endorsed principles
of shareholder primacy—that corporations exist principally to serve shareholders.”).
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This shift comes at a moment of increasing distress in corporate America, as big companies
face mounting global discontent over income inequality,98 harmful products,99 the power of
corporations,100 environmental degradation,101 poor working conditions,102 and corporate
reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic.103 In the midst of this shift, The Business Roundtable’s
landmark 2019 “Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation,” effectively repudiates its 1997
declaration that “the paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the
corporation’s stockholders.” The new Statement calls on corporate directors and managers to
commit to five groups of stakeholders—customers, employees, suppliers, communities,
shareholders—without hierarchy. Shareholders are listed fifth, suggesting, perhaps, that they are
in effect last among equals.
Some commentators have suggested that the corporate leaders behind the Roundtable’s
Statement are feeling pressure to rethink the role of business in society for a number of reasons:
First, social norms are changing and expectations from employees, customers, and
. . . investors are rising . . . . Second, [there is] a growing realization that a focus on
one key stakeholder or metric is as flawed as using your cholesterol level as the
only measure of your health. Third, investors . . . are increasingly pressing
companies to focus on their purpose and how they contribute to society. [F]ourth,
and perhaps most importantly, the world faces enormous, thorny challenges that
business is feeling: climate change, growing inequality [], awareness that [] CEOs
make hundreds of times more than their employees, water and resource scarcity,
soil degradation and loss of biodiversity, and more. These issues require systemic
efforts, cooperation, and pricing of those “externalities” [], like pollution and
carbon emissions, that business has been able to push off to society.104
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See Bob Lord, Inequality in America: Far Beyond Extreme, Inequality.org (Oct. 12, 2020),
https://inequality.org/great-divide/inequality-in-america-far-beyond-extreme/.
99
Examples include recent lawsuits against Purdue Pharma and Johnson & Johnson. See Natalie Sherman, Purdue
Pharma to Plead Guilty in $8bn Opioid Settlement, BBC (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business54636002; Tiffany Hsu & Roni Caryn Rabin, Johnson & Johnson to End Talc-Based Baby Powder Sales in North
America, N.Y. Times (May 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/19/business/johnson-baby-powder-salesstopped.html.
100
Michael Balsamo & Marcy Gordon, Justice Dept. Files Landmark Antitrust Case Against Google, Associated Press
(Oct.
20,
2020),
https://apnews.com/article/google-justice-department-antitrust0510e8f9047956254455ec5d4db06044; Spencer Soper, Bezos Disputes Amazon’s Market Power. But His Merchants
Feel the Pinch, Bloomberg (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-17/is-amazon-toopowerful-its-merchants-are-starting-to-wonder.
101
Brazil's Amazon Rainforest Suffers Worst Fires in a Decade, Guardian (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/oct/01/brazil-amazon-rainforest-worst-fires-in-decade;
Zeke
Hausfather, 2020 Is on Course to Be the Warmest Year on Record, World Econ. F. (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/10/climate-change-environment-earth-temperature-global-warming-heat/.
102
Andrew Mullin, Analysis: Aramark Has Some Troubling Practices Outside of CMU, Cent. Mich. Life (Feb. 13,
2020), https://www.cm-life.com/article/2020/02/aramark-outside-of-cmu; Amazon Workers Stage Global 'Prime Day'
Strikes over Poor Working Conditions, Bus. & Hum. Rts. Resource Ctr. (July 2019), https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/latest-news/amazon-workers-stage-global-prime-day-strikes-over-poor-working-conditions/.
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Ezequiel Minaya, New Ranking of Nation’s Top Employers’ Responses to Pandemic, Forbes (May 26, 2020),
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See Winston, supra note 14.
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Proponents of a new corporate purpose suggest the current shareholder system is not fit for
this purpose, and evidence suggests that many CEOs have been thinking about corporate objectives
in stakeholder terms for some time now. Indeed, many corporate mission statements contain
wording that is similar to portions of The Business Roundtable Statement. Most successful
managers would probably agree that a company cannot neglect its employees, customers, or
suppliers for long without negative implications. But should they have fiduciary obligations to
these stakeholders in addition to meeting their statutory and regulatory requirements? Although
stakeholder theory is gaining traction in the corporate world and is the rule of law in many states,105
it remains unclear how an expanded definition of corporate purpose could legally be squared with
the traditional definition of stockholder primacy. Little is known about the practical implications
of adopting a stakeholder theory. If this theory is to be viable in actual corporate governance, the
means by which it is to be implemented must be addressed.

III.

HOW MIGHT THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE STATEMENT BE WOVEN INTO LAW?

The Business Roundtable is challenging companies incorporated in any of the states to
enact change. Still, as the state in which the most public business corporations are incorporated,
Delaware is challenged most. What would it really mean for Delaware companies to follow the
principle of creating “value for all [] stakeholders?” United States Senator and former 2020
Presidential Candidate Elizabeth Warren hailed the initiative behind The Business Roundtable
Statement as a “welcome change,” but cautioned, “without real action, it [is] meaningless.” This
section explores what a Delaware-reaction might look like if the state legislature were to heed the
call of The Business Roundtable.

A.

Codifying the Business Roundtable Statement into Delaware Law

Currently, no state statute requires corporate directors to consider interests other than those
of their shareholders when exercising their corporate decision-making authority. Until 2010,
105

The following states have some form of constituency statute: Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Wyoming. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.0830 (LEXIS through all 2020 general legislation); Ga. Code
Ann. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (LEXIS through the 2020 Regular Session of the General Assembly); Idaho Code § 30-1702
(LEXIS through 2020 Regular and First Extraordinary Sessions and November 2020 General Election); Ind. Code
Ann. § 23-l-35-l(d) (Burns, LEXIS through the 2020 Second Regular Session of the 121st General Assembly); Iowa
Code Ann. § 491.101B (LEXIS through legislation from the 2020 Regular Session of the 88th General Assembly);
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.12-210(4) (LEXIS through Ch.128 of the 2020 Regular Session); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
156B, § 65 (LEXIS through Chapters 1-208 and the November ballot measures of the 2020 Legislative Session of the
191st General Court); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.251(5) (LEXIS through the end of the 2020 Regular Session, and 5th
Special Session, of the 91st Legislature); Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-8.30(d) (LEXIS through the 2020 Regular Session);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.347.1(4) (LEXIS through 100th General Assembly, 2nd Regular Session and 2020 1st
Extraordinary Session); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:6-1(2) (LEXIS through New Jersey 219th First Annual Session, L.
2020, c. 109, and J.R. 2); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 53-11-35(D) (LEXIS through all 2020 legislation); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 717(b) (Consol., LEXIS through 2020 released Chapters 1-285); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59(E) (Page, LEXIS
through File 53 of the 133rd (2019-2020) General Assembly); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 60.357(5) (LEXISN through the
2020 Second Special Session); R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-5.2-8(a) (LEXIS through Chapter 79 of the 2020 Session); S.D.
Codified Laws § 47-33-4 (LEXIS through acts received as of October 1st of the 2020 General Session of the 95th
South Dakota Legislative Assembly and Supreme Court Rule 20-06); Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-35-204 (LEXIS through
the 2020 Regular and Second Extraordinary Sessions); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-16-830 (LEXIS through 2020 Budget
Session and First Special Session of the Wyoming Legislature).
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however, Connecticut had a statute that mandated directors of a corporation to consider the
interests of its employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, and the community in addition to
shareholders.106 These are the stakeholder groups that are identified in The Business Roundtable
Statement as deserving equal consideration with shareholders.107 Accordingly, in speculating what
a Delaware codification of the Statement might look like, this Paper uses Connecticut’s prior
statute as a model.
Connecticut’s statute had read in pertinent part:
[A] director of a corporation . . . shall consider, in determining what he reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, (1) the long-term as well as
the short-term interests of the corporation, (2) the interests of the shareholders,
long-term as well as short-term, including the possibility that those interests may
be best served by the continued independence of the corporation, (3) the interests
of the corporation’s employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and (4)
community and societal considerations including those of any community in which
any office or other facility of the corporation is located. A director may also in his
discretion consider any other factors he reasonably considers appropriate in
determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.108
If the Delaware legislature were to enact a statute codifying the aspirations of The Business
Roundtable Statement, such statute might contain language similar to the above. Of course, this
Paper would suggest that the statutory language be modified to include gender-neutral terms to
prevent the reinforcement of historic gender stereotypes that the Connecticut legislature
inadvertently reinforced by using the term “he.”109 This model statute is missing something else,
too. While, on its face, the statute would seem to challenge the tenet that corporate directors owe
their loyalty exclusively to shareholders, it does not provide non-shareholders with a right of
enforcement. If the Business Roundtable Statement were to be codified into a statute with teeth, a
cause-of-action for non-shareholders to enforce this provision must be provided for these other
stakeholder groups.
Beyond this, Connecticut’s constituency statute is silent on many key issues. Among the
issues left open by this and almost all current constituency statutes are such critical questions as:
How should directors decide whether particular claimants fall into one of the protected constituent
categories, some of which, such as customers and communities, are very amorphous? What weight
should directors assign to shareholder and non-shareholder interests? What should directors do
when those interests cannot be reconciled? What should directors do when the interests of various
non-shareholder constituencies conflict amongst themselves? Are all these decisions committed to
the directors’ discretion and business judgment? What standards should courts use in reviewing a
director’s decision not to consider non-shareholder interests? What standards of review apply to

106

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-756 (2009), amended by 2010 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 10-35 (H.B. 5530) (West 2010).
Arizona may have been mandatory also, but the legislative history is unclear.
107
Creditors are not mentioned in the Business Roundtable Statement but could be considered customers or suppliers.
108
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-756 (2009), amended by 2010 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 10-35 (H.B. 5530) (West 2010)
(emphasis added).
109
Pronouns, Cuny Sch. L., https://www.law.cuny.edu/legal-writing/students/grammar/pronouns/ (last visited Nov.
22, 2020).
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director action claimed to be motivated by concern for non-shareholder constituents? Nor is there,
as yet, any significant guidance from the courts.
Additionally, Connecticut’s former mandatory constituency statute only applied in
particular circumstances. It applied to directors of a public corporation registered under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in control-shifting circumstances only. Similarly, Arizona’s
previously-mandatory constituency statute expressly limited a board's consideration of nonshareholder constituencies to takeover situations.110 Idaho’s mandatory constituency statutes were
also limited to change-of-control or merger scenarios.111 Though mandatory constituency statues
across the country varied in scope, virtually all were limited to cases of mergers, takeovers, or
changes-in-control. If Delaware were to enact a mandatory constituency statute that required a
board to consider non-shareholder interests in all scenarios—as The Business Roundtable
suggests—would the statute need to be drafted so as to apply to virtually any scenario that requires
a board of directors to make a decision on behalf of the company, or are there some decisions as
to which the interests of shareholders should prevail?
It also is worth noting that even if the model statute is interpreted literally, it requires a
consideration of the interests of non-shareholders, not action to promote or effectuate the interests
of non-shareholders. If the Delaware legislature were to seek to change the behavior of corporate
leaders, as The Business Roundtable Statement implores, it should require directors to act in the
best interests of all constituencies, rather than merely consider their interests.
That Delaware has declined to enact any sort of constituency statute over the last three
decades suggests that the sudden enactment of a mandatory statute in the state today is highly
unlikely. A permissive constituency statute, rather than a mandatory statute, though more
problematic, could be more appealing to the legislature.

B. Adopting a Permissive Constituency Statute in Delaware
Although no state currently has a mandatory statute, forty-one states have enacted some
form of a permissive constituency statute.112 Unlike the mandatory constituency statute discussed
above, permissive constituency statutes permit, rather than require, corporations to consider nonshareholders’ interests. The unifying principle of these permissive statutes is that they “enable
corporate directors to consider interests other than those of their shareholders when exercising
their corporate decision-making authority.”113 A common permissive constituency statute contains
the following provisions:
•
•

110

The board of directors of a corporation may consider the interests and effects of any
action upon non-shareholders.
The relevant non-shareholder groups include employees, suppliers, customers,
creditors and communities.

See Az. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-2702 (LEXIS through legislation from the 54th Legislature, 2nd Regular Session
(2020), all legislation.).
111
This is because they are included within the control share acquisition statute and a business combination statute.
See Idaho Code §§ 30-1602, 1702 (LEXIS through 2020 Regular and First Extraordinary Sessions and November
2020 General Election).
112
Joseph R. Shealy, The Corporate Identity Theory Dilemma: North Carolina and the Need for Constructionist
Corporate Law Reform, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 686, 698 (2016).
113
Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially
Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 765, 781-82 (2009).
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The directors may consider both long-term and short-term interests of the corporation.
The directors may consider local and national economies.
The directors may consider any other relevant social factors.114

In the states that have enacted constituency statutes, directors are allowed to explicitly
consider the interests of the community even without a near-term benefit to shareholders.115
[These] statutes purport to change the duty of care of officers and directors while creating
judicial standards for reviewing nonstatutory antitakeover devices such as poison pills. Whereas
many of the early antitakeover devices imposed limitations on entities attempting an unsolicited
purchase of another firm without addressing the duties of directors for the target firm, constituency
statutes may be expanded to apply outside the context of hostile takeovers to influence everyday
board decisions. These improvements suggest that constituency statutes enhance and codify widely
accepted legal principles.116
The substance of permissive constituency statutes varies from state to state. Still, virtually
all permissive statutes can be described as falling into one of four categories: (1) permissive
statutes covering all corporate decisions; (2) permissive statutes declaring that the corporation
itself is superior to shareholders; (3) permissive statutes covering only hostile takeover-related
decisions; and (4) a formally mandatory statute such as Connecticut’s, discussed above.
Pennsylvania’s permissive constituency statute is an example of a statute that falls into the
first category.117 Pennsylvania’s constituency statute provides that directors, in the discharge of
their fiduciary duty to protect and promote the best interests of the corporation, may consider the
effects of any action upon all groups affected by such action, including shareholders, employees,
suppliers, customers, creditors of the corporation, and communities in which offices or other
establishments of the corporation are located.118 Furthermore, directors may consider the “shortterm and long-term interests of the corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the
corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that these interests may be best served by
the continued independence of the corporation.”119 Importantly, this statute appears to cover all
director decisions, not just those in the context of a hostile takeover, merger, or change in control.
Illinois’ permissive constituency statute contains similar language, but also states that
directors owe a primary duty to the corporation, not shareholders, thus placing it in the second
group of statutes.120 The Illinois statute also explicitly provides that directors must take into
account “the effects of any action” and the “long-term and short-term interests of the corporation.”
114

Id. at 782.
Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations in
For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 409, 462 (2002).
116
Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency Concerns, 49 Emory L.J.
1085, 1094 (2000).
117
15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1715 (2010).
118
§ 1715(a)(1).
119
§ 1715(a)(2).
120
805 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/8.85 (2005) (“In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors,
committees of the board, individual directors and individual officers may, in considering the best long term and short
term interests of the corporation, consider the effects of any action (including without limitation, action which may
involve or relate to a change or potential change in control of the corporation) upon employees, suppliers and
customers of the corporation or its subsidiaries, communities in which offices or other establishments of the
corporation or its subsidiaries are located, and all other pertinent factors.”).
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This is significant, as traditional jurisprudence describes the long-term interests of the corporation
as the focus on shareholder return.121 Finally, directors are given broad discretion when
interpreting the degree of relevance a director must give to any specific factor when making a
decision on behalf of the corporation. Thus, as long as directors believe that a factor is pertinent to
a corporation, they may consider this factor even if it conflicts with the interests of the
shareholders.
Oregon’s permissive constituency statute provides an example of the third category of
statutes, as it covers hostile takeover situations only. The statute reads:
When evaluating any offer of another party to make a tender or exchange offer for any
equity security of the corporation, or any proposal to merge or consolidate the corporation with
another corporation or to purchase or otherwise acquire all or substantially all the properties and
assets of the corporation, the directors of the corporation may, in determining what they believe to
be in the best interests of the corporation, give due consideration to the social, legal and economic
effects on employees, customers and suppliers of the corporation and on the communities and
geographical areas in which the corporation and its subsidiaries operate, the economy of the state
and nation, the long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders,
including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of
the corporation, and other relevant factors.122
Thus, the language of Oregon’s permissive constituency statute only applies when directors
are weighing whether to accept or reject a hostile takeover attempt.
As discussed supra, until 2010, the only state to deviate from the use of permissive
language in its constituency statute was Connecticut. On its face, the Connecticut statute seemed
to force directors to consider interests beyond the corporation and its shareholders. However, like
the other enacting states, Connecticut did not provide non-shareholders with a right of
enforcement. It is significant that Connecticut’s constituency statute, in its previous mandatory
form, was never reviewed and interpreted in a decision by the state’s courts.
There are still nine states that have yet to enact a constituency statute. Delaware is one of
these nine. If the Business Roundtable’s Statement were to be codified into a permissive
constituency statute by the Delaware legislature, it would need to be codified to fit into the first
category of permissive statutes. As discussed supra, if the statute were to fall into one of the three
other camps, it would either apply only in specific circumstances or fail to capture the intent behind
the Statement that corporate boards must make “a fundamental commitment to all stakeholders.”123
Using Pennsylvania’s statute as a model, a permissive constituency statue for Delaware might look
like this:
(a) General rule. In discharging the fiduciary duties of their respective positions,
the board of directors may, in considering the best interests of the corporation,
consider to the extent they deem appropriate:
(1) The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such action,
including customers, employees, suppliers, communities in which offices
or other establishments of the corporation are located, and shareholders.
See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); see also Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network
Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
122
Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.357(5) (2019).
123
Bus. Roundtable, supra note 10, at 1.
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(2) The short-term and long-term interests of the corporation, including
benefits that may accrue to the corporation from its long-term plans and the
possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued
independence of the corporation.
(3) The resources, intent and conduct (past, stated and potential) of any
person seeking to acquire control of the corporation.
(4) All other pertinent factors.
(b) Consideration of interests and factors. The board of directors shall not be
required, in considering the best interests of the corporation or the effects of any
action, to regard any corporate interest or the interests of any particular group
affected by such action as a dominant or controlling interest or factor. The
consideration of interests and factors in the manner described in this subsection and
in subsection (a) shall not constitute a violation of standard of care and justifiable
reliance.
(c) Specific applications. — In exercising the powers vested in the corporation,
and in no way limiting the discretion of the board of directors, committees of the
board and individual directors pursuant to subsections (a) and (b), the fiduciary duty
of directors shall not be deemed to require them:
(1) to redeem any rights under, or to modify or render inapplicable, any
shareholder rights plan, including, but not limited to, a plan adopted
pursuant or made in relation to disparate treatment of certain persons;
(2) to render inapplicable, or make determinations relating to control
transactions, relating to business combinations, relating to control-share
acquisitions or relating to disgorgement by certain controlling shareholders
following attempts to acquire control, or under any other provision of this
title relating to or affecting acquisitions or potential or proposed
acquisitions of control; or
(3) to act as the board of directors, a committee of the board or an individual
director solely because of the effect such action might have on an
acquisition or potential or proposed acquisition of control of the corporation
or the consideration that might be offered or paid to shareholders in such an
acquisition.
(d) Presumption. Absent breach of fiduciary duty, lack of good faith or selfdealing, any act of the board of directors shall be presumed to be in the best interests
of the corporation. In assessing whether the best-interests standards has been
satisfied, there shall not be any greater obligation to justify, or higher burden of
proof with respect to, any act as the board of directors, any committee of the board
or any individual director relating to or affecting an acquisition or potential or
proposed acquisition of control of the corporation than is applied to any other act
as a board of directors, any committee of the board or any individual director.
Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this subsection, any act as the board
of directors relating to or affecting an acquisition or potential or proposed
acquisition of control to which a majority of the disinterested directors shall have
assented shall be presumed to satisfy the standard set forth in by the legislature,
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unless it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the disinterested directors
did not assent to such act in good faith after reasonable investigation.124
Even if Delaware were to enact a permissive constituency statute covering all corporate
decisions, this proposed statute allows, but does not require, directors to consider interests beyond
shareholders’ in certain contexts.125 Thus, it will have little impact on directors who already enjoy
protection from the business judgment rule, which Delaware directors do. In addition, this statute,
like all other permissive constituency statutes across the country, does not indicate how much
weight should be given to the various interests of constituents. The same concerns that inhibit the
potential enactment of a mandatory constituency statute are present here. If this hypothetical
statute were to operate in accordance with The Business Roundtable’s aspirations, a legally
enforceable right must be provided to non-shareholders, a standard against which various interests
may be weighed against each other must be furnished, and the statute must require directors to act
in the best interests of all constituencies, rather than merely consider their interests.
However, despite the appeal of a permissive constituency statute, enacting a statute that
allows directors to consider the interests of other constituencies will not solve the problems The
Business Roundtable seeks to rectify. In light of the discretion the statute gives to the board, the
“failure by managers to consider the interests of other constituencies creates no managerial liability
for such action.”126
Managers acting as rational maximizers and faced with a corporate decision have two
interests. First, managers want to maximize their own wealth or utility; second, and this interest is
clearly secondary to the first, managers want to maximize the wealth or utility of voting
stockholders, since voting stockholders appoint managers. Managers, at least as rational
maximizers, are essentially indifferent about the welfare of the other corporate constituencies.
Because of their discretionary nature, constituency statutes change none of this. The incentives of
managers after the passage of constituency statutes are exactly the same as the incentives before
the statutes; as rational maximizers, managers still want first to promote their own interests and
then to promote the interests of voting stockholders; they still are indifferent about the interests of
other constituencies.127
Constituency statutes provide directors no additional incentives to maximize the value of
the corporation or abstain from transferring wealth and resources away from unfavored
constituencies. With the protection afforded by the Business Judgment Rule, management may
also be able to use other constituencies to entrench itself. If a duty to all constituencies is
interpreted so broadly, it will not be hard for management to find some group whose interests are
adversely affected by a particular course of action, and therefore reject a corporate opportunity on
that ground.128 In this way, management would able to justify an action that leads to the
preservation of its own position, even if that decision turns out not to be in the best interests of the
corporation. Thus, constituency statutes, decidedly, are an incomplete remedy, and, allowing or
mandating a broad interpretation of statutory duty may reduce a company’s level of production
rather than increase it.
124

This is a modified version of title 15, section 1715 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes.
See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 407, 462-63 (2006).
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561, 621 (1996).
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A better approach may be to maintain a narrow interpretation of a board’s fiduciary duty
to shareholders, as Delaware does now, and allow firms that wish to adopt a different rule to opt
out of the narrow interpretation, or allow for collateral benefits to stakeholders.

C. Maintaining Delaware Corporate Law, Allowing for Informal and Collateral Benefits to
Stakeholders
Even if boards of directors were not held to have a fiduciary duty to stakeholders other than
shareholders, and those other stakeholders were not afforded a legal right to challenge corporate
management decisions which adversely affected them, this would not preclude boards and senior
officers from behaving as if they actually had such a duty, and stakeholders other than shareholders
had such rights. Moreover, a fiduciary duty owed exclusively to shareholders does little to threaten
directors who set out to implement stakeholder-oriented policies.
Historically, courts did not encumber corporate managers with a fiduciary duty towards
company shareholders in order to privilege shareholders vis-à-vis other stakeholder groups.
Rather, the fiduciary responsibility was designed to prevent self-dealing on the part of directors.129
There are at least three reasons to doubt that those fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders would
prevent a board from acting to benefit non-shareholder stakeholders, as The Business Roundtable
calls for:
First, it is not obvious that the right of shareholders to expect honesty, candor, and care on
the part of management gives them a higher level of protection than the legal rights available to
other stakeholders. Creditor interests, for example, are protected by bankruptcy law. Suppliers and
customers can seek redress under the Uniform Commercial Code or more recent statutes such as
“lemon laws” that cover used car sales. Tort victims are the beneficiaries of insurance requirements
for various kinds of businesses and employees can enlist government assistance in collecting
unpaid wages or compensation for income-diminishing injuries and can demand fiduciary
protection for pension assets and other benefits. . . . Second, courts are starting to impose on
corporate management fiduciary duties with regard to other groups under certain circumstances.
In Varity v. Howe (1996) [the United States Supreme Court ruled] that a corporation that
reorganized all of its money-losing ventures into a single subsidiary that eventually went bankrupt
(leaving a healthy surviving parent) had breached its fiduciary duty to the employees of the
subsidiary. . . . The Court [] extended this reasoning to the protection of non-retirement benefits
when it found for employees [that were] dismissed after refusing to accept employment with
another company, but a company with whom their original employer had arranged for them to do
exactly the same work but with reduced benefits (Intermodal v. Sante Fe Railroad, 1997). And
finally . . . when stockholders have attempted to challenge managerial behavior as being overly
generous toward another constituency, they have almost always lost.130
Those who oppose any change to the doctrine of shareholder primacy often cite the famous
dictum of the Michigan Supreme Court articulated in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.131 that the
corporation exists for the benefit of the shareholders as evidence of a restraint on the free discretion

129

Andrew F. Tuch, Reassessing Self-Dealing: Between No Conflict and Fairness, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 939, 939
(2019).
130
Richard Marens & Andrew Wicks, Getting Real: Stakeholder Theory, Managerial Practice, and the General
Irrelevance of Fiduciary Duties Owed to Shareholders, 9 Bus. Ethics Q. 273, 277-78 (1999).
131
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).

180

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:6: Feb. 2021

of a board of directors.132 However, an examination of the context of the court’s decision makes
clear that this statement was not meant to empower the shareholder at the expense of managerial
discretion; it was meant to forbid “the company’s decision to sit on a mountain of cash for allegedly
philanthropic, not business, purposes, particularly when the court had reasons to doubt Ford’s
candor regarding his actual motive.”133
Since Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., courts have proven reluctant to examine the economic
wisdom of business decisions. An examination of case law under circumstances less dramatic than
the facts of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. demonstrates that corporate directors have actually
successfully defended generosity toward non-shareholder constituents.134 Generosity toward
employees has almost always won if, unlike in the Dodge case, the generous treatment is justified
as a means of improving efficiency or productivity.135 Corporations have routinely defeated
challenges by stockholders to various bonus and profit-sharing plans for managers and employees
when such plans were justified as creating incentives for better corporate performance.136
If board fiduciary duties toward shareholders is dispositive in any area of corporate
governance, it is in a board’s response to takeover bids. Still, on numerous occasions courts have
applied the business judgment rule and refused to enjoin board decisions rejecting tender offers
that were neither manipulative nor fiscally unsound and might have benefitted shareholders. The
language of the courts’ opinions in these cases is remarkably similar to that of a normative
stakeholder approach. In particular, the Delaware Supreme Court, has consistently rejected the
notion that directors have a duty to sell the company whenever a takeover proposal offers a
premium over current market value of company stock.137 The Court has even established a positive
duty to adopt defensive measures to defeat a takeover attempt contrary to the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders.138 The Court implicitly defined these non-shareholder, corporate
stakeholder interests very broadly when it ruled in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum that boards
might consider impact on “customers, creditors, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally.”139
Numerous court decisions in other jurisdictions have reached similar results, supporting
the right of boards to choose not to sell control of the corporation to raiders who will pay the
highest premium stock price for shareholders.140 The court in Keyser v. National Finance, for
example, upheld a bank’s decision to choose one takeover “suitor” over another, explicitly
accepting, the bank’s justification that the winning bidder was better on “social issues,” including
the prospect of creating more opportunity for the company’s employees.141
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Moreover, the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders are not as fixed or inflexible as they
may appear. They can be, and frequently are, modified by contract.142 For instance, workers should
be able to contract for job security and wages with a corporation without necessarily requiring the
board to prioritize workers over shareholders. The fiduciary duties owed to shareholders do not
prevent workers from bargaining for and obtaining an agreement with respect to these and other
employment issues. Workers can protect their wage expectations with pension guarantees, golden
parachutes, successor clauses, stipulated cost of living adjustments, and other straightforward
provisions. Similarly, workers can obtain credible assurances against being forced to work
undesirable hours simply by stipulating the length of the workday. Working conditions can be
guaranteed by making reference to a well-known status quo and requiring the employer to maintain
working conditions at that level or above. In short, one can contract away fiduciary duties to
shareholders without changing the law.
As with contracts with workers, contracts between shareholders and firms routinely
subordinate the claims of shareholders to those of non-shareholder constituencies, such as
employees. These very contracts clearly impede the freedom of directors and managers to
maximize shareholder wealth, a concern that exists even in jurisdictions with constituency statutes.
Often, shareholders are willing to bargain with workers to give them job security and better wages
because doing so allows them to attract and retain better workers, thereby increasing profitability.
Similar logic applies to other fixed claimants such as bondholders and lenders. For
example, corporations often provide fixed claimants with security interests in corporate assets or
agree to restrictions on dividend payments or investments. These agreements benefit shareholders,
while also aiding the other constituencies, by increasing the availability of credit and lowering the
cost of borrowing.
Beyond contracts that carve out non-shareholder constituency rights, courts are able to
protect non-shareholder constituents by imposing gap-filling responsibilities on boards of directors
that are analogous to those provided by the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders. For example,
should unforeseen contingencies arise that cast doubt on the efficacy of the contractual protection
mentioned above, courts can protect workers by construing their employment contracts in light of
the original purposes behind the agreements. Gap-filling by modern judges in interpreting
contracts provides workers with the same sorts of protection that fiduciary duties provide for
shareholders.143
This has arguably been the Delaware Supreme Court’s approach in dealing with the nonshareholder constituencies identified by The Business Roundtable. It is noteworthy that the
Delaware approach recognizes that, over a wide range of issues, there “really is no conflict between
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the interests of other constituencies and the interests of shareholders.”144 For example, taking steps
to improve relations with the local community benefits the corporation and its many constituents,
generally. Similarly, drafting strong bond covenants or cultivating a reputation for fair dealing
with bondholders and creditors benefits the shareholders by lowering the corporation’s costs of
doing business. Moreover, the current Delaware approach recognizes that generally it is not
possible for a board to know beforehand with certainty, which decisions are specifically in the
shareholders’ interests, and which are not.145
In October 2019, shortly after the release of The Business Roundtable statement, then Chief
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court Leo Strine, self-published a paper, Toward Fair and
Sustainable Capitalism, proposing “to reform the American corporate governance system by
aligning the incentives of those who control large U.S. corporations with the interests of working
Americans . . . .”146 Chief Justice Strine suggested the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders
can be equitably accounted for without modifying current statutory fiduciary duties by:
Requiring not just operating companies, but institutional investors, to give
appropriate consideration to and make fair disclosure of their policies regarding
EESG issues, emphasizing “Employees” and not just “Environmental, Social, and
Governance” factors;
Giving workers more leverage by requiring all societally-important companies to
have board level committees charged with ensuring fair treatment of employees,
authorizing companies to use European-style works’ councils to increase employee
voice, and reforming labor laws to make it easier for workers to join a union and
bargain for fair wages and working conditions;
Reforming the corporate election system so that voting occurs on a more rational,
periodic, and thoughtful basis supportive of sustainable business practices and
long-term investment;
Improving the tax system to encourage sustainable, long-term investment and
discourage speculation, with the resulting proceeds being used to revitalize and
green America’s infrastructure, tackle climate change, invest in American workers’
skills, transition workers from carbon-intensive industries to jobs in the clean
energy sector; and
Taking other measures, such as reform of corporate political spending and forced
arbitration, to level the playing field for workers, consumers, and ordinary
investors.147
The proposals suggested by Chief Justice Strine are powerful. Perhaps even more
influential though, is that this call-for-action was authored by the same man who, in 2015, wrote:
“a clear-eyed look at the law of corporations in Delaware reveals that, within the limits of their
discretion, directors must make stockholder welfare their sole end, and that other interests may be
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taken into consideration only as a means of promoting stockholder welfare.”148 At first blush, it
would appear that Chief Justice Strine’s 2015 and 2019 positions are irreconcilable. This is not
necessarily true. What the Chief Justice appears to mean is that there need be no conflict between
the interests of these other constituencies and the interests of shareholders to which directors are
beholden.
The shareholder primacy rule articulated by Delaware and present in modern
socioeconomics can be considered a substantive judicial guardrail. The path it requires is clear.
However, in addressing issues often framed as matters of corporate social responsibility, the
shareholder primacy path does not preclude a for-profit company from taking social issues into
account in the conduct of its business. What is required to stay on the path is that the company’s
consideration of those social issues have a sufficient nexus to shareholder welfare and value
maximization. How can a board of directors determine that a sufficient nexus exists? For Delaware
business corporations, the basic answer should be familiar. The board should do what it does in
making other decisions regarding oversight of the company’s business: define the issue; gather all
reasonably available material information; identify and weigh the pros and cons; consider
alternatives; and make an independent, disinterested and informed business judgment in good
faith, looking solely to the economic best interests of shareholders as a whole. No time frame is
mandated and building long-term value is the goal.
Of course, decisions by boards of Delaware for-profit corporations can be challenged by
shareholders, as they frequently are. Such a challenge may be brought under state law for breach
of fiduciary duty—the two duties being the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, discussed supra.
Assuming the threshold application of the Business Judgment Rule is not rebutted, courts applying
Delaware law will not second-guess a board’s judgment unless the decision is found to be not
rational. To make such a finding, a court would have to conclude that the board’s decision cannot
be attributed to any rational business purpose related to the company. As then-Chancellor William
B. Chandler III of the Delaware Court of Chancery wrote in his Craigslist opinion:
When director decisions are reviewed under the Business Judgment Rule, this Court will
not question rational judgments about how promoting non-stockholder interests — be it through
making a charitable contribution, paying employees higher salaries and benefits, or more general
norms like promoting a particular corporate culture — ultimately promote stockholder value.149
Thus, it is possible that The Business Roundtable can achieve its goal of promoting nonshareholder stakeholder welfare by permitting Delaware to remain as-is and by pressuring
companies to focus more on creating a nexus between EESG issues and shareholder profits. It is
also possible that the Business Roundtable can achieve its goal by lobbying the Delaware
legislature to follow the lead of the forty-one other United States who have enacted statutes
promoting non-shareholder stakeholder welfare. Having discussed the legal avenues that exist, the
lingering question that must be addressed is should a duty to non-shareholder corporate
stakeholders be formally woven into law?

IV.

SHOULD THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE STATEMENT BE WOVEN INTO LAW?

What would be the practical implications of adopting a true stakeholder theory approach for
Delaware? The Business Roundtable Statement is not accompanied by a proposed plan of action.
148
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Without such action, the Statement does nothing to forecast whether a true stakeholder approach
might ever be implemented. Still, the Statement serves as a marker. The marker alone does create
some accountability, as Chief Justice Strine has acknowledged and there are tangible steps that
companies can take to show their commitment “is more than just of the moment.”150 The question
is, which steps are best?
This Paper argues that by maintaining Delaware’s current approach, companies are most
suited to promote “[a]n economy that serves all Americans.”151
First, expanding any fiduciary duty to non-shareholder constituencies is costly compared to
contracting privately, and private contracting should be effective to curb manager opportunism. If
the Business Roundtable Statement were codified into law, conflicting interests of various
stakeholder groups would fall under the same fiduciary umbrella. Litigation costs over which
group’s interest is to receive priority would skyrocket. Fear of litigation would trigger increased
managerial decision costs and costs in the form of foregone value-enhancing transactions. While
private contracts may not perfectly constrain managerial opportunism, the cure is likely worse than
the disease. The costs of such opportunism are likely dwarfed by the costs of bestowing a shared
fiduciary duty among conflicting parties. Private bargains should be respected and parties should
be permitted to constrain or modify shareholder primacy by contract. These parties have sufficient
incentive on their own to design careful limits on managerial opportunism.
Second, constituency statutes, especially permissive constituency statutes, are ineffective.
Despite their enactment in more than one-half of the states, currently all constituency statutes are
discretionary. As discussed supra, this means that managers may, but are not required to, consider
the interests of non-shareholder constituencies. The failure by managers to consider the interests
of other constituencies therefore creates no managerial liability. Acting as rational maximizers,
managers are essentially indifferent about the welfare of non-voting shareholders as no other
constituency votes to appoint managers. Because of their discretionary nature, constituency
statutes change none of this. The matter of obligations owed to various stakeholder groups should
be addressed directly and inclusively and not through a statute that deals by indirection with only
a part of a problem.
To be sure, this argument ignores the fact that corporations long have been able to issue
multiple classes of shares with different economic and voting rights, with management owing
fiduciary duties to each of these classes. Thus, it simply cannot be said that corporate law is
incapable of reconciling the fiduciary claims of a variety of competing interests. The argument
also ignores the effects of the Business Judgment Rule. Because most managers’ actions are
effectively protected against judicial scrutiny anyway, as a practical matter, the rights being taken
away from shareholders by non-shareholder constituency statutes do not provide much in the way
of concrete benefits for shareholders in the first place. Thus, the real problem with non-shareholder
constituency statutes is not that they take away something of value from the only group that has
any incentive to maximize the value of the firm, because other constituencies such as fixed
claimants or workers often have the greatest stake in the decisions being made. Similarly, nonshareholder constituency statutes cannot be condemned on the grounds that they upset a system of
legal rules that present a preexisting set of clearly defined behavioral guidelines for officers and
directors. No such set of guidelines exists.
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The most compelling argument against constituency statutes is that such statutes fail to
recognize that fiduciary duties are owed to residual claimants and residual claimants alone because
this is group faces the most severe set of contracting problems with respect to defining the nature
and extent of the obligations owed to them by officers and directors. Other constituencies besides
shareholders face contracting problems, but these problems can be solved at far less cost than those
confronting shareholders. Thus, fiduciary duties should properly be seen as a method of gap-filling
in incomplete contracts. And shareholders place a far greater value on the protection provided by
this gap-filling than do the non-shareholder constituencies of a corporation.
This dovetails into the third point, that non-shareholder constituencies already enjoy the
protection provided by judicial gap-filling and do not need additional gap-filling protections
afforded by expanding directors’ fiduciary duties. Under modern principles of contract law, courts
fill in gaps for these other constituencies against the background of the pre-existing contracts that
these groups have with the firm. Thus, gap-filling for employees or bondholders is done in the
context of interpreting the employment contracts, collective bargaining agreements, bond
indentures, and covenants that these other groups have with the corporation. The obvious exception
to this general rule arises with regard to the local communities in which large corporations operate.
Unlike other constituencies, the local community has no pre-existing agreement with the firm,
leaving no gap for a court to fill. But the local community is, or should be, well represented in the
political process. Any grievance felt by the community should presented to elected representatives
in the state and local government for redress.
Fourth, the most prominent structural alternative to shareholder primacy, Public Benefit
Corporations (“B Corps”), already exists in Delaware.152 A Delaware public benefit corporation is
a for-profit corporation “that is intended to produce a public benefit or public benefits and to
operate in a responsible and sustainable manner.”153 A B-Corp enables the business to be managed
in a way that balances shareholder interests, the best interests of people “outside the corporate box”
who are affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefits identified in its
Certificate of Incorporation. The existence of B-Corps is based on a perceived incongruence
between the legal framework governing for-profit corporations and the social purpose goals of
sustainable business, impact investment, and social enterprise actors. While directors of for-profit
companies traditionally have a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth, B-Corps are
required to pursue a social mission and consider all stakeholders, internal and external, when
making business decisions. Shareholder primacy is not an option for a benefit corporation; it is
legally required to account for the effects of its decisions on all stakeholders. For a traditional
corporation seeking to uphold the principles discussed in the Business Roundtable Statement, it
may become a certified B-Corp.154[154] To become a certified B-Corp, a company must first submit
to an independent assessment of its social and environmental performance accountability and
transparency. If the company scores high enough, it can become a certified B Corporation and then
it must formally incorporate its social and environmental mission into its governance articles as
152
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part of the terms of its certification as a B Corporation. Thereafter, the company needs to be
reassessed every three years to ensure that it is maintaining the required standard.155[155]
The number of B-Corps has grown dramatically in recent years. First formed in 2006,
estimates indicate that there are over 2,500 B-Corps in more than fifty countries, including such
prominent companies as Ben & Jerry’s, Patagonia, and Athleta.156[156] Consistent with its efforts
to maintain its leadership in corporate law and governance, Delaware is a leader in benefit
corporation legislation.157[157] The guiding principle of a B-Corp is the very opposite of stockholder
primacy; "investors and managers [of B-Corps] should not seek gains by simply extracting as much
value as possible from the economy, but should instead seek gains by simply building and sharing
value with all stakeholders in their investments."158[158]
In short, supporting a stakeholder theory does not necessarily involve the kind of radical
transformations of current legal relationships as some of its advocates might assume. Fulfilling
fiduciary duties to shareholders does not entail that managers must side with shareholders and
against other stakeholders. Companies have the legal autonomy to act proactively and advance the
interests of a number of stakeholders simultaneously. Directors and organizations have
considerable latitude in defining core values and philosophy, including exactly what kind of
responsibilities it wishes to assume with respect to a variety of stakeholders. Directors are also free
to exercise a wide latitude regarding the kinds of investments they wish to make and the way they
evaluate alternative uses of corporate resources. So, while implementing stakeholder theory may
seem to require radical changes in law, this is not so. It is well within the existing boundaries of
corporate governance, and particularly with respect to the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders.
To be sure, directors will still face difficult decisions about how to allocate resources and which
priorities to establish among stakeholder claims. However, this Paper has suggested that these are,
for the most part, moral choices which the law gives directors discretion to make without fear of
violating their fiduciary duties to shareholders, and thus, not having to make wholesale choices
between stakeholders and shareholders.

V.

CONCLUSION

Ideology matters. Since the 1980s stockholder primacy has been the dominant ideology
shaping corporate law. As a result, case law, director conduct, and our understanding of "best
governance practices" have all been viewed under a single prism: how do these rules impact
stockholder value?
The purpose of this Paper has been to underscore that fiduciary duty should be construed
narrowly and afforded to shareholders alone. The Business Roundtable’s Statement should not be
interpreted as urging state legislators or companies to afford such fiduciary rights to other
stakeholders. Such an interpretation is implausible as it creates a conflict between shareholders
155
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existing rights and new rights that would be carved out for others. Still, if American corporate law
does little to inhibit a stakeholder orientation on the part of corporate managers, it also does little
to compel one. It is certainly plausible that the definition of corporate ownership could be expanded
to allow various stakeholders a greater say in the governance of the corporation. As this Paper
suggests, this can be done without leaving shareholder primacy theory behind. Yet the Business
Roundtable Statement has not offered any advice as to how such expansion might be implemented.
In the interim, certainly, nothing prevents companies from “engag[ing] in activities designed to
increase its profits,” while simultaneously considering stakeholders as an important constituent
when making corporate decisions.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A. “Privacy”: What Does it Even Mean?
A simple touch of a button allows a person to share one photograph with billions of people.1
An instant message can easily be sent to a friend sitting across the table, or to a friend across the
world.2 Geographical boundaries cease to exist within the internet. This has transformed the way
citizens interact with one another, gather their news, and spend their time. Many people may
believe that online privacy has been put on the back burner and ignored, but this comment explores
the idea that it is not that simple.3 As members of society bond over memes or random viral
photographs, customers’ enjoyment of platforms such as Facebook are guided by differing ideas
of what online privacy even means. By analyzing privacy issues through this lens, a better
understanding of how the concept of privacy has changed in the digitized world will guide future
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discussions.4 Governments will then be able to enact beneficial legislation for global citizens while
still allowing for the free flow of information.5
The current privacy policies of companies such as Instagram, Snapchat, or LinkedIn are
difficult for lay persons to understand.6 These policies are not forthcoming and say things such as,
“[y]ou should read this in full, but here are a few key things we hope you take away from it.”7 By
telling individuals what they need to know, the corporation controls the privacy conversation rather
than the individual.8 For example, Facebook has argued that by posting to one hundred friends on
social media, the author of that post has given up privacy interests and has no reasonable
expectation of privacy.9 From a user’s perspective, if privacy is defined by the corporation rather
than by the individual, it is difficult to trust in those companies to adequately protect privacy
interests of users.10 Rather, the definition of privacy should be defined from an individual
perspective because privacy is personal.11 To illustrate this point, the Chief Executive of Google,
Sundar Pichai has stated:
To the families using the internet through a shared device, privacy might mean
privacy from one another. To the small-business owner who wants to start accepting
credit card payments, privacy means keeping customer data secure. To the teenage
sharing selfies, privacy could mean the ability to delete that data in the future.12
There is a disconnect between how much control individuals are willing to take over their
privacy and their lack of trust in online corporations. This disconnect stems from a non-existent
definition of online privacy with respect to private information, which makes it difficult for
legislatures to draft effective privacy regulations for fear of them becoming as convoluted as online
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See section III.
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stewards of the data they collect.”).
9
Facebook argued that sharing on social media platforms “is an affirmative social act to publish, to disclose, to
share ostensibly private information . . . .”. Charlie Warzel, Facebook Under Oath: You Have No Expectation of
Privacy, THE N. Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/opinion/facebook-courtprivacy.html (quoting the transcript of proceedings, In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., No. 18MD-02843 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2019). Others argue that privacy is personal and each individual should know how
their personal data is being used. Id.
10
Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of Control Over Their Personal Information,
supra note 9 (“Still, the majority of Americans are not confident about the way companies will behave when it
comes to using and protecting their personal data.”).
11
Id.
12
Sundar Pichai, Google’s Sundar Pichai: Privacy Should Not Be a Luxury Good, THE N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/opinion/google-sundar-pichai-privacy.html.
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privacy policies and terms of service.13 To illustrate this tension, as of May 2018, nearly threequarters of Americans did not read terms of service or privacy policies carefully when signing up
for social media networks.14 In fact, 39% of millennials just clicked “agree” without even reading
the terms or policy.15 For millennials this was an increase of 5% from 2014.16 While there is
currently no data for 2020, the trend seems to be that fewer people—particularly—millennials, are
reading terms of service when visiting social media websites.17 Nonetheless, as of May 2018, 3
out of 5 Americans had little to no trust in social media companies with their information.18
However, 40% of millennials had trust in social media sites despite failing to read website’s fine
print.19 If fewer people are reading terms of service and online privacy policies, it is unlikely that
more people will read lengthy privacy laws, much less take an active role in drafting effective
legislation.
Politicians are now responding to these concerns. On February 12, 2020, Democratic
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand of New York proposed that the United States create a Data Protection
Agency to provide personal data protections in the digital age by way of sweeping federal
regulations.20 According to the Senator, it is now necessary for the United States to supply
enhanced data protection to its citizens because the nation is “vastly behind other countries.”21
This comment argues that a federal privacy regulation is necessary in order for the United
States to keep up with the ever-changing privacy concerns of its citizens.22 To address these
concerns, Congress must first enact legislation that gives citizens privacy protections while
crafting that legislation to survive challenges under the First Amendment and prohibit application
of the Dormant Commerce Clause to state regulations. Ideally, this legislation would preempt and
prohibit state-by-state applications of data regulations, as each state regulation includes differing
protections of online privacy and access to personal information. This comment argues that current
proposed solutions fail to account for the very fact that there is no fundamental right to privacy in
the United States. Ultimately, in order for federal privacy legislation to survive the abovementioned legal challenges, a fundamental right to privacy must be established in the United
States. To illustrate the difficulty of such legislation, this comment addresses two differing
protections of online privacy, most clearly illustrated by The General Data Protection Regulation23
13

See Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of Control Over Their Personal Information,
supra note 9 for more statistics and research specifically about privacy policies and the way individuals interact with
those privacy policies.
14
Lincoln Park Strategies & Rad Campaign, Fake News and Privacy: A Concern for Americans More Than Ever, THE
STATE OF SOC. MEDIA AND ONLINE PRIV. (May 2018), onlineprivacydata.com. Nearly one-quarter of Americans are
asked to agree to privacy policies every day. Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of
Control Over Their Personal Information, supra note 9.
15
Lincoln Park Strategies & Rad Campaign, supra note 15. Interestingly, only 22% of adults in the United States
“ever read privacy policies before agreeing to their terms and conditions . . . .” Americans and Privacy: Concerned,
Confused and Feeling Lack of Control Over Their Personal Information, supra note 9.
16
Lincoln Park Strategies & Rad Campaign, supra note 15.
17
See id.
18
Id. Only 63% of all Americans understand data privacy regulations. Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused
and Feeling Lack of Control Over Their Personal Information, supra note 9.
19
Lincoln Park Strategies & Rad Campaign, supra note 15.
20
Sen. Kristin Gillibrand (@gillibrandny), The U.S. Needs A Data Protection Agency, MEDIUM (Feb. 12, 2020),
http://medium.com/@gillibrandy/the-u-s-needs-a-data-protection-agency-98a054f7b6bf.
21
Id.
22
Many scholars have proposed the idea of federal privacy regulation in the United States, and it has been a topic of
discussion as the internet has dominated society.
23
Regulation 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 94, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
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and the California Consumer Privacy Act, soon to be amended by the California Privacy Rights
Act.24
First, this comment dives into the history and current privacy laws in the European Union
to illustrate how the fundamental right to privacy in the European Union makes the GDPR
successful. Section II focuses on the current patchwork of privacy laws of the United States, using
California as an example of what a federal fundamental right to privacy may look like. Section III
will briefly address the California Consumer Privacy Act, as amended by the California Privacy
Rights Act, to assess its viability under both the Dormant Commerce Clause. That challenge will
be critiqued and discussed in relation to the recent passage of the CPRA.

II. PRIVACY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. The History of Privacy Law in the European Union
In order to appreciate and understand the evolution of the General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”) in the European Union, it must be understood that privacy in the European
Union is a fundamental right, meaning that the right of privacy is explicitly protected in Title II,
Article 8 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.25 The recognition of this right allows
the European Union to enact further laws and regulations that reflect the sweeping protection of
this right to privacy.26 More specifically, this right to privacy reflects the right to “protection of
personal information,” not merely privacy as it relates to niche areas such as children, criminal
justice proceedings, or credit information, for example.27 For now, this section will focus on
Directive 96/45, which the GDPR replaced in 2018.
Directive 96/4528 was adopted in the European Union on October 24, 1995 and addressed
the protection of personal and individualized information.29 The Directive established that the
specific right to privacy must be balanced against competing interests such as artistic expression
and journalistic purposes of media, to name a few.30 With respect to journalistic purposes, the
European Union has limited the right to privacy with respect to the literary and societal value of a
journalistic publication in question.31 The European Union Court of Justice has held that published
media does not lose its journalistic purpose when the media contains personal information, for
24

California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA), CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (2018).
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C.326) 391, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT.
26
See id; Data Protection, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/dataprotection_en.
27
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C.326) 391, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT.
28
Formally titled the “protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data.” Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 1995
O.J. (L. 281) 31, 31.
29
Id.
30
Id. See also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C.326) 391, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT; Joseph Savirimuthu, All or Nothing: This is the
Question? The Application of Article 3(2) Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, to the Internet, 25 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUT. & INFO. L. 241, 264 (2008).
31
Högsta Domstolen [HD] [Supreme Court] 2001-6-12 Ö B 293-00 (Swed.),
https://people.dsv.su.se/~jpalme/society/Ramsbro-HD-domen.html.
25
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example, insulting judgements about other people.32 The Court balanced the value of individual
privacy rights laid out in the Directive against the freedom of expression and determined that the
journalistic purpose of media outlives character attacks contained within the news stories.33 As the
internet and its information becomes more accessible, balancing these fundamental rights
continues to get increasingly difficult and uncertain.34
Indeed, the importance of Directive 96/45 was the underlying principle that “dataprocessing systems are designed to serve man; whereas they must . . . respect their fundamental
rights and freedoms . . . and contribute to economic and social progress . . . .”35 The current “Right
to Be Forgotten,” codified in the Article 17 of the GDPR,36 derives from Google Spain SL v.
Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEDP), which was decided May 13, 2014 by the
European Court of Justice.37 In that case, a resident of Spain, Mr. Gonzalez, alleged that reference
to his personal information on a website by Google through search results violated his fundamental
right to privacy.38 First, Mr. Gonzalez wanted the website itself to delete the pages on which his
personal information was included because the dispute to which the personal information related
to had been settled several years ago in connection with legal proceedings.39 While the Court
determined that the website itself was not liable under Directive 96/45 because the information
was legally contained within the page, the Court did make clear that obligations under the Directive
were owed to individuals directly by the operators of the search engines, rather than the operators
of the newspapers or links listed in the search results.40 Mr. Gonzalez’s request for Google to
remove mentions of his name from search results that could lead to discovery of this personal
information was thus accepted by the Court. 41
This is to be distinguished from the type of processing carried out by publishers of websites
whose website data appears in the search result list.42 The Court took a strong stance regarding
European Union citizen’s fundamental rights by stating that the operators of any search engine

32

Id. at 11.
Joseph Savirimuthu, All or Nothing: This is the Question? The Application of Article 3(2) Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC, to the Internet, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 241, 264 (2008) (quoting Ramsbro, B293-00 at 11).
34
See generally id. at 264-65 (arguing that “it may be difficult to balance the competing interests such as, rights of
expression and rights of privacy in such cases.”). Interestingly, this article was written in 2008 but these two competing
interests bear on the GDPR and protection of online privacy.
35
Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 31 (EC).
36
Regulation 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. See below for a more indepth discussion.
37
Case C-131/12, Google Spain, SL v. Agencia Española de Prot. de Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
317 (May 13, 2014).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. (“the operator of a search engine is obliged to remove from the list of results displayed following a search made
on the basis of a person’s name links to web pages, published by third parties and containing information relating to
that person . . . .”).
42
“It is undisputed that that activity of search engines plays a decisive role in the overall dissemination of those data
in that it renders the later accessible to any internet user making a search on the basis of the data subjects name,
including to internet users who otherwise would not have found the web page on which those data were published.”
Case C-131/12, Google Spain, SL v. Agencia Española de Prot. de Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
317 (May 13, 2014). “Google Search does not merely give access to content hosted on the indexed websites, but takes
advantage of that activity and includes, in return for payment, advertising associated with the internet users’ search
terms, for undertakings which wish to use that tool in order to offer their goods or services to the internet users.” Id.
33
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must ensure the fundamental rights to privacy and the protection of personal data. 43 The Court
further recognized that information from websites can be copied onto other websites, some of
which are not subject to European Union legislation.44 Therefore, the Court concluded that search
engines are not able to wait until the personal information of data subjects has been erased on
websites before de-listing the search engine results.45 In effect, the search engine must simply delist all relevant personal information without regard to whether that personal information has first
been taken down by the individual websites, or if those websites were subject to European Union
legislation to begin with.46 Thus, with respect to the fundamental right to privacy, search engines
are responsible under the Directive as data-processing systems, rather than individual websites.47
The acknowledgment by the Court that search engines themselves are subject to the
Directive and now, the GDPR, makes those corporations responsible for the protection of
individual personal data and individual privacy considerations.48 This puts a large responsibility
on the search engines. In effect, some may find it too difficult or cumbersome to follow European
Union guidelines and thus find it not worth it to operate within the European Union. 49 This
collateral effect is one of the many shortcomings of putting the protection and definition of
personal data and privacy in the hands of corporations rather than the individual.

B. The Current Privacy Law in the European Union
Responding to a need to “provide legal certainty and transparency,”50 the General Data
Protection Regulation51 took effect on May 25, 2018 and repealed Directive 95/46. This regulation,
nearly identical to Directive 95/46 but with added protections, recognizes that an individual’s
fundamental right to privacy may be outweighed by the right to freedom of information and
expression across the internet or other mediums.52 There are six principles53 that govern the GDPR.
These principles are to be upheld by all businesses and organizations that qualify under the
regulation and are as follows: (1) “lawfulness, fairness, and transparency”54; (2) “purpose

43

Id.
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
See section I.
49
The EU General Data Protection Regulation: Questions and Answers, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 6, 2018
5:00am EDT), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/06/eu-general-data-protection-regulation (“Although the GDPR
is an EU regulation, it will affect the data practices of many organizations outside the EU.”).
50
Case C-131/12, Google Spain, SL v. Agencia Española de Prot. de Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
317 (May 13, 2014).
51
Regulation 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data and repealing Directive 95/46, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU).
52
See id.
53
Id. at art. 5.
54
Id. at 1(a).
44
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limitation”55; (3) “data minimization”56; (4) “accuracy”57; (5) “storage limitation”58; and (6)
“integrity and confidentiality.”59
As a general provision, the European Union Court holds that it is not for individual
newspapers, magazines, or online sources to take down information on individual webpages.60 But
it is for the search engine to take sufficiently effective measures, as codified in the GDPR and
reinforced by Court decisions, to protect individual data subject’s fundamental rights.61 Search
engines must also “seriously discourage[e]” all those internet users from accessing information
related to an individual.62 What is meant by “seriously discourage” is ill-defined and unclear,
therefore, the extent of search engine obligations under the GDPR is up to differing interpretations.
As recently as 2018, the European Court of Human Rights held that a hyperlink posted on
a website that led to a separate defamatory website fell within an exception63 to an application of
a strict liability standard for defamation.64 The Court recognized that the primary purpose of
hyperlinks is to call readers’ attention to other material listed on a different website, and therefore
acts as a connection to other sources of information.65 Thus, the flow of information on the internet
from hyperlinking material to which the original publication does not exercise control might have
a “chilling effect,” either directly or indirectly, on the freedom of expression on the Internet.66
The European Court of Justice’s decision in Google LLC v. Commission nationale de
l’informatique et des libertes (CNIL) determined that a search engine is not required to remove a
link from all domain names used by the search engine in order to comply with the GDPR.67 The
practical effect of this requirement would be that if the operator did remove the links from all
domain names, no links would appear within a search regardless of where the search took place
and whether this search was from within the European Union or outside of it, such as in the United
States.68 Therefore, in order to address and combat some of the privacy interests at stake, Google
proposed a “geo-blocking” feature.69 This would block users in certain locations from accessing
information, regardless of which version of Google the user was searching.70 The individual’s

55

Id. at 1(b).
Id. at 1(c).
57
Regulation 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data and repealing Directive 95/46, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) at art. 5(1)(d).
58
Id. at 1(e).
59
Id. at 1(f).
60
Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de I’informatique et des libertes (CNIL), 2019
ECLI:EU:2019:771, (Sept. 24, 2019).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Regulation 2016/679, supra note 24 at art. 10. (Processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and
offences).
64
Magyar Jeti Zrt v. Hungary, 2018 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Google LLC v. Commission nationale de I’informatique et des libertes (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
772 (Sept. 24, 2019).
68
Id; see also Ibrahim Hasan, Google v CNIL and the Right to be Forgotten, PUBLICLAWTODAY (Nov. 8, 2019),
https://www.publiclawtoday.co.uk/information-law/344-information-law-features/41816-;
69
Google LLC v. Commission nationale de I’informatique et des libertes (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
772 (Sept. 24, 2019).
70
Id.
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location would be generated from an IP (Internet Protocol) address 71 so that Google could
determine whether the individual was located within the European Union.72 The Court balanced
the fundamental right to privacy with the right to information and determined that this feature was
an adequate solution by Google.73
While the Court recognized that the right to protect personal data is not an absolute right
for citizens, a balancing test is used to determine how that right squares with the function of society
and against other fundamental right—most importantly the freedom of expression and
information.74 Balancing these fundamental rights along with the necessary interests of the data
controller differ with respect to the context in which the processing takes place. Thus, each
balancing test determination varies significantly from case to case. 75 The Court stressed the fact
that Member States must reconcile the differing protections of online privacy and how those states
balance the fundamental right to privacy with the right of expression.76 In fact, European Union
law does not currently provide for cooperation between Member States, and those states have not
come to a joint decision on how to apply this balancing test in relation to the scope of dereferencing information outside the physical boundaries of the European Union.77 However, the
Court concluded that this is for search engines themselves to figure out.78
The Court also recognized that balancing the right to privacy of internet users and access
to information is likely to vary around the world.79 The Court concluded that, based on the
judgement in Google Spain, the subject of the search may request information to no longer be
accessible to the general public through search results.80 These individual “rights override . . . not
only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general
public in finding that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name.”81
Although the European Union recognizes a fundamental right to privacy, Member States
may balance the right to privacy with other rights, such as the right to free expression on the
internet, differently than other States.82 This patchwork of laws is representative of the way that

“Each device that connects to the Internet needs a unique identifying number with which to communicate, called an
‘IP address’”. What is an IP address?, APNIC, https://www.apnic.net/get-ip/faqs/what-is-an-ip-address/ (last visited
Jan 31, 2020).
72
Google LLC v. Commission nationale de I’informatique et des libertes (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
772 (Sept. 24, 2019).
73
Id.
74
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Title II, art. 11 (“Freedom of expression and information”).
75
Id. at 5.
76
Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de I’informatique et des libertes (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 772 (Sept. 24, 2019); Google LLC v. National Commission on Informatics and Liberty (CNIL),
GLOBAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/google-llc-v-nationalcommission-on-informatics-and-liberty-cnil/ (last visited Jan 31, 2021).
77
Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de I’informatique et des libertes (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 772 (Sept. 24, 2019) (stating that “[t]here is no obligation under EU law, for a search engine operator
who grants a request for de-referencing made by a data subject, as the case may be, following an injunction . . . to
carry out such a de-referencing on all the versions of its search engine”).
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
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the California Consumer Privacy Act fits in with the rest of the laws and regulations in the United
States.83

III. PRIVACY LAW IN CALIFORNIA
California has led the way for social and political change around the country. It doesn’t
come as a surprise then that California’s constitution formally recognizes both happiness and
privacy as “inalienable rights” for citizens.84 The state’s unique recognition of the right to privacy
slowly but surely paved the way for the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018.
As early as 1931, the California Court of Appeals held that California citizens have a right
to privacy.85 The Court stated that the law of privacy was recent and cited The Right to Privacy by
the Honorable Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren in 1890.86 That article influenced the
national recognition of the right to privacy, although many states refused to formally recognize
privacy as a fundamental right.87 The Court recognized that private events may become public as
a matter of public record, but nonetheless, the Court recognized that in California, the fundamental
law of the state permitted the recognition of the “right to pursue and obtain safety and happiness
without improper infringements thereon by others.” 88
The California courts expanded on this notion of private versus public information,
eventually commenting on the nature of electronic communications. In 1971, the California
Supreme Court criticized the role of media and electronic devices, “destroy[ing] an individual’s
autonomy, intrud[ing] upon his most intimate activities, and expos[ing] his personal characteristics

83

See, e.g., Practical Law Data Privacy Advisor, Demonstrating Compliance with the GDPR (2019). The European
Courts are not the only courts around the world to recognize the inherent difficulty when trying to apply different
values of privacy and balance those values with other fundamental rights. For example, The Delhi High Court in
2019 issued an injunction against Google, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter and directed those platforms to remove
URLs that linked to defamatory information. Ramdev v. Facebook, GLOBAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION,
https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/ramdev-v-facebook/ (last visited May 23, 2020). The Court
viewed geo-blocking as an insufficient way to prevent access to the defamatory information while recognizing that
this would necessarily call for a “global takedown order” and would threaten the free flow of information on the
internet. Id. See, e.g., Jennifer Huddleston & Ian Adams, Potential Constitutional Conflicts in State and Local Data
Privacy Regulations, REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY PROJECT OF THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/RTP-Cyber-and-Privacy-Paper-Constitutional-Conflicts-in-Data-Privacyfinal.pdf.
84
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”).
85
Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931). In this case, Gabrielle Darley a prostitute and was tried for
murder which she was ultimately acquitted of. Id. After this, Darley “abandoned her life of shame and became entirely
rehabilitated . . . [the next year she] commenced the duties of caring for their home, and thereafter at all times lived
an exemplary, virtuous, honorable, and righteous life.” Id. Darley mentioned to the Court that her friends did not know
about her past. Id. However, in July 1925, a movie was released entitled “The Red Kimono,” which was based upon
Darley’s past life, a true story. Id.
86
Id. at 91. The Court distinguished California from other jurisdictions, “[t]he question is a new one in California.
The only case to which we have been cited which even remotely relates to it is that of Crane v. Heine, 35 Cal. App.
466, 170 P. 433. This case, however, furnishes us with no authority for adopting in this state the doctrine of the right
of privacy as it is known in other jurisdictions.” Id. at 92; Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (December 1890).
87
Melvin, 297 P. at 92.
88
Id. at 93.
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to public gaze.”89 When determining whether an embarrassing yet truthful news article infringed
on an individual’s right to privacy, the Court considered the social value of the article and the
offensive nature of the information contained in the article.90 The Court noted that current events
naturally spark media attention, and because that information has a high social value, constitutional
protections are higher for newsworthy events.91 Distinguishing those newsworthy events from the
article at issue, the Court determined that this article did not serve an “independent public
purpose,” and thus the individual’s privacy concerns outweighed First Amendment protections.92
That case was subsequently overruled by Gates v. Discovery Comm., Inc in 2004.93 The
Court took a step back from an individual’s right to privacy, at least so far as it relates to facts
available in public record.94 The California Court concluded that prior Supreme Court decisions,
specifically Cox. v. Cohn, undermined the recognition of an individual’s fundamental right to
privacy and favored broad First Amendment protections for news articles.95 Importantly, the Court
recognized that under federal constitutional law principles and common law, the right to privacy
is difficult to recognize as a fundamental right.96 Thus, while happiness and privacy are both
“inalienable rights” under the California constitution, courts have had difficulty balancing these
rights with other constitutional protections such as the First Amendment.97

IV. THE CCPA
A. What is the CCPA?
The California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) includes many different provisions, but
this section will focus specifically on § 1798.105 of the California Civil Code as amended by the
Act98. The goals of the CCPA expand on the existing right to privacy in the United States and
provide Californians with data privacy protections in order to control the use of personal
information.99 The California legislation was approved a month after the GDPR went into effect,
and is the strictest personal data privacy regime in the United States.100 The Act only applies in
California and to California residents, however making compliance by internet companies that
engage in business within the United States inherently difficult.101

Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n.,483 P.2d 34, 37 (1971).
Id. at 38.
91
Id. at 40.
92
Id. at 39-40 (relying on A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People (1960)).
93
See Gates v. Discovery Comm., Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004).
94
Id. at 562.
95
Id. See Victor P. Muskin, The Right to Be Forgotten: Are Europe and America on a Collision Course?, 91 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 36 (March, 2019).
96
Gates, 101 P.3d at 573. See also Shaun G. Jamison, Creating a National Data Privacy Law For the United States,
10 CYBARIS AN INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 7 (2019) for a discussion on a federal right to privacy.
97
See Gates v. Discovery Comm., Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004).
98
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (2018).
99
About the California Consumer Privacy Act, CALIFORNIANS FOR CONSUMER PRIVACY,
https://www.caprivacy.org/about (last visited Jan. 17, 2020).
100
Szuyin Leow, The California Consumer Privacy Act Arrives in January 2020. What Can We Expect?, LOGICATE
(Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.logicgate.com/2019/02/12/the-california-consumer-privacy-act-arrives-in-january2020-what-can-we-expect/.
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Id.
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The CCPA requires a business to comply with customer requests to delete personal
information102 if the customer requests that deletion, unless it is necessary for the business to
collect this personal data.103 The Act gives Californians specific privacy rights, including: (1) the
right to know what personal information is collected about the consumer; (2) the right to know
whether that information is sold or disclosed, and to whom; (3) the right to say no to that sale; (4)
the right to access that information; and (5) the right to equal treatment by the business.104
California is just one of eleven states that recognize privacy as an enumerated right in its
state constitution.105 However, balancing one state’s fundamental right of privacy with federal
constitutional law principles is difficult at best.106 In order to determine whether the CCPA comes
into conflict with federal constitutional principles, it is necessary to analyze the Act under the
Dormant Commerce Clause.

B. Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge
A central constitutional challenge to the CCPA is the Dormant Commerce Clause, which
prohibits discrimination between in state and out-of-state citizens.107 When Congress or the
Supreme Court has not preempted an area of state legislation, state legislation is analyzed under
strict or intermediate scrutiny in order to be constitutional.108 The following analysis focuses on
the challenges of the CCPA under this Constitutional principle.109
Article I of the United States Constitution supports the principle that state and local laws
may not burden commerce between the states more than necessary.110 When challenging a state
regulation under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the first question for the court is whether the
state legislation is an “illegitimate means of isolating a state from the national economy,” and thus
is facially discriminatory (a per se violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause).111 Discrimination
means “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the
The Act defines “personal information” as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable
of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or
household.” West's Ann. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140. This includes, but is not limited to, “inferences drawn . . . to
create a profile about a consumer reflecting . . . preferences, characteristics, psychological trends, predispositions,
behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes.” Id. While the CCPA does not include publicly available
information “lawfully made available from federal, state, or local government records,” the definition of “personal
information” is vague, broad, and unspecific. CCPA, Section 1798.140(o)(2); see David Zetoony, CCPA Privacy
FAQs: Does “personal information” include information that a business obtains from government records?,
JDSUPRA (July 17, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ccpa-privacy-faqs-does-personal-17583/ (last visited
Feb. 23, 2020) (“The CCPS was put together quickly (in approximately one week). Given its hasty drafting, there are
a number of instances in which the act is at best ambiguous and at worst unintelligible.”).
103
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION INFORMATION, AB-1760 CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT OF 2018 (2019); Alan
S. Gutterman, California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Bus. Transactions Solutions § 230:38.50.
104
Id.
105
Id.; Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NCLS, https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-andinformation-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx (last visited May 27, 2020).
106
See, e.g., Huddleston & Adams, supra note 84.
107
See, e.g, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
108
See id.
109
For an in-depth discussion, see Russell Spivak, Too Big a Fish in the Digital Pond? The California Consumer
Privacy Act and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 475 (2019); Huddleston & Adams, supra note
84.
110
Huddleston & Adams, supra note 84.
111
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978).
102
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former and burdens the latter.”112 These laws are subject to the strictest scrutiny, as economic
protectionism is not a legitimate means to “evenhandedly [] effectuate a legitimate local public
interest.”113 When state legislation is an “illegitimate means of isolating the state from the national
economy,” this state law will be facially discriminatory towards out-of-state commerce.114 When
a law is not facially discriminatory, the law is subject to the Pike balancing test.115 This test is
conducted by answering the following four questions of the state regulation: (1) whether the
regulation is even-handed; (2) whether the regulation effectuates a legitimate purpose; (3) whether
the regulation’s effects on interstate commerce are incidental; and (4) whether the burden of the
state regulation is excessive in relation to local putative benefits.116
The argument that the CCPA does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause relies in part
on Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., in which the Supreme Court of the United States determined that
when a state regulates commerce occurring “wholly outside” that State’s borders, that regulation
is invalid.117 Scholars argue that the language of the CCPA, specifically the language in §
1798.140(c)(1) that only those businesses that actually “do[] business in the State of California”
precludes application of the extraterritoriality test to the CPPA, while others write this
extraterritorial test off as inapplicable except to those cases of price-fixing, such as in Healy.118
However, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals in American Bookstores recognized that because
there are no recognized geographical boundaries within the internet, it is nearly impossible for a
state to regulate those activities on the internet without “project[ing] its legislation into other
states.”119 In that case, the Court struck down a law prohibiting dissemination of sexually harmful
materials to children over the internet.120 The Court determined that Vermont’s interest was
“impracticable” because the Vermont law prohibited Vermont, but not other states, from viewing
certain materials.121 Importantly, the Court noted that the internet may soon be protected from
state-by-state regulations.122 Thus, the burdens imposed by the CCPA do not end with the
corporation who is directly affected but will instead create a domino effect of far-reaching
implications for those business who regularly use personal data.123
112

Spivak, supra note 110, at 495 (quoting Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99
(1994)).
113
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
114
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S at 627.
115
Nicholas F. Palmeri, Who Should Regulate Data?: An Analysis of The California Consumer Privacy Act and Its
Effects on Nationwide Data Protection Laws, 11 Hastings Sci. & Tech.L.J. 37, (2020).
116
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. For a more in-depth discussion, see Palmeri, supra note 116.
117
Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989).
118
Spivak, supra note 110. While this article does not go into great detail about the different tests under the Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, the extraterritorial argument is the primary analysis used to determine whether the
CCPA is invalid. See, e.g., Kiran K. Jeevanjee, Nice Thought, Poor Execution: Why the Dormant Commerce Clause
Precludes California’s CCPA from Setting National Privacy Law, 70 AM. U. L. REV. F. 75, 75 (2020); Mallory
Ursul, The States’ Role in Data Privacy: California Consumer Privacy Act versus Dormant Commerce Clause, 52
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 577, 578 (2019); Palmeri, supra note 116.
119
American Booksellers Foundation v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Healy, 491 U.S. 324 at
334).
120
Id. at 102.
121
Id. at 103-04 (“A person outside Vermont who posts information on a website or on an electronic discussion
group cannot prevent in Vermont from accessing the material. If someone in Connecticut posts material for the
intended benefit of other people in Connecticut, that person must assume that someone from Vermont may also view
the material. This means those outside Vermont must comply with [the law]. . . .”).
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Id. at 104.
123
Huddleston & Adams, supra note 84, at 8.
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The scholars who only look to the language of the CCPA or who write off the
extraterritorial analysis as inapplicable are mistaken to do so. Admittedly, it is difficult to argue
that the CCPA regulates something that is occurring “wholly outside” the state’s borders; however,
the internet, social media, and online data regulations do not follow along the border of any state.124
While the CCPA may say that the regulation only applies to those businesses doing business in
California, the stringent requirements for compliance under the regulation impact other businesses
not yet doing business in California. For example, some of those businesses may have chosen not
to do business in California and may never do so because it is too difficult or expensive to comply
with the requirements under the CCPA. The corporations located within California are now faced
with a new reality: either comply with the most comprehensive privacy Act in the country or stop
doing business in California.125
The CPRA may nonetheless save the CCPA from an extraterritorial argument.126 As
currently written, the CPRA has increased the number of California residents of which businesses
“buy, sell, or share” the personal information of from 50,000 to 100,000.127 This increase raises
the threshold that a business must reach in order to be regulated by the CCPA, in turn creating
more of a limitation on the businesses that are considered to do business in California.
An additional consideration under the Dormant Commerce Clause is whether states such
as Maine128 and Nevada129 expand current privacy regulations to be as comprehensive as the
CCPA.130 A federal fundamental right to privacy, and as a result, federal privacy regulation, would
preempt these state laws and effectively prohibit any application of the Dormant Commerce Clause
to these swiss-cheese like state regulations.131

V. CONCLUSION
The internet will continue to impact society in the future, which renders it necessary to
determine how differing privacy laws will affect how global citizens interact with one another,

124

See Section I(A).
Huddleston & Adams, supra note 84, at 8-9.
126
For more information on what is included in the CPRA, see CCPA vs. CPRA - What Has Changed?, ONETRUST
(Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.onetrust.com/blog/ccpa-vs-cpra-what-has-changed/.
127
Id.
128
The Maine Privacy Law, LD 946, only applies to internet service providers, and thus is not nearly as
comprehensive as the CCPA. An Act To Protect The Privacy of Online Customer Information, 1 M.R.S. § 9301
(2019); see also Lothar Determann & Helena J. Engfeldt, Maine and Nevada’s New Data Privacy Laws and the
California Consumer Privacy Act Compared, BAKERMCKENZIE (June 20, 2019),
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2019/06/maine-and-nevada-new-data-privacy-laws.
129
Nevada Senate Bill 220 limits the type of information protected. See Nev. Rev. Stat § 603A (2019); see also
Lothar Determann & Helena J. Engfeldt, Maine and Nevada’s New Data Privacy Laws and the California
Consumer Privacy Act Compared, BAKERMCKENZIE (June 20, 2019),
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2019/06/maine-and-nevada-new-data-privacy-laws.
130
“[I]f multiple states adopted comprehensive date privacy legislation . . . conflicting state privacy regulations
resulting in unreasonable or even impossible compliance could support . . . extraterritoriality.” Mallory Ursul, The
States’ Role in Data Privacy: California Consumer Privacy Act Versus Dormant Commerce Clause, 52 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 577, 601 (2019).
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For more information on one federal privacy approach, see Cameron F. Kerry & John B. Morris, Jr., Preemption:
A balanced national approach to protecting all Americans’ privacy, BROOKINGS (June 29, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/06/29/preemption-a-balanced-national-approach-to-protecting-allamericans-privacy/.
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whether that is across the room or across the world.132 By analyzing privacy with this perspective
in mind, a better understanding of what privacy means in a digitized world will guide future
discussions to allow for beneficial privacy legislation.133 As discussed above, although social
media has increased at alarming rates just within the past few years, the internet has not reached
its peak.134 Privacy laws, both past and current, have worked for a short moment. As technology
continues to grow, it is more important than ever to assign privacy value in relation to other
constitutional protections and to define what privacy means in the digital age.135
In the European Union, Directive 96/45 set the foundation for the “Right to be
Forgotten.”136 Member States have acknowledged the difficulty of balancing individuals’
expression interests with the fundamental right to privacy.137 Courts have determined that it is the
responsibility of the search engine to adequately protect personal data, which in effect puts the
privacy conversation in the hands of corporations.138 Similarly, in the state of California, United
States, the fundamental law of the state has permitted the courts to formally recognize a
fundamental right to happiness and privacy, although squaring this right with other constitutional
protections, such as the First Amendment, has proven challenging.139
The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 is the most sweeping data protection regime
currently in effect within the United States.140 However, this Act has several significant hurdles to
jump over before consumers should blindly accept the consequences that will soon affect the
accessibility of information worldwide and between the states.141 The Act will be modified by the
CPRA in 2023, however, which may save the CCPA for failing under the Dormant Commerce
Clause.142
Federal legislation in the United States fails to account for internet privacy in a comparable
way to both the CCPA and the GDPR.143 The United States Congress should draft federal
legislation that will ultimately preempt state laws such as the CCPA and prevent those laws to be
applied on a state-by-state basis.144 First, however, privacy must be established as a fundamental
right, specifically enumerated in the Constitution of the United States.
There are no geographical boundaries on an Instagram or Facebook page. It is possible to
message a person on the opposite side of the world. A picture on Instagram may go “viral” in a
number of minutes. Technology and the internet are here to stay. Social media, news outlets, and
the access to unlimited information at individual fingertips comes with a price, and it is likely that
132
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“price” is the inherent loss of individual privacy if that determination is left up to the corporation
and privacy is not regarded as a fundamental right within the United States.
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I. INTRO
“Truly fortunate is the nation, which sets itself the goal of finding the means to improve.”1
-- Tobias Asser, founder of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
The above words of Tobias Asser guide the recently passed Hague Judgments Convention.
Asser started initiatives for a convention that would improve global judicial cooperation in light
of growing cross-border trade and international commerce.2 Recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments is regulated by national law, domestic law, and “principles of comity,
reciprocity and res judicata.”3
In the US, enforcement of foreign judgments depends on the state in which enforcement is
4
sought. On the other side, enforcement of US court judgments in another country encounter
criticism regarding “excessive” monetary damages.5 Hence, approximately 90% of international
commercial contracts6 rely on arbitration clauses under the New York Convention to ensure
enforceability across jurisdictions.7
Since its passage in 1958, the New York Convention has risen to the challenge of
international business and dispute needs. However, while arbitration was historically the cheaper,
quicker, and more efficient alternative to litigation,8 the tides have turned. Modern practices are
causing arbitral amounts-in-dispute to rise.9 Discovery processes and motion practices extend the
proceedings to last longer.10 Arbitration’s traditional hallmarks, “speedy, simple, and
inexpensive”11 are a fairly tale of the past.
Currently, foreign court judgments run the risk of unenforceability when parties are seeking
recognition beyond their jurisdiction unless states are party to a specific judgment enforcement
treaty or the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement (“Choice of Court
Convention”). Even then, it is hard to know when and how a judicial ruling will be recognized in
another jurisdiction. Today, the US is a signatory only to the Choice of Court Convention.12
HAGUE CONVENTION ON PRIVATE INT’L. LAW [hereinafter HCCH], 22nd Diplomatic Session of the HCCH: The
Adoption of the 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention, YOUTUBE (Sep. 9, 2019), https://youtu.be/1SgcrsD9Iao
[hereinafter 22nd Diplomatic Session].
2
Id.
3
Bureau
of
Consular
Affairs,
Enforcement
of
Judgments,
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
STATE,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/internl-judicial-asst/Enforcement-ofJudges.html.
4
SCOTT A EDELMAN ET AL., ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: IN 28 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 131, 131
(Patrick Doris ed., 2006), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/Edelman-JuraEnforcement-of-Foreign-Judgments-US.pdf.
5
Bureau of Consular Affairs, supra note 3.
6
S.I. Strong, Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International Commercial Mediation, 73 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1973, 1976 (2016).
7
Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1119, 1141-42 n.137 (2019).
8
Strong, supra note 6, at 1983.
9
See generally 1982-83.
10
See id. at 1983.
11
Bookman, supra note 7, at 1125.
12
Bureau of Consular Affairs, supra note 3; see generally HCCH, Status Table: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice
of Court Agreements, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98; Bureau of Consular
1
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To deal with a growing international commercial community, resulting in a rising number
of international commercial disputes, the HCCH sought to tackle the challenges of modern
commerce. On July 2, 2019, the HCCH’s 22nd Diplomatic Session met in The Hague and passed
the Hague Judgments Convention.13 The Hague Judgments Convention would expand dispute
resolution options available to businesses. The Hague Judgments Convention promises
enforceability of judicial rulings across borders among signatory states, seeking a solution to the
international litigation question: Will my judgment be enforced outside of the jurisdiction of the
court that rendered the judgment?
The Hague Judgments Convention’s underlying goal is uniformity and predictability in
international judicial proceedings.14 To encourage recognition of foreign judgments and achieve
this goal of uniformity and predictability, judges are encouraged to interpret contracts with an
“international spirit.”15 This ethos requires judges to rise to the challenge and incorporate all
applicable regulations, rules, and laws potentially relevant to international proceedings. 16 By
fostering uniformity, attorneys should be better at predicting enforceability of judgments, assisting
clients in selecting the most appropriate dispute resolution option, as well as choosing the
appropriate forum and governing law during negotiations.17 In essence, the new Hague Judgments
Convention should foster faster court proceedings and resolutions on the international stage.18
Additionally, the Hague Judgments Convention should increase convenience, offering a one-stopshop for determining the question of enforceability19 rather than requiring thorough research and
analysis of existing, and sometimes non-existing, independent treaties.
On its face, the Hague Judgments Convention appears promising. What can be wrong with
the advancement of cross-border cooperation? However, the devil lies in the details. This article
will take a look at what those details are, what it will take for the Hague Judgments Convention to
reach commercial significance, and once reached, what factors will push businesses in one
direction or another when selecting the most appropriate dispute resolution option.
Part II of this article will introduce the Hague Judgments Convention, relevant Articles for
commercial transactions and enforcement, and the Hague Judgments Convention’s history. To put
the Hague Judgments Convention in perspective, the Hague Judgments Convention will be
compared to the New York Convention and the recently passed Singapore Mediation Convention,
both introduced in Part II.

Affairs,
International
Treaties
&
Agreements,
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
STATE,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/intl-treaties.html.
13
HCCH, It’s done: the 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention has been adopted!, https://www.hcch.net/en/newsarchive/details/?varevent=687 (last visited Sep. 11, 2020) [hereinafter It’s done].
14
HCCH, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters,
art. 20 (concluded July 2, 2019) https://assets.hcch.net/docs/806e290e-bbd8-413d-b15e-8e3e1bf1496d.pdf
[hereinafter Recognition and Enforcement].
15
HCCH, Twenty-Second Session, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 86, art. 21 ¶ 3939, July 2,
2019 https://assets.hcch.net/docs/7d2ae3f7-e8c6-4ef3-807c-15f112aa483d.pdf [hereinafter Twenty-Second Session].
16
Id.
17
HCCH, Recognition and Enforcement, supra note 14.
18
HCCH, 22nd Diplomatic Session, supra note 1.
19
Id.
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Part III analyzes various factors that must be met in order for the Hague Judgments
Convention to take on a significant role. Divided into three subsections, the first section considers
factors influencing states when deciding to sign onto the Hague Judgments Convention and
analyzes what hurdles states must overcome before wanting to join, including political concerns
and biases. Part III will also consider the realities of commercial significance in light of signatories.
The second section will analyze practical considerations such as the freedom to contract and costs
associated with dispute resolution. The third and final section of Part III will assume commercial
significance, analyzing the balancing process parties undertake when considering litigation over
arbitration as a new dispute resolution option.
Part IV will conclude, demonstrating that the hurdles placed before state governments,
contracting parties, and enforcing courts make court proceedings on the international stage less
desirable than arbitration to date. Although a noble cause and a worthy objective to strive for in
the future, as the world stands today, arbitration will carry the day.

II. BACKGROUND
When negotiating contracts, parties have significant flexibility in choosing the type of
dispute resolution, forum, governing law, and other important factors necessary for a successful
agreement. International contracts generally turn to the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts for basic principles that will easily translate to enforceability on the
international stage.20 As international trade has progressed, substantive law has evolved into a
harmonious body of legal principles.21 However, contracts are generally up to the parties and are
thoroughly negotiated by highly sophisticated parties.22 Hence, parties will choose their preferred
dispute resolution option based on enforceability, confidentiality, efficiency, and much more.
Unlike litigation or arbitration, mediation serves as a popular proceeding in resolving disputes
early on. Because participation is voluntary and decisions are non-binding, proceedings tend to
preserve the parties’ relationships,23 encouraging continued trading practices. With that in mind,
the legal industry on a global scale is trying to facilitate interstate relations, foster commerce, and
find forms of dispute resolutions that will satisfy everyone involved. Two of the more popular
adjudicative dispute resolution options are litigation and arbitration. Currently, arbitration wins on
the international playing field, because court rulings generally lack enforcement in foreign
jurisdictions. Hence, the leaders of global commerce have tried to find ways to resolve this
discrepancy with the Hague Judgments Convention.
Because arbitration comes in two flavors—ad hoc and institutional proceedings—it is
worth noting that this article spends little time on ad hoc proceedings, as there is insufficient data
available; however, its absence has no effect on the underlying analysis and conclusion.

20

Klaus P. Berger, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, An Article-by-Article Commentary,
34 ARB. INT’L 469–71 (2018).
21
Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 30 (2008).
22
Bookman, supra note 7, at 1128.
23
G.A. Res. 73/198, at 3 (Dec. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Singapore Convention].
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A. Basics
Parties carefully negotiate commercial contracts. Hence, every contract will vary from
other contracts, even though negotiations start off with each party referencing their basic content
checklist - similar to form contracts. International contracts are inherently customized documents,
capable of adapting to the participating parties, current economic settings, and relevant legal
standards.
When businesses are negotiating regarding which form of dispute resolution to select, they
are dealing with three options: arbitration, litigation, and mediation.24 As this article will
demonstrate, each option comes with its own advantages and disadvantages. The first option,
arbitration, offers privacy and confidentiality but outcomes are case-specific and results are not
reasonably predictable.25 The second option, litigation, offers predictability and reliability, but is
inherently public. The third option, mediation, offers privacy and confidentiality as well, but is an
agreement as opposed to a third-party decision. Usually mediation is selected in addition to one of
the other two options. Rarely will a contract select both arbitration and litigation. When negotiating
the dispute resolution clause, businesses and their attorneys alike are well advised to consider the
options available to them thoroughly analyzing advantages and disadvantages before setting their
selection in stone.
Arbitration is much more flexible for the individual parties. Procedurally, litigation offers
more regulated and generalized guidelines, whereas arbitration and arbitral institutions allow for
personalized and tailored rules.26 For example, parties to arbitration will purposely search for a
neutral forum to hold their proceedings, whereas forum shopping in courts is frowned upon.
Although judges will generally follow the parties’ agreement and even apply the contract’s
governing law, judges are bound by procedural rules and public policy considerations.
Furthermore, in arbitration the parties may designate a specific arbitrator responsible for the
proceedings. Because arbitrators have no educational or skill requirements other than what the
parties agree upon, considerations for selecting the appropriate arbitrator may include the
arbitrator’s knowledge in the industry, the chosen governing law, or a common language between
the parties. In contrast, court proceedings will not allow parties to shop for judges.
Additionally, the right to appeal in arbitration is limited; in contrast, it is a constitutional
right in judicial proceedings. Finality of arbitral awards is achieved upon receiving the award.
Even if parties agree to judicial appeals, the arbitral award cannot be challenged on its merits.
Parties can only appeal awards based on procedural flaws. If an arbitral appeal is successful, courts
may either uphold the award or invalidate it. Nothing more. Finality in courts is only achieved
upon exhausting all options of appeal, a long and arduous process.

24

Bookman, supra note 7, at 1125.
Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 21, at 37; Strong, supra note 6, at 1982; Stephen L. Brodsky, Cross-Border
Arbitration: A Beneficial Alternative to Resolving International Commercial Disputes, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N., (July
3, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/commercial-business/articles/2019/spring2019cross-border-arbitration-international-commercial-disputes/.
26
Carolyn B. Lamm, Eckhard R. Hellback, & Nikolaos Tsolakidis, Int’l Arbitration in a Globalized World, 20 DISP.
RESOL. MAG. 4, 5 (2013-14).
25
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The standard of discoverable information differs as well. While parties in arbitration only
need to produce information they will use for their case, courts require all information that could
be relevant to the proceedings. However, should parties play hard ball in courts, hitting the breaks
on providing relevant information, courts have the full power of a government entity to subpoena
documents, witnesses, and third parties.27 While arbitrators can subpoena participating parties,
witnesses, and documents,28 the power is limited,29 and arbitrators rely on courts to assist with
enforcing the subpoena.30 To circumvent this inconvenience, arbitrators will often imply adverse
inference against the non-producing party, penalizing hold-outs.
Another difference between litigation and arbitration is the judge’s or arbitrator’s duty to
follow substantive law. While the arbitrator may or may not follow the selected governing law of
the contract, deciding in equity if the parties agree to give the arbitrators that power, judges lack
such freedoms.
Finally, and most significantly, litigation and arbitration differ in enforceability as
previously mentioned. The 2019 Hague Judgments Convention seeks to overcome this barrier.

B. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or
Commercial Matters
i.

Intro

The first project considering a “global approach to jurisdiction and judgments recognition”
was introduced by the United States in 1992.31 In 2005, this idea resulted in the Choice of Court
Agreement.32 The Choice of Court Agreement allows contracts with an “exclusive choice of court”
to receive enforcement of their agreement across fellow member states.33 Judgments must be made
on the merits,34 and the agreement must designate at least one specific court to rule on the
contractual disputes “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts.”35 If the contract does
not address the matter, as is frequently the case, the Choice of Court Agreement does not apply.
The Choice of Court Agreement’s progeny, the Hague Judgments Convention, shares the common
goal of cooperation and uniformity across international borders.36
27

See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (assuming proper jurisdiction).
See 9 U.S.C. § 7.
29
See, e.g., CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, 878 F.3d 703 (9th Cir. 2017).
30
See 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
31
Ronald A. Brand, The Circulation of Judgments under the Draft Hague Judgments Convention 4 (Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Pittsburgh Law, Working Paper No. 2019-02, 2019); see generally HCCH, Twenty-Second
Session, supra note 15, at 4.
32
HCCH, Twenty-Second Session, supra note 15, at 4.
33
HCCH, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, art. 8(1), 44 I.L.M. 1294 (concluded June 30, 2005).
[hereinafter Choice of Court Agreements]
34
Id. at art. 4(1).
35
Id. at art. 3(a).
36
See generally HCCH, Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 33. Current economically significant signatory states
to the Choice of Court Agreement include the United States (2009), United Kingdom (2018), Singapore (2015),
Germany (2015), France (2015), China (2017), and the European Union (2009). European member states dominate
the agreement. HCCH, 22nd Diplomatic Session, supra note 1; HCCH, Recognition and Enforcement, supra note 14,
at art. 20.
28
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In 2011, members of the HCCH decided to continue down the path of jurisdictional
uniformity, creating a Working Group that would submit the “proposed draft Text for a Convention
on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters” in 2015.37
Currently, over 85 states are members of the HCCH.38 Members include, inter alia, the United
States, various European states, the European Union, and several states from the Americas, Middle
East, and Asia.39 When the members of the HCCH met for the 22nd Diplomatic Session, over 400
delegates attended the meeting in The Hague.40 After numerous revisions, the Working Group’s
draft was ultimately passed at the 22nd Diplomatic Session in July 2019.41 While the broad goal
of uniformity remains a hallmark of the document, the Hague Judgments Convention also intends
to improve practical effectiveness of court judgments, avoid duplicative proceedings, and reduce
costs and lengths of proceedings while at the same time increasing predictability.42
ii.

The Hague Judgments Convention

There are two ways in which states can become signatories to the Hague Judgments
Convention: Signature or accession.43 Once joined, the Hague Judgments Convention could apply
to the member’s territorial units as well.44 Jurisdictions with multiple territorial units will have to
turn to Articles 23 and 26 to help interpret and apply the Hague Judgments Convention to each
unit.45 Although the United States spearheaded the idea of a uniform method for judicial
recognition across borders in the 1990’s, it has yet to sign on to the Hague Judgments Convention.
As of publication of this article, only two states have signed the document.46
There are numerous sources available for parties to turn to when seeking help with the
articles’ interpretation.47 The Hague Judgments Convention is intended to complement existing
conventions and overrides neither the Choice of Court Convention nor the New York
37

HCCH, Twenty-Second Session, supra note 15, at 4–5; see also HCCH, Recognition and Enforcement, supra note
14.
38
Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, HCCH Members, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/states/hcch-members
(last visited Sep. 11, 2020) (membership count based on Nov. 12, 2019 data).
39
Id.
40
HCCH, 22nd Diplomatic Session, supra note 1.
41
HCCH, Twenty-Second Session, supra note 15, at 1; see also HCCH, It’s done, supra note 13.
42
HCCH, Twenty-Second Session, supra note 15, at para. 8-12; see also HCCH, Recognition and Enforcement, supra
note 14.
43
HCCH, Twenty-Second Session, supra note 15 at para. 431.
44
For example, the Convention would equally bind all U.S. judicial systems, federal and state. Id. at para. 434-37.
45
HCCH, Twenty-Second Session, supra note 15 at para. 434-35 (HCCH, 2019); see also HCCH, Recognition and
Enforcement, supra note 14 art. 23, 26.
46
As of August 2020, only two states have ratified the document. HCCH, Status Table: Convention of 2 July 2019 on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=137 (last visited Sep. 11, 2020).
47
See generally HCCH, Twenty-Second Session, supra note 15, at para. 14-15, 143-44; HCCH, “CIVIL OR
COMMERCIAL MATTERS” / “ACTA IURE IMPERII,” INFORMATION DOCUMENT NO 4 OF JUNE 2016 fOR THE ATTENTION
OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF JUNE 2016 ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 2
(2016); HCCH, Glossary of Commonly Used Terms and References: Document for the attention of the Special
Commission of June 2016 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 3-4 (2016) [hereinafter,
Glossary of Commonly Used Terms and References]; HCCH, SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS FOR INFORMATION
DOCUMENT NO 4: DOCUMENTS FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF JUNE 2016 ON THE RECOGNITION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 3-4 (2016).
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Convention.48 Commercial contract disputes regarding place of performance are specifically
governed by Article 5(1)(g).49
When seeking enforcement of a judgment, the multifaceted aspects of jurisdiction present
a mine field to parties. Firstly, place of performance will be key to recognition of the court of
origin’s judgment when seeking enforcement in the addressed court.50 Place of performance is
determined based on the parties’ agreement or the contract’s governing substantive law. 51 Where
the agreement is silent on place of performance or the selected place of performance is invalid the
“law of the requested State”, the enforcing state’s law,52 will determine applicable law.53 Secondly,
jurisdiction can vary depending on who is filing the claim and what court is being addressed.54
Once jurisdiction is established, additional hurdles to enforcement must be overcome.
Parties must anticipate judicial use of the Hague Judgments Convention’s escape clauses,
including public policy and specific “relations”, which means a specific exception.55 Both options
create broad excuses for non-enforcement. Firstly, judges are ultimately granted broad discretion
under public policy considerations, which include questions of sovereignty and security.56
Although the Hague Judgments Convention expects judges to “interpret strictly,” requiring nonenforcement to “constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal
order of the [s]tate in which enforcement is sought,” no specific guidelines are provided.57 Because
the Hague Judgments Convention offers little other guidance on these points, case law and
jurisdictional practice will have to be established for parties to know how courts will approach the
matter. Fortunately, although the court might refuse enforcement, refusal does not void the court
of origin’s ruling.58 Secondly, specific relations on the state level can lead to unexpected
recognitions because recognition of judgments may be excused for specific signatory states where
the enforcing state decided to rely on reservations in compliance with international laws.59
Overall, even once jurisdiction can be established, the Convention allows broad discretion
for enforcement, and parties are well-advised to thoroughly research public policies and state
relations before committing to a court of origin or court of enforcement.

48

HCCH, Twenty-Second Session, supra note 15, at para. 66, 414, 420.
Id. at para. 129.
50
Id. at para. 189-90.
51
Id. at para. 191-92.
52
HCCH, Glossary of Commonly Used Terms and References, supra note 47, at 3-4.
53
HCCH, Twenty-Second Session, supra note 15, at para. 193, 195 (additional examples available at para. 194).
54
Id. For example, if the vendor files a claim for payment, jurisdiction is where the payment is due. But if the buyer
files for delayed delivery, jurisdiction is proper at the place of delivery. Id. at para. 190.
55
HCCH, Recognition and Enforcement, supra note 15, at art. 7, 17-19, 29(3).
56
See HCCH, Twenty-Second Session, supra note 15, at para. 275, 294.
57
Id. at para. 289. “Manifestly” includes violations of procedural requirements set under a state’s Constitution but
does not include violations of underlying substantive laws. See generally Id. at para. 290-93.
58
HCCH, Recognition and Enforcement, supra note 14, at art. 7.
59
See HCCH, Twenty-Second Session, supra note 16, at para. 447.
49
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C. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
To encourage cross-border trading, sophisticated and influential movers of the world
collaborated to pass the New York Convention on arbitration in June 1958.60 The New York
Convention propelled international dispute resolution into the current century, advancing
international trade to a whole new level.61 Due to the New York Convention’s success and its
reputation established over several years, arbitration awards are being recognized across several
states, resulting in widespread enforcement of awards. The New York Convention’s success is also
partly due to parties’ willingness to comply with arbitral findings.62
The New York Convention applies to “recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards
made in the territory of a state other than the state where the recognition and enforcement of such
awards are sought.”63 Recognition extends to awards rendered by arbitrators and arbitral bodies as
long as the original agreement to arbitrate amongst the parties was in writing.64 States shall
generally enforce awards made in compliance with the New York Convention,65 but may refuse
enforcement for one of six reasons: i) incapacity of a party, ii) insufficient notice, iii) awards
reaching beyond the agreement, iv) the arbitrator or proceeding violating the agreement or
governing law, v) the matter was not arbitrable, or vi) enforcement would violate public policy.66
The day the New York Convention was passed predicted the document’s success. Ten
members signed on-site, including Belgium, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Germany, India, Israel,
Jordan, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and Poland.67 After years of trying to convince the US
government that independent treaties were no longer sufficient for international arbitration, the
ABA finally won.68 The US signed the New York Convention in 1970, preceded by, inter alia,
Russia, and Japan.69 The UK soon followed suit, signing on September 24, 1975.70 Only at this
point did the New York Convention truly take off. The signatories of the early 1970s propelled the
New York Convention’s significance into what it is today, garnering momentum for international

60

See N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, Contracting States, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (last visited Sep.
11, 2020) for a list of states participating in the Convention and their dates of signature, ratification, accession, or
succession.
61
60 Years of the New York Convention: A Triumph of Trans-National Legal Co-Operation, or a Product of its Time
and in Need of Revision?, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (July 27, 2018), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latestthinking/60-years-of-the-new-york-convention-a-triumph-of-trans-national-legal-co-operation.
62
See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP & LOUKAS MISTELLS, QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON,
INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION:
CORPORATE
ATTITUDES
AND
PRACTICES
(2008),
2,
4
https://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/pwc-international-arbitration-2008.pdf.
63
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 art. I(1), 3.
64
Id. at arts. I(2), II(1)-(2).
65
Id. at art. III.
66
Id. at art. V. (the six options are summaries of the articles’ enforcement exceptions and do not reflect the explicit
options available).
67
N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, supra note 60.
68
Bookman, supra note 7, at 1136; HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS, supra note 61.
69
N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, supra note 60 (showing China signed in 1987, Russia in 1958, and Japan in 1961).
70
Id.
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arbitration’s popularity.71 As of the beginning of 2020, over 160 nations had signed on to the New
York Convention.72
Arbitration proceedings continue to increase to date. For example, the International
Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) recorded a staggering 77% increase of arbitration cases between
1992 and 2007.73 The New York Convention’s momentum from the 1970s has carried over into
the 21st century.

D. United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from
Mediation
As one of the newest conventions on the international dispute market, the Singapore
Convention fills the gap where existing conventions do not incorporate various alternative dispute
resolution options and disregard “consistent standards on the cross-border enforcement” of
mediation settlements.74 By passing the Singapore Convention in August 2019, the need for crossborder recognition of mediations was met.75 By the end of 2019, over 50 states had already signed
on, including China, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore.76
Generally, mediation attempts to amicably resolve disputes with a third-party neutral.77 A
mediator seeks to find common ground between the parties, guiding them along a path of
consensus to finding a solution. The Singapore Convention only applies to mediation, and cannot
be used to enforce court rulings or arbitral awards.78 Recognition requires proceedings to result in
a written settlement agreement.79 The Singapore Convention is only applicable in diversity cases
of international commercial disputes.80 Diversity under the Singapore Convention can have two
meanings: i) Either minimal party diversity - at least two parties have their place of business in
another state;81 or ii) performance under the settlement agreement is in another state or the
underlying issue is closely connected to another state.82 The Singapore Convention’s diversity
requirements parallel those of US court diversity jurisdiction requirements. While reciprocal
enforcement is expected amongst fellow signatory states, enforcement can be refused for similar
reasons as listed under the New York Convention.83
71

See Yves Derains, New Trends in the Practical Application of ICC Rules of Arbitration, 3 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS.
39, 39 (1981).
72
N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, supra note 60 (showing the most recently joined state being the Maldives in September
2019).
73
Lucy Greenwood, The Rise, Fall and Rise of International Arbitration: A View from 2030, 77 ARB. 435, 436 (2011).
74
Singapore Convention, supra note 23, at 2.
75
Id. at 1.
76
UniteasjDSD sssUUnited Nation Treaty Collection, United Nation Convention on International Settlement
Agreements Resulting from Mediation, Dec. 20, 2018,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-4&chapter=22&clang=_en.
77
Singapore Convention, supra note 23, at 4.
78
Id. at art. 1.
79
Id. at art. 1, art. 2(2), art. 4(1)(b).
80
Id. at art. 1.
81
Id. at art. 1(a).
82
Id. at art. 1(b).
83
Compare Singapore Convention, supra note 23, at art. 5, with United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 63, art. 5.

213

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:8: Feb. 2021

While the Singapore Convention fills an important gap in the international dispute
resolution arena, it will take a smaller role in this article. Contracts typically consider mediation
as the first line-of-defense. While parties might seek to resolve disputes using mediation and
arbitration or litigation, parties will rarely choose arbitration and litigation as a dispute resolution
option. Hence, mediation’s interplay with either is complementary. Its significance should not be
impacted by the new Hague Judgments Convention.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Tipping Points - A Question of Commercial Significance
i.

Intro

Before US businesses and attorneys can begin transitioning dispute resolution terms from
arbitration to judicial proceedings, the Hague Judgments Convention needs member states. While
attorneys and professionals are eager to jump on the international Hague Judgments Convention
train,84 predicting sunny prospects for international trade agreements is premature, 85 especially
considering that as of publication of this article, only the Ukraine and Uruguay had signed.86
Bearing in mind how many delegates attended the 22nd Diplomatic session in July87 and
the profession’s enthusiasm, it seems enticing and plausible to conclude that quick and numerous
accession by various states is to be expected.88 Additionally, the business and legal benefits of
having a judicial resolution option seem desirable.89 Realistically, however, accession and
acceptance will face numerous hurdles, some higher than others.

ii.

Political Concerns and Biases

While this article focuses on the Hague Judgments Convention’s effects on international
commercial contracts, states are nonetheless making a political decision.90 Hence, political
decisions still impact international commercial relations.91 One consideration is the question of
84

E.g., David P. Stewart, Current Developments, The Hague Conference Adopts a New Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters, 113 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 772, 782 (2019);
Michiel Coenraads & Jorian Hamster, A Gamechanger in International Dispute Resolution: The 2019 Convention on
Enforcement
of
Foreign
Judgments,
DLA
PIPER
(July
8,
2019),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2019/07/the-hague-enforcement-convention/; Robert Price &
Isuru Deveendra, A New Global Regime for Cross-Border Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments, LATHAM
& WATKINS: LATHAM.LONDON (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.latham.london/2019/08/a-new-global-regime-forcross-border-enforcement-of-civil-and-commercial-judgments/.
85
Stewart, supra note 84; HCCH, Status Table: Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 46.
86
HCCH, Status Table: Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
or Commercial Matters, supra note 46.
87
HCCH, It’s done, supra note 13.
88
Stewart, supra note 84.
89
Id. at 782.
90
Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 21, at 24.
91
See E. Norman Veasey, The Conundrum of the Arbitration vs. Litigation Decision, A MERICAN BAR ASS’N (Sept.
19, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2015/12/07_veasey/.
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sovereignty and concerns for recognizing another government’s actions. The answer is invariably
tied to states’ political administration and philosophies.92 Currently, scholars recognize that, across
the board, the U.S. is not quite ready to jump on the bandwagon of general recognition.93
Furthermore, this is reflected in the United States’ foreign policy and the fact that U.S. treaty
ratification is generally slow and cumbersome.94 For example, because every country’s
governmental values differ, U.S. constitutional questions will heavily influence the decision of
signing the Hague Judgments Convention one way or another.95 Because enforcement would apply
to all judicial holdings of member states, signing on to the Hague Judgments Convention removes
a state’s ability to choose whose rulings to recognize. Only if states “notify the depository” that
they will not accept judgments of a new signatory state can enforcement be excused under the new
Hague Judgments Convention.96
Another indication of states’ hesitancy to recognize cross-border court rulings is the Choice
of Court Convention; the Convention has abysmal popularity thus far. Although passed in 2005
with great enthusiasm, as of 2019, only 36 states have signed on to the Choice of Court
Convention.97 In contrast, the New York Convention reached 36 states only four years after being
passed in 1958.98 Even then, it still took several years and major players before international
arbitration took off. As of today, the Choice of Court Convention is an example that indicates
continued governmental concerns and reluctance. Although recently significant players signed on
to the Choice of Court Convention, the effects are yet to be seen.
A second consideration of how states approach the matter is one of political pride and a
concern for the message parties send when choosing courts other than their own.99 Pride has gotten
in the way of lesser things than global cooperation. Arbitration, on the other hand, has little to no
political nuances because the proceedings are fully removed from any governmental decisionmaker.100 However, as elaborated further below, a pattern emerges even in arbitration, and popular

See Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 113 AM. J. of INT’L
L. 131 (2019).
93
Stewart, supra note 84, at 782.
94
Id.
95
See China, People’s Republic of - Government, FOREIGN LAW GUIDE (Marci Hoffman ed.) (discussing China,
France, and UK), http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/10 .1163/2213-2996_flg_COM_323948 (last visited Nov. 16,
2019);
France
Legal
System,
FOREIGN
LAW
GUIDE
(Marci
Hoffman
ed.),
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/10.1163/2213-2996_flg_COM_323135 (last visited Nov. 16, 2019); Iran Legislation
and
the
Judicial
System,
FOREIGN
LAW
GUIDE
(Marci
Hoffman
ed.),
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/10.1163/2213-2996_flg_COM_099302 (last visited Nov. 16, 2019); Queen and
Church
of
England,
ROYAL
INSIGHT,
https://web.archive.org/web/20080307003413/http://www.royalinsight.gov.uk/output/Page4708.asp (last visited
Nov. 16, 2019); United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - Legal System, FOREIGN LAW GUIDE (Marci
Hoffman ed.), http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/10.1163/2213-2996_flg_COM_323001 (last visited Nov. 16,
2019).
96
HCCH, It’s done, supra note 13; HCCH; see also Recognition and Enforcement, supra note 14, art. 29(3); see, e.g.,
HCCH, Twenty-Second Session, supra note 15, at para. 447.
97
HCCH, Status Table: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 12.
98
N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, supra note 60.
99
Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 21, at 24.
100
This will not apply if at least one of the contracting parties is a state or governmental entity.
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fora and governing laws are discernable. Is arbitration already sending a message to the
international community about which seats of arbitration are better than others?101
A third consideration requires a review of how states weigh and value contractual
relationships. While the US gives great deference to contractual agreements, other countries do
not. US parties will be hard-pressed to give up contractual freedoms generously granted by US
courts.102 With this freedom in mind, it is more than reasonable that businesses and the legal
profession will want to participate in the US’ decision of signing on to the Hague Judgments
Convention. Ultimately, whichever lobbying group influences the decision most will be a driving
factor in how the Hague Judgments Convention is not only implemented but used and applied.
A fourth consideration includes cultural considerations at large. Due to “pioneering
scientists, programmers and engineers,” the Internet offers a phenomenal platform for information
exchange.103 With modern technology, our cultural differences seem to disappear as they slowly
melt into one multicultural pot. However, it takes generations to overcome some cultural traditions.
We must ask ourselves every day whether societies are ready to put aside their differences. The
populist rage against globalism is fiercely trying to move away from the melting pot. These popular
movements are everchanging. While during the post-war period states were encouraged to work
together (another reason why the New York Convention garnered strong support and popularity in
the 1970’s), before (during the 1920’s) and again today, strong hostility towards international
cooperation is discouraging even international arbitration. Depending on the state’s government
and populist stance, citizens and domestic politics drive the decision to sign on to the Hague
Judgments Convention. Hence, current views on globalism are another driving factor impacting
state’s decisions on whether or not to sign on to the Hague Judgments Convention.
Internally, with its dual system of government, the US faces a fifth hurdle of
enforceability.104 The Hague Judgments Convention’s goal of uniformity, must apply on both
federal and state level.105 However, US contract law is state law106 and lacks uniformity even
within the US borders.107 Although Delaware is US business law’s central hub, other US states are
not bound to copy its rules. Additionally, international arbitral contracts using US law appear to
prefer New York law instead.108 Political concerns, biases, and pride are high hurdles that must be
overcome. They are also hurdles that are less prevalent in arbitration, only holding back
international litigation.

101

See infra Part III Section B2.
See Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 21, at 24.
103
Evan Andrews, Who Invented the Internet, HISTORY (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.history.com/news/whoinvented-the-internet.
104
Stewart, supra note 84, at 782.
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See HCCH, Recognition and Enforcement, supra note 14, at art. 20, art. 22(3).
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See Stewart, supra note 84, at 782.
107
Id.
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Gilles Cuniberti, The International Market for Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws, 34 NW. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 455, 510 (2014).
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Current Alternatives

Aside from the Hague Judgments Convention, there are two possible alternatives to the
political question. The first alternative is comity; the second alternative is treaties. However, the
first alternative, comity, faces two significant barriers. The first barrier is that reciprocity is
currently unsuccessful because of foreign perceptions of US monetary damages.109 Additional bad
news is that the Supreme Court recognized in Hilton v. Guyot that “the decisions of this court have
clearly recognized that judgments of a foreign state are prima facie evidence only.” 110 While the
progenies of Hilton have indicated a willingness to recognize other judgments under a comity
argument,111 foreign courts’ distaste for exorbitant US damages awards has halted any significant
development of precedent on this theory. Although US courts are willing to consider foreign court
judgments and enforceability of those judgments,112 this does not resolve foreign states’
unwillingness to honor US judgments.113 The second barrier is that reciprocity is unreliable
because it lacks predictability and receives a case-by-case review. Yet predictability is a significant
factor considered when choosing the appropriate dispute resolution form.
The second alternative would be bilateral or multilateral treaties. Although states to the
Hague Judgments Convention can implement reservations of enforcement under Article 29, the
need to monitor signatories only to implement such an exception seems cumbersome. Relying on
bilateral or multilateral treaties instead sounds more efficient. However, currently there are only
few such treaties in place. Lack of treaties further demonstrates the political struggle that states are
experiencing on this matter. The young associate, tasked with finding the Holy Grail of a judgment
recognition treaty, will, despite diligent efforts, be hard pressed to find a treaty in the first place.114
While there are several concerns governments must overcome before signing the Hague Judgments
Convention, the alternatives seem equally unsatisfying.

iv.

Brexit

There is clearly some hesitancy amongst the states when starting to recognize each other’s
court rulings. Perhaps the primary question that should be asked is whether foreign court judgment
recognition could ever work at all? Fortunately, the answer to this question is: Yes. As a trailblazer
in inter-state cooperation, the European Union’s practices shed light on the remote possibility of
cross-border court recognitions and potential success.115 Although initially intended for economic
progression, the EU quickly realized it had to assimilate some of the individual states’
governmental functions, or at least find a way to encourage and effectively facilitate trade. That
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Bureau of Consular Affairs, supra note 3.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 182 (1895).
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See Christina Weston, The Enforcement Loophole: Judgment-Recognition Defenses as a Loophole to Corporate
Accountability for Conduct Abroad, 25 EMORY INT’l L. Rev. 731 (2011).
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Id.
113
Bureau of Consular Affairs, supra note 3.
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See Bureau of Consular Affairs, International Treaties & Agreements, supra note 12.
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Enforcement of Judgments, E-JUSTICE EUROPA, https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_enforcement_of_judgments51-en.do (last visited Sep. 11 2020).
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meant finding a way to deal with international commercial contracts, judgments, and judgment
enforcement. The solution: the Brussels I Regulation.116
The regulation requires EU members to recognize foreign court monetary and specific
performance judgments, with the caveat that procedural requirements must be met.117 Enforcement
itself follows national rules of the enforcing state.118 Hence, the answer to the question whether
enforcement of foreign court judgments is possible can be answered in the affirmative. But is it
probable on a bigger scale?
Looking to current events, the UK threw a huge curve ball into the EU after passing
119
Brexit. As a consequence of the anticipated severance, the UK must determine how to maintain
judicial relevance in the EU market.120 The Brussels I Regulation only applies to EU members,
which, post Brexit, the UK no longer is. Additionally, by exiting the Union, the UK is no longer
part of the Rome I and II Conventions.121 Hence, a new solution must be found. Unfortunately,
common ground has not been found - yet. The EU is recommending the European Court of Justice
as a common venue with common rules.122 The UK disagrees.123 Despite the UK’s lack of
alternatives, the UK brings up a worthy argument when noting that “there is no point in countries
lining up their rules if they cannot agree on what those rules mean.”124 Regardless of how good
the UK’s counterarguments are to the EU’s solutions, it does not look as though the UK has come
up with any other feasible solutions other than successfully boasting about their willingness to
entertain various suggestions.125 To add insult to injury, and despite the UK’s express aversion for
the European Court of Justice,126 the EU has graciously offered to let that very same court rule on
the matter if no common ground can be found.127 As of 2020, ideas continue to diverge, and in the
draft withdrawal agreement Articles 162 - 165 remain opaque.128 The future of these two “‘closest
friend[s] and neighbour[s]’” appears grim.129
Although the EU is, and remains, an incredible feat of multi-cultural and ethical
cooperation, in the big scheme of the universe, European countries are very similar. They share a
common ancestry and even have reasonably similar cultural values and religion. One could go so
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far as to venture that even Americans share this common ideology. But if the European Union, its
continuing members, and the UK cannot find common ground what hope is there for the global
community? International commercial contracts do not merely exist among similar cultures. The
international community is forced to deal with much greater disparities, having to overcome
cultural differences between Western and Asian cultures, Middle Eastern and African parties, as
well as South American nations. The multi-faceted parties partaking on the global scale is
remarkable, and perhaps exactly what appears intimidating to governments. Additionally, Brexit
addresses a more substantive question applicable to international proceedings. English Law, and
the UK as a territory, have been popular options in arbitration agreements. “Hurricane Brexit”130
will have some effect on how parties view their dispute resolution options with enforcement as a
fundamental goal.
Ultimately, how Brexit will solve this predicament can be exceptionally insightful into the
effects on the Hague Judgments Convention by illuminating hurdles faced and introducing
alternatives not yet considered. However, at least today, the question as to whether recognition and
enforcement of foreign court judgments is probable is answered in the negative. Many kinks must
be ironed out on the individual state level, something the Hague Judgments Convention and 22nd
Diplomatic Session could not possibly have done or prepared for on their own. The old saying
“only time will tell” must carry the day.

v.

Quantity and Quality of Signatories

Governments overcoming political concerns and biases will not alone create commercial

significance. Commentators agree that a “significant number” of signatories is necessary.131
However, what is this number? The author of this article postulates that commercial significance
requires either a lot of “fish” (quantity) or specific big “fish” (quality) in the Hague Judgments
Convention “sea.” Both the New York Convention and Choice of Court Convention can offer
insight and shed light on this theory.
Turning to quantity first: by the end of the 1970’s, when the New York Convention’s
impact was truly noticeable for the first time, 61 states had signed onto the New York
Convention.132 Translated into the Hague Judgments Convention: Over 50 states would have to be
convinced that recognizing each other’s court rulings is a great idea. These numbers do not bode
well considering that, for a similar time frame, a period of fourteen years, the Choice of Court
Convention had only achieved about half of those numbers.133 Putting the Choice of Court
Convention’s quantities into perspective: It only took the New York Convention four years to
achieve the same amount of approval the Choice of Court Convention holds today.134
Turning to quality: Both the US and the UK joined the New York Convention in the 1970’s
- the beginning of arbitration’s modern significance. Considering the UK’s arbitral popularity for
seat and governing law today, the UK plays an important role in determining an arbitration
130

Term invented by the author.
HCCH, 22nd Diplomatic Session, supra note 1.
132
N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, supra note 60.
133
HCCH, Status Table: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 12.
134
See N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, supra note 60.
131

219

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.2:8: Feb. 2021

convention’s popularity.135 However, it took the UK over ten years to sign on to each the New
York and the Choice of Court Convention.136 The US is not much better when considering
timeframe.137 At best, key players such as the UK and the US join a convention approximately ten
years later. For the Hague Judgments Convention that means 2029. However, unlike the New York
Convention and Choice of Court Convention, the Hague Judgments Convention faces additional
hurdles. Compared to the New York Convention, which walked away with 10 signatories the day
of being passed,138 the Hague Judgments Convention received only one signature from Uruguay
in July and no additional members since. On the other hand, one signatory is 100% better than the
signatures the Choice of Court Convention received in all of 2005. 139 The Choice of Court
Convention received its first signature in 2007, and only received a significant boost when the EU
signed as the second sovereign in 2009.140 Hence, before it can meet quantity or quality, the Hague
Judgments Convention must survive its two-signatory requirement or else all efforts will be null
and void.141
Summarily, this article predicts that key players will be the turning point for the Hague
Judgments Convention, rather than numerosity. The New York Convention had a great deal of
signatory states from the beginning, yet the decade that saw both the US and the UK join was a
decade in which the New York Convention experienced such a boost that it must be more than
mere coincidence. Perhaps this bodes well for the Hague Judgments Convention and US parties in
particular. From an enforcement and practicality perspective, US and UK law, courts, and
proceedings are more similar to each other than any other judicial systems on the global market.
This is because the US legal system was created with the UK as a backdrop. Additionally, a Choice
of Court Convention’s success would help the new Hague Judgments Convention’s standing as
well.

vi.

In Light of Mediation

Compared to the above conventions, it is quite exciting to see the Singapore Convention
setting a signatory record, currently showcasing over 50 signatories.142 Even the New York
Convention received only a total of 24 new signatures within the same year it was passed.143 The
Singapore Convention’s popularity further demonstrates states’ hesitancy regarding court related
proceedings. The Singapore Convention’s popularity is further reflected in the amount of disparate
member states, spanning from the Americas (Chile, US, Venezuela), to Europe (Georgia, Turkey,
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Ukraine), Africa (Nigeria, Uganda, Uruguay), the Middle East (Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia), and Asia (China, Fiji, India, Singapore).
The nature of mediation leaves all concerns of comity to the wayside, allowing for simple
cross-border cooperation between business parties. Globally recognized mediation awards are
even more preferable to the business owner who seeks amicable resolutions of disputes, preserving
business relations that were so hard fought for in the first place.144 Although widespread
acceptance only requires “effectiveness of the procedure” as well as cost efficiencies, 145 the
Singapore Convention does not resolve the question of accountability where parties are unable to
cooperate.146 Hence, parties will continue to select a binding dispute resolution option to
incorporate a neutral fact finder. However, that means attorneys are back to square one when
weighing litigation versus arbitration.

vii.

Expectations

With these concerns in mind, the Hague Judgments Convention is unlikely to receive
widespread recognition in the near future. To even consider signing onto the Hague Judgments
Convention, states must overcome hurdles that include questions of comity and populist
movements. Even once those stars align, the “fish” in the “sea” must ultimately be significant.
While many little “fish” will play a factor, realistically, the bigger ones truly drive a convention
forward. The reality is that, the longer it takes for global recognition of court rulings to take over,
the more developed arbitral practices become. At some point, the cost-balance of switching from
arbitration to litigation will be outweighed by well-established, veteran arbitral practices.

B. Practical Considerations
i.

Intro

Generally, the question of enforceability of judgments, judicial or arbitral, is becoming
more relevant every day. The number of newly filed arbitrations rises from year to year with
increased party disparity. Obtaining jurisdiction in an arbitration case is reasonably simple and
based in the contract. Obtaining personal and subject matter jurisdiction as well as establishing
proper venue in courts is more difficult. By setting out basic arbitration parameters, parties create
their own jurisdiction. For example, in arbitration, similar to a choice of venue clause, parties can
select a specific arbitral institution to administer proceedings. Globally prominent international
arbitral institutions include the ICC, International Centre for Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”),
London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”), Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre
(“HKIAC”), Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”), and Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce (“SCC”). Generally, institutions are selected for their neutrality. However, finding a
neutral court that also has jurisdiction will prove difficult.
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Establishing personal jurisdiction specifically will also prove difficult, whereas arbitration
does not face such hurdles. International arbitral proceedings are multicultural in nature. The ICC
alone processed over 800 cases in 2018, proceedings representing over 130 different countries.147
Of those proceedings, a majority of cases included US parties.148 Although Western cultures make
up a majority of the parties in the ICC, more and more cases are seeing an increase of parties from
the Middle East, including the United Arab Emirates and Turkey.149 Just as the ICC appears to
primarily attract Western cultures, the LCIA reports comparable cultural representations.150
Similarly, the HKIAC, an Asian based institution, reports that most of its parties come from
Asia.151 While the reasons for institutional party disparity might differ, and parties also select
institutions based on geographic advantages, trading benefits and barriers, or even cultural reasons,
the result is the same across the board: Each institution deals with diverse parties. The melting pot
is colorful. This will undoubtedly translate into any judicial proceeding as well and most likely
will cause some tensions.
Establishing judicial jurisdiction will depend on the court selected and its powers over the
parties, which presently is a fairly inflexible system on the international stage. One reason for the
New York Convention’s success lies in its flexibility to accommodate these variations. Whether
the Hague Judgments Convention can offer the necessary flexibility and ability to accommodate
such multi-cultural proceedings is unlikely.

ii.

The Freedom to Contract

As previously mentioned, parties to contracts have great autonomy when negotiating their
agreements. Because international contracts involve sophisticated participants, the terms of such
agreements, including dispute resolution clauses, are highly negotiated.152 Due to enforceability
concerns of judicial rulings, 97% of international commercial contracts turn to arbitration as their
number one choice for dispute resolution.153
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Parties can choose the seat of arbitration and governing law independently of each other.
When deciding the location of arbitration, parties consider the reputation and legal procedures
available as well as neutrality of the location.154 Over the years, preferences have developed, and
the majority of parties prefer London as their seat of arbitration, closely followed by Paris.155
London is only rivaled by Hong Kong for parties arbitrating through the HKIAC in Asia.156
Assuming the reasons parties choose a seat of arbitration are transferable into the litigation world,
the fact that England is a popular choice bodes well for American parties who will benefit from a
common language and familiar judicial system. This seems to lean in favor of judicial proceedings
under the new Hague Judgments Convention. However, with Brexit alive and well, the UK’s future
remains in the dark.
When deciding governing law, parties must select procedural rules as well as underlying
substantive laws while negotiating their agreements. Procedural rules are only as flexible as the
arbitral institution allows. Each institution has its own, fully developed procedural rules.157
Procedural requirements in courts will similarly vary. Even within the US, procedural rules diverge
across the states and between the various court levels. Hence, it is only to be expected that other
foreign courts will differ also.158 Procedures are greatly influenced by underlying cultural values
and beliefs, and those differences will be reflected in court proceedings.159 The greatest hurdle to
overcome will be finding a court with power over both parties. If the court lacks personal
jurisdiction over one party, proceedings will come to a halt. Furthermore, the need for the court’s
power over parties goes as far as enforcement. Judicial power is territorial and enforcement beyond
those borders would rely on foreign courts to assist - an issue the Hague Judgments Conventions
seeks to remedy.
Substantively, it looks as though English Law is the winner in arbitral proceedings,
followed by Swiss, US, French, and German law.160 The LCIA similarly recorded that a majority
of their cases, over 200, selected English Law as governing law, distantly followed by Cyprus with
only 10 cases.161 English law carries the day even across the institutions and into Asia.162 Again,
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assuming the reasons for selecting governing law in arbitration are translatable into the litigation
world, US parties are fairly likely to be comfortable with the applicable laws in the UK court
system should they choose litigation as their dispute resolution option under the Hague Judgments
Convention.163 Additionally, since the UK judicial system is reasonably well respected across the
board and one of the better known systems of law, application of its substantive rules in other
courts is less likely to be met with disdain.
Because this article focuses on international contracts that have at least one US contracting
party involved, it is worth noting that in the world of US based international arbitration, New York
is the clear winner for both forum and substantive law.164 However, because foreign parties despise
US damages awards, most non-US parties will not want to choose a US court for that reason
alone.165

iii.

Costs of International Dispute Resolution

The traditional benefits of arbitration may no longer justify its choice over litigation. While
arbitration has seen a boom over the last several decades, its traditional hallmarks are slowly
dissipating. Growing amounts in controversy and litigators’ flair for motion practice result in
longer proceedings and greater expenses. Fees differ significantly depending on what arbitral
institution the parties choose but generally range from $1,000 to $200,000.166 Additionally, while
arbitral proceedings, on average, last up to two years,167 recent tendencies for more elaborate
discovery proceedings and fanciful motion practices escalate costs and delay cases by
approximately 40%.168
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Court proceedings’ traditional hallmarks, “slow [and] inefficient,”169 are alive and well.
Curiously, in comparison, court-related costs appear deceivingly lower than the above reported
arbitration expenses.170 However, assuming that New York’s arbitration popularity prevails over
litigation proceedings, New York’s fees ultimately add up to the same, although expenses are
allocated differently.171 The statistics are deceiving as they do not reflect any other filing fees,
expert witness expenses, or court reporter costs. Some of these expenses are present in arbitration,
while others are not, depending on the proceedings and the parties. Due to litigators’ aggressive
motion practice, expenses for court proceedings will rise high and fast. Some businesses can spend
over $200 billion on litigation.172 On the global scale, the US is estimated to be the costliest
litigation forum when compared to Canada, Europe, and Japan. 173 However, within Europe, the
UK appears to be the most expensive litigation forum.174 Expenses will be a driving factor for
businesses in the negotiation process. If, for example, motion practice remains lower in arbitration,
and length of proceedings are shorter, arbitration should carry the day.
Mediation expenses will vary depending on how the parties choose to proceed, but costs
of proceedings are generally lower compared to either litigation or arbitration.175 The primary
reason for lower costs is that mediation experiences significantly shorten resolution periods.176 As
such, from a cost perspective, mediation is generally preferred.

iv.

Dockets

Although the difference in applicable fees is difficult to capture, docket load information
is much more straightforward. Most international arbitral institutions receive under 1,000 new
filings per year.177 Of those filed cases, contractual disputes were either financial, service contracts,
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sale of goods,178 or commercial and corporate agreements.179 The cases submitted to arbitration
are limited in subject matter, especially considering arbitrability. While the number of arbitral
filings has increased, it comes no where near newly filed US civil cases. US federal courts, on the
other hand, recorded over 277,000 civil cases filed in 2018, of which 85,316 (8%) were state law
cases in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.180 New York alone reported over 1 million new
civil cases filed in 2018.181 Of all the cases pending, over 900 civil cases had been pending for at
least three years.182 Thirty-five percent of all civil cases lasted over one year, some even taking
over ten years before a final agreement or judgment was reached.183
Economic efficiencies are a key concern for parties when they consider docket load. A
greater workload means it could take longer for issues to be resolved which, in turn, raises costs.
Judges are assigned cases which they cannot decline. Arbitrators can turn down cases for any
reason and frequently parties will consider an arbitrator’s caseload when selecting their tribunal.
On the other hand, arbitrators generally work alone,184 whereas judges have an entire staff helping
them with research, writing, and administration. Arbitrability is another reason why economic
efficiency favors arbitration. Not everything is arbitrable. However, anything can be litigated
regardless of subject matter or consent. Hence, while parties do not consider the number of cases
a judge or arbitrator is working on per se, they consider the economies of scale in relation to
workload, time, and money.
Additionally, with the freedom to forum shop, parties should keep the realities of each
system in mind. The complexities of international disputes make court proceedings less desirable.
The contractual autonomy will always be limited in the litigation realm, because existing rules and
regulations must be followed, whereas rules and regulations can be created to suit the parties in
arbitration. Even with the Hague Judgments Convention in force, the ability to enforce foreign
court rulings could still be limited depending on how states adopt the Convention.185 Parties might
599 approved draft awards. See also 2018 ICDR CASE DATA INFOGRAPHIC 1 (Int’l Ctr for Dispute Resolution,
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still have to expend substantial efforts and money to have a foreign court judgment enforced in
another country. The New York Convention, however, has made enforcement of arbitral awards
fairly straightforward. Although arbitration is becoming costlier and lengthier, time and effort
spent on arbitration could keep bottom-line expenses lower.

C. Incorporation
i.

Overcoming the Status Quo

Humans are creatures of habit. Due to the current legal opportunities, arbitration is the
frontrunner in international contracts. If parties are supposed to shift from arbitration to litigation,
parties, many of which are businesses, will want to take their own risk tolerance into account,
justifying change. Hence, with transition comes some hurdles.
The first two hurdles are purely political. The first hurdle to overcome is one of current
business practices. To achieve a successful contract, most law firms and in-house counsels have
some form of checklist to reference.186 These checklists help avoid pitfalls and prevent mistakes
whose lessons have already been learned.187 Due to well established checklists, attorneys and
businesspeople may be hesitant to venture into the international contracts’ arena without welldefined and established guidelines. Without industry support, governments have little incentive to
join the Convention. On the other hand, if there is no push from the industry yet governments sign
on to the Hague Judgments Convention sua sponte, those countries could still feel the need to
promote their efforts to the business community, garnering industry support for their decision in
retrospect.
Should a country decide to gather support for their decision to join the Hague Judgments
Convention, the second hurdle would require the government to overcome the business golden
rule: Good friends are hard to come by.188 Because of this rule, mediation has taken on popularity,
and fosters continued relations and amicable solutions. Businesses want to maintain relationships
that they have worked so hard to establish. If an issue can be fixed amicably, why not try?189 While
mediation can be used before turning to more aggressive dispute resolution options such as
arbitration or litigation, arbitration and litigation cannot. These two last forms of dispute resolution
act as alternatives; contracts can choose only one or the other. Choosing between arbitration and
litigation will be driven by questions of expenses, confidentiality, and predictability.
It is unlikely that the US will decide to join the Hague Judgments Convention on its own.
In the US, it is more likely that businesses would have to push for the government to sign on to
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the Hague Judgments Convention, similar to the New York Convention, if the US government is
to be persuaded to sign the Convention.190
Once businesses have determined their risk tolerance, checklists and practices will be
updated to match their findings. At that point, if they transition to litigation, the change will be
immediate. With risk tolerance in mind, transitions from arbitration to litigation are likely to be an
industry related decision. For example, highly complex technical subject matters lend themselves
best to arbitration where the need for decisionmakers with expertise can be met.

ii.

Effects of the Advantages and Disadvantages

After introducing the idea of risk tolerance, it seems only fair to take a look at what that
consideration might entail. Advantages and disadvantages of dispute resolution forms have been
discussed ad infinitum over the years. As addressed in more detail in the article’s introduction
portion,191 these alternatives can be part of a steppingstone toward more aggressive dispute
resolution options192
Factors such as predictability, homogeneity of the law,193 decision makers, subpoena
powers, and docket load all influence the outcome. Furthermore, jurisdictional requirements in the
US are hard to come by when bringing a suit194 and when seeking enforcement.195 Even if
jurisdictional requirements are met, one party is going to be concerned with biases and other
intangible disadvantages.

a. Confidentiality and Privacy
The most significant factor for business parties to consider is confidentiality.196 Privacy
only prevents non-parties from attending the proceedings, whereas confidentiality offers true
protection of the information discussed, and prevents parties from discussing the
proceedings. 197 Arbitration can offer both.198 Courts generally offer neither.199
The concern for confidentiality favors arbitration. Because strategic advantages take on a
heightened role on the international playing field, the protection of vital information takes on a
central role.200 Arbitration’s policy towards confidentiality is much more generous and amicable
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for international business affairs.201 Although there is a jurisdictional split regarding whether
confidentiality is presumed versus requiring an explicit agreement pertaining to confidentiality,
the protection of any information is easily obtained.202 Confidentiality for arbitral proceedings
follows a two-pronged approach: i) The obligation of confidentiality amongst the parties involved
in the arbitration, including third-party witnesses, and ii) confidentiality of the substance of the
current arbitration against future proceedings, including exchanged documents and evidence.203
However, achieving either or both is purely based on party assent and can cover the fact that the
proceedings are happening at all, the content of the proceedings, as well as the award.
The US judiciary, on the other hand, is no fan of confidentiality and will generally require
production and exchange of all relevant information.204 Although parties may seek a protective
order for the information they are producing, they must show they have “in good faith conferred
or attempted to confer” with opposing party to resolve the issue before petitioning the court for
protection.205 The court, in turn, has wide discretion in such rulings, allowing decisions to range
from a seal, partial seal, or any other form the judge deems appropriate or necessary to protect the
information.206 Judges may consider the public’s interest in the information and its relevance to
the public nature of the proceedings.207 This can take on different forms and include review of
historical practices or even the public’s interest in the information.208 In practice, “good cause”
only applies to non-dispositive motions.209 In any other situation, if the information is material to
the substance of the case, protection must overcome a “compelling need” standard. 210 Not only
does this raise the burden to be met by the requesting party, documents previously designated
confidential will lose that status if “introduced at trial or filed in connection with a motion for
summary judgment.”211 For reasons of confidentiality, arbitration will win every time.
Privacy also favors arbitration. Privacy matters because it can protect parties from the
stigma associated with dispute resolutions, shielding business reputation and market value.
Arbitration is inherently and automatically private. That means, unless the parties tell someone
they are in dispute resolution proceedings, only the participants in the arbitration will know. The
inherent public nature of court proceedings makes it impossible for parties to keep their legal issues
on the down-low, hoping the press will not tear them apart. The fact that a legal process is ongoing
cannot be hidden. If the business’ name is in the case heading, even a not-so-diligent reporter will
soon know more. While the institution could neither confirm nor deny the existence of such a case,
201
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the judge’s Judicial Assistant would be much more forthcoming. Privacy leans in favor of
arbitration on the international commercial playing field. Overall, if a party seeks full protection
of their information and brand proliferation, arbitration is the correct choice.

b. Predictability
A strong factor favoring litigation is predictability. While courts can offer predictability of
the law, arbitration takes place in the wild west. Arbitration does not seek predictability in the way
courts do. Because arbitral proceedings are private, tailored to the parties, and determined based
on the parties in the specific dispute, no one arbitral award will be the same. Depending on the
court venue, precedent can offer some amount of certainty to trained legal experts, allowing for
their clients to make proper risk tolerance decisions. However, not being versed in a forum court’s
proceedings and governing laws disadvantages the foreign attorney, forcing businesses to hire
local counsel. This in turn increases costs.
Language is another factor to consider. This issue takes on two forms: i) The ability to
speak the language and ii) the underlying values associated with words and phrases. Firstly, not
being versed in the forum court’s language will disadvantage parties and limit predictability in that
regard. While in parties to an arbitration can select an arbitrator based on language skills, courts
will not be as accommodating since parties cannot select the judge.212 Language barriers are
inevitable. Secondly, while the Hague Judgments Convention seeks uniformity in its application,
this would require that words and situations be interpreted similarly. Yet, culturally, this is
impossible. While capable of speaking each other’s languages, a person’s understanding of the
world around them and how locals use certain words and phrases to express themselves remains
unbridgeable. If something as simple as “walking distance” can mean a mere few blocks to an
American but can mean a 20-minute walk to a European, there is little hope to find common ground
in the legal process, a system built on the delicate balance of words and their meanings. Even
where judges attempt to interpret broadly, as recommended under the Hague Judgments
Convention,213 cultural differences will nonetheless limit interpretation. Furthermore, interpreting
the Hague Judgments Convention itself may affect predictability as the language used does not fit
squarely within the current international framework.214 Because underlying cultural values
influence what meanings words receive, and the same word in one place will have completely
different underlying values in another, global uniformity will be difficult to achieve.
The goal of predictability has several angles to it on the international scale and goes beyond
currently unestablished international litigation precedent. However, it is up to contracting parties
to create the predictability they seek by participating in the process and creating a history that will
ultimately feed into this need for predictability.
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c. Efficiency

When turning to cost-balance considerations, efficiency is the number one factor parties
consider when choosing between dispute resolution options.215 As indicated above, if efficiency
means low costs, then currently, no dispute resolution proceeding truly achieves this goal.216
Because up to 90% of international commercial contracts currently use arbitration clauses, 217 the
expectation of a “speedy, simple, and inexpensive” arbitration are goals of the past.218 High stakes
and procedural requirements in the international arbitration proceedings increase expenses
significantly,219 running tallies up to $1 million.220 Although any dispute resolution runs high -cost
tallies, businesses will nevertheless seek out the cheapest option available. When selecting an
arbitral institution, expenses can range from $1,000221 to $119,000.222 However, as addressed in
more detail in Section B above, arbitral proceedings are shorter223 and fewer.224 US and UK court
dockets see thousands upon thousands of newly filed civil cases every year,225 sometimes
continuing for over ten years.226 Because of the realities of court dockets, parties in litigation
proceedings ultimately turn to settlement agreements within three years.227 Even when compared
to the timeframe from filing to settlement, litigation proceedings are still twice as long as reported
average arbitral proceedings.228
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Efficiencies also consider the length of proceedings impacting the finality of awards.229
Depending on the agreement, parties can agree that the arbitral award is final, binding, and nonappealable.230 Arbitral appeals are possible but must be included in the parties’ agreement.231 The
arbiter will alter his ruling in only a few instances.232 Appeals of arbitral awards to the courts are
rare and judicial review is limited.233 On the other hand, court proceedings are tied to the right of
appeal and will reach finality only when all options for appeal have been exhausted. From a cost
perspective, arbitration should win hands-down.234
Length of proceedings effects costs in another way: Use of intellectual brain power.
Intellectual resources include attorneys, executives, and in-house staff necessary for the
proceedings. The more brain power that is needed, the more intellectual resources are diverted
from day-to-day business procedures. The more resources are diverted from day-to-day business
procedures, the more money flows into dispute resolution proceedings because it is flowing away
from the business’ actual operations. While this ties into the idea of lag time mentioned above,
resource allocation for the actual proceedings will be the same for both arbitration and litigation.
However, arbitration has some options on how to address these expenses. One way to efficiently
use these resources is to negotiate well defined procedural requirements in arbitration
proceedings.235 For example: The use of modern technology to host proceedings such as
videoconferences reduces travel time, which in turn reduces expenses while increasing
efficiencies.236 While US courts are trying to move into the 21st century and incorporate
technology into proceedings,237 these options are limited and still in their test stages, bound by an
ancient system unwilling to change. Another option is for arbitration parties to select an optimal
geographic location for both sides, regardless of jurisdictional requirements. To a certain degree,
this option is also available in court proceedings within the US since courts will recognize selected
venues.238
Efficiencies also include lag time in behavioral changes. It takes time, money, and energy
for staff and paperwork to adjust to a new system. As mentioned above, parties will have
contractual checklists that set the tone for negotiations. The longer a current system is in place, the
more difficult it will be to change. This means that the longer it takes for the Hague Judgments
Convention to reach commercial significance, the longer arbitral proceedings will have been in
229
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place and the longer it will take to transition. Even if transition were to occur today, arbitration
has a long standing tradition considering the New York Convention has already been in place for
over 60 years.
Overall, when considering efficiencies, Western businesses are more likely to continue to
rely on international arbitration proceedings. Although costs appear deceivingly similar, arbitral
proceedings remain more cost-efficient due to finality, flexibilities, and technological advances
. Interestingly, efficiencies are not as important when dealing with Asian parties. According to
statistics, Asian parties value certainty and enforceability over efficiency. 239 While enforceability
is no longer a problem for arbitration, certainty is. Certainty and predictability are a benefit the
Hague Judgments Convention specifically offers.240 In addition, considering that the Chinese
dragon is slowly awakening, making the country and its citizens significant players on the
international commercial playing field, Chinese parties are likely to push for judicial proceedings
that can give them the certainty they seek.
d. Public Policy Considerations

Perhaps a lesser yet relevant factor for choosing arbitration or litigation is the effects of
public policy on the decision-making process. Public policy plays no role in arbitration, except
possibly in denying enforcement of an arbitral award under the New York Convention. However,
at common law, US courts may decline to enforce judgments that violate US public policies.241
Additionally, the Hague Judgments Convention offers various escapes to enforcement under its
Articles.
The first excuse for non-enforcement lies with Article 7(1)(c) which allows courts to deny
enforcement for public policy concerns. But what does that mean? Neither US precedent, the
Hague Judgments Convention’s definitions,242 nor its glossary243 provide insight into how this
might play out. Generally, questions of public policy will have little impact on the commercial law
context. However, such a question can arise where one of the parties is a government entity. For
example, the Chinese government currently owns some of the world’s largest public companies.244
Contracts with the Chinese government are going to increase. Contracts involving foreign
governments bring with them issues of enforceability even in arbitration. In 2018, the D.C. District
Court reviewed factors for non-enforcement of arbitral awards from Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v.
Maiellano Tours, Inc.245 as it denied a request to stay, later recognizing that specific performance
of arbitral awards against a foreign government requires a balance between sovereignty and
contract rules.246 “Given that the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity in its own
239
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courts against specific performance in contract cases,” enforcement against the foreign
government would “defy comprehension” of compliance.247 On the litigation side, China will not
want to subject itself to a US court, and certainly not under the current political climate. In contrast,
a contracting party will not want to end up in Chinese court, presuming bias against it. Arbitration
seems like a fair and safe middle ground in comparison.
To tackle its greater involvement in international commerce, China created a new court in
2018 “[u]nder the backdrop of the deepening development of the Belt and Road Initiative”: The
International Commercial Court.248 The court is intended to process international commercial
cases specifically.249 The venue is now a “one-stop platform for resolving international commercial
disputes.”250 Not knowing the effect of China’s new court, issues of enforcement place arbitration
and litigation on the same footing.
A second “escape” under public policy excuses presents itself in Article 19 of the Hague
Judgments Convention. Article 19 allows courts to refuse enforcement where a state or one of its
agencies is party to the agreement. This appears to be in line with current US policies. After the
Tate Letter251 retracted any and all immunities for foreign states in commercial actions and
Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank252 caused a panicked US Executive Branch to instruct courts
not to enforce judgments against foreign governments within the US, non-enforcement against
foreign governments is likely. Unlike judicial proceedings, arbitration is free of such political
considerations, which once again places arbitration as the winner.
A third concern under public policy addresses the question of due process of law.253 The
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the US Constitution applies to the US and the US alone. Hence,
while comity amongst US States works, it does not in the international arena.254 For example, after
obtaining a default judgment against a US citizen, two Iranian banks sought enforcement of that
judgment in the US.255 However, the Ninth Circuit denied enforcement, reasoning that Iran’s lack
of public trials, politically weighted proceedings, and joint governmental branches violated US
public policies.256 Another instance arose when the D.C. District Court denied enforcement of a
British judgment because the underlying public policies were “repugnant” to Maryland’s public
policy.257 Although decided under a different political climate, these cases remain good law
making it very clear that constitutional violations will receive zero deference by American courts
when considering enforcement of foreign court rulings.258
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As indicated by the D.C. District Court and noted above, a fourth and somewhat smaller
public policy concern in the commercial world is public policy considerations in the constitutional
sense.259 Generally, US courts give “meaning to our constitutional values.”260 Constitutional
values will more likely come into play when considering proper procedures or lack thereof. While
US courts have already decided on some arbitration-related public policy considerations, these
concerns will only be magnified in the judicial proceeding. For example, arbitral awards from
proceedings where arbitrators ruled on a contract removing antitrust violation remedies will
receive no deference from US courts but could theoretically still be arbitrated.261 Where a country’s
statutory rights are implicated, public policy is implicated.
Public policy excuses for non-enforcement do not end here. A fifth excuse includes
“[i]nternational comity abstention and the presumption against extraterritoriality.”262
Extraterritoriality allows courts to presume that statutes apply domestically only.263 By comparing
international comity abstention justifications with forum non-conveniens, Bookman sheds light on
the argument’s malleability and the term’s vagueness. Forum non-conveniens allows courts to
decline jurisdiction where another forum would be better suited. 264 However, the doctrine is not
very well-defined and gives courts the leeway to avoid “uncomfortable” situations.265 Having to
decide whether to enforce a foreign court’s judgment will undoubtedly become uncomfortable.266
Given the lay of the land now, there is no reason why US courts could not expand this doctrine
liberally to foreign court rulings.
Lastly, although both litigation and arbitration might face public policy scrutiny, complete
disregard of public policy in court proceedings can actually result in court holdings being
overturned. Disregard of public policy in arbitration will have no such effect on the award. In
conclusion, while public policy remains a grey area of enforcement for arbitral awards to-date, it
will receive greater deference in cases fully litigated. Hence, from a public policy point of view,
arbitration is preferable.

e. Additional Factors
In addition to expenses, time, resources, confidentiality, and public policy concerns, parties
need to consider various other factors. First, parties should consider the underlying subject matter’s
complexity and uniqueness. While a judge is a trained legal professional, skilled in dispute
resolution, he or she and the jury (if applicable) may not understand the subject matter well enough
to make an educated decision. Although this should not be a showstopper, as it is up to the attorneys
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to educate their audience, parties that are able to select the arbitrator can avoid the effects of bad
lawyering.
Second, although universally prohibited, judicial biases are real and can disadvantage one
party over the other. The realistic concern about bias is not about impartiality but about
neutrality.267 While a judge will certainly seek to overcome cultural biases and language barriers,
everyone grows up around certain legal concepts, has a specific approach to legal problems,268 and
develops a culturally specific mindset—generally known as “unconscious biases.”269 The crux of
these biases is that they occur in the decision maker’s subconscious, influencing rulings on a deeply
fundamental level of which even the decision maker is unaware.270 To add insult to injury, scholars
have found that decisions are frequently made intuitively, giving these unconscious biases full
reign over delicate situations.271 In Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank,272 by upholding the district
court’s “judicial notice” of historic facts and background, the Second Circuit demonstrates the
social issues that will be part and parcel to any court proceedings.273 In its opinion, the district
court dedicates an entire section to “Liberia’s government, its recent civil war, and its judiciary.”274
The case demonstrates not only US court biases, but also foreign court influences. One way to
balance such bias is by selecting a neutral venue, a court that does not advantage one party over
the other due to cultural differences. However, this will most likely result in courts lacking
jurisdiction. The concern of unconscious biases will equally apply to arbitrators. Unlike court
proceedings, parties to arbitration have the flexibility to designate a specific arbitrator,
incorporating the risk of bias in their decision-making process.
Third, parties will want to consider the powers available to the fact finder and decision
maker. Arbitrators are limited in their subpoena powers and rely on local courts to enforce
unanswered requests, while courts have the government’s full enforcement powers and do not need
to rely on another entity to punish.275 However, the courts’ powers are territorial and will not reach
evidence or witnesses beyond their borders. This limitation strips away any advantage gained if
relevant evidence is spread out across the world, rather than focused in one location.
For the above reasons, enforceability of foreign court rulings will remain unpredictable—
at least at the beginning of the Hague Judgments Convention’s life. Even if enough states join,
parties must conduct a thorough cost and risk analysis before abandoning their current system.
These analyses will most likely turn in favor of arbitration. However, as businesses transition from
arbitration to litigation and begin resolving disputes through the judiciary, the transition is likely
to occur along industry lines.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Hague Judgments Convention is no panacea to the enforcement of foreign court
judgments. Existing concerns will remain across the board. Considering how long it took for the
Hague Judgments Convention to finally be passed, and the lack of immediate enthusiasm in
comparison to other similar conventions intertwined with political concerns demonstrate widespread doubt. Even if enough states signed onto the Hague Judgments Convention, a certain
amount of lag time and educational gap regarding the Hague Judgments Convention will further
delay any commercial relevance the Hague Judgments Convention might have. At that point,
arbitration will have been the primary choice of dispute resolution for international commercial
contracts for many decades. Unlike domestic contractual disputes, litigation of international
contractual disputes will have to experience a new set of precedents that incorporates the
international nature of the relationship. Arbitration would offer a better-oiled machine than its new
alternative.
However, while it is difficult to change the current status quo, once change takes place, it
will change quickly. Businesses will not keep one foot in arbitration and dip their toes into
litigation. Businesses and industries will choose one or the other. Relevant to that transition will
be key considerations such as expenses and biases.
While the future of international litigation remains in limbo, international mediation’s fate
bodes well. Its non-binding and voluntary nature protects business relations and has little to no
drawbacks and encourages cross-border relations.
In conclusion, although a noble solution on its face, the Hague Judgments Convention
brings with it many headaches. It is in humanity’s nature to reach for the stars even if to land on
the moon. As of today, the Hague Judgments Convention will not take the world by storm. In the
foreseeable future, it looks as though international commercial contracts are stuck with current
options, expanded only by the force of the Singapore Mediation Convention.

